|
Fragmented posted:For what it's worth i remember a drone thinking something was "As impossible as traveling through time." it one of the books, either Matter or Use of Weapons i think. Banks covered this in one of the more recent books, with a soldier trapped inside a slowly overheating spacecraft wondering about the backed-up version of herself that would be reborn, and how much she'd changed from being that person.
|
#
?
Mar 22, 2012 19:29
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 11, 2024 22:22 |
|
|
andrew smash posted:The real reason is that banks is an anarchist, not a physicist, and doesn't write time travel stories because at least to this point he hasn't wanted to. There isn't a consistency between culture universe physics and relativity because he hasn't bothered to try and come up with one. And, let's be honest - the resulting culture book would suck balls if he did. You're right of course. Fun story > technobabble any day, but Banks does say quite a few things that obviously refer to relativity. There's the notion in Excession of the 'skein' of real space, warped/dimpled by mass, just like gravity is the curvature of spacetime in general relativity. There are also explicit references to gravity waves, both as natural phenomena and as artificial signals or sensory pulses. In The State of the Art, when the Arbitrary leaves the solar system it accelerates in real space as long as it can, so that its "rapidly increasing mass" might be noticed by gravity wave experiments on Earth, implying that both special and general relativity are valid on some level. So he hasn't ignored relativity completely, just its more worrying implications for FTL travel and causality. I doubt he'll ever try to explain the paradox away, and no 'explanation' would be ultimately satisfactory (just fewer and fewer people would know exactly why it was BS), but I like my idea - it at least kinda sorta makes sense with what we already know about information propagation (related events that look like they're separated by spacelike intervals in real space are still separated by timelike intervals in hyperspace), and since there's light in hyperspace and it does travel much much faster... it just seemed conceptually neat to me. That still doesn't solve the problem of anyone with hyperspace access essentially being the Kwisatz Haderach, constantly receiving signals from their future selves. Maybe that's what makes Minds so smart! This does really make me wonder about causality in media where the speed of light is lower... the same apparent time travel should be possible, unless I'm misunderstanding. Of course it doesn't matter and I doubt Banks will write a time travel Culture book... it would invalidate the rest of the series, and it would probably suck, like you said. I just hope he keeps producing technobabble that's up to the same thought provoking level as what he has done in the past (according to my inertial frame!). mllaneza posted:Neither of those look enough like sex toys. Honestly. Indeed. I present the Psychopath Class ex-Rapid Offensive Unit, now Very Fast Picket Frank Exchange of Views  http://i.imgur.com/5wC5U.jpg
|
|
#
?
Mar 22, 2012 20:22
|
|
|
Fragmented posted:
Oct  Morthanveld  Nariscene 
|
|
#
?
Mar 22, 2012 23:35
|
|
|
The only alien I had trouble envisioning was Kabe. He's like a triangle on legs isn't he or something?
|
|
#
?
Mar 22, 2012 23:43
|
|
|
Prolonged Priapism posted:This does really make me wonder about causality in media where the speed of light is lower... the same apparent time travel should be possible, unless I'm misunderstanding. You are. It is already possible to accelerate particles above the speed of light in specific media. All it does is produce a pretty glow, no time travel involved or causality broken.
|
|
#
?
Mar 23, 2012 00:18
|
|
|
a kitten posted:awesome pictures Is that Marain functional (has anyone actually made it functional?) I remember watching a video of somebody creating a nonary typeface, but I don't remember if it covered anything about the structure of Marain itself.
|
|
#
?
Mar 23, 2012 02:17
|
|
|
Fragmented posted:For what it's worth i remember a drone thinking something was "As impossible as traveling through time." it one of the books, either Matter or Use of Weapons i think. Oh boy,  Maybe I'll post about this when I get to work. The short version is that each time you make a scan or backup of yourself, 'you' forks into two 'yous' who each have valid claim to be the original, but after that point it's every fork for itself.
|
|
#
?
Mar 23, 2012 14:12
|
|
|
Flipswitch posted:The only alien I had trouble envisioning was Kabe. More like a tetrahedron with a huge mouth on top and three legs. Jet black, if I am not mistaken. A huge mouth as well, I remember something about people being alarmed when they saw him eating.
|
|
#
?
Mar 23, 2012 17:47
|
|
|
It comes down to whether or not you have a 'soul'. If not, if there is no such thing, then anything that's identical to you must be you. If you do have a soul then anything that has your soul is you. Or, conversely doesn't have your soul isn't you. Banks, to my knowledge, doesn't address soulness directly but since he does hint at 'afterlife' pretty routinely (the sublimed/ascended?) it is certainly one of his larger, hanging questions.
|
|
#
?
Mar 23, 2012 17:51
|
|
|
a kitten posted:I think this is his photostream, there are the covers as well as a GSV and assorted aliens. Lovely art, both the concept art and the covers. But I cursed when I saw this http://www.flickr.com/photos/lukejfrost/5723722577/sizes/l/in/set-72157626729157968/
|
|
#
?
Mar 23, 2012 22:34
|
|
|
Murgos posted:It comes down to whether or not you have a 'soul'. It's pretty clear that sublimation is the process by which a civ passes from banks-style singularity to vinge-style singularity. Afterlife among the galactics in the way most people think of it is explicitly dealt with in surface detail.
|
|
#
?
Mar 23, 2012 23:56
|
|
|
Murgos posted:It comes down to whether or not you have a 'soul'. What? That's inane. A perfect duplicate of me is not me. It's another being in another body with identical chemical makeup and physical state. It's like the transporters in Star Trek- if the transporter didn't disassemble the crew before reassembling them, but instead copied the information about where all their particles were and reassembled them, you wouldn't insist that they were the same people!
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 00:59
|
|
|
What about the loner guy in Excession that the Affront kills? The traitor mind says it captured his mind state before he was killed and the guy ends up being brought back to life. The mind even uses it as an excuse when trying to convince itself it was right(after the Killing Time effectors it hehe) What's the difference between that and death though? If it's just a copy the first guy is still gone right? What then is the point of backing up? (I can understand in the case of SC agents because SC owns your rear end) Fragmented fucked around with this message at 01:53 on Mar 24, 2012 |
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 01:50
|
|
|
Fragmented posted:What about the loner guy in Excession that the Affront kills? The traitor mind says it captured his mind state before he was killed and the guy ends up being brought back to life. The mind even uses it as an excuse when trying to convince itself it was right(after the Killing Time effectors it hehe) Really? Killing Time has an entire bit in the same book about backing up and then feeling an oddly settled calm now that mind was set and course is true. Killing Time has a moment of personal introspection (Obviously rare for OU class) and then decides against re-transmitting the updated version of Killing Time.
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 02:06
|
|
|
Fragmented posted:What about the loner guy in Excession that the Affront kills? The traitor mind says it captured his mind state before he was killed and the guy ends up being brought back to life. The mind even uses it as an excuse when trying to convince itself it was right(after the Killing Time effectors it hehe) You don't back up for yourself, really, you back up so that there'll still be a more or less you sort of thing in the world, whether because you think you're awesome enough that your nonexistence would hurt the world or simply so that your friends don't have to deal with the pain of your not being around anymore. Of course, this also occurs in a setting where people seem to have agreed to not think too closely about the matter. Your continuity of consciousness is still over. Like I say, the best way to imagine it is to consider what happens if the backup is activated before the original is killed/destroyed. E: If you haven't read Stross's Accelerando, it deals to some extent with the weirdness that happens once backups and AI are fairly cheap and it's possible to simply spawn copies of your consciousness and set them loose in the net. It's also one of the most anti-singulitarian books I've ever read.
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 02:08
|
|
|
If a recent copy of your mindtsate isn't a good enough match to be you, then you aren't the person who fell asleep in your bed, either. 
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 02:11
|
|
|
Pope Guilty posted:It's also one of the most anti-singulitarian books I've ever read. Ahehehehehe, wiggly line. Is this anything resembling a thing or did you just go with a word that should work?
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 02:16
|
|
|
rejutka posted:Ahehehehehe, wiggly line. Is this anything resembling a thing or did you just go with a word that should work? If it isn't the right word, then dammit, something like it should be!
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 02:20
|
|
|
We are nothing new. *nods sagely* That said, is there anyone would not become a part of the Culture? Gobuchul and Zakalwe are the only two I remember with genuine misgivings.
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 02:27
|
|
|
rejutka posted:We are nothing new. *nods sagely* Culture people can be privileged jerks sometimes, but really, it's a society created with the goal of creating a utopia. Who wouldn't?
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 02:43
|
|
|
Pope Guilty posted:If it isn't the right word, then dammit, something like it should be! I've seen people on the internet use the term singularitarian without irony. take that as you will. rejutka posted:That said, is there anyone would not become a part of the Culture? Gobuchul and Zakalwe are the only two I remember with genuine misgivings. Horza and zakalwe, despite being interesting protagonists, are also war criminals by any sensible definition of the word so consider their perspective.
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 02:50
|
|
|
The Dark One posted:If a recent copy of your mindtsate isn't a good enough match to be you, then you aren't the person who fell asleep in your bed, either. This is where this discussion usually ends up i know. I'm more wondering about the universe of the the culture. Like in Excession when the first ship to encounter it is destroyed you find out at the end that the mind states of every human/AI are saved by it. If it is truly the death of consciousness with a copy left in it's place then isn't the excession just as bad as if it just killed them without saving a copy?
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 03:39
|
|
|
andrew smash posted:Horza and zakalwe, despite being interesting protagonists, are also war criminals by any sensible definition of the word so consider their perspective. Not mutually exclusive. (partially the point.)
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 04:35
|
|
|
Pope Guilty posted:What? That's inane. A perfect duplicate of me is not me. It's another being in another body with identical chemical makeup and physical state. Yes you would. The same process that would occur here (reconstruction of the template from new matter) occurs naturally over the course of your life. The notional transporter here simply accelerates that process from years to moments. As long as the pattern of information is preserved, it's you. (Bear in mind that any copying or transcription process immediately creates two forks which begin to diverge when the process is complete and the causal connection severed.) If you're religious of course you may feel differently, but the physics is unequivocal and doesn't really leave any room for philosophical wiggling. e: One useful way to think about this is to consider a machine which replaces one atom in your body with an identical new atom, in the same place. This clearly does not kill you or make you a new person. Now consider a machine which does the same with two atoms, then three, then four, and so on until it has replaced every atom in your body. There's no way to draw a line and say 'oh, it's not ME any more', just as long as the structure remains the same. Nothing of who or what you are is stored in individual atoms, just in the arrangement of them. General Battuta fucked around with this message at 04:53 on Mar 24, 2012 |
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 04:50
|
|
|
General Battuta posted:Yes you would. The same process that would occur here (reconstruction of the template from new matter) occurs naturally over the course of your life. The notional transporter here simply accelerates that process from years to moments. That's absurd. As well take two identical cubes of iron and proclaim them the same object. quote:If you're religious of course you may feel differently, but the physics is unequivocal and doesn't really leave any room for philosophical wiggling. I'm not the least bit religious, and I think you'd have to believe in souls to believe in the identity of two separate pieces of matter. quote:e: One useful way to think about this is to consider a machine which replaces one atom in your body with an identical new atom, in the same place. This clearly does not kill you or make you a new person. Now consider a machine which does the same with two atoms, then three, then four, and so on until it has replaced every atom in your body. There's no way to draw a line and say 'oh, it's not ME any more', just as long as the structure remains the same. Nothing of who or what you are is stored in individual atoms, just in the arrangement of them. In this case there is a continuity of body and consciousness. In the case of duplicates, it is a separate thing being built from separate matter with no continuity between the two.
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 08:30
|
|
|
That continuity is only relevant if you think of a consciousness as a "thing" that clings to the physical atoms of your brain and attaches itself to the new atoms as they arrive, which is kind of a dualist mentality. In both cases of your body's atoms being replaced and a new body being built from scratch the end results would be indistinguishable, and continuity (or the "illusion" of continuity) would be maintained by memory.
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 10:26
|
|
|
Llamadeus posted:That continuity is only relevant if you think of a consciousness as a "thing" that clings to the physical atoms of your brain and attaches itself to the new atoms as they arrive, which is kind of a dualist mentality. In both cases of your body's atoms being replaced and a new body being built from scratch the end results would be indistinguishable, and continuity (or the "illusion" of continuity) would be maintained by memory. So you'd be okay with being shot in the face if a duplicate body were created and activated for you, then? Since the duplicate wouldn't know the difference?
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 10:44
|
|
|
Well, no, because I imagine getting shot in the face would be pretty painful! And the fact that after duplication both consciousness would start diverging and you could no longer call them identical. But there's also the chance that I'd end up "being" the duplicate, since there's nothing to distinguish it from my original body. If my body (and brain state) was destroyed and recreated from new material in my sleep (or if I stepped into a Star Trek transporter), I'm fairly sure I wouldn't "experience" any sort of death, and a partial version of that is happening continuously. For consciousness to be tied to the specific atoms of your brain it would have to have some sort of physical substance, and/or you'd have to be able to distinguish between those specific atoms (each proton and electron doesn't have some sort of ID attached to it, they're just interchangeable components of matter). Pope Guilty posted:I'm not the least bit religious, and I think you'd have to believe in souls to believe in the identity of two separate pieces of matter.
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 11:10
|
|
|
Llamadeus posted:Well, no, because I imagine getting shot in the face would be pretty painful! Or be instantly vaporized, whatever. Point is, painlessly killed and replaced with a duplicate. You wouldn't agree to that, right? quote:And the fact that after duplication both consciousness would start diverging and you could no longer call them identical. But there's also the chance that I'd end up "being" the duplicate, since there's nothing to distinguish it from my original body. Other than you, you know, already exist. quote:If my body (and brain state) was destroyed and recreated from new material in my sleep (or if I stepped into a Star Trek transporter), I'm fairly sure I wouldn't "experience" any sort of death, and a partial version of that is happening continuously. You wouldn't experience anything ever again, since it'd be that other, diverging consciousness that experiences things from now on. There would in fact be no divergence. One would stop, and another with the memories of the other would start. quote:For consciousness to be tied to the specific atoms of your brain it would have to have some sort of physical substance, and/or you'd have to be able to distinguish between those specific atoms (each proton and electron doesn't have some sort of ID attached to it, they're just interchangeable components of matter). What? No. Consciousness is somehow linked to specific matter. If I tore apart your body, your consciousness would stop. Two identical bodies, comprised of exactly the same particles in exactly the same arrangement, would not be the same person- they'd be two separate consciousnesses. quote:Basically you'd have to show me where this "identity" is stored, since it's not a physical property of matter. No, no, "identity" as in the property of identity, not identity as in self-image or whatever. The mathematical sense. As in, they're the same thing.
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 11:32
|
|
|
Pope Guilty posted:Or be instantly vaporized, whatever. Point is, painlessly killed and replaced with a duplicate. You wouldn't agree to that, right? Pope Guilty posted:Other than you, you know, already exist. Pope Guilty posted:What? No. Consciousness is somehow linked to specific matter. If I tore apart your body, your consciousness would stop. Two identical bodies, comprised of exactly the same particles in exactly the same arrangement, would not be the same person- they'd be two separate consciousnesses. I don't even know where the assertion that consciousness is "somehow" linked to specific matter is one I don't understand, since there's no evidence to suggest it. There's not even a way to distinguish one electron from another (it's not as if each one has a barcode etched into it) so I think "specific" matter is irrelevant. Well this is a pretty long philosophy-of-mind derail!
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 11:53
|
|
|
Llamadeus posted:I'm not sure if this is actually relevant, whatever consciousness actually is there's no reason it can't bifurcate. Bifurcation implies splitting a thing into two, whereas the hypotheticals we've been throwing around involve creating a second thing in the image of the first. quote:Well basically it comes down to the assumption/belief that consciousness isn't a property of the actual specific atoms but arises from the processes and arragement of the neurons of my brain. Which I think is an entirely logical (even if we have no way of knowing if it's true) materialist viewpoint. Consciousness is tied to the specific matter which presently happens to be doing whatever it is that causes consciousness to arise. Disperse the matter, and the consciousness, in every instance humanity has thus far discovered, ends. I'm not saying that consciousness is mystically tied to specific atoms forever or whatever, simply that consciousness is as best we can determine thus far somehow a product of matter, and that individual instances of consciousness are as best as we can tell unique to the matter which is at the moment creating them. In other words, two identical computers running identical program are not the same machine. Two rubies with identical structures are not the same gem. Two brains with identical structures are not the same person. Llamadeus posted:Well this is a pretty long philosophy-of-mind derail! The capacity to inspire this kind of discussion is part of why I love science fiction. 
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 12:12
|
|
|
Pope Guilty posted:Bifurcation implies splitting a thing into two, whereas the hypotheticals we've been throwing around involve creating a second thing in the image of the first. But if consciousness is a product of the patterning and arrangement rather than of the actual molecules themselves, then there's no distinction between 'the image of' and actually being.
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 12:17
|
|
|
MikeJF posted:But if consciousness is a product of the patterning and arrangement rather than of the actual molecules themselves, then there's no distinction between 'the image of' and actually being. I'm not arguing that you can have two copies of the same person, two bodies of identical makeup and arrangement. I'm arguing that the two copies would not share a consciousness but instead be possessed of an identical consciousness state that would rapidly diverge. My point is that being one of those two copies would make not being killed okay; you would not simply wake up in the other, but rather the copy would wake up and think it was you. Again, Stross's Accelerando has a bit where thanks to near-lightspeed travel, a consciousness cloned from a person is of a different age (is, IIRC, still fairly young even as the original is dead, though I haven't read the book in awhile and could be misremembering) than the original. Come to think of it, I believe the younger, duplicated consciousness is actually held accountable for its parent's actions, and it's stupid and absurd for precisely the reasons I've argued here.
|
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 12:38
|
|
|
Pope Guilty posted:I'm not arguing that you can have two copies of the same person, two bodies of identical makeup and arrangement. I'm arguing that the two copies would not share a consciousness but instead be possessed of an identical consciousness state that would rapidly diverge. This is completely true, but what you need to remember is that each fork is genuinely 'you'. If one fork is killed, that fork is absolutely dead, but the original person who was duplicated is still alive, in the sense that the person you were five years ago is still alive today - since the other fork has equal claim to being that person. Let's go back a bit to unpack and examine an objection you had, and hopefully help clarify it for you. quote:Bifurcation implies splitting a thing into two, whereas the hypotheticals we've been throwing around involve creating a second thing in the image of the first. All the hypothetical we've been throwing around - for example, being instantaneously disintegrated by a teleporter, then reassembled from the pattern of information - are identical to the processes that your body undergoes in your day-to-day life. I'll try to illustrate with some thought experiments, if you're willing to work with me. But it's important that this be a dialogue, not a point-by-point rebuttal contest. Shall I go ahead? I also want to make sure you're asking the right question, because it looks like you're stumbling on a common obstacle - failing to specify what 'you' is in the thought experiment. For example, in the following: quote:So you'd be okay with being shot in the face if a duplicate body were created and activated for you, then? Since the duplicate wouldn't know the difference? That depends. Are you asking about 'you' just before I have myself duplicated by a duplication machine, or 'you', one of the two forks produced after the duplication? In the former case, I'm not happy with it, since I am certain I am going to die but also certain I am going to live. In the latter case - no, I don't want to be shot! I'll die! General Battuta fucked around with this message at 14:44 on Mar 24, 2012 |
|
#
?
Mar 24, 2012 14:38
|
|
|
It's discussions like this which is probably why the use of backing up is a cyclical fashion (and personal choice) in the Culture itself. The ones who want a perceived continuity-of-consciousness will never get backed up and once their body dies, that's that.
|
|
#
?
Mar 25, 2012 05:26
|
|
|
I never really understood these discussions. Even if we cure aging and disease, you're still likely to die at some point because you're going to catch a bullet or get hit by a bus or trip over your own shoelaces. Having a backup seems like a good idea, even if you believe in things like souls. Maybe it's a bit narcissistic, but I'd prefer a duplicate or virtual reality upload instead of having kids.
|
|
#
?
Mar 25, 2012 05:45
|
|
|
zalmoxes posted:I never really understood these discussions. Even if we cure aging and disease, you're still likely to die at some point because you're going to catch a bullet or get hit by a bus or trip over your own shoelaces. Having a backup seems like a good idea, even if you believe in things like souls. Maybe it's a bit narcissistic, but I'd prefer a duplicate or virtual reality upload instead of having kids. My whole point in all of this is that having a backup is completely irrelevant to the dead person; it doesn't let you wake up again after being killed. You don't benefit in the least from it, unless you get off on the idea of there being a duplicate of you walking around after you die. But of course, you only get that benefit until you die, whereupon there's no you to benefit from anymore.
|
|
#
?
Mar 25, 2012 06:05
|
|
|
Pope Guilty posted:My whole point in all of this is that having a backup is completely irrelevant to the dead person; it doesn't let you wake up again after being killed. You don't benefit in the least from it, unless you get off on the idea of there being a duplicate of you walking around after you die. But of course, you only get that benefit until you die, whereupon there's no you to benefit from anymore. Of course, but being dead is also irrelevant to a dead person. The difference here is that the dead person continues to have an effect on reality as opposed to just ceasing to exist. His consciousness(his ideas, knowledge and patterns of thinking ) is preserved to interact with the world in a way as if he never died in the first place.
|
|
#
?
Mar 25, 2012 06:19
|
|
|
zalmoxes posted:Of course, but being dead is also irrelevant to a dead person. The difference here is that the dead person continues to have an effect on reality as opposed to just ceasing to exist. His consciousness(his ideas, knowledge and patterns of thinking ) is preserved to interact with the world in a way as if he never died in the first place. And how messed up an idea is that? Think of how lovely American culture was even fifty years ago, or a hundred years ago, and now imagine that none of those people ever died.
|
|
#
?
Mar 25, 2012 11:02
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 11, 2024 22:22 |
|
|
General Battuta posted:This is completely true, but what you need to remember is that each fork is genuinely 'you'. I think that part of the problem in the discussion is that there are two slightly different definitions of 'you'/identity being used. There's the one based in external measurement (if an external entity can't tell the difference between A and B then A is B; 'externalist' for shorthand) and one based on subjective experience (if I'm copied and then later killed, my own subjective internal experience ends, call it 'internalist'). A lot of the argument is people a) talking past each other using different definitions, and b) people arguing for their preferred definition as being the correct one. So in your replace-N-atoms machine, from an 'externalist' perspective, you're absolutely right ("a difference that makes no difference is no difference"); from an 'internalist' perspective, I'm less convinced (and I think you've very cleverly slipped a false dichotomy in there; just because we have a very clear intuition on one extreme (N=1, 2, or 3) leading into a very large and poorly defined gray area (N>3 and < 100% of total), it doesn't mean that the limit is therefore proven). If you replaced every atom in my brain simultaneously, I think there's a very good chance that the internal monologue that I think of as 'me' might end -- a fade to black in my own Cartesian theater, just to abuse a phrase -- and be replaced by an indistinguishable copy. I don't know enough about the neurological basis of subjective experience to really be certain. Regardless, if we go to the 'backing up' case, where an older copy of a person is created if the earlier dies, I don't think there's much in the way of argument: does a particular chain of consciousness end? Yes. Is the person who is made to replace them the original person (as of the time of backup) to any reasonable test? Also yes, granting various assumptions about the level of technology etc. Does this mean that you should or should not fear death if you're backed up? I suspect it comes down to how much you subjectively value internalist vs externalist notions of identity. If you die, the 'you' that is represented by a continuous stream of consciousness doesn't get to have any more fun, but at least your family won't have to miss you. I think the deeper problem is that holding exclusively to the internalist notion, if not very carefully examined, can lead to the conclusion that the copy somehow has less intrinsic worth than the original, which can lead one to start advocating some rather sketchy ideas (Grow your own clone slave army! Duplicate yourself for spare parts! Every man a pharaoh!) but that's a different can of worms.
|
|
#
?
Mar 25, 2012 13:36
|
|
