quote:

And those who disparage “populism” in general neglect its salutary function. When populist talkers direct their outrage at elites, in government or business, who neglect the needs and betray the trust of ordinary citizens, they can perform a service to the nation. They train their language of discontent on those accused of betraying the core ideal of American democracy — one that is no less powerful because it can never be fully realized.

In their own fashion, Sanders and Trump are protesting inequalities and the corruption of public life without calling the entire system into question. (Sanders may speak of “revolution,” but he still chose to run for president within the two-party system.) You may love such upheavals or loathe them. Trump’s hostility toward undocumented immigrants and Muslims is certainly reprehensible. But every major “populist” insurgency is a warning about serious problems festering in our politics. To simply blame the messenger is an exercise in denial.

quote:

If you’re active on Twitter it might come as a surprise to see Bernie supporters harass and intimidate black activists. If you take the time to get more familiar with Bernie’s political movement over the last four or so years, it isn’t really very surprising after all.

In this article I want to document how Bernie, from when he first started talking about running for President in 2014 to very recently, has created a movement of white populism and rage not so very different from that of Trump.

quote:

Why the common ground? Well, because populists gonna populist, whether they are on the Bernie Bro left or the "drain the swamp" right, although each side may be loathe to admit how much they have in common. But in reality, it's quite a bit. Both are deeply suspicious of capitalism as a positive force in bringing about a peaceful and prosperous society. Both rhetorically champion "the people" against "the elite" or "the establishment." And both tend to ignore possible constraints on their actions, which is one reason they dislike markets. (This tends to be true of populists everywhere.) As presidential candidates, Sanders and Trump had the two most implausible economic plans, with both assuming super-fast economic growth to make their numbers work. When you're a populist politician with big dreams of Medicare for all or mega-tax cuts for all, it's a real drag to have to worry about debt-to-GDP ratios or what bond investors might think

Lawman 0 posted:

anything rich people don't like op
close thread

Lawman 0 posted:

anything rich people don't like op
close thread

Fat-Lip-Sum-41.mp3 posted:

let's define "regime" next

Blurred posted:

This is a good book for thinking about this issue. The authors link nationalistic populism (and all populism is at least vaguely nationalistic in nature - there are no cosmopolitan populisms) to what they call the "4 Ds": distrust, destruction, deprivation, de-alignment. These are the factors which push people towards populism, and the factors that populist demagogues harp on to attract voters.

• Distrust: Populism begins with a distrust of higher institutions, and a belief that these institutions are failing the people and the nation. Institutions here could mean particular bodies - the WTO, the EU, the courts etc. - or they could be more nebulous constructions like "globalists" or "the elite". Whatever the precise target, populism gains traction wherever people begin to lose faith in the existing order. Populist rhetoric thus often takes on a paranoid or conspiratorial bent because it is necessary for populist candidates to push the idea that the current system does not have your best interests and heart and cannot be trusted.
  
  
• Destruction: Populism carries with it the idea that "the people" (however so defined or understood) are under an existential threat. There are "others" (again, however so defined or understood) who wish to destroy your culture, your nation and your way of life. Populism for that reason often has a nostalgic bent - a wistful desire to return to a rather underspecified time where the nation was "great" and had yet to be undermined by these "others". Populist rhetoric will therefore often take on a persecutory tone and invoke belligerent allusions (as there is a real sense in which the populists believe they are "at war" for their lives), and is almost always xenophobic in nature. Immigration is a major issue in all populist movements for that reason.
  
  
• Deprivation: Populism also carries with it the idea that "the people" are also somehow being "deprived" of something to which they believe they are entitled. These arguments are often economic in nature and is directed against the wealthy "elites" who are seen as hording all the money, or against foreign "others" in the form of countries ("China is killing us on trade") or individual people ("they took our jobs!"). Deprivation is, of course, a relative term. A person may in fact be better off than they were in the past, but still feel resentful when they witness others who they feel are benefiting more. Populism, for that reason, is more likely to be rural in nature (as economic growth tends to concentrate in urban areas), more appealing to those with a lower education (as they feel they are being deprived of employment opportunities) and racially charged (as any signal that immigrants or minorities are living in a state of low deprivation is likely to evoke a sense of relative deprivation among the ethnic majority). Populist rhetoric is thus necessarily negative, if not apocalyptic, in its depiction of social decay: if you don't believe that you are being unduly deprived of something, then populist ideas have no possibility of gaining traction.
  
  
• De-alignment: De-alignment is the idea that traditional social and political blocs are in decline, and that populism is more likely to take root in nations where this decline is most pronounced. Class identification is in decline in most of the western world, so is religious identification, so is union membership, so is political party affiliation and so on. People are now more likely to view socio-cultural bonds and group membership in their nation as something shifting and volatile rather than as something stable and reliable, which in turn stokes fear and anxiety. Once dependable cultural pillars are seen as having been uprooted and as having been replaced by newer cultural forms (identity politics, political correctness etc.) which is seen as eroding traditional sources of "belonging". This is why populism is typically anti-liberal in nature (as liberalism implies the possibility of individual conscience, which undermines the possibility of a simple, hegemonic, nationalistic culture to which all belong and pledge subservience) and typically holds a greater appeal to older people and to social conservatives (who are less likely to welcome or be able to adapt to any cultural change).

Blurred posted:

Blurred posted:

This is a good book for thinking about this issue. The authors link nationalistic populism (and all populism is at least vaguely nationalistic in nature - there are no cosmopolitan populisms) to what they call the "4 Ds": distrust, destruction, deprivation, de-alignment. These are the factors which push people towards populism, and the factors that populist demagogues harp on to attract voters.

• Distrust: Populism begins with a distrust of higher institutions, and a belief that these institutions are failing the people and the nation. Institutions here could mean particular bodies - the WTO, the EU, the courts etc. - or they could be more nebulous constructions like "globalists" or "the elite". Whatever the precise target, populism gains traction wherever people begin to lose faith in the existing order. Populist rhetoric thus often takes on a paranoid or conspiratorial bent because it is necessary for populist candidates to push the idea that the current system does not have your best interests and heart and cannot be trusted.
  
  
• Destruction: Populism carries with it the idea that "the people" (however so defined or understood) are under an existential threat. There are "others" (again, however so defined or understood) who wish to destroy your culture, your nation and your way of life. Populism for that reason often has a nostalgic bent - a wistful desire to return to a rather underspecified time where the nation was "great" and had yet to be undermined by these "others". Populist rhetoric will therefore often take on a persecutory tone and invoke belligerent allusions (as there is a real sense in which the populists believe they are "at war" for their lives), and is almost always xenophobic in nature. Immigration is a major issue in all populist movements for that reason.
  
  
• Deprivation: Populism also carries with it the idea that "the people" are also somehow being "deprived" of something to which they believe they are entitled. These arguments are often economic in nature and is directed against the wealthy "elites" who are seen as hording all the money, or against foreign "others" in the form of countries ("China is killing us on trade") or individual people ("they took our jobs!"). Deprivation is, of course, a relative term. A person may in fact be better off than they were in the past, but still feel resentful when they witness others who they feel are benefiting more. Populism, for that reason, is more likely to be rural in nature (as economic growth tends to concentrate in urban areas), more appealing to those with a lower education (as they feel they are being deprived of employment opportunities) and racially charged (as any signal that immigrants or minorities are living in a state of low deprivation is likely to evoke a sense of relative deprivation among the ethnic majority). Populist rhetoric is thus necessarily negative, if not apocalyptic, in its depiction of social decay: if you don't believe that you are being unduly deprived of something, then populist ideas have no possibility of gaining traction.
  
  
• De-alignment: De-alignment is the idea that traditional social and political blocs are in decline, and that populism is more likely to take root in nations where this decline is most pronounced. Class identification is in decline in most of the western world, so is religious identification, so is union membership, so is political party affiliation and so on. People are now more likely to view socio-cultural bonds and group membership in their nation as something shifting and volatile rather than as something stable and reliable, which in turn stokes fear and anxiety. Once dependable cultural pillars are seen as having been uprooted and as having been replaced by newer cultural forms (identity politics, political correctness etc.) which is seen as eroding traditional sources of "belonging". This is why populism is typically anti-liberal in nature (as liberalism implies the possibility of individual conscience, which undermines the possibility of a simple, hegemonic, nationalistic culture to which all belong and pledge subservience) and typically holds a greater appeal to older people and to social conservatives (who are less likely to welcome or be able to adapt to any cultural change).