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iyaayas01 posted:Northrop got royally pissed and sued McD...eventually they reached a settlement where McD would pay $50 million to Northrop and gain sole rights to the design (and any subsequent foreign sales), with no admission of wrongdoing. With negotiating skills like this, it seems like common sense that nobody ever buys their airplanes.
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# ? Dec 16, 2011 15:35 |
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# ? May 22, 2024 07:29 |
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Certainly an interesting way to transport an experimental aircraft. http://www.abc-7.com/story/16323848/2011/12/14/its-a-bird-its-a-planeits-a-ufo quote:COWLEY COUNTY, KANSAS -
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# ? Dec 17, 2011 06:35 |
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PREYING MANTITS posted:Certainly an interesting way to transport an experimental aircraft. Maybe an X-47B? wiki thinks it is 38' long, but with the wings off 32' is probably about right. Though Wiki claims that X-47B ship 2 had it's maiden flight in November 2011, and they will both eventually end up at Pax river, so maybe with a new one at Edwards, they are sending ship 1 to Patuxent. Slo-Tek fucked around with this message at 07:05 on Dec 17, 2011 |
# ? Dec 17, 2011 06:47 |
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Needs better pictures. At 32' it wouldn't have had any problem going anywhere, given that a normal semi-trailer is 53' long. The story says that they had to remove signs because the load was too long to make a turn, but 32' isn't nearly long enough to pose that sort of problem. Edit: Better picture, still not great, doesn't really look that long, just wide. The Locator fucked around with this message at 07:42 on Dec 17, 2011 |
# ? Dec 17, 2011 07:36 |
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The Locator posted:Needs better pictures. At 32' it wouldn't have had any problem going anywhere, given that a normal semi-trailer is 53' long. Here's a photo of first X-47B flight last February: And a photo of one of the mockups of it they've been trotting around to various airshows, for scale:
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# ? Dec 17, 2011 14:56 |
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Godholio posted:With negotiating skills like this, it seems like common sense that nobody ever buys their airplanes. On the contrary. A company that builds pretty awesome planes but can't negotiate for poo poo? That's like going to a Ford dealership and buying a GT for 30k because the 19 year old "salesman" doesn't know what a Ford GT is.
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# ? Dec 17, 2011 15:26 |
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Slo-Tek posted:Maybe an X-47B? wiki thinks it is 38' long, but with the wings off 32' is probably about right. Interesting, between your theory and grover's I'd say that's very likely what it was. Especially when comparing the profile with grover's first flight shot.
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# ? Dec 18, 2011 00:10 |
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Maybe there's a smaller plane inside
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# ? Dec 18, 2011 01:41 |
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How do they get the truck to the destination?
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# ? Dec 18, 2011 04:43 |
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Godholio posted:How do they get the truck to the destination? In pieces and assembled on site. Not many places need to send or receive entire Airbus fuselage sections.
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# ? Dec 18, 2011 06:45 |
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iyaayas01 posted:Hypoxia happens pretty fast at 50,000 feet. Going to have to read through the mishap report. edit; drat website is down now. Octoduck fucked around with this message at 07:22 on Dec 18, 2011 |
# ? Dec 18, 2011 07:10 |
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Gorilla Salad posted:Maybe there's a smaller plane inside Is that a 787 forward fuselage?
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# ? Dec 18, 2011 20:49 |
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In an Airbus? Boeing's got its own distorted-looking giant cargo aircraft to haul other aircraft parts around in:
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# ? Dec 18, 2011 21:20 |
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edit: /\/\ Waldo is just below the port horizontal stabilizer.Advent Horizon posted:Is that a 787 forward fuselage? Looks like an A321 to me.
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# ? Dec 18, 2011 21:20 |
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The Christian Science Monitor is reporting that Iran did highjack the drone electronically, by messing with it's GPS. Supposedly Iranians managed to trick the drone into thinking it was landing in Afghanistan.
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# ? Dec 18, 2011 23:21 |
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Nebakenezzer posted:The Christian Science Monitor is reporting that Iran did highjack the drone electronically, by messing with it's GPS. Supposedly Iranians managed to trick the drone into thinking it was landing in Afghanistan. This has been discussed at length in the thread over in GiP...the general consensus is that it is typical Iranian propaganda bullshit. Jamming GPS signal != hacking the Gibson and spoofing the drone into thinking it is somewhere it is not...these things have INS for a reason.
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# ? Dec 19, 2011 00:07 |
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Ola posted:edit: /\/\ Waldo is just below the port horizontal stabilizer. Holy poo poo it sure looks like he is. Also NASA has/had their own version:
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# ? Dec 19, 2011 00:15 |
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Phanatic posted:In an Airbus? Airbus only made theirs after the line "every Airbus is delivered on the wings of a Boeing" became known.
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# ? Dec 19, 2011 05:57 |
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Here's your daily aircraft porn: Air NZ has just rolled out a black 777 and it looks so loving sexy. That thing's just about the most boss civilian aircraft I've seen. Having said that, the fern on the back puts a bit too much non-black on it for my personal liking - that gloss black just looks so sexy I want more of it.
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# ? Dec 19, 2011 09:38 |
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ANZ took delivery of an A320 this fall in the same livery. This fall was also the Rugby World Cup. To say the French made a couple comments while the aircraft was on the flight line would be putting it mildly. http://www.airliners.net/photo/Air-New-Zealand/Airbus-A320-232/2017930/&sid=2e3dc5b707ce290618869aa83522c154 Understeer fucked around with this message at 13:29 on Dec 19, 2011 |
# ? Dec 19, 2011 13:25 |
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iyaayas01 posted:This has been discussed at length in the thread over in GiP...the general consensus is that it is typical Iranian propaganda bullshit. Jamming GPS signal != hacking the Gibson and spoofing the drone into thinking it is somewhere it is not...these things have INS for a reason. The general consensus there sucks. If I owned 3 radio towers I could make a military drone fly off course, and I'm not an electronic warfare agency of a government. All you need is the known coordinates of 3 satellites, their broadcast frequency, and the ability to delay and rebroadcast their signal from multiple ground sources. A simple delay can trick the GPS into thinking it's 500 miles West of its actual location, and cause it to suddenly veer to the East. It would think it is correcting its position or returning to base, when in fact it is flying deeper into Iran. GiP think because the signal is encrypted it is impossible to crack, but they don't need to crack it, just slow it down. They think Iran is too stupid to hack it, but it's not complicated and it's not even innovative. All it took was a few minutes on google to find a research white-paper on the vulnerabilities of military GPS receivers. Now imagine if you are a government with an electronic warfare agency, access to a hundred radio towers, a serious interest in recovering a remote controlled spy plane, and daily opportunities to do so. So you have to acknowledge the vulnerability exists and there is continual access to exploit that vulnerability. Every day the probability that they will exploit it approaches 1. So now you've caused a drone to veer off course and it's going to attempt to fly 500 miles in the wrong direction until it runs out of fuel. All the remains is the glide characteristics of an aircraft that's designed to maximize efficiency and maintain straight and level flight so it can hover over a target for hours on end. People in there seriously think this thing is going to brick, but it's not.. it's going to glide. Sure it's going to hit hard and fast, but plenty of people survive crashes like with only some structural damage to the aircraft. Like the taped back on wing we see in the Iranian press photo.
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# ? Dec 19, 2011 14:26 |
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Mr.Peabody posted:The general consensus there sucks. If I owned 3 radio towers I could make a military drone fly off course, and I'm not an electronic warfare agency of a government. All you need is the known coordinates of 3 satellites, their broadcast frequency, and the ability to delay and rebroadcast their signal from multiple ground sources. A simple delay can trick the GPS into thinking it's 500 miles West of its actual location, and cause it to suddenly veer to the East. It would think it is correcting its position or returning to base, when in fact it is flying deeper into Iran. GiP think because the signal is encrypted it is impossible to crack, but they don't need to crack it, just slow it down. They think Iran is too stupid to hack it, but it's not complicated and it's not even innovative. All it took was a few minutes on google to find a research white-paper on the vulnerabilities of military GPS receivers. Now imagine if you are a government with an electronic warfare agency, access to a hundred radio towers, a serious interest in recovering a remote controlled spy plane, and daily opportunities to do so. So you have to acknowledge the vulnerability exists and there is continual access to exploit that vulnerability. Every day the probability that they will exploit it approaches 1. It's definitely possible to do, and I've seen it done...on civilian GPS receivers. Remember that military receivers can decrypt P(Y) (accuracy improvement) starting with PPS-SM in the mid 1990s, and currently on SAASM (the uDAGR I've linked below implements SAASM). It doesn't improve jam-resistance any though (same signal coming from space), though the new code they are rolling out on Block IIR/IIF promises to improve that aspect as well. What the P-code does prevent is an enemy transmitter mimicking a real GPS satellite and the P(Y) code. The GPS ASICs that Uncle Sam uses are rolled in-house; I think you're in for a world of hurt if you're caught with a Rockwell GPS ASIC in your pocket. "Browns are dumb hurrr"/"GiP is dumb hurrrrr" aside though, it'd be dumb for an UAV like that to depend solely on GPS as a navigation system as iyaayas said, and it likely has a INS/IMU or similar system as well. Coupled with a large amount of sensor fusion fed into a control system, it'd be almost impossible for a UAV to not realize that it's GPS data if supposedly jammed/compromised is no longer valid. Every civilian UAV I've seen, even the most basic of homemade drone has some type of IMU in play feeding into a Kalman filter or similar. Some of us moronic civilians even go further and implement Schuler tuning in our INS. I think that article makes a good (and almost reasonable) story, and hopefully my faith in the competence of our fine engineers at Lockheed and friends is not mis-placed. Here is a public/non-classified description of RC's modern military GPS portable unit. e: SAASM - Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module DAGR - Defense Advanced GPS Receiver Selective Availability - a now defunct ability to introduce artificial navigation error in public navigation signals P(Y) - the "precision" code. Each satellite broadcasts several signals, originally just the public/open to all C/A coarse code and precision P code, but now expanded to new secure code (M code) and transmitting civilian signals on a new frequency as well. Currently there are: L1 - C/A, L1C Civilian Code, Military (M) Code, P(Y) L2 - L2C Civilian Code, Military (M) Code L3 - NUCLEAR LAUNCH DETECTED L4 - Nothing L5 - Safety of Life e2: "well what the gently caress do you know about GPS movax?" I researched under one of the engineers on the original NAVSTAR project, read several of the standard GPS texts from cover-to-cover and am currently home-building a GPS receiver, so I think I know a fair amount about it. Still all conjecture though. e3: jamming != spoofing, jamming should not have made the UAV "land safely in Iran", and if they successfully spoofed our military GPS signals, we are kinda boned. Jamming is me screaming "DICKS DICKS DICKS DICKS" so you can't hear what your friend is saying, spoofing is me intercepting your friend's words and replacing them with my own "LAND YOUR DICK IN MY BUTT" movax fucked around with this message at 17:58 on Dec 19, 2011 |
# ? Dec 19, 2011 16:01 |
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Are you writing your own GPS code, or using a premade chip? What is your output? NMEA 0183 over serial is all I've used so far, and on a somewhat old USB GPS WAAS module. I have an old Trimble SLGR unit floating around somewhere, I don't remember it working very well, the old SA being set makes a lot of sense. DJ Commie fucked around with this message at 17:27 on Dec 19, 2011 |
# ? Dec 19, 2011 17:20 |
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Mr.Peabody posted:The general consensus there sucks. If I owned 3 radio towers I could make a military drone fly off course, and I'm not an electronic warfare agency of a government. All you need is the known coordinates of 3 satellites, their broadcast frequency, and the ability to delay and rebroadcast their signal from multiple ground sources. A simple delay can trick the GPS into thinking it's 500 miles West of its actual location, and cause it to suddenly veer to the East. It would think it is correcting its position or returning to base, when in fact it is flying deeper into Iran. GiP think because the signal is encrypted it is impossible to crack, but they don't need to crack it, just slow it down. They think Iran is too stupid to hack it, but it's not complicated and it's not even innovative. All it took was a few minutes on google to find a research white-paper on the vulnerabilities of military GPS receivers. Now imagine if you are a government with an electronic warfare agency, access to a hundred radio towers, a serious interest in recovering a remote controlled spy plane, and daily opportunities to do so. So you have to acknowledge the vulnerability exists and there is continual access to exploit that vulnerability. Every day the probability that they will exploit it approaches 1. Jamming does not equal seizing control. Unless there were a constellation of jammers along the route-of flight, the drone would eventually lose line-of-sight and return to normal operations. If the data it was getting from the jammers was conflicting (and it almost certainly would be) it would switch to INS navigation, but it would probably take a few minutes before the system made the switch. If you think they were SPOOFING the signal, that's something different, and that's where you disagree with people I trust more than random goons, even in AI where we've got some smart folks in their fields. Edit: Well poo poo, movax pretty much owns this topic.
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# ? Dec 19, 2011 17:27 |
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DJ Commie posted:Are you writing your own GPS code, or using a premade chip? What is your output? NMEA 0183 over serial is all I've used so far, and on a somewhat old USB GPS WAAS module. Using a pre-made chip is really easy with an Arduino or any other microcontroller, and is far more practical then what I'm doing, heh. I've used quite a few, from SirF to cheap-rear end Chinese ones integrated with GSM (SIM548 and similar). Mostly interfaced with over serial and NMEA 0183 format, as you said. I'm basing mine off this project and some Altera FPGAs I have laying around. That project in turn was build by an Eastern European guy who built his own receiver almost fifteen loving years ago out of discrete chips. This will be retarded expensive, but incredibly satisfying to build from scratch. I find it really cool to scratch build something that's usually limited to a giant corporation + semiconductor fab; high-speed stuff is really hard for the hobbyist/enthusiast to break into. I wonder if it'll violate ITAR because it lacks any speed/altitude restrictions movax fucked around with this message at 17:49 on Dec 19, 2011 |
# ? Dec 19, 2011 17:45 |
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Pfft, the Navy?
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# ? Dec 19, 2011 22:45 |
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Ola posted:edit: /\/\ Waldo is just below the port horizontal stabilizer. I think it's a A320 or A319. There's no exit door just in front of the wing. The 321 is a bit longer.
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# ? Dec 19, 2011 22:49 |
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Colonial Air Force posted:Pfft, the Navy? Hah, that picture owns, know anything about the circumstances it was taken in?
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# ? Dec 19, 2011 23:01 |
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I'd like to think they came up behind it with a larger aircraft that swallowed it up like in the old James Bond movies.
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# ? Dec 19, 2011 23:04 |
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movax posted:Hah, that picture owns, know anything about the circumstances it was taken in? Brits and Yanks zapping each other also: VF-11's insignia on 892 Sqn's tail 892 Sqn's tail on VMFA 531's F-4
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# ? Dec 19, 2011 23:35 |
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Mr.Peabody posted:The general consensus there sucks. If I owned 3 radio towers I could make a military drone fly off course, and I'm not an electronic warfare agency of a government. All you need is the known coordinates of 3 satellites, their broadcast frequency, and the ability to delay and rebroadcast their signal from multiple ground sources. A simple delay can trick the GPS into thinking it's 500 miles West of its actual location, and cause it to suddenly veer to the East. It would think it is correcting its position or returning to base, when in fact it is flying deeper into Iran. GiP think because the signal is encrypted it is impossible to crack, but they don't need to crack it, just slow it down. They think Iran is too stupid to hack it, but it's not complicated and it's not even innovative. All it took was a few minutes on google to find a research white-paper on the vulnerabilities of military GPS receivers. Now imagine if you are a government with an electronic warfare agency, access to a hundred radio towers, a serious interest in recovering a remote controlled spy plane, and daily opportunities to do so. So you have to acknowledge the vulnerability exists and there is continual access to exploit that vulnerability. Every day the probability that they will exploit it approaches 1.
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# ? Dec 20, 2011 00:39 |
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Colonial Air Force posted:Pfft, the Navy? F-4s could get off a ramp deck?
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# ? Dec 20, 2011 00:50 |
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Understeer posted:ANZ took delivery of an A320 this fall in the same livery. This fall was also the Rugby World Cup. To say the French made a couple comments while the aircraft was on the flight line would be putting it mildly. That's hot.
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# ? Dec 20, 2011 01:04 |
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Godholio posted:F-4s could get off a ramp deck? The Audacious class Ark Royal was a good 'ol catapult and tailhook aircraft carrier.
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# ? Dec 20, 2011 01:06 |
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That would explain it.
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# ? Dec 20, 2011 02:07 |
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movax posted:It's definitely possible to do, and I've seen it done...on civilian GPS receivers. Remember that military receivers can decrypt P(Y) (accuracy improvement) starting with PPS-SM in the mid 1990s, and currently on SAASM (the uDAGR I've linked below implements SAASM). It doesn't improve jam-resistance any though (same signal coming from space), though the new code they are rolling out on Block IIR/IIF promises to improve that aspect as well. What the P-code does prevent is an enemy transmitter mimicking a real GPS satellite and the P(Y) code. The GPS ASICs that Uncle Sam uses are rolled in-house; I think you're in for a world of hurt if you're caught with a Rockwell GPS ASIC in your pocket. I think there's been some confusion, in that the theory is that it was a two-fold attack. UAVs are primarily piloted by a human. The theory goes that there was a jamming signal that disconnected the "unhackable" encrypted command and control signal from the UAV forcing it to fall back into a GPS guided "return home" failover. The second part of the attack was then manipulating the timing of the GPS streams to manipulate the UAV to consider itself off course and attempt to correct itself. I know the military is working on a new generation of GPS signal that will be far more robust and secure than what is currently implemented, but I'm not aware of the minuta of detail. It's pretty cool you're home-brewing a GPS receiver, I'm definitely not opposed to hearing all sides of the issue but as I've been piecing it together it seems there's definitely a plausibility to using signal attacks on the UAVs to prevent them from returning back to base. It could just be that the Iranians sort of stumbled into a plausible scenario through coincidence, but I think in terms of national security, we should mitigate risk and not off-handedly dismiss potential threats as GiP demonstrates.
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# ? Dec 20, 2011 02:43 |
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grover posted:This wouldn't work; the rebroadcast encrypted signal would be rejected for being out-of-tolerance. Spoofing of this sort only works when the signal starts out completely synchronized with the GPS unit's position- something that can only happen if the repeater is initially positioned within a few feet of the target. It's something that's easily done in a laboratory, but just not possible in practice. this one I just stumbled across than the GiP discussion on the matter. E: What's the potential to using GBAS augmentation to assist in the spoofing? Mr.Peabody fucked around with this message at 03:02 on Dec 20, 2011 |
# ? Dec 20, 2011 02:58 |
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Mr.Peabody posted:I think there's been some confusion, in that the theory is that it was a two-fold attack. UAVs are primarily piloted by a human. The theory goes that there was a jamming signal that disconnected the "unhackable" encrypted command and control signal from the UAV forcing it to fall back into a GPS guided "return home" failover. The second part of the attack was then manipulating the timing of the GPS streams to manipulate the UAV to consider itself off course and attempt to correct itself. Here's the problem with that though...as has been stated before, the drone doesn't rely solely on GPS for guidance. It has some sort of INS that would be GPS updated; INS's are generally insanely accurate on their own. In order for the scenario to play out the Iranians would have to jam/otherwise prevent the control signal from getting to the drone (possible), spoof the GPS signal effectively enough to convince the drone to continue to use GPS updating instead of just going solely on INS (unlikely), and do it for a long enough time that the drone's INS is brought far enough off course (even more unlikely). Like we've said, it isn't as simple as going "haha drone, you are no longer here where you thought you were, you are now here" because of the INS. Also, that article you linked to discusses the "hacked" unencrypted video feeds as a serious problem, which really says all you need to know about his credibility on the issue. (Hint: that isn't much of a problem.) Edit: In non-drone related news, the K-MAX made its first flight in Afghanistan over the weekend. This is a pretty cool program. From Bill Sweetman's comment on that article... quote:In the lighter moments of World War II, the Spitfire was used in an unorthodox role: bringing beer kegs to the men in Normandy. Read the whole thing and check out the awesome pictures. iyaayas01 fucked around with this message at 03:39 on Dec 20, 2011 |
# ? Dec 20, 2011 03:17 |
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Mr.Peabody posted:I'm not putting myself out as an expert on GPS, but it's more interesting to find websites like http://www.syssec.ethz.ch/research/ccs139-tippenhauer.pdf
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# ? Dec 20, 2011 04:59 |
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# ? May 22, 2024 07:29 |
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Mr.Peabody posted:I'm not putting myself out as an expert on GPS, but it's more interesting to find websites like That article is attacking the civilian signals, which make absolutely 0 guarantee as to the veracity of the data being transmitted. Again, the encryption applied generating the current P(Y)-code (on its way out) aids in anti-spoofing, primarily. It prevents me from modifying the words your buddy is telling you, but it won't do much against me yelling at the top of my lungs to drown out your friend's words. Of course, the downside of deploying a GPS jammer is that an AGM-88 HARM (which iyaayas could tell you all about) will be very excited to reduce your radiation source to rubble (using microwaves as decoys aside, like the Serbians did). Mr.Peabody posted:I think there's been some confusion, in that the theory is that it was a two-fold attack. UAVs are primarily piloted by a human. The theory goes that there was a jamming signal that disconnected the "unhackable" encrypted command and control signal from the UAV forcing it to fall back into a GPS guided "return home" failover. Unless defense contractor security is incredibly abysmal, or there was a huge unreported security breach, I don't think the scenario of breaking in and literally "stealing" the drone by taking over its command/control is feasible. Jamming it though to create the scenario you describ would be feasible though. quote:The second part of the attack was then manipulating the timing of the GPS streams to manipulate the UAV to consider itself off course and attempt to correct itself. I know the military is working on a new generation of GPS signal that will be far more robust and secure than what is currently implemented, but I'm not aware of the minuta of detail. Discussed above; the encryption/mathematical protection aside, grover described basic communication theory a few posts ago that renders it incredibly difficult to spoof GPS signals out in the wild. GPS is incredibly timing-sensitive (some systems utilize GPS not for location, but for time synchronization. (something like a Symmetricom 4410A or similar that probably costs more than you or I make in a year). e: in fact, I think AT&T microcells utilize their GPS receiver for position (to make sure you can't run it in Europe/outside of the country it's RF is designed for) as well as time synchronization.
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# ? Dec 20, 2011 06:55 |