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fart simpson
Jul 2, 2005

DEATH TO AMERICA
:xickos:

Rabelais D posted:

I'm an expat so I cant talk with too much authority about local opinions. Some of the elderly were no doubt influenced by the media who made it their duty to give everyone a daily update of how many people were suffering side effects (or dying) after vaccination. The headlines would frequently read "Another dies after getting jabbed" or "Man's face paralyzed after vaccine mishap". Elderly people with pre-existing conditions (i.e. most of them) were told to seek medical advice before vaccination and early on a lot of that advice seems to have been "maybe don't get it".

A lot of my younger local HK colleagues seem sceptical of the vaccines and I'm not sure why. Pro-Beijingers seem to prefer Sinovac, of course, and there is a general belief that side effects are worse with Pfizer.

one of my friends in hong kong is so strongly anti-sinovac that when i got sinopharm in mainland china, he called me stupid and said "sinopharm is the same as sinovac, which doesn't work at all. you're an idiot for getting it" doesn't seem like a healthy attitude to me!

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Ghost Leviathan
Mar 2, 2017
Probation
Can't post for 12 hours!
If China wanted to make an example of Hong Kong as the Goofus to the mainland's Gallant then I dunno how better they could have done than just sitting back and letting them do things the way they have.

Kavros
May 18, 2011

sleep sleep sleep
fly fly post post
sleep sleep sleep

Rabelais D posted:

The authorities don't even seem to have grasped the severity of measures required to control the virus - which is their stated aim.

Then it's over already, and it's a full breakout by next week, sounds like. The next part of this misadventure is finding out how many of the elderly have been effectively doomed by misinformation and vaccine FUD.

Smeef
Aug 15, 2003

I posted my food for USPOL Thanksgiving!



Pillbug

Discendo Vox posted:

Can you speak to vaccination beliefs in HK? How are the vaccines generally perceived? Was the PRC vaccine nationalism effort a factor?

It's bad but different from the US and Europe, from what I've seen of all the above. I think I've written about it in this thread before. Part of the population is skeptical of anything from the central government, and so was skeptical of Sinovac and the mainland-manufactured BioNTech (even though I believe only some was manufactured there). Another part is skeptical of non-Chinese vaccines, including a lot of weird old race theory about how Chinese immune systems are different. Vaccine nationalism and regular old sensationalist tabloid reporting also seem to play a role. I also think the Covid Zero policies have sometimes created unintended disincentives to get vaccinated — "Why get a vaccine if we will never have Covid here?"

Ghost Leviathan posted:

If China wanted to make an example of Hong Kong as the Goofus to the mainland's Gallant then I dunno how better they could have done than just sitting back and letting them do things the way they have.

HK hasn't done that badly, and there has been a lot of cooperation between the central government and HKSAR from the start. As recently as late November a delegation from the National Health Commission did a tour of HK and declared that HK has been consistently following the strategy set by the central government, that there were a few improvements to be made in data sharing, and that plans to reopen the border could proceed.

A big flaming stink
Apr 26, 2010
yeah, to add to what smeef said, while it's tempting to imagine that the mainland gave hong kong just enough rope to hang themselves with, i think it would still be in the cpc's interests to not have a huge outbreak on the border of the country.

Smeef
Aug 15, 2003

I posted my food for USPOL Thanksgiving!



Pillbug

A big flaming stink posted:

yeah, to add to what smeef said, while it's tempting to imagine that the mainland gave hong kong just enough rope to hang themselves with, i think it would still be in the cpc's interests to not have a huge outbreak on the border of the country.

I would go further and say it's not just seen as 'on the border.' Regardless of anyone's normative positions on independence, etc., HK is part of China (it is HKSAR after all) and plays a unique and valuable gateway role, especially for the Chinese economic and political elite, both in HK and mainland. While I'm sure there are some psychotic hardliners who want to teach HKers a lesson or whatever, it is far more in the CCP and central government's interests to continuing pursing constructive cooperation between HK and the mainland. Providing medical expertise and resources is an easy way to do that and will do more to win support than will power plays.

I think that the outcome in HK with this outbreak will also influence the mainland's Covid strategy. If HK suppresses the outbreak with more modest measures, that may give mainland authorities more confidence in doing the same. Or if cases run rampant but health outcomes are tolerable, the healthcare system is resilient, and the population remains supportive of the government, then it will alleviate concerns about the destabilizing effects of Covid. Conversely, if it's chaos, then expect a much longer path to mainland relaxing policies.

ronya
Nov 8, 2010

I'm the normal one.

You hate ridden fucks will regret your words when you eventually grow up.

Peace.
the title made me boggle the analysis is more reasoned and less hot-takey:

https://twitter.com/i_montaigneEN/status/1492076810716205057

quote:

There are more margins for government action and support to the economy
than generally recognized. But the prevailing policy is to use these margins
very selectively
and only as they become necessary to prevent a contraction of the
economy. There was always a contrast between central cautiousness at the center
and what passes as profligate spending or borrowing by local governments. In fact,
this is often a consequence of tasks pushed down at the local government level. In
previous phases, the central government has made up the gap, and/or allowed local
governments to find new sources of revenue.

Nevertheless, this time is different. After two decades of de facto decentralization
following the recentralisation of 1995, the center has called the game of local
governments with budget cuts followed by credit cuts and finally a hands-off attitude
in the first phase of a real estate crisis that it seems to have initiated. In this
phase, Xi Jinping appears to be a fiscal and financial hawk, and his government
seems preoccupied with the moral hazard implicit in coming to the rescue of local
governments. In a second phase, it is beginning to release some support, but this
will also imply a centralized control of resources. The pain at local levels is much
more intense than in 1995 because there has been no quid pro quo between
central and local authorities until the end of 2021.


Relief is now on the way, but on the central government – and Xi Jinping’s – terms
and in a limited fashion. It is not only an issue of the perpetual struggle for control
between central and local levels in China. It is also a function of Xi Jinping’s ove-
rall philosophy: minimize the risks from a dependence on the outside world
that more central indebtedness would bring, stay ready for the possibility of
a major geopolitical or geoeconomic crisis on the world stage.
Other policies,
such as the accent on food security, go in the same direction. Simultaneously,
the state is to keep its focus on critical transformations, such as technological
upgrading, energy transition, digital governance, and connectivity.

I quoted an interesting paper previously on the politics of the 1995 centralization reform. To reiterate the broad strokes of how China centralized fiscal control: in 1994, increasing the center's nominal share whilst allowing the localities the autonomy to tacitly run up massive hidden liabilities; in 2014, not successfully forcing budget balance yet but mainly forcing localities to to formally bring their liabilities to market, and now in 2021 finally letting market pressure - rather than government pressure as such - bring those risks to heel. Theoretically, anyway. The trickle of news seems to a reversion to too-big-to-fail provincial-level backstops.

The wisdom of preserving a large 'fiscal buffer' in order to respond to crises is perhaps overly informed by 2008 (good fundamentals are, after all, what made Asia circa 1996 so confident that they could not possibly be subject to a financial crisis a la 1980s Latin America. Well, they weren't, but they were subject to a different kind of crisis anyway: one which good fundamentals and fiscal space did not protect them from).

Herstory Begins Now
Aug 5, 2003
SOME REALLY TEDIOUS DUMB SHIT THAT SUCKS ASS TO READ ->>

A big flaming stink posted:

yeah, to add to what smeef said, while it's tempting to imagine that the mainland gave hong kong just enough rope to hang themselves with, i think it would still be in the cpc's interests to not have a huge outbreak on the border of the country.

Yeah there is zero way it is in anyone not insane's interests to have a massive covid outbreak running rampant in hong kong. Zero covid very quickly doesn't work if you have a huge source of cases just burning away within your borders.

therobit
Aug 19, 2008

I've been tryin' to speak with you for a long time

Smeef posted:

I would go further and say it's not just seen as 'on the border.' Regardless of anyone's normative positions on independence, etc., HK is part of China (it is HKSAR after all) and plays a unique and valuable gateway role, especially for the Chinese economic and political elite, both in HK and mainland. While I'm sure there are some psychotic hardliners who want to teach HKers a lesson or whatever, it is far more in the CCP and central government's interests to continuing pursing constructive cooperation between HK and the mainland. Providing medical expertise and resources is an easy way to do that and will do more to win support than will power plays.

I think that the outcome in HK with this outbreak will also influence the mainland's Covid strategy. If HK suppresses the outbreak with more modest measures, that may give mainland authorities more confidence in doing the same. Or if cases run rampant but health outcomes are tolerable, the healthcare system is resilient, and the population remains supportive of the government, then it will alleviate concerns about the destabilizing effects of Covid. Conversely, if it's chaos, then expect a much longer path to mainland relaxing policies.

ronya posted:

the title made me boggle the analysis is more reasoned and less hot-takey:

https://twitter.com/i_montaigneEN/status/1492076810716205057

I quoted an interesting paper previously on the politics of the 1995 centralization reform. To reiterate the broad strokes of how China centralized fiscal control: in 1994, increasing the center's nominal share whilst allowing the localities the autonomy to tacitly run up massive hidden liabilities; in 2014, not successfully forcing budget balance yet but mainly forcing localities to to formally bring their liabilities to market, and now in 2021 finally letting market pressure - rather than government pressure as such - bring those risks to heel. Theoretically, anyway. The trickle of news seems to a reversion to too-big-to-fail provincial-level backstops.

The wisdom of preserving a large 'fiscal buffer' in order to respond to crises is perhaps overly informed by 2008 (good fundamentals are, after all, what made Asia circa 1996 so confident that they could not possibly be subject to a financial crisis a la 1980s Latin America. Well, they weren't, but they were subject to a different kind of crisis anyway: one which good fundamentals and fiscal space did not protect them from).

Credit where credit is due, both of these are very good informative and or thought provoking posts.

Shrimp or Shrimps
Feb 14, 2012


HK is at 80%+ for 1st shot at the moment which is honestly higher than I would have guessed it would be a year ago.

https://www.covidvaccine.gov.hk/en/
https://www.covidvaccine.gov.hk/en/dashboard

Smeef
Aug 15, 2003

I posted my food for USPOL Thanksgiving!



Pillbug

Shrimp or Shrimps posted:

HK is at 80%+ for 1st shot at the moment which is honestly higher than I would have guessed it would be a year ago.

https://www.covidvaccine.gov.hk/en/
https://www.covidvaccine.gov.hk/en/dashboard

For sure better than a year ago, but here's what worries me (using data from the links you posted):
  • 255k people over the age of 80 (2/3 of those 80+) are completely unvaccinated!
  • 43% of the unvaccinated are aged 60+. That's 675k people.
  • Sinovac is far more popular among the elderly. There is a very strong direct relationship between age group and choice of Sinovac or Biontech. Nearly 3x as many of those 80+ who have been vaccinated used Sinovac. I suspect it is because of Sinovac arriving to HK earlier, when the elderly were prioritized, as well as media fearmongering about BioNTech as a non-Chinese vaccine. While any vaccine is better than none, the evidence on Sinovac is more limited and the results less impressive than for BioNTech.

Kavros
May 18, 2011

sleep sleep sleep
fly fly post post
sleep sleep sleep
I'm inclined to believe that it's mostly about sinovac being the first available rollout, which would highly preference the elderly as first recipients but I would be fascinated to find out if vaccine factionalism played a hand, because that's definitely existed as a feature of the global pandemic. I guess compare the sinovac rates vs. other similarly preferenced early vaccine groups.

therobit
Aug 19, 2008

I've been tryin' to speak with you for a long time
Serious question, is Sinovac effective?

Herstory Begins Now
Aug 5, 2003
SOME REALLY TEDIOUS DUMB SHIT THAT SUCKS ASS TO READ ->>
yeah

Alchenar
Apr 9, 2008

Maybe a tad less effective than Astrazeneca but not in the sense that would meaningfully impact your ability to reach herd immunity if you get good enough uptake.

Fritz the Horse
Dec 26, 2019

... of course!
iirc the Sinovac/Sinopharm inactivated vaccines got a lot of bad publicity when they were found to not have great protection from infection at a similar time the mRNA vaccines offered pretty good sterilizing immunity. So the Chinese gov't did a mea culpa. Then it turned out the sterilizing immunity from two shots of mRNA waned pretty quickly and welp, Sinopharm/Sinovac aren't garbage after all, they still provided protection against severe disease.

I have absolutely no idea how good Sinovac/Sinopharm vaccines are against Delta and Omicron. I'm guessing pretty poor at preventing infection and decent to quite good at preventing serious illness.

tbh Western news media seems to have largely forgotten about the Chinese vaccines, I'd certainly be interested to hear updates on them.

Rabelais D
Dec 11, 2012

ts'u nnu k'u k'o t'khye:
A demon doth defecate at thy door
Sinovac had about 51% efficacy at preventing symptomatic covid before the variants came along. Astrazeneca's figure was 60 something percent.

Now we have Omicron, and three doses of Sinovac cannot give enough antibodies to read a "protective threshold" (see below article link) against the disease, although they do prevent serious infection in a lot of cases which is the most important thing. In fact the amount of antibodies you get from Sinovac seems to be quite pitifully low. HK scientists told people who had two shots of Sinovac to get a Pfizer booster because that actually put them over the protective threshold.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-23/three-sinovac-doses-fail-to-protect-against-omicron-study-shows

Sinovac is still a good vaccine. It just isn't as good as a lot of the others that are widely available.

A big flaming stink
Apr 26, 2010
Caveat to the "widely available" part; the last time I checked sinovac/pharm were entire magnitudes more obtainable for people in the global South compared to mRNA stuff due to some combo of developed nations hoarding Pfizer/moderna and the prc aggressively exporting sino

Cabal Ties
Feb 28, 2004
Yam Slacker
https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/sinovac-vaccine-efficacy-drops-28-three-five-months-%97-report

30% efficacy after 6 months for sinovac. There were numerous reports about this. I feel bad for anyone fed this vaccine as it’s clearly the runt of the vaccine litter when it comes to efficacy.

America Inc.
Nov 22, 2013

I plan to live forever, of course, but barring that I'd settle for a couple thousand years. Even 500 would be pretty nice.
I bet in 10 years Taiwan is invaded and annexed by China. Taiwan is not a NATO ally and the US isn't gonna start WW3 to save them, just like Ukraine.

E: on revision I'll say that Taiwan isn't the same kind of situation as Ukraine. There are no boots on the ground in Ukraine and Taiwan and the US have a different historical relationship.

America Inc. fucked around with this message at 23:15 on Feb 12, 2022

A big flaming stink
Apr 26, 2010

quarantinethepast posted:

I bet in 10 years Taiwan is invaded and annexed by China. Taiwan is not a NATO ally and the US isn't gonna start WW3 to save them, just like Ukraine.

E: on revision I'll say that Taiwan isn't the same kind of situation as Ukraine. There are no boots on the ground in Ukraine and Taiwan and the US have a different historical relationship.

why invade taiwan when the prc can flex its soft power to bring Taiwan's political factions under its influence?

Smeef
Aug 15, 2003

I posted my food for USPOL Thanksgiving!



Pillbug
Apropos vaccination rates and the elderly in HK, SCMP just published this story. I tried not to copy the entire thing, but there are a lot of interesting points here. I feel like the government has given tons of priority to the elderly, but clearly some elderly don't feel that way. The dependence on a smartphone app seems like an obvious barrier.

https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong...pgtype=homepage

quote:

Coronavirus Hong Kong: alone, afraid and distrustful of government, many elderly residents shun vaccines, despite the price paid

While younger Hongkongers have largely embraced the inoculation drive, the majority of residents aged 80 and above are resisting
Living alone with little outside contact, some worry what will happen if they develop complications, while others say they have no clear guidance from their doctors

Hongkonger Sit Pui-yu, 72, is staunchly against taking a Covid-19 vaccine, even if his refusal means he will no longer be able to dine out or shop for food in wet markets.

Sit, who is single and lives alone in a public housing flat in Wong Tai Sin, said his decision was due to his lack of confidence in the government.

“The government has never truly taken consideration of the elderly in every single measure and policy it has carried out since the start of the pandemic,” he said.

Sit pointed to the mandatory use of the official “Leave Home Safe” Covid-19 risk-exposure app in restaurants and said he was only able to use the programme after receiving a donated smartphone and being taught how to use it. He was also bothered by a new vaccine pass scheme, which will bar the unvaccinated from entering most public premises from February 24.

“I have lost trust in the government, so I have no confidence in its vaccination programme,” he said.

Sit is not alone. Despite repeated urgent appeals by authorities and medical experts for the elderly to take a vaccine amid a record surge in infections, many elderly Hongkongers are resisting due to their concerns about the safety of the shots or lack of trust in the government, as well as opposition by concerned family members.

:words:

Ivan Lin Wai-kiu, a community organiser with the Society for Community Organisation (SoCO), said about half of the impoverished elderly he worked with had been vaccinated, while the rest still harboured doubts about the safety of the jabs or suffered from medical conditions that made them unfit for the shots.

Lin pointed out that some elderly with chronic conditions had to wait months for an appointment with a specialist at a public hospital to confirm whether they were suitable to receive a shot, while others were frustrated when even their own doctors were unable to give them a definitive answer on whether they should go ahead.

One 72-year-old resident, who did not want to be identified, said she finally decided to get a jab last month but was turned away by the staff members giving the doses because she had skipped taking aspirin for her heart disease for a while.

She said they asked her to go back and consult her doctor, who had never given her a clear answer about whether she was fit for vaccination, and her next hospital visit was not until next month.

Unvaccinated, she was so worried about catching the virus she dared not leave her public housing flat unless absolutely necessary and now faced the possibility of being unable to enter wet markets or supermarkets once use of the vaccine pass became widespread.

:words:

Meanwhile, care homes for the elderly have also stepped up vaccination drives for residents, after more than 20 facilities reported infections during the fifth wave.

Kenneth Chan Chi-yuk, chairman of the Elderly Services Association of Hong Kong, said that since the end of last month, care homes had been inviting government medical teams, as well as private doctors, to evaluate the medical condition of residents and vaccinate them if they were deemed suitable without the need of consent from their families.

The tighter social-distancing rules and the worsening wave of infections has pushed up the vaccination rate among care home residents from 20 to 30 per cent to about 50 per cent. But some continued to hold out, including residents who had been discouraged by family members concerned about the health of their loved ones or who were opposed in principle to the official vaccination programme.

:words:

The limited capacity of outreach teams going into the homes meant some residents were forced to wait until March or even April to get a shot. Chan urged authorities and private groups to step up the vaccination drive.

Sze Lai-shan, SoCO’s deputy director, also pointed to the so-called invisible elderly, or older residents who were isolated and poorly informed. The Social Welfare Department and elderly health centres should check on these residents through home visits or phone calls and follow up after they were vaccinated to provide assistance if they developed side effects or complications, Lai said.

“Some are hesitant because they fear they will be left helpless if anything goes wrong,” she said.

GoutPatrol
Oct 17, 2009

*Stupid Babby*

A big flaming stink posted:

why invade taiwan when the prc can flex its soft power to bring Taiwan's political factions under its influence?

Considering the past 8 years, they have been doing a real lovely job of that.

I have seen in the past 10 years of living in Taiwan that support for China/popular support for reunification gets less every year. During the Ma/Hu era, things were going pretty well economically and a large part of it was due to greater economic connections to China itself. And many people were moving to China because it was seen that you could get a higher paying job over there. Ever since the first HK protests, popular support of China, especially with the young, has been in the toilet. The DPP appears to be consolidating themselves in power. The KMT itself is losing support in the North, with more people supporting parties that are similar in policy but don't have the "stink" of the white terror era on them.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_People%27s_Party (no matter what that wiki article says, Ko's party is taking more support from the pan-blue than pan-green imo.)

In the past year China has been flexing its soft power to piss off most Taiwanese people, for example, agricultural bans:

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56353963 - pineapples

quote:

“Taiwanese pineapples are stronger than fighter jets. Geopolitical pressures cannot squeeze their deliciousness,” declared Taiwan’s Vice President Lai Ching-te, in a tweet.

According to Taiwan’s Council of Agriculture, the island produces 420,000 tonnes of pineapple annually, and exported a little over 10% of that last year, with almost all of it going to China.

Without mainland sales, Taiwanese growers face a possible glut of pineapples, and with it a danger that prices might fall.

President Tsai Ing-wen launched a “pineapple challenge” on social media, aimed at getting Taiwanese consumers to buy more of the fruit.

Japan and other SE Asian nations picked up the slack, along with greater domestic consumption.

Same thing with custard apples last fall: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=17_ezoNN44I

GoutPatrol fucked around with this message at 06:31 on Feb 13, 2022

A big flaming stink
Apr 26, 2010

GoutPatrol posted:

Considering the past 8 years, they have been doing a real lovely job of that.

I have seen in the past 10 years of living in Taiwan that support for China/popular support for reunification gets less every year. During the Ma/Hu era, things were going pretty well economically and a large part of it was due to greater economic connections to China itself. And many people were moving to China because it was seen that you could get a higher paying job over there. Ever since the first HK protests, popular support of China, especially with the young, has been in the toilet. The DPP appears to be consolidating themselves in power. The KMT itself is losing support in the North, with more people supporting parties that are similar in policy but don't have the "stink" of the white terror era on them.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_People%27s_Party (no matter what that wiki article says, Ko's party is taking more support from the pan-blue than pan-green imo.)

In the past year China has been flexing its soft power to piss off most Taiwanese people, for example, agricultural bans:

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56353963 - pineapples

Japan and other SE Asian nations picked up the slack, along with greater domestic consumption.

Same thing with custard apples last fall: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=17_ezoNN44I

to be clear, i dont mean engendering popular support, i mean making opposition to the PRC's goals geopolitically and economically untenable

Ghost Leviathan
Mar 2, 2017
Probation
Can't post for 12 hours!
I mean the whole 'reunification' thing in Taiwan terms, is that still the idea that somehow the entirety of China will fall under the authority of the government in exile on a small island? Which had always struck me as laughably delusional even as a child.

ronya
Nov 8, 2010

I'm the normal one.

You hate ridden fucks will regret your words when you eventually grow up.

Peace.

Ghost Leviathan posted:

I mean the whole 'reunification' thing in Taiwan terms, is that still the idea that somehow the entirety of China will fall under the authority of the government in exile on a small island? Which had always struck me as laughably delusional even as a child.

No; the broadly 1990s-flavoured hope for KMT-flavoured unificationists is in some form of political transition in the mainland that would create a political entity acceptable for negotiations for merger (of the two political entities, equal in status, that constitute One China*).

* as opposed to one legitimate political entity and an illegitimate communist rebellion pre-1991

Given the relative sizes of their economies and the propensity of apparently invulnerable communist regimes to dissolve suddenly in the early 1990s, this arguably wasn't an unrealistic hope.

Since the Taiwanese transition to democracy itself, the KMT is prepared to countenance periods where it doesn't rule Taiwan itself, never mind the mainland. "Well you probably wouldn't rule the resulting merged entity either" is no longer felt to be an existential threat. And that's how all imagined communities work, don't they?

ronya fucked around with this message at 05:44 on Feb 14, 2022

Smeef
Aug 15, 2003

I posted my food for USPOL Thanksgiving!



Pillbug

Ghost Leviathan posted:

I mean the whole 'reunification' thing in Taiwan terms, is that still the idea that somehow the entirety of China will fall under the authority of the government in exile on a small island? Which had always struck me as laughably delusional even as a child.

That's just part of Taiwan's political 'myth', and I don't mean that in a pejorative way — all countries have them. I don't take what the political elite (of any country) say at face value, nor do I expect people (elite or non-elite) to behave rationally in their politics.

I personally think the likelihood of PRC invading Taiwan is quite low, but still too high for comfort. I think it would take a series of bad outcomes to end up there and would not be part of some long-term PRC plan. A major economic downturn in PRC, a legitimacy crisis for the Party, saber-rattling and brinksmanship the likes of which we haven't yet seen in order to rally support, and then multiple accidents that escalate the situation.

The status quo is just too beneficial both to PRC and Taiwan. Not just in the 'economic ties' sense, but in a deeper political sense, too. Hell, the status quo is just too beneficial to the whole region/world.

If unification happens, I would bet on it happening over a much longer period and heavily dependent on PRC advancing to a state where it offers a much more compelling alternative vision of life to the Taiwanese people, who are far wealthier while also having less inequality, are more socially progressive, and are accustomed to open public opposition and inclusion in politics.

The Russia-Ukraine situation actually makes me more confident that it won't happen. Xi is not Putin, and despite some gestures to the contrary, does not seem to really like or admire him at all. Evidently no one even met him at the airport when he arrived to the Olympics, which would explain why Putin also fell asleep in the opening ceremony (i.e., some sort of petty shot back). I think Xi likes to be seen on the international stage as a respectable statesman, as playing by the rules, as a steady, predictable hand — not as some smirking bully and troll. PRC is not Russia, either, and despite immense power concentrated in Xi's hands, I expect (admittedly not knowing much about Russia) that he (or whoever is leader) would face much more opposition from internal factions and systems. And East Asia is not Europe. Again, I know little about Ukraine, but what I do know suggests it wouldn't be one's top prospective bedfellow in ordinary times, at least not mine. Korea and Japan (maybe even some others in the region) would be much less likely to appease and far more capable of making it costly for an aggressor.

ronya
Nov 8, 2010

I'm the normal one.

You hate ridden fucks will regret your words when you eventually grow up.

Peace.

ronya posted:

on that topic, a panel I found interesting, on China's Gen Z: https://www.readingthechinadream.com/xu-jilin-houlang-and-houlang-culture.html

no resemblance to Western discourse on boomers/millennials/gen z, I'm sure...

The Chaoyang blog recently covered the topic of 后浪 (gen z), 正能量 (can-do spirit), etc.: https://chaoyang.substack.com/p/chive-pocket-camp

In particular, an observation on pop culture I've seen remarked also elsewhere:

quote:

To use contemporary art as a slightly abstracted example, most major Chinese artists are pushing 50. While there are a handful of artists in their early 40s that have just about reached the same status, below that there’s a gap—an artist in their mid-30s might still be considered “up and coming” even though their predecessors were participating in major international shows at the same age. The “secret sauce” that made established stars—participation in quasi-dissident activities in the 90s and a more open attitude towards China in the West leading to cosigns from foreign tastemakers with a knock-effect at home; enough time having passed for these dalliances to not be a liability now; and strong relationships with major art academies in China—seems hard to replicate in this day and age.

> While people today are growing up in a time of unprecedented prosperity, the ladder that leads to the heights of that prosperity seems to have been kicked out of the way.

Perhaps this explains in part the obsession with 风口 (fengkou) which Yi-Ling explored in an earlier Rewilding: it takes a freak accident of the zeitgeist to bust out of the status quo.

Countries only get to build their big "thirty glorious years" consensus institutions once. After that, sweeping change is hard.

ronya fucked around with this message at 08:55 on Feb 15, 2022

ronya
Nov 8, 2010

I'm the normal one.

You hate ridden fucks will regret your words when you eventually grow up.

Peace.
https://twitter.com/henrysgao/status/1493793855623155712

Direct link: http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0215/c64094-32352701.html

not unfamiliar to the tort-happy West, perhaps, but "守法、遇事找法、解决问题靠法" seems to be the emphasis: to inculcate a culture where one abides by the the law, finds the relevant law when there are incidents, and relies on legislation to establish answers to lawfulness questions

(that being presumably the neoliberal part of the neoliberal-neoauthoritarian compact making itself felt - it predates the nationalist-exceptionalist gloss that - IMO anyway - doesn't seem to actually mean anything in particular)

ronya fucked around with this message at 07:23 on Feb 16, 2022

Horatius Bonar
Sep 8, 2011

Rule of law, without an independent judiciary, I don't know how that works. At all times rule of law is a sliding scale but that is one of the things that you need to get to the other side. And I don't see any moves towards that in this vision of a socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics.

And is 推动我国法域外适用的法律体系建设 (Promote the construction of a legal system applicable outside the jurisdiction of our country) uh.. what it sounds like? Ignoring erroneous Western ideas like the peace of Westphalia? Or is that a bad translation, and it's about something normal like extradition treaties or working with established international law?

ronya
Nov 8, 2010

I'm the normal one.

You hate ridden fucks will regret your words when you eventually grow up.

Peace.
"Rule of law" 法治 has an implication in English-language jurisprudence theory of being opposed to "rule by law", which is not present in Chinese.

That said - it's not purely a translation artefact; see e.g. rule of law jurisprudence in Singapore, which is a studiously English-language Westminster system, and nonetheless has an enduring academic debate on what "rule of law" covers. Here, have the Singapore Minister of Law give an exegesis on the concept in English:

quote:

https://law1.nus.edu.sg/sjls/articles/SJLS-Dec-12-357.pdf

At the same time, the precepts of the law, and of the Rule of Law, must be applied
with hard-nosed practicality. There is no use having beautiful laws, embodying the
noblest ideals, only to do something else in practice. Elegant constitutions can be
easily had, and are not hard to find. What matters is how the laws apply in practice.
The truest test of the success of the law, of the Rule of Law, lies in the benefits it
produces for society and individuals.

Mr Lee Kuan Yew makes the point lucidly in one of his early speeches. This is
a favourite passage of mine. It gives a sharp perspective by the leader of a then-
developing country, to the ideals on the Rule of Law espoused by those steeped in
the traditions of the French and American Revolutions. Let me quote:

quote:

There is a gulf between the principles of the rule of law, distilled to its quintessence
in the background of peaceful 19th century England, and its actual practice in con-
temporary Britain. The gulf is even wider between the principle and its practical
application in the hard realities of the social and economic conditions of Malaya.
You will have to bridge the gulf between the ideal principle and its practice in
our given sociological and economic milieu. For if the forms are not adapted and
principles not adjusted to meet our own circumstances but blindly applied, it may
be to our undoing.
...
The rule of law talks of... the right of association and expression, of assembly, of
peaceful demonstration, concepts which first stemmed from the French Revolu-
tion and were later refined in Victorian England. But nowhere in the world today
are these rights allowed to practise without limitations, for blindly applied these
ideals can work towards the undoing of organised society. For the acid test of any
legal system is not the greatness or the grandeur of its ideal concepts, but whether
in fact it is able to produce order and justice in the relationships between man and
man and between man and the State. To maintain this order with the best degree
of tolerance and humanity is a problem, which has faced us acutely in the last
few years as our own Malayans took over the key positions of the Legislature, the
Executive and the Judiciary.
...
Justice and fair play according to pre-determined rules of law can be achieved
within our situation if there is integrity of purpose and an intelligent search for
forms which will work and which will meet the needs of our society. Reality is
relatively more fixed than form. So if we allow form to become fixed because
reality cannot be so easily varied, then calamity must... befall us.

Too often, developing countries did not take into account the actual state of their
societies and attempted to import laws wholesale. The results have not always been
good.

Let me also quote from a paper from Professor Larry Diamond from Stanford.
It throws a sharp focus the problems faced by many developing states with poor
governance:

quote:

Consider the archetypical badly governed country. Corruption is endemic
throughout the system of government at every level. Everywhere, development
promise is sapped by corruption. Public infrastructure decays or is never built
because the resources from the relevant ministries are diverted to private ends.
Decisions on public expenditures are tilted toward unproductive investments—
sophisticated weapons, white-elephant construction projects—that can deliver
large kickbacks to the civilian officials and military officers who award them...
[C]linics are not stocked and staffed, roads are not paved and repaired because the
funds for these essential dimensions of development are squandered and stolen.
Businesses cannot get licenses to operate and small producers cannot get titles
to their land because it would take half a year and a small fortune to navigate
through the shoals of a bloated, corrupt state bureaucracy. State bureaucracies
remain littered with pointless and debilitating regulations, each one of them an
opportunity for corrupt officials to collect rents.
...
In a context of rotten governance, individuals seek governmental positions in order
to collect rents and accumulate personal wealth—to convert public resources into
private goods. There is no commitment to the public good and no confidence in the
future... Thus, there is no respect for law, and no rule of law... Lacking a sense of
public purpose, discipline, and esprit de corps, the civil service, police, customs,
and other public institutions function poorly and corruptly. Salaries are meager
because the country is poor, taxes are not collected, corruption is expected, and
government payrolls are bloated with the ranks of political clients and fictitious
workers. Corruption is rife at the bottom of the governance system because that is
the climate that is set at the top, and because government workers cannot live on the
salaries they are paid. In fact, institutions in such a society are a façade. The police
do not enforce the law. Judges do not decide the law. Customs officials do not
inspect the goods. Manufacturers do not produce, bankers do not invest, borrow-
ers do not repay, and contracts do not get enforced. Any actor with discretionary
power is a rent-seeker. Every transaction is twisted to immediate advantage.

Look around the world today. How many countries which profess to the highest
ideals of democracy, of the Rule of Law, fit that description? I suspect a rather large
number.

From the start we were determined to avoid such an outcome, where the forms of
the Rule of Law were observed but the ultimate goal of advancing the general welfare
was sacrificed. The Rule of Law must deliver good governance. It should provide a
framework and architecture that actively improves the life of Singaporeans. To this
end, we have not followed some of the conventional thinking on what the Rule of
Law requires and how it should be applied. We have suffered considerable criticism
for this, but I think our approach is ultimately a defensible one.

You'll notice some stock similarities - Western conceits, Western hypocrisy, "rule of law" must be adapted to supposedly exceptional local and temporal conditions, priority is delivering good material results, the highest realisation of "the rule of law" means reification of statutory process on the ground. Somewhere Wang Huning's ear itches.

re: 推动我国法域外适用的法律体系建设, no, that's more like advocating for Chinese participation in the formation of international frameworks/agreements

Horatius Bonar
Sep 8, 2011

ronya posted:

re: 推动我国法域外适用的法律体系建设, no, that's more like advocating for Chinese participation in the formation of international frameworks/agreements

Thanks for that, I like to go to Chinese sources directly because there's so much that never gets published in English, but trying to make sense of a policy paper with my vocabulary lol, a struggle. "I don't think this is an accurate translation but I have no idea what's wrong with it."

There's a lot of mention of building rule of law, which makes me wonder what the term is for the current unnamed or untranslatable status that rule of law must be built from? Something between rule of man (人治) and rule of law (法治). But I'm getting the idea I'm down a pointless path as the terms seem to be dependent on context, or vague enough to encompass anything. And while rule by law and rule of law is still a worthwhile distinction, it just doesn't translate in a useful way. Still feel like reading this document is like reading about someone building a beautiful addition on a house without mentioning the house. And the house was built on a vacant lot just a few decades ago.

CommieGIR
Aug 22, 2006

The blue glow is a feature, not a bug


Pillbug
The return of Legalism?

ronya
Nov 8, 2010

I'm the normal one.

You hate ridden fucks will regret your words when you eventually grow up.

Peace.

Horatius Bonar posted:

Thanks for that, I like to go to Chinese sources directly because there's so much that never gets published in English, but trying to make sense of a policy paper with my vocabulary lol, a struggle. "I don't think this is an accurate translation but I have no idea what's wrong with it."

There's a lot of mention of building rule of law, which makes me wonder what the term is for the current unnamed or untranslatable status that rule of law must be built from? Something between rule of man (人治) and rule of law (法治). But I'm getting the idea I'm down a pointless path as the terms seem to be dependent on context, or vague enough to encompass anything. And while rule by law and rule of law is still a worthwhile distinction, it just doesn't translate in a useful way. Still feel like reading this document is like reading about someone building a beautiful addition on a house without mentioning the house. And the house was built on a vacant lot just a few decades ago.

Apropos: https://brill.com/view/journals/cjgg/5/2/article-p153_4.xml?language=en

Xu, Lu (2019) The Changing Perspectives of Chinese Law:Socialist Rule of Law, Emerging Case Law and the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese Journal of Global Governance, 5 (2). pp. 153-175. ISSN 2352-5193

Fun and games with homophones:

quote:

In the absence of a widely understandable expression in Chinese, some have tried to translate “rule by law” as equivalent to “以法治国 yǐ fa zhi guo” (govern the nation by law). There are a number of reasons why this would be rather unhelpful in explaining the concept to the Chinese audience. The phrase was first used by Legalist politicians and philosophers such as Guan Zhong (725–645 BC) and Han Fei (279–233 BC), but hardly found its way into the common parlance for the next two thousand years. This largely forgotten historic phrase may struggle to fit into a role of explaining contemporary thinking with all the Legalistic baggage attached to it. At the same time, “yǐ fa zhi guo” is a close homophone to “依法治国 yī fa zhi guo” (govern the country according to law), which is the core value enshrined in the Constitution, discussed below. The possible confusion inherent in such subtle differences would hardly help to clarify the already complex subject matter. Furthermore, the phrase, being unused in the past, has never carried any approbative or pejorative sense to it, unlike the “rule by law” label in English with its dedicated use in criticism. So any criticism that “China is doing yǐ fa zhi guo!” would still leave the Chinese audience bewildered as before.

...

Nevertheless, there have been attempts of even worse translation, by equating the notion of “法制 fa zhi” (legal system) to “rule by law”. This fa zhi (legal system) is a complete homophone to “法治 fa zhi” (rule of law) and the existence of two different fa zhi is certainly an easy cause for confusion for non-Chinese speakers in this area. For example, when Keith observed in 1994 that “during the Chinese legal reform of the 1980s, Western commentary … routinely presumed that any Chinese reference to ‘fazhi’ connoted ‘rule by law’ as opposed to ‘rule of law’”, it is unclear which fa zhi the author was referring to. Leaving aside the confusion of identical pronunciation, fa zhi (legal system) in Chinese is still a neutral, if not modestly approbative, term without any derogatory connotation. Chinese legal scholars routinely write about not just the fa zhi (legal system) of China but the fa zhi (legal system) of other countries. For example, there is no indication that when writing about the fa zhi (legal system) of the United Kingdom, any Chinese author was in fact commenting on the rule-by-law status of the country.

All that said - as before, my sense is that reasoning too hard from supposedly uniquely Chinese cultural aspects belies the observation of commonalities embraced in a great deal of 20th century socialist thinking on state-building

CommieGIR posted:

The return of Legalism?

This analogy seems fashionable but I'm averse to it; it's like invoking Plato in an essay on some contemporary subject. It relies more on the politics of contemporary scholars of Plato/Legalism - the 'baggage', as Xu suggests - and at that point, why not pick a contemporary scholar of something more salient instead. It's not like one is starved for schools of Marxist or liberal thought.

ronya fucked around with this message at 04:39 on Feb 17, 2022

ronya
Nov 8, 2010

I'm the normal one.

You hate ridden fucks will regret your words when you eventually grow up.

Peace.
A thoughtful essay by a leftie pro-China blogger (that I substantively disagree with):

quote:

https://lateralthinkingtechnology.wordpress.com/2021/12/08/seeing-red-on-chinese-nostalgia-and-two-visions-of-history/

A thought experiment – if the Party (hypothetical for the purposes of intellectual discussion incoming) were to disappear tomorrow, the liberal wet dream achieved, elections being held and say the Socialist Party and the China Party, or whatever, starting to compete, what would happen to the vastness of the seventy year legacy of the People’s Republic? Would it simply dissolve, with all That Bad Stuff condemned? Or would it continue to cast an enormous shadow over whatever came after it, democratic or otherwise? We can look at post-Soviet Russia, where “Post-Soviet” is the only thing that really defines it, for a suggestion of the answer. In the chaos of the Maoist period itself it might have been possible to imagine a Party fallen and a fictional Chinese history resumed. By now whatever happens politically in the future (and I believe, anyway, it will still largely be the Party) the imprint of communist government is much larger, and its legacy is marked not only by the very bad things that might have overshadowed everything at certain points but by a lot of good as well, and by the cloud of nostalgia and the buttress of mythology. The idea of clinging, like Chiang Kai-shek, to the possibility of going and retaking the mainland from the communist bandits – as time piles up it’s becoming ever more absurd.

And yet many outside of the mainland, whether diaspora Chinese themselves or foreign observers, very much refuse to accept this. Especially with foreigners all discussions over the new Chinese nationalism and the continued broad but vague popular support for the Party focus on one of two things. The first is the crude economic-prosperity-for-political-control argument, in which literally no one anywhere feels anything for the government except hatred or begrudging acceptance. The other is that, where the emotive pull of the past seven decades is acknowledged, the focus is solely on out-of-touch old cadres or young, feisty “little pink” internet trolls. Chinese attitudes to the government that are not negative are framed solely as either mercenary or the intensely political habits of ancient communist fossils and of angry young people and no one else.

...

So we find that in the time in history when it is probably the best to actually live in China, warts and all, it is also the time of sharpest antagonism between people living there and people not living there. Because of high politics and American decline and Taiwanese post-colonial confusion and Xi Jinping and the Chinese Dream and all that malarky, sure – also because of the simple and blasphemous idea that in a space celebrating nostalgia for China as it was before, alongside kung fu and Confucian officials in flowing robes and badass Three Kingdoms soldiers and moon gates and mountain temples, and neon signs and sexy girls in qipao and Nationalist soldiers and triad gangsters with dragon tattoos, there could also be a space for Red Army soldiers and Maoist slogans and other communist symbols. Chinese history, in the whole sense of ‘China’ as a people and not only the PRC, will eventually have to accommodate this, to accept that things have moved on from the shared perspective of a desperate man fleeing Guangzhou by homemade boat to get to Hong Kong or a bitter Nationalist officer coming to settle in Taipei – or indeed a State Department official heading off to Japan as the communists take Beijing, cursing himself for ‘losing China’. Chinese outside of that lost motherland will have to accept that the Reds, whatever their political future, have won in at least one very major sense, and have carved themselves into that semi-fictional five thousand year history. They will ultimately have to accept some of communist mythology and nostalgia and the red culture that spawned it as legitimate – or else wherever China goes in the future will leave them out in the cold. That’s the stark truth of the girl in the hanfu in the Maoist factory ruins.

the obvious counterpoint (to me, anyway) is the drift even amidst the Chinese revolutionary mythos itself - e.g. the Maoist sloganeer displacing the May Fourth intellectual as the prototypical big-character-poster-waver, or for that matter the same Maoist sloganeer displacing later party governance in claiming the place of the archetypical communist in cultural memory - that governance with all the good stuff intended for Ostalgie with Chinese characteristics.

interesting, nonetheless

A big flaming stink
Apr 26, 2010
That blogpost is extremely interesting. I have to admit that passage you quoted, the counterfactual, was one of the less persuasive parts of it. To presuppose the sudden disappearance of the CPC requires us to consider how exactly that would occur to draw any meaningful conclusions. That said, the author makes excellent points about the degree to which red culture and red nostalgia has become an utterly normalized part of the cultural fabric of the people in China. I think he's bang on about his criticisms of the idea that the party's rule represents an aberration or a blight on the continuity of the 5,000 years of history of China, that it is a downright farce at this point.

Red China has become an inexorable part of the people's cultural memory, and it would take a profoundly traumatizing event to simply excise those 70 years of memories.

A big flaming stink fucked around with this message at 00:59 on Feb 19, 2022

Smeef
Aug 15, 2003

I posted my food for USPOL Thanksgiving!



Pillbug
Eh, the post strikes me as one giant strawman. I don't think I've ever noticed anyone even unconsciously suggest the beliefs that he's arguing against.

How are u
May 19, 2005

by Azathoth
I'd never encountered the idea that the post-revolution Chinese government is some sort of, like, stain on Chinese history. That strikes me as a little hyperbolic. It's not even like the CCP is a departure from pre-revolution China. It's a capitalist society run by a blend of oligarchy and autocracy. That seems pretty much the same as things were before Mao came along.

Silver2195
Apr 4, 2012

Smeef posted:

Eh, the post strikes me as one giant strawman. I don't think I've ever noticed anyone even unconsciously suggest the beliefs that he's arguing against.

I think you do see a version of it from anti-CCP Chinese nationalists like the people behind Shen Yun. You also see a less angry version of it as an orientalist cliché from non-Chinese sci-fi writers and the like (I'm thinking of Neal Stephenson's The Diamond Age in particular). In the latter version, even the "neon signs and sexy girls in qipao and Nationalist soldiers and triad gangsters with dragon tattoos" are seen as somehow "fake"; it's the "kung fu and Confucian officials in flowing robes and badass Three Kingdoms soldiers and moon gates and mountain temples" that are imagined to be the "real" China that would return if the CCP went away.

Silver2195 fucked around with this message at 03:15 on Feb 19, 2022

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Ghost Leviathan
Mar 2, 2017
Probation
Can't post for 12 hours!
Returning to an imagined golden age through extermination of the subversive degenerates and their legacy is pretty standard fascism.

Ironically it's kinda the opposite of the treatment of Russia; a post-Communist Russia that isn't the USSR isn't something that the world's ruling class can internalise as 'real'.

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