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http://www.airbusdriver.net/airbus_fltlaws.htm The 'laws' we keep referring to. In Normal you 'should' not be able to stall the plane, in alternative you can. This is what I think Bonin was stuck on while fixated on the altitude loss. "System introduces a progressive nose down command which attempts to prevent the speed from decaying further. This command CAN be overridden by sidestick input. The airplane CAN be stalled in Alternate Law."
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Dec 10, 2011 22:50
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Bondematt posted:The plane knew it was in a stall, I haven't seen it say anything about overspeeding. With the pitots blocked it would still be showing last speed(immediate blockage of drain/ram) or no speed(ram blocked) until they changed altitude/unblocked the pitots, assuming they fail the same as a standard pitot. Do you know what happens to your indicated airspeed when you climb in a plane with blocked pitots?
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Dec 11, 2011 07:42
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Hmm, that's true. It would show an increased airspeed. Why did the pilot initiate the climb though, it was not at the direction of the flight director as that wouldn't have occurred until they had already climbed? Did they cross a front while plugged? Bondematt fucked around with this message at 08:09 on Dec 11, 2011 |
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Dec 11, 2011 07:55
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Goddamn, this would be awesome http://www.space.com/13883-nasa-jupiter-moon-europa-lander-mission.html if they can ever scrounge together funding for it.
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Dec 11, 2011 16:43
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Tsuru posted:Do you know what happens to your indicated airspeed when you climb in a plane with blocked pitots? From the transcript: 02:10:35 (Bonin) D'accord. Okay. Thanks to the effects of the anti-icing system, one of the pitot tubes begins to work again. The cockpit displays once again show valid speed information. 02:10:36 (Robert) Redescends! Descend! ... 02:14:27 (Captain) 10 degrès d'assiette... Ten degrees of pitch... Exactly 1.4 seconds later, the cockpit voice recorder stops They had valid speed on the instruments for the vast majority of the time. At the time the pitot tube becomes ice-free and the speed readouts returned, they were still climbing above their cruise altitude.
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Dec 11, 2011 17:21
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Previa_fun posted:I can believe that maybe it was damaged enough that they just put a coat of paint on it and bondo'd it enough to look "presentable." Repost that huge image.
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Dec 11, 2011 17:41
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The Locator posted:From the transcript: You also need to appreciate the way a large airliner handles when the stabilizer is trimmed fully up, especially when the FBW is working against you by neatly ironing out any G and pitch-rate clues as to what is happening. I flew this scenario in a military sim for an aircraft of similar size and weight/CG but without the FBW: even without the C-star pitch control "helping" you, the stablity of the aircraft on the pitch axis and the remaining controllability in the roll axis very deceitfully lull you into a sense that you are in control when you're not. At the same time being inside a ITCZ-sized thunderstorm at night probably did not help them getting a picture of what was happening.
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Dec 11, 2011 18:32
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OK, I've got some time to give an explanation of AF447. Before I get going, you need to understand that at the moment nearly everything you see reported about this accident, both in the media (sourced from both Airbus and from Air France) and sadly from the BEA (the French equivalent to the NTSB), is biased in such a way as to minimise the legal and political fallout from this accident for any of the parties involved, due to the way an aircraft accident proceeds through their legal system. At the moment, Air France and their pilot union contend that there is a fundamental flaw with the A330, and that while some mistakes were made by their aircrew, they do not deserve the share of the blame that the BEA has leveled at them, as it has tremendous implication in the criminal and civil cases that will occur in the next several years. The BEA, on the other hand, seems to be all too happy to blame the aircrew of AF447 as the sole cause of the accident, and doesn't seem to place enough blame on Airbus for the accident - whether this is from a sense of national pride over Airbus or from political pressure from on top is unclear, and frankly not that important for the sake of this discussion. Let me be clear about one thing; there is enough blame in this accident that the aircrew of AF447, Air France and Airbus each share a tremendous amount in their own right. First of all, I'll discuss the A330. Many people contend that the aircraft is unsafe due to the way the aircraft handles and responds to pilot inputs. As I mentioned earlier in the thread, there is simply no truth to this. If there was an unreasonable amount risk associated, one of the many accident investigators of the world would have raised red flags over this years ago - it simply hasn't happened. Granted, Airbus aircraft do things differently than what the armchair or private pilot expects aircraft to do, but there are very good grounds for the decisions that led Airbus to do this (more on this later). From a technical standpoint, our first contributing factor that helped bring down this A330 has very little to do with the aircraft itself; it has to do with Airbus, Air France and EASA (European Air Safety Administration; roughly equivalent to the FAA) equally. After a number of incidents where air data was lost, on account of the Thales-manufactured air data probes icing up in conditions conducive to the formation supercooled water droplets (small water droplets that are cooled below the freezing point; they can form ice at an extremely high rate in certain conditions), Airbus recommended that EASA issue a Technical Service Bulletin (TSB) for airlines to replace the suspect air data probes on A330s and A340s with a different type that uses a more effective heating element. A TSB is similar to any service bulletin issued by a car manufacturer; it should be complied with, but there isn't need for immediate action (inspection or otherwise). As a result, Air France and other airlines decided to replace the suspect probes any time one of the affected aircraft went in for heavy maintenance. Unfortunately for those on AF447, that particular aircraft had not yet been in for heavy maintenance, and was still equipped with the suspect probes. Had Airbus and EASA issued an airworthiness directive (AD) instead (and as they did in the days following the accident), which can include any action up to grounding the affected aircraft until the issue is rectified, this accident likely would never have happened. Our second contributing factor deals with aircrew training. From the very first time a pilot climbs into an aircraft, we are taught that in order to recover from a stall, the procedure is to lower the nose to reduce angle of attack and trade some altitude for more airspeed while adding maximum power. This time-tested procedure goes out the window when you enter the world of high-altitude flight, for good reason (or at least, so we thought). In still air and at low altitudes, like where you would find a Cessna putting around, the difference between what the aircraft "feels" (which is displayed in the cockpit as indicated airspeed, or IAS, on the airspeed gauge) and the actual speed the aircraft is traveling over the ground (true airspeed, or TAS) is minimal; at 5000 feet above sea level, 100 knots indicated might be about 110 knots true. At 35,000 feet, that 100 knots of indicated airspeed turns into 170 knots of true airspeed. This means that at high altitude, you need to accelerate the aircraft longer or harder to get a knot of indicated airspeed than you would at low altitude. In addition to that, you start to run into Mach effects at much lower indicated airspeeds at high altitude than you would at low altitude. As a result, an aircrew needs to be cognizant of the following aspects of high-altitude flight before maneuvering the aircraft: -Small indicated airspeed window between stall and maximum operating mach (Mmo); -Large changes in TAS are needed for small changes in IAS; -Changes in angle of attack (AoA or alpha) occur much faster while maneuvering, due to low IAS; and -Control surfaces are less effective due to reduced IAS. Now, let's return to our Cessna 172 at low altitude. It is a requirement that all pilots demonstrate the ability to fully stall the aircraft, lower the nose, add power and recover to normal flight, with a minimum loss of altitude. In a Cessna 172, this can be done with a 50-foot loss of altitude - not all that major. At cruising altitude in an airliner, however, you might need to lose several thousand feet of altitude to recover from a stall (which isn't desirable at all with aircraft flying at 1000 foot intervals in most of the world), if recovery is even possible - it is conceivable that a swept wing aircraft could be flown into a stall that is so severe that it might be unrecoverable, either because of aerodynamics or because the engines flame out. As a result, pilots flying aircraft in this environment are taught to avoid ever stalling the aircraft in the first place (both by procedures and by recognising the cues that are built into the aircraft, like stall horns, stick shakers and the like), and that if a stall is incipient, the correct procedure is to set maximum power and maintain aircraft attitude until you "fly out" of the stall. Relating this back to AF447, several factors come into play here; first, they were flying into bad weather where turbulence was expected (another contributing factor). In a situation such as that, it is standard procedure to reduce airspeed in order to reduce the impact of the turbulence on the airframe. The negative effect of this, of course, is to eat up some of the airspeed margin above stall speed. The problem here is that the aircrew, like any other in the world, was relying heavily on the autoflight system (both the autopilot and the autothrottles) to make these changes on their behalf. The problem is, many autoflight systems are very good at masking problems until it's too late; what often happens is they will use up all the control authority available to them, at which point they disconnect and hand the aircraft, out of trim and potentially even out of control authority or even engine power, back to the pilots already behind the 8-ball. This is one of my other contributing factors; the over-reliance on automated systems, or at very least, a lack of knowledge as to how these systems degrade (or if they will degrade in the first place) when things go wrong. Even beyond that, there is considerable evidence of poor communication between the two aircrew at the controls in the lead up to the accident. Some of the problem is that it is standard procedure to defer judgement to the pilot in commmand on what action to take; this is all very well and fine when he/she is on the flight deck and in the loop, so to speak, but what if they are in their rest period, as was the case on AF447? I concede that it is highly unusual for something to go wrong in cruise (most accidents occur, of course, at takeoff and landing, when the whole aircrew will be on the flight deck, regardless if they're at the controls or not), but it isn't outside the realm of possibility. The interplay between a relief pilot and the first officer is something that needs to be given the same attention that the relationship between the PIC and the other crew members was years ago. If this accident happened at my company and I needed to make recommendations for preventing a re-occurrence, both for internal use and industry-wide, they would be: 1) Better training and awareness of high-altitude flight characteristics, with emphasis on hand-flying the aircraft. Also, consider changing stall recognition and recovery techniques, possibly to be based on flying the aircraft by angle of attack rather than just pitch and power. 2) Better understanding of flight deck automation, and more and better indication of system degradation. Also, consider simplifying, from a pilot's perspective, how these systems interact with one another. 3) Change and update how CRM works on long haul flights, and set better, more clear rules as to who is in command of the aircraft at any given time. Also, consider including 3-pilot training sessions in the simulator, or improving the scenarios to better reflect realistic situations. 4) Improve communications between airframer, airlines and regulatory bodies with regard to airworthiness issues. In summary, AF447 can't, as many are trying to assert both here and elsewhere, be thought of as a single-point failure. As with any accident, many factors come into play in the chain of events leading up to them; any one "break" in the chain will stop the accident from happening.
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Dec 12, 2011 03:16
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Sorry for the double post, but I found something of interest on a completely unrelated subject. The Boyd Group, an airline consultancy, has released a report on AMR's Chapter 11 filing. It makes for a good read; certainly better than the poo poo some news agencies tried to pass off as "analysis": http://www.aviationplanning.com/Images/AMR%20Bankruptcy%20-%20Time%20For%20Reality.pdf Sounds like Eagle might be all but wound down in the near future.
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Dec 12, 2011 03:27
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MrChips posted:Lots of words While everything you are saying is true it still doesn't change the  feeling I think we're all getting from the flight crews reactions to the situation they were in. I know it was probably a very busy, stressful and terrifying 4 minutes for the two co-pilots, but there was so much instrument information that is so basic for any pilot in front of them that they just seemed to ignore. I mean how do you have an angle of attack of 40 degrees and not see that on your instruments? How do you see both your altitude and and airspeed drop consistently over a few minutes while holding the nose 15 degrees of pitch while the throttles are at max power and not put that info together and realize whats going on?
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Dec 12, 2011 04:44
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kill me now posted:mean how do you have an angle of attack of 40 degrees and not see that on your instruments? I think AoA instruction should be vastly more emphasized in all phases of pilot training. I wonder if the 330 even has an AoA indicator. Most civilian aircraft don't.
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Dec 12, 2011 05:45
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The Ferret King posted:I think AoA instruction should be vastly more emphasized in all phases of pilot training. I wonder if the 330 even has an AoA indicator. Most civilian aircraft don't.
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Dec 12, 2011 09:54
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Something similar happened on Birgenair 301 back in 96, with a 757. Mud dauber wasps made a nest in the pitot tube that fed the Pilot side instruments, but not the copilot side. So the pilot got overspeed while the copilot got stall, and the captain stalled it right into the ocean because the copilot was afraid to challenge the captain. You'd think since pitot, instrument disagree had happened before there'd be more training on it.
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Dec 12, 2011 15:05
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This accident has fundamentally changed how I view aviation. Much like the A330, my attitude is upset by the idea that someone in control of a perfectly serviceable transatlantic airliner can ride it into the ocean while staring at the gauges going "I don't know what's happening!" There's an infamous mythical quote where an Airbus pilot says "what's it doing now?" often quoted by detractors to illustrate the inherent flaw of abstracting the pilot out of the loop. How can you not be swayed in that direction when reading that transcript?
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Dec 12, 2011 15:11
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Ola posted:This accident has fundamentally changed how I view aviation. Much like the A330, my attitude is upset by the idea that someone in control of a perfectly serviceable transatlantic airliner can ride it into the ocean while staring at the gauges going "I don't know what's happening!"
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Dec 12, 2011 15:37
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MrChips, that was an excellent write-up, thanks. I know that the mishap obviously had a whole host of causes/an accident chain, but I can't help but focus in on the breakdown in CRM, just because it seems so egregious. You would think with all the training that takes place with regard to this (not to mention the instances of its successful use to mitigate an otherwise possibly catastrophic situation) people would employ it more effectively.
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Dec 12, 2011 15:38
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Ola posted:This accident has fundamentally changed how I view aviation. Much like the A330, my attitude is upset by the idea that someone in control of a perfectly serviceable transatlantic airliner can ride it into the ocean while staring at the gauges going "I don't know what's happening!" How can you tell an Airbus pilot? He's the one who says, 'What's it doing now?' How can you tell an experienced Airbus pilot? She's the one who says, 'It's doing that again!'
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Dec 12, 2011 16:41
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A good article: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/jsp_includes/articlePrint.jsp?headLine=High-Altitude%20Upset%20Recovery&storyID=news/bca0711p2.xml Includes contributions by a very famous A320 pilot.
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Dec 12, 2011 18:13
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I can't imagine you folks have missed it, but the Flight Level 390 blog is just absolutely fantastic. I can't stop reading it. http://flightlevel390.blogspot.com/ Relevant to the discussion is this excerpt: Captain Dave posted:Fi-Fi (the A320) can be very frustrating to a new pilot when the expected reaction goes off on a wild tangent or does not happen at all. There are work arounds to such problematic areas... Isolate it and apply manual flight techniques until you understand what the automation is trying to do. So very well written, and so, so smart.
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Dec 12, 2011 19:00
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Tsuru posted:FWIW, Airbus has been working on a system that uses inertial reference data to reconstruct an approximate airspeed figure when air data sources become unavailable since well before the accident. The problem is, you can think up the most amazing avionic doodads, but you still have to get your regulatory authorities to accept it and your customers to buy it. Every Airbus has a GPS, and every GPS can calculate speed. Why isn't this a suitable emergency backup for verifying airspeed?
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Dec 12, 2011 19:19
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Ola posted:A good article: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/jsp_includes/articlePrint.jsp?headLine=High-Altitude%20Upset%20Recovery&storyID=news/bca0711p2.xml Emphasis mine: quote:Celebrated for his successful ditching of a powerless A320 in the Hudson River, Sullenberger is now a writer, aviation consultant and public speaker. He notes that there were 12 or 13 similar upset mishaps prior to AF447 in recent years, but that Air France 447 has attracted the most public interest. Sullenberger says that there needs to be a global safety reporting network that will enable the aviation industry to identify problems more quickly and find solutions.
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Dec 12, 2011 19:25
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Mr.Peabody posted:Every Airbus has a GPS, and every GPS can calculate speed. Why isn't this a suitable emergency backup for verifying airspeed? The discrepancy between airspeed and ground speed (what GPS measures) can be hundreds of knots at altitude.
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Dec 12, 2011 19:27
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Mr.Peabody posted:Every Airbus has a GPS, and every GPS can calculate speed. Why isn't this a suitable emergency backup for verifying airspeed?
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Dec 12, 2011 19:33
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The best backup to airspeed is angle of attack. This is a brilliant gauge which puts the pilot further into the loop, giving him more information which is closer to what the wing is doing and abstracted to a very little degree. You can put it on your kitplane and you will have a variant in your military fighter but no certified GA or commercial airliner has it, I don't know why. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DCerL8ljRwk
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Dec 12, 2011 20:13
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Ola posted:This accident has fundamentally changed how I view aviation. Much like the A330, my attitude is upset by the idea that someone in control of a perfectly serviceable transatlantic airliner can ride it into the ocean while staring at the gauges going "I don't know what's happening!" It baffles me as well. I haven't even solo'ed yet, but pitch + power = performance has been beaten into my head over and over again so many times I cannot fathom how it would be forgotten.
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Dec 12, 2011 22:04
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Tsuru posted:Most EFIS aircraft have an FPV symbol that can be enabled on de ADI, which gives you an indication of your AOA, combined with beta+drift. The problem is that for these guys their FPA was so far off the scale that it would have resulted in a dashed symbol at the bottom of the instrument, had they tried to turn it on. The FPV symbol, in all honesty, is just a toy in many cases. Sure it reports AoA, but does it tell you if you've exceeded the critical AoA? Does it take into account flap/leading edge device settings? A proper AoA gauge, or at least a number that changes colour on the PFD, would go a long way to helping in situations like this. iyaayas01 posted:I know that the mishap obviously had a whole host of causes/an accident chain, but I can't help but focus in on the breakdown in CRM, just because it seems so egregious. You would think with all the training that takes place with regard to this (not to mention the instances of its successful use to mitigate an otherwise possibly catastrophic situation) people would employ it more effectively. You've hit the nail on the head. As much as it is a series of unfortunate events and decisions, the poor CRM on AF447 was, IMO, what ultimately led to its demise. Forget about the weather, the aircraft or anything else; proper crew communication could have saved this aircraft. As I touched on in my write-up, very few airlines put the three pilots typical of a long-haul flight together for any kind of meaningful training in the simulator, and I am not aware of any airline that put first officers and relief pilots into any kind of training that accurately reflects the chain of command found on a long-haul flight.
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Dec 12, 2011 22:17
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MrChips posted:You've hit the nail on the head. As much as it is a series of unfortunate events and decisions, the poor CRM on AF447 was, IMO, what ultimately led to its demise. Forget about the weather, the aircraft or anything else; proper crew communication could have saved this aircraft. As I touched on in my write-up, very few airlines put the three pilots typical of a long-haul flight together for any kind of meaningful training in the simulator, and I am not aware of any airline that put first officers and relief pilots into any kind of training that accurately reflects the chain of command found on a long-haul flight. What I find interesting is that most airlines apparently don't do any serious three pilot long-haul-esque sim training...this stands out quite a bit seeing as how the first really famous CRM success story featured an extra pilot in the cockpit who played a pretty crucial role (United 232). That seems like the the sort of thing you would want to run through, doubly so the PIC issues between FOs and relief pilots. Sullenberger is absolutely right in that focusing in on the crew is going to miss a lot of important issues that need to be addressed, but at the same time this was ultimately a failure of CRM and poor decision making.
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Dec 13, 2011 02:58
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BonzoESC posted:Emphasis mine: Considering what MrChips said about the BEA and how some safety reporting systems are exclusive to certain countries, maybe ICAO should implement some global accident investigation styled after the NTSB or NASA ASRS. That way such future accidents (we know they'll happen as long as humans have some input on flying aircraft) could be analyzed with minimized interference from legal/political fallout involving the accident/incident parties.
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Dec 13, 2011 07:35
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MrChips posted:The FPV symbol, in all honesty, is just a toy in many cases. Sure it reports AoA, but does it tell you if you've exceeded the critical AoA? Does it take into account flap/leading edge device settings? A proper AoA gauge, or at least a number that changes colour on the PFD, would go a long way to helping in situations like this. Link
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Dec 13, 2011 12:28
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OK, if you've hung out in AI you've probably seen the video of that guy who built that fully functional 1/4 scale model Ferrari. Well, somebody has done the same thing. For planes. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gIsvW_yhhjs
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Dec 13, 2011 19:30
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drat. After a labor of love like that, I don't know if I could bear to fly it. I was also totally hoping for an in-cockpit camera with head tracking and video goggles.
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Dec 13, 2011 19:42
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They do a some giant-scale RC model things in Dayton from time to time, looks like the Jet World Masters was in Dayton in 2011, but I think there are other events. Unfortunately either my google is bad, or they are bad at web presence, because I'm not finding anything annual for 2012. I'd really like to see it some day.
Slo-Tek fucked around with this message at 20:22 on Dec 13, 2011 |
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Dec 13, 2011 20:20
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I present the following challenge to the RC community. A fully VTOL F-35, ducted fan, tilting/swiveling nozzle and all, with computer control which can do a stable hover.
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Dec 13, 2011 20:28
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Former Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen and others looking to build the largest plane in history for launching vehicles into space: http://www.spaceflightnow.com/news/n1112/13stratolaunch/ If this thing actually flies...wow. Stratolaunch website, looks like it's getting bombed right now though: http://stratolaunch.com/
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Dec 13, 2011 20:31
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Never change, Rutan. Getting 13,500lb to LEO with that small a rocket is impressive. Thats not far behind what the Falcon 9 gets with nearly 10 times the propellant.
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Dec 13, 2011 21:27
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That's only because the Jet-A to feed 6 turbines hauling 1.2 million pounds 1400 miles doesn't count as 'propellant'.
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Dec 13, 2011 23:06
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Advent Horizon posted:That's only because the Jet-A to feed 6 turbines hauling 1.2 million pounds 1400 miles doesn't count as 'propellant'. But you mix those pounds of fuel mix with 20-40lbs of air instead of carrying your oxygen. That's where the real advantage comes from.
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Dec 13, 2011 23:30
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Nerobro posted:But you mix those pounds of fuel mix with 20-40lbs of air instead of carrying your oxygen. That's where the real advantage comes from. That and I suppose a first stage that partially gains altitude by generating some lift by design rather than just brute force. That said, I'd be surprised if it's terribly successful. Not sure there is much of a market for a bigger Pegasus given the competition but we'll see.  Mainly interested just to see if they really build that big rear end plane.
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Dec 13, 2011 23:51
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MrChips posted:Now, let's return to our Cessna 172 at low altitude. It is a requirement that all pilots demonstrate the ability to fully stall the aircraft, lower the nose, add power and recover to normal flight, with a minimum loss of altitude. In a Cessna 172, this can be done with a 50-foot loss of altitude - not all that major. At cruising altitude in an airliner, however, you might need to lose several thousand feet of altitude to recover from a stall (which isn't desirable at all with aircraft flying at 1000 foot intervals in most of the world), if recovery is even possible - it is conceivable that a swept wing aircraft could be flown into a stall that is so severe that it might be unrecoverable, either because of aerodynamics or because the engines flame out. As a result, pilots flying aircraft in this environment are taught to avoid ever stalling the aircraft in the first place (both by procedures and by recognising the cues that are built into the aircraft, like stall horns, stick shakers and the like), and that if a stall is incipient, the correct procedure is to set maximum power and maintain aircraft attitude until you "fly out" of the stall. Can you elaborate on the bolded part? Because what if you can't fly out of the stall?
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Dec 14, 2011 00:42
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Alpine Mustache posted:Can you elaborate on the bolded part? Because what if you can't fly out of the stall? Then you're going to be on the news! If everything is working right, it won't be a problem. The stall warning system will sound before the aircraft actually stalls, and increasing airspeed will get you into a safer angle of attack (relative wind gets closer to the chord line). Plus, a modern fly-by-wire jetliner will either try to keep you from stalling altogether, or fight you, if you get too close to the stall. If you're talking about a stall close to the ground, flying out in the manner described is actually the safest alternative in a lot of ways. You don't want a pilot to hear the stall warning, push the yoke/stick forward to recover, and plow the plane into the ground. The problem, of course, is when the warning systems and automation fail, and training doesn't cover what's going on.
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Dec 14, 2011 01:16
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