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The whole "stirrup =knights!" argument is also a tad overinflated, as there were other solutions before the stirrups that made it possible to do mounted attacks with a little more oomph. One of them being a raised back on the saddle that kept you from being pushed back when making contact. Shock cavalry existed before the stirrups, even if some people don't want to believe that since it's so simple to explain the increase of shock cavalry to the introduction of stirrups alone. As previously mentioned it has as much to do with the sizes of horses. The ponies that you see in East Asian armies around the medieval period were not used for shock attack either, because they were tiny. Japanese horses had an average height of around 130 cm, with some as short as 110 cm. That's a large Grand Danois. Experiments with ponies of similar sizes and the weight of an armoured man show that they were pretty much unable to gallop at all. Instead they trotted along at around 9 km/h (5.6 mph). Needless to say, all the stirrups in the world didn't make shock attacks a stable among the samurai, so this points to the quality of the horses to be of bigger value than the availability of stirrups. lilljonas fucked around with this message at 09:20 on Apr 8, 2012 |
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Apr 8, 2012 09:08
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Why exactly did the Germans initiate Operation Michael in WW1? I know that they were running short on men/resources/food, but launching a huge offensive like that when you're short of everything just seems foolish. Wouldn't it have been much better to just shore up their defenses and let the allies bleed themselves on them? The war with Russia was over, and given that the Americans were the only ones that still had any sort of fight left in them, why not just fight a defensive war for a few months till the Brits and French gave up?
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Apr 8, 2012 10:37
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Deadman63 posted:Why exactly did the Germans initiate Operation Michael in WW1? I know that they were running short on men/resources/food, but launching a huge offensive like that when you're short of everything just seems foolish. Wouldn't it have been much better to just shore up their defenses and let the allies bleed themselves on them? The war with Russia was over, and given that the Americans were the only ones that still had any sort of fight left in them, why not just fight a defensive war for a few months till the Brits and French gave up? It was ultimately a move of desperation, there were several factors that were rapidly diminishing the strength of the German army, the Spring Offensive was essentially the last remaining window of time for a "last hurrah" type of thing. I'd just like to address some stuff point by point: 1) "shore up their defenses and let the allies bleed on them": this isn't really doable, for a couple of reasons. First doctrine had changed to a more defense in depth approach, so even if you were never going to attack, you were still going to counterattack when the enemy took your second trench (if you're willing to trade off the first trench and let the enemy tire themselves out a bit). This means that you would have high casualties anyways, not at parity, but if we look at most ww1 engagements then in that situation the Germans would be taking ~80% of allied casualties. Trading 5 men for 4 is a totally acceptable ratio for the Entente. Furthermore, the allies were constantly bringing more and better tanks onto the field, the Germans were growing more adept at countering them, but now you have Mark IVs, Vs and FT-17s being fielded en masse in regularity, and even better designs like the Mark VIII and even an APC, the Mark IX. So yes, holding a defensive line would've prolonged the conflict, but it would've not brought about any sort of favorable German conclusion. 2) "given that the Americans were the only ones that still had any sort of fight left in them, fight a defensive war for a few months till the Brits and French gave up?": The fact that the French and British were on the brink of morale collapse at the start of 1918 seems to be a common misconception. Its true that morale dropped really low during 1917, but its a testament to the cohesion of these armies that they survived 1917. The fact that the French army quickly recovered from front-line mutinies and was back in action shortly, all in the midst of the most important French war to that date, is remarkable. The same can be said for the Italians (at Caporetto, which was way worse than anything seen in north-eastern France). On the point of the Americans, they had 1 million men in May 1918, about 50/50 on fighting/logistics. In March, they had 318,000 men at the front line. At that point, the American (military) contribution was still not in any way a major factor in the trenches. It also bears mentioning that the AEF doctrine was dated in comparison to the other belligerents, and many American soldiers lost their lives in pointless attacks that did little to harm the Germans. However, AEF doctrine was improving rapidly, and it was growing as a fighting force at an incredible rate. Remember that the US not only had 2 million volunteers but also 2.8 million conscripts from which to draw on. And all these guys were at an excellent level of morale. 3) "they were running short on men/resources/food": This is exactly the crucial point when talking about the central powers in 1917/18. I could go on forever about this, but to state it plainly, by March 1918, when Operation Michel was launched, the Germans were running on fumes. They had almost nothing left. The Russian collapse had granted them a brief respite, which they essentially used to gather everything they had to throw at the allies. The "turnip winter" of 1917/18 had made the massive discontent in Germany skyrocket, as the nation as a whole was running out of food, and had no way to acquire any more. To say nothing of more elaborate industrial resources, medicine, chemicals, etc. In 1914 the average German adult man consumed 4000kcal per day, in 1916, it was down to 1700kcal. In 1917 loot from the East and Romania made things a bit better, but by 1918 it had dropped again to 1916 levels, if not lower. Butter, veal and mutton were down to 60% of 1912 levels, Milk 50%, and Fat at a measly 20%. Food riots were becoming common. This is about the Spring Offensive though, so allow me to talk about the army a bit before this gets too long. When the war concluded, the German Army had aprox. 4.2 million men in it (also had to feed 2m+ PoWs). At the start of the Spring Offensive this would've been even bigger. Its estimated that daily rations gave the Germans 2800kcal, whilst for comparison the British and French were at about the 4000kcal mark, and the Americans even higher. To add to this, German soldiers were sending food back home, when really you would expect it to be the opposite, with civilians being able to send food to the front. Its worth nothing that during Operation Michel, German advances in some areas were stopped when supply caches were overrun and the men stuffed themselves with food. These events also had great demoralizing effects on the Germans, as they were able to see just how much "extra" food the Entente had. By the time that the shock of the Spring Offensives had been absorbed, the allies were able to go all out on the offensive in the hundred days, at an incredible rate of advance over the entire front. The Austro-Hungarian/Italian battles of the Piave and then the Vittorio Veneto offensive follow the same rough patterns, although I'm not that well read in that regard so I won't draw particular comparisons. In my opinion, Germany had no other options prior to the Spring Offensives. If they were going to come to terms with the 14 points (as was the only way to even bring the allies to the table) they would've had to pass from their military government to a civilian one. That wasn't going to happen in March 1918 (as it did in later in Oct.). At that point the German army still had one good fight left in it, and from Ludendorff's point of view, why wouldn't you throw it all in on the last roll of the dice? He knew defeat was likely to be inevitable, so you might as well try to knock them back a bit and maybe you could get some sort of favorable negotiation. I think a much more important question is why did the Entente commanders think that German strength was still considerable in late 1918 when the German army was crumbling, and why did they sign an armistice so close to being able to totally defeat the German armies on the field? Ghost of Mussolini fucked around with this message at 11:49 on Apr 8, 2012 |
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Apr 8, 2012 11:39
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Deadman63 posted:Why exactly did the Germans initiate Operation Michael in WW1? I know that they were running short on men/resources/food, but launching a huge offensive like that when you're short of everything just seems foolish. Wouldn't it have been much better to just shore up their defenses and let the allies bleed themselves on them? The war with Russia was over, and given that the Americans were the only ones that still had any sort of fight left in them, why not just fight a defensive war for a few months till the Brits and French gave up? As I understand it, Germany was suffering from starvation pretty badly by this time and the US had already joined the war, which meant that they had a rapidly closing window with which to use the infusion of troops they had just received from the recently-concluded Eastern Front. I think they were betting on being able to push to the channel and knock the BEF out of the war in the hopes of kicking them out and by extension preventing the Americans from landing their own troops in force because they knew that they wouldn't be able to pull off a bleed-them-white strategy against the sheer number of troops that the US would bring to the table. It may have well been that the Allies had also figured out how to assault the German trenches effectively, but I'm not sure if the timelines match.
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Apr 8, 2012 11:43
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Ghost of Mussolini posted:I think a much more important question is why did the Entente commanders think that German strength was still considerable in late 1918 when the German army was crumbling, and why did they sign an armistice so close to being able to totally defeat the German armies on the field?
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Apr 8, 2012 12:48
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Ghost of Mussolini posted:I think a much more important question is why did the Entente commanders think that German strength was still considerable in late 1918 when the German army was crumbling, and why did they sign an armistice so close to being able to totally defeat the German armies on the field? German coastal cities were revolting in early November by the influence of mutinous sailors and communists, and the spread of Bolshevik style revolution from Russia to Germany was certainly not something that anyone in the Entente desired. That was IMHO a very significant development for both parties. The worst case scenario would have been the revolution sweeping from Russia through Germany to the equally weary France. Also the occupation of Germany would have been quite an effort. Also Wilson didn't agree all that strongly with the French revanchism, especially after the Kaiser abdicated and Germany became a republic. Did you know... that the Allied occupation of Rhineland also gave birth to the term "Rhinelandbastard" for mixed race children fathered by black French troops? Life wasn't easy for them, I'll tell you that... quote:Hans Hauck was an Afro-German survivor of the Nazi regime in Germany. I wonder what the Russian soldiers thought.
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Apr 8, 2012 12:48
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R. Mute posted:Because they didn't have to destroy those armies? Nenonen posted:German coastal cities were revolting in early November by the influence of mutinous sailors and communists, and the spread of Bolshevik style revolution from Russia to Germany was certainly not something that anyone in the Entente desired. That was IMHO a very significant development for both parties. The worst case scenario would have been the revolution sweeping from Russia through Germany to the equally weary France. Also the occupation of Germany would have been quite an effort. Nenonen posted:Also Wilson didn't agree all that strongly with the French revanchism, especially after the Kaiser abdicated and Germany became a republic. Just to be clear I'm not advocating that the French march all the way to Berlin and knock down the Brandenburg Gate, I just find it very odd that the Entente didn't come to the table to deal with the Germans until they had recovered Belgium, Luxembourg and Alsace-Lorraine. They could've done that, it wouldn't have taken more than a couple weeks, and settled for an armistice and subsequent peace negotiations on much better terms.
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Apr 8, 2012 13:17
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Ghost of Mussolini posted:Just to be clear I'm not advocating that the French march all the way to Berlin and knock down the Brandenburg Gate, I just find it very odd that the Entente didn't come to the table to deal with the Germans until they had recovered Belgium, Luxembourg and Alsace-Lorraine. They could've done that, it wouldn't have taken more than a couple weeks, and settled for an armistice and subsequent peace negotiations on much better terms. You have your history completely wrong. The Armistice terms included withdrawal from the occupied territories and surrender of substantial German war material (that made continuing the war for Germany impossible). Likewise, Versailles and the other Treaties were peace dictated by the victors and the only negotiation happened between them - your assertion about getting better terms is completely nonsensical because the reality is that the Allies wrote the peace treaties almost entirely without input from the Central Powers. e: The Armistice was in practice a total surrender by Germany. There aren't really any conceivably better terms the Allies could have demanded other than full occupation, which nobody wanted and would have been stupid. You can't really blame the Entente leaders for not acting to visibly crush Germany to stave off a 'stab-in-the-back' myth that didn't exist at the time and was deliberately manufactured by Hindenburg. Alchenar fucked around with this message at 15:12 on Apr 8, 2012 |
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Apr 8, 2012 13:40
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Alchenar posted:You have your history completely wrong. Alchenar posted:The Armistance terms included withdrawal from the occupied territories and surrender of substantial German war material (that made continuing the war for Germany impossible). Likewise, Versailles and the other Treaties were peace dictated by the victors and the only negotiation happened between them - your assertion about getting better terms is completely nonsensical because the reality is that the Allies wrote the peace treaties almost entirely without input from the Central Powers. You are also right on the fact that Germany had no input at the formulation of the peace treaty, but the mere fact that they grasped the 14 Points and were able to establish the Armistice on that basis. On paper the Armistice is very strong and ends the German state's ability to do anything but put down internal insurrections. What it doesn't reflect was the overall atmosphere that at that time, further peace negotiations were to be done on Wilsonian principles, rather than on a basis of German total surrender.
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Apr 8, 2012 14:22
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No, there was no peace based on the 14 points nor was one ever on the cards in November 1918. You are completely wrong on this, read the Armistice terms - it's a surrender demand. e: there is literally nothing of the 14 points in the Armistice document, I have no idea where you are getting this from but you could hardly be more wrong if you were trying e2: the extent to which the Entente were 'tied' to the 14 points was entirely a matter of their own propaganda and had absolutely no relation to the military situation. In fact only the USA formally had it as a basis for peace, the signatories to the Treaty of London were still committed to the war aims that they'd set out. \/ fixed :P (it's one of those really weird misspellings I consistently make) Alchenar fucked around with this message at 15:12 on Apr 8, 2012 |
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Apr 8, 2012 15:03
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Armistice.
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Apr 8, 2012 15:07
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Ghost of Mussolini you are also completely ignoring the fact that the Germans did not take part in the Versailles negotiations.
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Apr 8, 2012 15:15
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Alchenar posted:No, there was no peace based on the 14 points nor was one ever on the cards in November 1918. You are completely wrong on this, read the Armistice terms - it's a surrender demand. I said it wasn't on the Armistice terms, as its not, you are right in restating that. It wasn't down on paper, but the diplomatic approaches by the Germans in mid-October were done stipulating an eventual settlement around the 14 points. In late September, Ludendorff told the Kaiser and von Hertling that the German Army would not be able to sustain operations for more than a few months. Ludendorff himself suggested that they seek a peace on the 14 points. To that effect Prince Maximilian was made Prime Minister on October 4, and on the following day they asked the US to start negotiating terms based on the 14 points. Wilson told them to retreat to pre-war borders, get the submarines into port and have the Kaiser resign. They booted Ludendorff out of the army and got to work on the rest, and then in the first week of November asked for negotiations again, which were accepted. All heavily tied to the 14 points politically, if not on paper. I don't see how you can say that the 14 Points are irrelevant or that the Entente wasn't linked to the promises that Wilson made (even if he hadn't conferred with the British and French). So much of the issues later in 1919 were based around this fact, that the political establishments of France and Britain disagreed with Wilson and the 14 points. e: Alchenar posted:e2: the extent to which the Entente were 'tied' to the 14 points was entirely a matter of their own propaganda and had absolutely no relation to the military situation. In fact only the USA formally had it as a basis for peace, the signatories to the Treaty of London were still committed to the war aims that they'd set out. Alchenar posted:Ghost of Mussolini you are also completely ignoring the fact that the Germans did not take part in the Versailles negotiations. Ghost of Mussolini fucked around with this message at 15:28 on Apr 8, 2012 |
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Apr 8, 2012 15:22
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You said:quote:I just find it very odd that the Entente didn't come to the table to deal with the Germans until they had recovered Belgium, Luxembourg and Alsace-Lorraine. They could've done that, it wouldn't have taken more than a couple weeks, and settled for an armistice and subsequent peace negotiations on much better terms. Which is nonsense, because the Entente dictated the terms that they agreed between themselves anyway without any reference to the German position at all and that they got Belgium, Luxembourg and Alsace-Lorraine as well as a demilitarized Rhineland in November 1918.
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Apr 8, 2012 16:48
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Alchenar posted:You said: I should've clarified and said that the lack of obtaining a better posture (both political and military) was clearly due to the allies own inconsistency in approaching the Germans. The Germans had little power to do anything other than to choose when to ask for an armistice, the fact that they did so with the 14 Points as a basis, and that the allies set conditions for such talks that the Germans subsequently made, meant that politically they were adhering to discussions along such lines. The Armistice as it was signed was in line with Wilson's policy, and it is the disconnect between that policy and the policies favored by the European allies that produced such a muddled position. Had they pushed the Germans out of those areas through force of arms, rather than through the Armistice, there wouldn't have been a need for a negotiated cease-fire (which is where the Armistice ultimately lands) but in a full imposition of terms more in accordance of those of the British and French as the German army collapsed and the navy mutinied en masse.
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Apr 8, 2012 17:33
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Which leads to...? I'm sorry but I fail to see the point in stressing these tenuous what-ifs.
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Apr 8, 2012 19:19
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Ghost of Mussolini posted:Had they pushed the Germans out of those areas through force of arms, rather than through the Armistice, there wouldn't have been a need for a negotiated cease-fire (which is where the Armistice ultimately lands) but in a full imposition of terms more in accordance of those of the British and French as the German army collapsed and the navy mutinied en masse. There wasn't a negotiated cease-fire by any real sense of the term. The November Armistice was a series of terms that the Allies dictated to the Germans, which were accepted because the German negotiators knew that they were on the verge of total collapse and needed peace now. Given that the Allies literally dictated the terms that they wanted both in November and at Versailles I have absolutely no idea what you could possibly mean by 'a stronger negotiating position'. You keep banging on about the 14 points without seeming to realise that at Versailles Wilson had largely given up on the 14 points and was in line with the British and French in wanting to punish Germany. Which is why Versailles dismantles the German Empire completely, slices significant territory off Germany proper and is full of reparations. Alchenar fucked around with this message at 19:38 on Apr 8, 2012 |
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Apr 8, 2012 19:30
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Farecoal posted:What was the largest surrender in military history by number of troops? Google isn't giving an answer. Operation August Storm. It was what, 900,000 Japanese that gave it up? And that was during what is possibly one of the greatest military operations of all time.
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Apr 8, 2012 21:04
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I hope Admiral Snackbar is too busy with his military history job to post here. I'm also taking a History degree and want to focus on the military aspect but i'm too afraid of what's in store for me in terms of jobs. Hope he makes it ok 
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Apr 9, 2012 17:14
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Mans posted:I hope Admiral Snackbar is too busy with his military history job to post here. I'm also taking a History degree and want to focus on the military aspect but i'm too afraid of what's in store for me in terms of jobs. Hope he makes it ok Good luck man, your living the dream for some of us  .
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Apr 9, 2012 17:32
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Mans posted:I hope Admiral Snackbar is too busy with his military history job to post here. I'm also taking a History degree and want to focus on the military aspect but i'm too afraid of what's in store for me in terms of jobs. Hope he makes it ok
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Apr 9, 2012 18:02
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Can someone tell me why WW1 was so static yet bloody? I always hear that it was due to the generals refusal to adopt new tactics or the machine gun was too advanced to counter.
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Apr 9, 2012 19:21
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Supeerme posted:Can someone tell me why WW1 was so static yet bloody? I always hear that it was due to the generals refusal to adopt new tactics or the machine gun was too advanced to counter. In a nutshell, offensive tactics had not caught up with defensive ones. You don't assault trenches, bolt-action rifles, artillery and machine guns like you are still fighting the Napoleonic Wars. U.S. Civil War had already shown this in some detail, but nobody really took it into account.
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Apr 9, 2012 19:42
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Supeerme posted:Can someone tell me why WW1 was so static yet bloody? I always hear that it was due to the generals refusal to adopt new tactics or the machine gun was too advanced to counter. The machine gun was something, but the primary killer in WWI was artillery. The introduction of hydraulic recoil mechanisms on field guns meant that instead of having to re-aim your gun for every shot you could aim once and then just sweep an entire field in front of you with shells.
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Apr 9, 2012 20:05
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Supeerme posted:Can someone tell me why WW1 was so static yet bloody? I always hear that it was due to the generals refusal to adopt new tactics or the machine gun was too advanced to counter. Armies were too big and railways networks too developed. Every time an Army (on an side) built up some momentum in an offensive in 1914 it outran it's supplies and its lines of communication. In the meantime the defender was able to use railways to rapidly bring up reserves and blunt the advance/counter-attack. It basically took four years for each side to develop the capacity to breakthrough the enemy lines (that's actually the easy bit that everyone could almost always do) and then advance through the breakthrough area faster than the enemy could bring up reserves. In 1918 the Allies and the Germans had different tactical solutions, but on a strategic scale they both amounted to a rolling series of offensives that kept smashing the front-line back until the enemy ran out of reserves. In WW2 the solution was generally to use lots of tanks while air power suppressed enemy railways.
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Apr 9, 2012 20:37
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To continue the torpedo_chat.txt how well did British torpedos preform? If I remember correctly they managed to sink Bismark with airial torpedos. And Pearl Harbour the poo poo out of the Italian navy at Toranto edit: knocked out the stearing with torpedos Trench_Rat fucked around with this message at 23:26 on Apr 10, 2012 |
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Apr 10, 2012 23:24
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I don't know anything about British aerial torpedoes. However, if any problems arose from a British torpedo run, it would start with their mode of delivery. The Fairey Swordfish was named by a madman and put in service in 1934(!). It was the biplane that felled the battleship, and demolished the concept of a fleet in being. The Japanese took notes on the harbour attack. It was very slow, laden with a heavy torpedo and two crewmen. So slow, that fire control on the Bismarck could not compensate for it. Not that it would matter, it flew barely 5 meters above the water level, below the depression capable on the battleship's guns. None of this was intended, and the Swordfish's operational career is a pretty charming miracle. They weren't fun to fly, if you thought otherwise. I watched an interview with a Swordfish crewman on the Bismarck run. He described in harrowing terms. All the FC troubles didn't stop the Germans from trying. The flak kept on pounding as the ailing biplanes trudged onwards. Practically nothing hit, but again, the plane was so slow, that the crewman's time, spent just watching the guns, felt like an eternity. Each one spewed a brilliant explosion that blasted hot shrapnel with each flash, and he could only sit there like a guest at his own execution. The British had rushed other biplanes into service. One was Gloster Gladiator, and it was probably the best engineered multiple-wing fighter in history. Compared to contemporary aircraft, it was superbly maneuvrable. It's flaws were obvious after some time at war. Neverthless, Gladiators scored kills, mostly against unwary Italian bombers. Their most famous engagement was a week at Malta, where 3 Gladiators probably confused the Italians long enough to score some hits. Nowadays, they are maintained by patriotic gentlemen of background and wealth.
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Apr 11, 2012 05:26
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Supeerme posted:Can someone tell me why WW1 was so static yet bloody? I always hear that it was due to the generals refusal to adopt new tactics or the machine gun was too advanced to counter. Like others have said, it turned static (in the west) mainly because of modern weapons and modern railways. Both sides could quickly bring troops to the front line thanks to railroads, but once there they couldn't outmaneuver their enemies. Even if you managed to break through the enemy defenses, you couldn't bring reinforcements and supplies up quickly enough to exploit it before the inevitable counterattack. The way every officer had been trained was that you won a battle by outflanking the enemy and hitting him in the side. The trench system came about almost by accident as both sides secured their south flank and then tried to outflank the enemy to the north, until they hit the coast and there was no more room for flanking maneuvers. After that, if you wanted to outmaneuver the enemy you would first have to break through his defenses, which usually meant frontal assaults against prepared positions. The machine gun gave a pair of soldiers the firepower equivalent of about a regiment's worth of American Civil War soldiers. The invention of indirect artillery fire meant that an artilleryman didn't even have to be on the field of battle to kill enemy soldiers. In the east, where the railroad network was not quite so developed, and where the Russians had yet to master the art of indirect fire (which they would become obscenely good at some 25 years later), the war was more fluid and the death toll not quite so grotesque. Note also that the idea of small-sale tactics didn't really exist at that time, and an ordinary soldier wasn't expected to do much more than carry a rifle, march towards the enemy and bayonet some fuckers once he got there. When the war started, neither side utilized steel helmets, and the idea of camouflaged uniforms was still controversial enough that there were outraged protests in the French National Assembly when it was suggested that maybe their soldiers would survive longer if they weren't wearing red pants and blue coats.
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Apr 11, 2012 09:25
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Mr. Sunshine posted:Note also that the idea of small-sale tactics didn't really exist at that time, and an ordinary soldier wasn't expected to do much more than carry a rifle, march towards the enemy and bayonet some fuckers once he got there. When the war started, neither side utilized steel helmets, and the idea of camouflaged uniforms was still controversial enough that there were outraged protests in the French National Assembly when it was suggested that maybe their soldiers would survive longer if they weren't wearing red pants and blue coats. This is a common thought about WWI, and it just isn't the case. There are two cases where it is very much true - the British Army at the Somme and the Americans. The British army at the Somme were largely new recruits - Kitchener's New Model Army. The original BEF was basically destroyed by this point and pretty much every British soldier was green. So the higher command felt that the troops weren't trained well enough to do anything but march forward in formation. The other case was the Americans, who also were bringing green soldiers to battle and didn't have the confidence in their troops to allow them to use more innovative tactics. These two situations have permeated the discussion such that many think it was always the case. It wasn't. The Allies had two tactical innovations. The British innovation was technological. They introduced light field mortars that were dazzlingly effective on the tactical level, they were eventually the first to use tanks, and they had other technological breakthroughs in terms of electronic and communications warfare. The French innovation was tactical - packet movement. Rather than moving in mass formations, the French infantry moved in small groups, from cover to cover, alternating moving and covering one another with fire. The German innovation was to fuse these two ideas into their Stormtrooper tactics. They chose small groups of the best men, outfitted them with new technology like flamethrowers and gave them unlimited grenades (using technology like the British) and they moved in packets and small groups to infiltrate and penetrate enemy front lines and destroy strongpoints (packet movement ala the French). Obviously there was insophistication at both the tactical and strategic levels in WWI. But to say that there was no concept of small scale tactics is just false. There was in fact great tactical innovation during the war. Not all of that innovation was present in every battle, by any stretch, but that doesn't mean it didn't exist and it didn't matter, because it did and it did. gohuskies fucked around with this message at 09:56 on Apr 11, 2012 |
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Apr 11, 2012 09:54
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Let's not also forget the tremendous tunnel war that took place during this time, which was generally a local success for the British during the Somme offensive. Unfortunately, it was relegated to the northern half of the line, and British efforts in the southern half failed miserably, of course. Still, there were some cool little technological innovations, like the Livens Flame Projector. This was a giant flamethrower that had a telescoping head, so it could pop out of little holes near the trenches and douse the Germans with fire. In the few places it was used it apparently had great effect, though again the problems of greater coordination with a larger offensive made its use ultimately meaningless.
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Apr 11, 2012 10:27
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Didn't the Brits also have a tactical innovation? I remember reading something like they beat the German defensive strategy of quick-response reserves by focusing on small sections of trench and holding onto them tenaciously, instead of trying to advance on a broad front.
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Apr 11, 2012 10:53
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gradenko_2000 posted:Didn't the Brits also have a tactical innovation? I remember reading something like they beat the German defensive strategy of quick-response reserves by focusing on small sections of trench and holding onto them tenaciously, instead of trying to advance on a broad front. There was very definite tactical innovation on the part of the British Army. The impression I've got has been that British tactical innovation for small units was offset for much of the war by the difficulties of implementation, particularly given that the British Army underwent a proportionately much larger increase in size that the armies of the Continental powers and also had a much smaller base of reservists to draw from. This made in much more difficult to disseminate small unit tactics (which require a high level of independence on the part of Subalterns and NCOs) under more trained and/or experienced man power was available. This means it was late 1916/ early 1917 by the time you get more sophisticated tactics employed. I seem to recall there were issues with the Staff set up as well which meant that new tactical ideas took a long time to be disseminated, although it's been a while since I read anything about this. But the bite and hold method you describe, as well as closer integration of indirect fire artillery and the beginnings of combined arms operations were all tactical developments made by the British Army during WW1, among others, and the British Army was a very different beast at the end of the war than at the beginning. I'd really recommend this: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Battle-Tactics-Western-Front-British/dp/0300066635/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1334144958&sr=8-1 It's a very detailed look at the evolution of British tactics in the later part of the war.
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Apr 11, 2012 12:55
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gradenko_2000 posted:Didn't the Brits also have a tactical innovation? I remember reading something like they beat the German defensive strategy of quick-response reserves by focusing on small sections of trench and holding onto them tenaciously, instead of trying to advance on a broad front. That was more a case of developing the increasing availability of artillery into use of 'box barrages'. So - the problem throughout the war is that infantry were usually able to capture the first line or two of the enemy trenches, but as the attack progressed communications with the rear broke down and enemy reinforcements would move into the 'battle zone' and counter-attack, inflicting heavy casualties and usually restoring the line to it's original position. The British/French operational solution in 1918 is simple; just attack the first two lines, while making massive use of artillery to create a 'box' around the attack sector which effectively blocks any chance for reserve troops to counter-attack. Sure, you might only gain a few hundred yards at a time, but if you do this in several places close to each other then you can render the whole enemy line indefensible and they're forced to withdraw to another prepared position. What happened in the hundred days offensive is that the Allies kept hitting the Germans again and again and forcing them back (without making the mistake of over-extending and suffering the resulting horrible casualties), until eventually the German Army ran out of coherent formations and lines to fall back to.
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Apr 11, 2012 13:11
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So how about this dude: William F. Dean (right) quote:For two days, the 34th Infantry fought the advancing North Koreans in bitter house-to-house fighting. North Korean soldiers continued to infiltrate the city, often disguised as farmers. The remaining elements of the 24th Infantry Division were pushed back block by block. Without radios, and unable to communicate with the remaining elements of the division, Dean joined the men on the front lines, hunting the T-34 tanks with the help of the new shaped-charge, armor-piercing 3.5 inch "Super Bazookas", which had only been put into production two weeks before the war. At one point, Dean personally attacked a tank with a hand grenade, destroying it. Also, you might be surprised to know that the Republic of Korea recently formed its very own Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate, among other things, the 200,000-1,200,000 political prisoners killed during the war. 
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Apr 11, 2012 13:53
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Trench_Rat posted:To continue the torpedo_chat.txt how well did British torpedos preform? If I remember correctly they managed to sink Bismark with airial torpedos. And Pearl Harbour the poo poo out of the Italian navy at Toranto British torpedoes were some of the best of the "conventional" ones. (I call the Japanese Long Lance non-conventional, because it ran on pure oxygen, not air). Most people here know the story that the German magnetic mine was mostly harmless, because the Germans dropped one on a Thames bank in front of an army complex. The British captured it intact, and a counter measure was quickly developed. But the Germans fixed one of their major problems with the contact pistols with a captured British torpedo that failed to detonate in the harbor of Wilhelmshaven.
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Apr 11, 2012 16:21
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Guys! A weird one, but I don't suppose that anyone remembers anything about the US counter-insurgency strategy involving the montagnard tribes in Vietnam. I've got a vague recollection of a US Military Officer (of a fairly junior grade) pioneering the engagement and training of montagnard tribesmen to fight the Viet Cong. Ho Chi Min did a tongue in cheek condolence speech/letter when the officer was killed. Can anyone name that Officer! I can't find it anywhere.
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Apr 11, 2012 21:16
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I have something I want to ask about: Polearms. What was their main use? Were they restricted to group combat or could you legitimately go into one-on-one combat with a polearm? (although that's not restricted to warfare, I guess)? And why the gently caress are there so goddamn many of them?
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Apr 11, 2012 22:52
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There are so many goddamned polearms because they are cheap to make and its easy to train large groups of men in their use. Assuming their use is to stand in place, wave the killy end at someone, and stop them getting near you. A polearm is basically a spear, and its great at giving the user reach. If you can outreach your enemy, you can hit him first or prevent him from getting close enough to hit you. Once you have your spear point, you add more bits to suit your needs. Need to cleave flesh? Add an axe head. Need to grab horsemen/reins? Add a hook! Armour? Add a hammer. Different blacksmiths had different ways of making the modular polearm so we have so many different kinds. They don't cost alot either. A polearm costs way less to make than a sword, or even a bow. While a specialist is required to make bows and swords (and also arrows, and armour etc.), your common village blacksmith can pump out iron heads for polearms, maybe with a bit of steel welded to the blade, or diamond the spear point for extra penetration. Things he'd be used to doing from the tools he'd be making most of the time. Mass equiping a militia force becomes alot easier like this. So you take your militia and tell them to stand here, point your polearms over there. With the reach they have (and the thickness of the formation), cavarly is disuaded. They could even use that reach and weight of the formation to push other groups of men off the battlefield, as pike blocks were supposed to do. Thats the simpliest way to put it, although hopefully other people will add more.
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Apr 11, 2012 23:27
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Rabhadh posted:diamond the spear point for extra penetration. Wow, did this really happen?
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Apr 11, 2012 23:40
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The shape of a diamond, otherwise that would be the most expensive militia known to man :P
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Apr 11, 2012 23:49
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