Tactics and Strategy Thread (not an advanced stats thread)

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Sports Argument Stadium > The Ray Parlour > Tactics and Strategy Thread (not an advanced stats thread)

Earthy Ape Unit: Jun 17, 2014; by XyloJW

I looked around and I don't really see a thread for the discussion of current trends in tactics, strategy and match day preparation, other than one off posts in the general threads and maybe the OP of the Spain thread from the WC.

So let's fix that. In my opinion it's a great time to discuss tactics/strategy etc. because there are some interesting things going on as everyone sorts out the Post-Guardiola world (WINGBACKS! PRESSING! POSSESSION IS MEANINGLESS!) which is kinda cool. Oh wait, Guardiola is still here? Weird.

I'd prefer this not end up as a place where a) code tags are posted and b) advanced stats get thrown around, although each of these could have its place here. I would just hope they'd be used to supplement an interesting discussion.

What would be nice to see are discussions on how your team plays (whether it's Manchester United or Hereford United) and why they play that way, discussions on how leagues as a whole are playing, and discussions on interesting developments that are just showing up. That would be cool.

Anyway - First some resources:

ZonalMarking.com - Haha j/k please no, just don't. Not saying it's always bad, but urg....go here instead: http://spielverlagerung.com/

Neville and Carragher
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=neville+carragher - Can't recommend these two guys enough.

I'm a big Jonathan Northcroft fan, and I know some people may have issues with the Times but w/e. He does some good interview articles. Also some of his tweets are unintentionally funny.
https://twitter.com/JNorthcroft

quote:

Jonathan Northcroft @JNorthcroft � Aug 31
Said to BR "intensity" is not associated with Balotelli. Reply: "measure him over time. No one associated Coutinho or Sturridge with that"

Kevin Gates - a bit of a newcomer but I think he has some good things to say.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e3KHeaByfqg (a few cuss words)

To kick things off let's talk Pressing.

Pressing is a bit of a buzzword lately, but the idea of getting in on your man has been around forever. What's happening now is that clubs are really focusing on two aspects of putting pressure on the opponents - a) when it happens and b) why it happens. Of course c) how it happens is still important, but I don't want to get into that in this post (just look at the advanced stats image above, that should cover it). Maybe someone else can help here.

For a) when it happens, teams have gotten very sophisticated about when they press. Teams like Atletico are now content to cede possession with the intent of actually letting the other side work the ball into a part of the field where deploying a press will be most successful. This is related to b) why it happens, as the whole point is to absorb the other team's offence, force them into passing into an area where a coordinated team press and counter will be most effective, and exploit this to regain possession in a shape and flow that's advantageous. This is a bit different from Barcelona-style "keep the ball at all costs and then press on turnovers to get the ball out in a passing lane where Biscuits can snag it so we can continue to keep the ball at all costs" and certainly different than the all out on the ball NOW! styles some teams have deployed through various pressing techniques.

Supposedly Stoke City merked Man City last week by playing to Atletico's template, but I was too busy swearing at the screen to notice. If so, I think it's an exciting time as these sort of strategic decisions get copied all the time and I think there are worse playing philosophies that could be implemented across the major leagues.

I'm not of a great mind so this is all pretty simple high level stuff and I would imagine some posters here have a lot more to contribute. I'm sure the Suqit triangles post will make it in here at some point, can't wait for that. Maybe one day this thread could get a gem of a post that replaces it.

Earthy Ape Unit fucked around with this message at 18:57 on Sep 12, 2014

# ? Sep 12, 2014 18:51

Adbot: ADBOT LOVES YOU

# ? Apr 28, 2024 23:02

sebzilla: Mar 17, 2009; Kid's blasting everything in sight with that new-fangled musket.

Everyone read Inverting The Pyramid by Jonathan Wilson, it's cool and good and explains all kinds of stuff like why traditional shirt numbers are the way they are (and different in different countries) as well as giving a pretty comprehensive history of the development of football tactics from the birth of football in ~~1992~~ the 19th century up to the present day (or a few years ago I guess).

Other football books are available.

# ? Sep 12, 2014 19:05

Strawman: Feb 9, 2008; Tortuga means turtle, and that's me. I take my time but I always win.

At the end of the day its a game of two halves imo

# ? Sep 12, 2014 22:51

Pissflaps: Oct 20, 2002; by VideoGames

One thing I do know: it all evens out in the end.

# ? Sep 12, 2014 22:55

Earthy Ape Unit: Jun 17, 2014; by XyloJW

Pissflaps posted:

One thing I do know: it all evens out in the end.

I believe the correct quote is "something something 11 men simple game and at the end [Editor's note: and this next bit is the important part] Germany wins."

# ? Sep 12, 2014 22:56

straight up brolic: Jan 31, 2007; After all, I was nice in ball,
Came to practice weed scented
Report card like the speed limit

I've written a few of these for money.

quote:

Roma�s Ultras held up a banner that read �Not knowing how to respond to defeat is worse than defeat itself� upon the side�s presentation to supporters on August 21st. They were referencing the side�s 1-0 loss to Lazio in the Coppa Italia final, the first steps of what they assumed was the destruction of a young but talented team, as well as the uninspired hiring of Rudi Garcia, who was resoundingly booed. It was assumed that Garcia would merely be the next to fly off the Benedetto consortium�s coaching carousel. In the carousel�s wake lay the mangled egos of Zdenek Zeman and Luis Enrique: men who I greatly admire, but found it difficult for their idealism to gain traction in the pragmatic landscape of today�s Serie A.

We�re now only 3 months into Rudi Garcia�s reign as manager, and if you haven�t been paying attention, the carousel has stopped. Garcia has already etched his name into the history books by presiding over Roma�s greatest ever start to a Serie A season, conceding only a single goal overall, and picking up a 2-0 win over rivals Lazio in the process. Roma are playing some of the most promising and attractive football seen from the side in years, and I�m genuinely excited to watch the club. The shift in fortunes has been enabled by both major and minor changes to three core components that underline football tactics: personnel, ideology, and positioning.

The players:

If you want a bit of a laugh, have a look at Roma supporters� prognostications for the season and thoughts regarding the board from just after the closing of this past transfer window. The widespread doomsday predictions and furor weren�t necessarily that hard to understand. The team sold their two most promising players, Erik Lamela and Marquinhos, and didn�t bring in a single player that could create an equal amount of excitement.

The reality of the situation, however, was that the key sales (Lamela, Marquinhos, Stekelenburg, and Osvaldo) allowed Garcia to stabilize the side with quality and depth in areas where the side desperately needed it, while making massive profits in the process. The seven major incoming players were Adem Ljajic (Fiorentina), Gervinho (Arsenal), Kevin Strootman (PSV), Mehdi Benatia (Udinese), Maicon (Manchester City), Morgan De Sanctis (Napoli), and Tin Jedvaj (Dinamo Zagreb).

Benatia, for me, is a stronger, smarter, and more accomplished player now than the lithe and promising Marquinhos. The Brazilian certainly could (and probably will) prove to be the better player in the long run, but Benatia is in his prime as a defender and had previously led Udinese to consistently perform better than the sum of their parts in defense. The partnership that he and Castan are building in the back has been excellent, and the defense already seems to have an awareness and confidence that was missing during much of last season.

Strootman was arguably the most maligned signing, but has been, in my mind, the most instrumental player to their early successes. The Dutch international�s style has long been compared to the patient approach of Michael Carrick, but his game offers so much more, embodying the expression, �jack of all trades, master of none,� in the best possible way. He�s an able runner, defender, attacker and creator, and the system he�s playing in (we�ll get to that in a moment) gives him license to perform all of those duties. A player like Strootman is what Garcia�s tactics require, and there are few players that could better fill his role.

Ljajic and Gervinho are ostensibly a multi-faceted replacement to what Lamela offered. Ljajic has a bit of a temperamental and nasty side, but his technique and talent are tough to match. And if a player could be judged on those qualities alone, Ljajic would be extremely similar to Lamela. He can play in behind the striker and out-wide, and could offer the club a long-term replacement for Francesco Totti if the captain can help him grow as a player and as a leader in his remaining years.

Gervinho is easy to laugh off, but he clearly has ability, reaching the greatest heights of his career while playing under Rudi Garcia at Lille (where Eden Hazard, famously, declared him the most talented player he�d ever played with). The idea here was obviously to get him at a cut-rate and hope that he could rediscover some of the confidence and final product that he was missing and become a top-player again. We�re five matches in and he�s already scored a goal; he�s one to monitor.

The Ideas:

Speaking of carousel�s: Garcia�s tactics owe a lot, in terms of inspiration, to the Dutch teams of the 1970s that popularized rotating roles and duties for players. Garcia has long favored the 4-3-3 base system, but embraces a level of fluidity that leaves his system defying labels in practice, as the side becomes amorphous in the interest of manipulating space on the field. Serie A defenses, generally prepared to sit back in defense for long periods of the game, have been simply undone by the guile and movement of the team thus far. Garcia�s not a magic man, but he understands that successful football tactics are predicated on being strong and compact in defense, and open, controlling, and fluid in attack: a huge upgrade from his more single-minded predecessors.

The Positions:

The idea of a rotating 4-3-3 has been enabled by Garcia�s willingness to redefine his own formation�s positions based on the available personnel. He�s done this by resurrecting some of the positional ideas that underpinned Luciano Spaletti�s excellent 2007 team, and has made a few tweaks to allow for greater fluidity, more control in the midfield, and a little more defensiveness.

An idea that is almost a direct allusion to Spaletti�s side is Garcia�s use of Totti. The term �false-9� is thrown around a lot, but what�s going on here is that Totti is withdrawing into midfield to receive the ball, and although selected as a lone striker, has many of the duties typically given to a playmaker or a center forward. With Totti in the midfield, Ljajic and Gervinho or Florenzi move forward into either wing or striker positions, respectively, allowing the side to morph from its 4-3-3 base position to resemble a 4-3-1-2 on the counter-attack and a 4-5-1 when in possession. This positional flexibility has allowed a player that lacks pace like Totti to use his other attributes and intelligence to create confusion in the backline, while creating the space necessary to receive the ball and the time to do something with it.

Unlike the 2007 team, the midfield is doing much of the yeoman�s work in attack as well as defense. Spaletti preferred the counter to measured build-up, but that approach led his teams to be undone by European sides that weren�t as pragmatic as their Italian counterparts. Pjanic, De Rossi, and Strootman all have unique duties, but are also required to contribute in all phases of the game. This obviously places a physical strain on the players, but fortunately, the personnel are almost perfect to implement it. Adding another willing runner like Michael Bradley to the equation when he returns from injury should also help improve the depth and consistency of the approach. Roma have won the possession battle in every match this season and frequently pack the midfield with 5 or 6 players. This might typically result in a neutered attack, but the allowance for players to move from defense to attack, exemplified by Benatia�s goal against Sampdoria, has actually created more defensive chaos than many teams get out of static 4-4-2s.

Defensively, the midfield rotates based on who is attacking, always leaving one player to shield the defense at the base of the pyramid. This could potentially be a weak link going forward as the better sides in the league could sit back and wait to expose a weaker player like Pjanic in defense. Fortunately for Roma, only a few managers (namely Conte, Benitez, and Mazzarri) have both the quality on the pitch and tactical nous to execute that type of gameplan consistently. The fullbacks are generally staggered, with one performing a more defensive role and the other bombing up the pitch, but there have been times this season when both have moved forward and two midfielders have stayed back.

Tactical Awareness

Here�s an example of Garcia�s tactical flexibility: the only outfield player not intentionally assuming multiple roles in the course of a game is Castan, who operates primarily as a covering defender.

Going forward:

There is no reason why Roma should be incapable of achieving a European place this season. Their only rivals, in my mind, are Juventus, Napoli, Inter, and Fiorentina. The latter two will be the obvious competitors for that coveted third Champions League spot, but Roma look to be well poised as long as Garcia�s ideas continue to evolve and health stays on their side. Their lack of European commitment should be a massive boost to their chances. And why not Roma? In winning Ligue 1, reinvigorating Joe Cole, and leading a supposedly �depleted� Roma side to their best ever start, anything seems possible with Rudi Garcia at the helm.

# ? Sep 12, 2014 23:04

straight up brolic: Jan 31, 2007; After all, I was nice in ball,
Came to practice weed scented
Report card like the speed limit

quote:

Louis Van Gaal promised change when he was made Manchester United manager. He suggested that a departure from the sadness of the previous nine months and a reversion to the confidence of the Sir Alex Ferguson era was in store. And all summer and preseason it looked like he�d delivered. The club brought in shiny new players that could work with his preferred 3-5-2 system, Luke Shaw and Ander Herrera, and they rolled through the competition in their preseason tour of the United States. But against Swansea on Saturday, United produced more of the same: inert possession and home disappointment.

Before delving into the tactical undoing of United at the weekend (and it was that, not mere bad luck or poor finishing), its important to give a bit of credit to Swansea who set up to deal with the system fantastically and were well organized at the back. A formation with one striker is always going to give the 3-5-2 difficulty, because you�re often put in positions where three players are marking one (in this case the central defenders and the lone striker). That �over-marking� leaves you short of players elsewhere on the park and Swansea�s first goal, a brilliant 29 pass move that has already been examined to death, was a perfect example of how winning the numbers game creates both time on the ball and space on the field. Angel Rangel and Ashley Williams both impressed in defense, while Ben Davies� stand-in, Neil Taylor, had a game to forget. Gylfi Sigurdsson was immense in his return for the Swans.

The 3-5-2, like most football formations, is ideologically sound. It�s predicated on the idea that a team will earn a numerical advantage in midfield while attacking, and a numerical advantage in defense while defending. This is enabled by the use of wingbacks, players that serve either an attacking and defending role based on the possession and location of the ball and start higher up the pitch than the traditional fullback. The Netherlands team that the Louis Van Gaal coached to the third place trophy at the World Cup had two players perfectly suited to this role in Daley Blind and Daryl Janmaat. In addition to wingbacks, the left and right centerback roles are also specialized for the system. These players need to be able to push up into midfield occasionally and (generally) have the footedness of the side they�re playing on as they spend more time in possession than they might in a four-man defense.

United�s failure on Saturday came down to a lack of understanding and a lack of specialization. The solutions to both of these problems will come with time. The team is still inexperienced in this new tactic and the new roles they�re playing within it. Players like Luke Shaw and Antonio Valencia will provide a huge boost when they recover from injury. Until then, however, it might be a bit of rough sailing, as some of the mistakes on Saturday were basic and horrific.

Juan Mata played far too high up the pitch the entire match. He was basically operating as a secondary striker/number 10. This would be fine in the attacking third, but he wasn�t coming back to receive the ball enough when United were deep and possession. As a result Herrera and Fletcher were anesthetized as they became swamped in midfield and could only really pass the ball to the backline and the wingbacks. Because of Mata�s positional error, United were always a man down in midfield and gaps started appearing between the lines for Swansea to exploit. I�m not sure he can even play in this system. It requires too much mental fortitude and consistency for an indulgent player like him. Jose Mourinho let him go because he lacked the discipline to perform in his Chelsea team and Van Gaal might be feeling a bit of history repeating itself. On Monday Night Football, Gary Neville did an excellent job of showing one of Mata�s situational failures; when United were in defense he left his man, Ki, to pursue the ball. This wound up giving him the space to score the opening goal. We already knew about his shortcomings in defense, but to also see him so lazy and tactically na�ve when United were in possession was a surprise.

The centerbacks clearly have not had enough time. Against a lone striker one of the three defenders has to move up into the midfield whenever the striker drops deep to mark him. When this happens the rest of the team drops into a flatback four and it works terrifically. Bruno Martins Indi got done a few times at the World Cup, typical for an inexperienced player, but also he did a tremendous job of tracking dangerous players into the midfield and stopping moves before they could start. He was instrumental to the Netherlands' success. On Saturday, Wilfried Bony was ostensibly allowed free reign drop in between the midfielders and the defenders, receive the ball and hold it up for his fellow attackers. That time on the ball allowed Swansea a foothold in the game.

The wing backs have been much discussed in the media, but the only point I'd like to hammer home is that, if your starting position is going to be at fullback (as it was in this game), you need a defensive player in that position or you're not really benefitting from the talents that your wide players bring to the table. Januzaj was absolutely rampant going up against Taylor, but his introduction into the game also exposed how much better United were in attack when they played a 3-4-1-2 as compared to the 5-2-1-2 that they started out the match in. As the home side, and the side supposed to be attacking, United's wingbacks should have been pushing Swansea's wingers deeper into their own half. If Mata had actually kept a three man midfield in shape, this would have opened up the middle of the park for United and allowed the wingbacks enough the defensive space recover into when they lost the ball.

In the second half, Manchester United switched to a 4-5-1, bringing on Nani, taking off Hernandez, and moving Jones over to fullback. Yet the problem with too few men in the midfield persisted. Many of United's players just don't have the right mentality as of now. You can't have 4 players on the pitch (Mata, Nani, Januzaj, Young) who are only comfortable going forward. They've been asked to take on greater responsibilities and they just don't currently have the mental or physical attributes to perform them. Look at the image below to see the effect that this imbalance has on a team. The lines between midfield and attack are stretched and there are few options to play out of the back. This led to the club revisiting the much maligned Moyes tactic of "lumping it up onto Fellaini's head".

To Young's credit, he worked very hard in a position that he has never played much before, but when he was clearly beaten for Swansea's final goal all of his naivet� as a defender was on display. Keeping him on as an out and out fullback was a mistake that was going to be punished.

It's not all doom and gloom for United. The signing of left-footed centerback Marcos Rojo is a perfect move for the team. The former Sporting Lisbon defender is comfortable at centerback or leftback, has skill and ability on the ball, and is a nice physical player with good speed and strength. These qualities are hugely important for the specialized position of left centerback in a three-man defense. Juventus's Chielliini is the prototype at that spot, but I'd bet that Rojo can come in and do a great job for the Red Devils. Rojo has his flaws, he's too aggressive, gets a little lost positionally, and has a tough time marking quick players, but they'll be mitigated if he plays the stopping defender role and Evans plays cover (as seems most likely).

Make sure to check-in next week to see how the team is evolving. I wouldn't bet against Van Gaal just yet, at least not until Shaw and Valencia return. United have too much quality injured or unfit to fairly judge their sour performance at the weekend. As is, its a minor hiccup on the road back to the top 4.

# ? Sep 12, 2014 23:10

straight up brolic: Jan 31, 2007; After all, I was nice in ball,
Came to practice weed scented
Report card like the speed limit

also everyone (in this case meaning Michael Cox, the zonal marking guy who wrote an article for ESPN about it) is trying to say that Stoke's performance was "Atletico" esque, but using defensive traps with 8 or 9 men behind the ball and then countering has been around as an idea forever and it's how some plucky underdog upsets a big team every year and why Martin O'neill's sides raped the big clubs.

The only difference with Atletico is that, like Mourinho's Inter, they have the quality to put you to the sword when they recover possession.

# ? Sep 12, 2014 23:26

Strawman: Feb 9, 2008; Tortuga means turtle, and that's me. I take my time but I always win.

Some people believe football is a matter of life and death, I am very disappointed with that attitude. I can assure you it is much, much more important that you make nice triangles

# ? Sep 12, 2014 23:42

Lenin Riefenstahl: Sep 18, 2003; That's enough! Out of here, you tubs of beer!

My prognis.......prognastu....prenast...pra..prognostacist............prognostications for Man U's season are still not good.

# ? Sep 13, 2014 00:43

Charlotte Hornets: Dec 30, 2011; by Fritz the Horse

"The perfect football match ends in a 0-0 draw" - Xenophon, Anabasis, Chapter 15, pg 7. 420 BC

# ? Sep 13, 2014 01:14

chuggo is BACK: Jul 1, 2008; "Chuggo"

PWM POTM December 2014

You think that's possession you're counting?

# ? Sep 13, 2014 01:19

Shrapnig: Jan 21, 2005

Call them and tell them that they are missing the subtlety. Instead of following the ball, follow the off ball movement. Look for triangles to appear, dissolve and then reappear right before your eyes. Watch as player's heads swivel to find the man making the run for the second pass, not the first. Watch the tight control and decision making. Don't appreciate the pass that was made, appreciate the pass that wasn't because it was more difficult and less likely to be successful.

Watch the instant pressure applied once the ball is lost. Appreciate the monumental patience and discipline required to maintain possession without making foolish passes for long stretches. Realize that they are making things that are incredibly difficult to do both physically and tactically look so easy that it becomes boring.

# ? Sep 13, 2014 01:22

Earthy Ape Unit: Jun 17, 2014; by XyloJW

straight up brolic posted:

I've written a few of these for money.

Fully sick posting, thanks.

# ? Sep 13, 2014 03:36

Tzen: Sep 11, 2001

Great thread and posts, enjoying the read.

sebzilla posted:

Everyone read Inverting The Pyramid by Jonathan Wilson, it's cool and good and explains all kinds of stuff like why traditional shirt numbers are the way they are (and different in different countries) as well as giving a pretty comprehensive history of the development of football tactics from the birth of football in ~~1992~~ the 19th century up to the present day (or a few years ago I guess).

Other football books are available.

This book is a must for anybody remotely interested in tactics/etc. I read it earlier this year and highly recommend it.

# ? Sep 13, 2014 04:35

Slaapaav: Mar 3, 2006; by Azathoth

its more of a history book that explain how formations evolved, its dry as hell and not very interesting because it never goes really deep on any subject

# ? Sep 13, 2014 04:38

straight up brolic: Jan 31, 2007; After all, I was nice in ball,
Came to practice weed scented
Report card like the speed limit

daivd goldblatt's "the ball is round" is a better football history book imo

# ? Sep 13, 2014 08:28

Walh Hara: May 11, 2012

straight up brolic posted:

I've written a few of these for money.

I'm quite a big fan of Rudi Garcia and if Belgium or a club I like (Everton) needed a new manager there wouldn't be many managers I'd like more. I mean, a young manager known for playing attractive and offensive football who got great results in good competitions with mediocre sides without spending much, what more could you want?

# ? Sep 13, 2014 08:55

straight up brolic: Jan 31, 2007; After all, I was nice in ball,
Came to practice weed scented
Report card like the speed limit

quote:

Gabby Agbonlahor�s winner for Villa against Liverpool could be aptly described as a �jammy corner goal�. The ball bounced off Phillippe Senderos�s coconut of a head, fell onto Gabby�s foot, deflected off Manquillo, and rolled into the far corner. But if you think back to before the corner, the goal, in its entirety, summed up Villa�s performance.

Liverpool�s Sakho had possession of the ball and tried to play an incisive pass forwards to Coutinho, but Villa sprung one of their defensive traps. Coutinho appeared to be unmarked when Sakho was looking to play forward, but Delph and Westwood were waiting, five yards away, for a ball to be played in. They sprung on him immediately, winning possession in the middle of the park and starting the break. Delph then played the ball wide to Hutton who launched a ball up to Agbonlahor. The English striker sprinted 30 yards and used his pace and strength to absolutely outwork Sakho and win the corner. Villa utilized their tactical plan, hard work and determination, physicality, and set piece strength to create a goal that shouldn't have been.

The midfield trap that initially won the ball for the goal was just one of many employed by Villa in the match. The two types of passes that they principally tried to eliminate were direct balls from the holding midfielders to the attacking midfielders and attacking passes from the full backs. Keeping the ball from moving on the ground between the defensive players and the attacking players allowed them to, with 10 men behind the ball, neutralize any significant threat from Liverpool. It's telling that Liverpool's best chances came from individual brilliance, not team play.

Wide Traps

First, we'll look at the strong side traps. In these situations, when Liverpool were even with Villa numerically, the Birmingham outfit waited for the pass to reach the fullback, then kicked the press into high gear, marking all of his nearby options extremely closely. The idea here is that you either get them moving backwards or you get the ball.

In the first example above, Sakho swings the ball over to Moreno and, after Moreno plays it up to Lallana, the teeth come out from the Villa midfield and defense. Their reactivity and work rate made it so that the only tenable option was retreat.

On the other side of the pitch, a similar trap is employed as Markovic receives the ball around the halfway line and is presented with no forward options. It's obvious that Lambert coached up these situations in advance as the players hunted in a way that was almost robotic. This prevention of forward progress was crucial to winning the tempo battle.

The weak side traps, on the other hand, were so effective that they became almost an offensive outlet for Villa. Below you'll see Sakho metronomically and mindlessly swing the ball to Moreno, who's outnumbered as he tries to move forward (which alone is illustrative of the Spaniard's Premier League na�vet�). He has no forward option and, in try to play a stupid one-two with Lallana, he gifts Villa possession in a dangerous area.

The passage below, from midway through the second half, showed all phases of Villa's trapping deployment. They first forced Liverpool backwards on the strong side wing, then rushed out into midfield to prevent any easy entry passes, and finally pressurized the weak side wing to create a change in possession. Liverpool decision to set up in a five man midfield instead of the diamond that they'd been having success with seemed to doom them from the start against this Villa team.

These were the lineups deployed after Lambert quickly moved out of a midfield diamond when he realized Rodgers was playing five in midfield.

The tightness and organization of the defensive 4-3-3 against Rodger's wide midfield worked like a charm. There were two-on-one defensive situations all over the pitch and Villa often won the ball back easily. They weren't able to create much out of these changes in possession and, if they had the quality and hold up play of a player like Benteke in the side, it could have been worse for Liverpool.

On the other side of the coin, Liverpool's manager and their fans have good reason to curse Roy Hodgson. His alleged mishandling of Daniel Sturridge not only kept out one of their best players, but also left them bereft of fluidity. Balotelli is effective as a fulcrum in attack, with good hold-up play and physicality, but Liverpool were crying out for a forward like Sturridge who's willing to come wide, play on the wing, and create numerical advantages. Sterling could have also fulfilled this role if he hadn't been rested. I'm not sure that Balotelli can be effective as a lone striker in Rodger's system, he looked much like Diego Costa has in Spain side that demands more creativity and fluidity from their forwards: lost and ineffective.

Villa's traps and removal of options led to Liverpool's defending players (the back four, Henderson, and Mignolet) passing the ball almost twice as much as the rest of the team. This is illustrative of Liverpool's insipid attacks, recycled possession, and low tempo. Possession without a cutting edge is worthless and that's all you got from Rodgers today. Paul Lambert's tactics both prevented Liverpool from getting into their preferred attacking positions and drew the Merseyside team into new and uncomfortable positions in order to try and add more sting to their attack. The Scottish manager should receive the plaudits here and he has clearly got Brendan Rodgers number away from home.

This performance will also compound the fear that Rodgers is not a tactically reactive manager. He�s very proactive and has strong ideas about the game of football, but he should have recognized Villa�s ability to deal with his base formation and rerolled the dice. He wont come against many sides as organized as Villa were today, but his trouble against the midtable sides that are is becoming a pattern. They struggled against Stoke, Hull, Villa, and Crystal Palace (once Pulis became manager) last season and Rodger's will need to work on a Plan B to cement his status as one of Europe's elite young managers.

straight up brolic fucked around with this message at 15:55 on Sep 14, 2014

# ? Sep 14, 2014 15:51

Bogan Krkic: Oct 31, 2010; Swedish style? No.
Yugoslavian style? Of course not.
It has to be Zlatan-style.

I'd like to say I very much disagree with the idea that Villa had a 4-3-3-0 rather than a 4-3-3. It's exactly the same shape, just incredibly deep so there is no striker playing off the defenders, but instead running at them. That's hardly a strikerless formation though, it's just a team playing deep and trying to hit on the counter. That said, formations are almost entirely all fluid these days and trying to put them in code tags is a losing battle.

# ? Sep 14, 2014 16:55

straight up brolic: Jan 31, 2007; After all, I was nice in ball,
Came to practice weed scented
Report card like the speed limit

Bogan Krkic posted:

I'd like to say I very much disagree with the idea that Villa had a 4-3-3-0 rather than a 4-3-3. It's exactly the same shape, just incredibly deep so there is no striker playing off the defenders, but instead running at them. That's hardly a strikerless formation though, it's just a team playing deep and trying to hit on the counter. That said, formations are almost entirely all fluid these days and trying to put them in code tags is a losing battle.

lol that's just how that lovely lineup maker thing coded the lineups

# ? Sep 14, 2014 17:06

Bogan Krkic: Oct 31, 2010; Swedish style? No.
Yugoslavian style? Of course not.
It has to be Zlatan-style.

straight up brolic posted:

lol that's just how that lovely lineup maker thing coded the lineups

Well I look like an idiot now

# ? Sep 14, 2014 17:31

Polidoro: Jan 5, 2011; Huevo se dice argidia. Argidia!

Just kick it up to the big lad and make sure you get stuck in. That's the formula for success.

# ? Sep 15, 2014 00:42

Earthy Ape Unit: Jun 17, 2014; by XyloJW

Mmm this is good stuff (both the sick brolic posts and Steve messing up)

# ? Sep 15, 2014 01:17

Ewar Woowar: Feb 25, 2007

Villa did really well at isolating our fullbacks/centre backs all game. So many times Manquillo had to chase a long ball played in behind him and once he got it there was no option to do anything bar put it out for a throw in. The way to remedy that is to have a keeper be more confident and offer an outlet for a pass or have your defensive midfielder play deeper...unfortunately that's one of Mignolet's biggest weak points and in Gerrard we have a player that is probably not the most disciplined in his positioning and no longer has the engine to make up for it.

Much was made about missing Sturridge and not starting Sterling but the biggest loss in that game was the lack of shape due to Joe Allen (or possible replacement Emre Can) not being available.

# ? Sep 15, 2014 01:19

straight up brolic: Jan 31, 2007; After all, I was nice in ball,
Came to practice weed scented
Report card like the speed limit

Ewar Woowar posted:

Much was made about missing Sturridge and not starting Sterling but the biggest loss in that game was the lack of shape due to Joe Allen (or possible replacement Emre Can) not being available.

Is Lucas dead or just out of the mix?

# ? Sep 15, 2014 02:52

Ewar Woowar: Feb 25, 2007

straight up brolic posted:

Is Lucas dead or just out of the mix?

He had a couple of really bad injuries and is not the player he once was. He's looked really slow and as a result gives away a tonne of free kicks. Gerrard's shift into a deeper lying midfielder has probably made him surplus to requirements really as having them both on the pitch at the same time has resulted in some of our poorest performances under Rodgers. Can is probably going to be preferred over him in the defensive midfielder role anyway as he's infinitely better physically and seems more comfortable on the ball.

# ? Sep 15, 2014 03:39

ephex: Nov 4, 2007; PHWOAR CRIMINAL

This really sums it up

imo

# ? Sep 15, 2014 03:52

Huskalator: Mar 17, 2009; Proud ~~fascist~~
anti-anti-fascist

Get two really fast guys to be your strikers then park the bus with the other eight men. When you get the ball hoof it immediately down the field and let your strikers run after it. Score lots of goals and concede very little. Works for my rec league team.

# ? Sep 15, 2014 04:32