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haveblue posted:still can't believe anyone seriously thinks "it's pointless and dumb" would stop a bitcoiner from doing a thing the kind of bitcoiner who does that sort of thing would be too incompetent to pull it off. qed
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 02:57 |
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# ? Jun 9, 2024 09:22 |
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not replying to anyone, just posting into the void, but if someone wanted to set up something to test some bitcoin related nonsense they could quite easily use a personal testnet with a difficulty of 1 (like there's seriously self contained roll your own bitcoin testnet packages out there already, it's basically no effort) and test whatever they hell they wanted with a NES or something. you don't have to do all your testing on the actual network. with an ASIC you'd have a block like every nanosecond, probably.
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 03:16 |
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And when you post long at the void, the void also posts at you
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 03:26 |
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please don't try to fill the void in your life with posting. go to youth group this sunday instead
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 03:40 |
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Boxturret posted:is vorhees a bitcoin jesus i forget Friday The 13th, Voorhees is Bitcoin Voorhees
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 04:13 |
realpost Jason was always my favorite slasher
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 04:20 |
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it makes sense, for anyone who doesn't understand it GHASH has enough power to get most blocks themselves they don't want to appear to have 50% of the network miners get returns based on how much they're contributing to the network, not how many solutions they find (which is basically the whole point of pools) if ghash is participating in pool X, they will get plenty of payout whether or not they, personally, find solutions solutions they find in Pool X are shared between themselves and anyone else participating in the pool solutions they find in their own pool are only split among themselves THEREFORE, a found solution in their own pool is worth more to GHASH than a solution found in another pool so, when they find a hash, they can simply discard it, and there is a high probability they will find a hash for the next block in their own pool, which is worth more to them
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 04:44 |
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or they can simply run a second pool or set of pools and thus not waste any of the power they're paying for
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 04:48 |
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is it dead yet? is bitcoin dead?
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 04:50 |
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Nintendo Kid posted:or they can simply run a second pool or set of pools and thus not waste any of the power they're paying for
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 04:54 |
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theflyingorc posted:they would be found out almost immediately, because they will owe payouts to people who bought mining power, and they would either have to give reduced payouts(because they must payout to more people than their hashing power of the main pool is earning) to hide it or give payouts when these "bonus" pools hit winning numbers, instantly revealing that those pools are, in fact, run by GHASH they would be found out almost immediately if they were doing fake hashing efforts for other pools too.
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 04:56 |
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I think we are all just going to have to agree that even if a 51% attack will occur it's going to take time to mature. In the meantime diversify your comedy futures by focusing on the Silk Road firesale which is going to happen for sure
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 05:02 |
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theflyingorc posted:so, when they find a hash, they can simply discard it, and there is a high probability they will find a hash for the next block in their own pool, which is worth more to them also: suppressing hashes found for other pools would help a dishonest operator to more reliably carry out 51% type attacks attacks are not a binary switch that flips on soon as you hit fiddy percent, an attacker can always be hosed over in their attempts to control the chain by honest nodes mining a few blocks in a row. insert you are self into honest mining pools and you get a chance to suppress blocks you don't want broadcast to the network
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 05:05 |
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i think the reality is that if ghash.io is malicious, it'll probably be subtle and in ways that bitcoiners can rationalize away if they're caught, meaning we won't see something big and stupid like freezing the wallets for the silkroad coins. even if they aren't malicious, though, this is a big loss for bitcoin philosophically. bitcoin's main reason for being is to have decentralization and policy that was barely possible to change, which is hard when the mining is shared between many miners. and they pay dearly for that decentralization through extreme electricity usage as anonymous proof of some kind is needed to reach meaningful concensus, and proof of work was what satoshi choose. that's why the network effectively pays miners $43 for each transaction they send (those fees are paid through inflation, though, so bitcoin transactions only require 5-10 cents to send. sustainable). of course, with 51% of the mining in one place, that's not the case anymore. it's not in ghash.io's self interest to mess up the network, but it's also not in the federal reserve's interest to destroy the economy. bitcoiners are effectively using fiat that's issued from several pools, with one pool powerful enough to invalidate all the other blocks if they so choose. essentially, bitcoiners are no longer using a trustless network that would follow the same rules and behaviors regardless of any select group's actions. they are trusting ghash, and frankly, i find it hard to believe that ghash is less likely to pull a stunt to debase a currency than the federal reserve. TVarmy fucked around with this message at 05:15 on Jun 14, 2014 |
# ? Jun 14, 2014 05:12 |
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say the network is giving out 1 bitcoin a day and say there's only you and some other guy mining, and you have 1 hash power each. if you both mine normally, you'll each get 0.5 bitcoins a day but let's say you instead take 5 percent of your hashing power and use it to fakemine for the other guy, so you get a part of his reward, but don't contribute to the real hashing power now you will only generate 0.95 / (1.95) ≈ 0.487 bitcoins yourself but the other guy will generate 1 / (1.95) ≈ 0.513 of which you get (0.05 / 1.05) * 0.513 ≈ 0.024 0.487 + 0.0244 = 0.511 i think once you have a large amount of the hashing power, it may be better to leech off other pools than to mine for real and increase the mining difficulty is my math wrong here?
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 05:21 |
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TVarmy posted:i think the reality is that if ghash.io is malicious, it'll probably be subtle and in ways that bitcoiners can rationalize away if they're caught, meaning we won't see something big and stupid like freezing the wallets for the silkroad coins. even if they aren't malicious, though, this is a big loss for bitcoin philosophically. Thing is even if Ghash did something drastic like embargo the seized butts, most buttheads would support it because it benefits them. At least not enough people would speak out against it to do anything to change the new status quo
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 05:24 |
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hi did u kno coinbase is giving out free coins just follow this referral link
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 05:28 |
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suffix posted:is my math wrong here? The math is not wrong, but some of the assumptions might not be correct. There are more than 2 mining pools, so you can't leech everyone else. But yeah, even if you have negligible hash power, you'd increase your profits by leeching other mining pools, but only if you direct less than 50% of your hash power to leeching. Magrov fucked around with this message at 05:40 on Jun 14, 2014 |
# ? Jun 14, 2014 05:38 |
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americong posted:hi did u kno coinbase is giving out free coins just follow this referral link i cliked so hard i broke my mouse and stil no free bitcoins :-(
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 05:40 |
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api call girl posted:realpost Jason was always my favorite slasher Michael Myers in Halloween 1 and 2 was great not so much past there
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 06:09 |
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theflyingorc posted:so, when they find a hash, they can simply discard it, and there is a high probability they will find a hash for the next block in their own pool, which is worth more to them thus increasing the number of blocks ghash is finding thus increasing the % of blocks found by ghash thus making the miners they don't control (ie, everything that's not cex.io) more likely to bail the closer they get to 51% I'm still voting for "some of the unknown 20% is probably cex.io" instead of this weird roundabout way of doing what amounts to "increasing ghash.io's hash %"
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 06:12 |
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InShaneee posted:thread getting fishmech'd pretty hard right now
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 06:27 |
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I can't make titles out of this poo poo, people
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 06:34 |
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rotor posted:I can't make titles out of this poo poo, people quoth the bitcoiner i have to deal with irl on a biweekly basis: "currently seeking venture capital for the world's first-ever cpu on an asic"
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 06:48 |
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rotor posted:I can't make titles out of this poo poo, people
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 07:11 |
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Linguica posted:sufficient familiarity with Latex to create the look & feel
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 07:19 |
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heres a title 4 uuncurable mlady posted:come back ...!
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 07:19 |
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suffix posted:is my math wrong here? as far as I can tell, no in fact, if I did the algebra right, the optimal fakemining ratio is always 50%, regardless of what fraction of the total hashing power you have, assuming that your fakeminer gets you a share of all the other rewards if you have 1%, and you fakemine with half of it, you get (.005/.995)+(.99/.995)(.005/.995) = 1.0025% if you have 98%, and you fakemine with half of it, you get (.49/.51)+(.02/.51)(.49/.51) = 99.8462% at 50%, you can get 55.5...% by fakemining with half not being able to get a share of all other rewards may change this, although it would also mean you'd capture proportionately more of the pools you were fakemining in, so...
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 07:22 |
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Fakemining is also a way to convert hashing power to bitcoins without increasing the network difficulty, as it doesn't increase the number of blocks mined, so it might make sense for a part of huge hardware farm.
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 09:15 |
TVarmy posted:i think the reality is that if ghash.io is malicious, it'll probably be subtle and in ways that bitcoiners can rationalize away if they're caught, meaning we won't see something big and stupid like freezing the wallets for the silkroad coins. even if they aren't malicious, though, this is a big loss for bitcoin philosophically. But how is this good for bitcoin?
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 09:19 |
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rotor posted:I can't make titles out of this poo poo, people itt we believe random bitcoiner claims (not fishmech though)
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 09:20 |
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betalarmannen posted:Fakemining is also a way to convert hashing power to bitcoins without increasing the network difficulty, as it doesn't increase the number of blocks mined, so it might make sense for a part of huge hardware farm. this is actually a pretty fascinating point, and it's a little too late right now for me to try and work through the implications but i'm pretty sure it means that a large pool like ghash would make optimal returns over the short to medium term by sabotaging other pools (if they were to fake mine with a substantial portion of the other pools total output they would tank payout rates, proportionally to the hashing power they contribute compared to the rest of the pool), effectively taking money from a competitor (twice, if their customers wind up moving to ghash) while also not-contributing to raising difficulty.
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 09:29 |
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Just fakemining to tank the other pool's payouts is a viable business tactic to get people to shift. Suppose your pool is at 45% of the overall hashpower, while some other pool is at 10%. By taking 1/10th of your own hashpower, and "fakemining" on that other pool, you can siphon off 1/3rd of their payouts without giving them any extra income. you only give up 5% of your gross revenue, but everyone mining on the target pool gets much lower payouts, making switching to your own pool way more attractive. it's basically the walmart strategy of selling at a loss to drive your competitors out of business (which is basically what ghash was already doing by running a mining pool with no fees), except even more libertarian free market.
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 09:48 |
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Segmentation Fault posted:But how is this good for bitcoin? free market. anyone who doesn't like ghash being the fedoral reserve can just start their own mining pool and out hash them. just try that with your fiat and see how many jails you end up in. cogito ergo bitcoin is still better qed TO DA MOON
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 11:50 |
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bitcoin - anonymous currencyquote:
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 12:47 |
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Greyhawk posted:bitcoin - anonymous currency its in the wiki! god!!!!
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 12:53 |
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im expecting quality laffs
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 12:53 |
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Gavin posted:Blog literally saying ghash.io isn't a problem because they probably won't gently caress everyone and if they did everyone would probably figure out something jesus gently caress coiners are stupid e: THIS IS BITCOIN'S "CHIEF SCIENTIST", not some random kid Same Great Paste fucked around with this message at 12:59 on Jun 14, 2014 |
# ? Jun 14, 2014 12:56 |
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I'm Selfish Mining At Ghash.IO (self.Bitcoin) submitted 15 hours ago by ghashthrow Hello, I control somewhere between 50 TH/s and 2 PH/s(can't be too specific for security reasons) of hashing power. Today, I have been pointing some of this at Ghash.IO, and selfish mining to hinder their profits. I withhold blocks I find, and do not send them. I encourage others to do the same(towards Ghash.IO), to destroy this pool that is deliberately trying to harm Bitcoin. Thanks.
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 13:15 |
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# ? Jun 9, 2024 09:22 |
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Same Great Paste posted:e: THIS IS BITCOIN'S "CHIEF SCIENTIST", not some random kid dont worry m'am im chief scientist at bitcoin
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# ? Jun 14, 2014 13:28 |