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Sometimes you look back at history and are surprised by how familiar everything is to the present and sometimes you're surprised by how utterly different it is. I was just reading about Lincoln's inspection of Richmond after it's fall and the whole thing is bananas. Lincoln, his 12 year old son and a ranking admiral walk two miles through the city the day after it fell, protected only by a single civilian body guard and ten Navy sailors. The idea of a modern sitting President entering a major enemy city, much less their capitol, only a day after it fell with any amount of security seems incredibly iffy, let alone less than a dozen men in the open air. With that little attention to security it's a wonder Lincoln lasted as long as he did before being killed.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 02:03 |
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# ? Jun 12, 2024 18:35 |
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bewbies posted:It is pretty much the exact opposite of how the US military has designed itself since roughly the ACW: "plans" are more like concepts, you want to delegate decision-making to subordinates as much as is practical, subordinates are generally empowered with the ability to trash "the plan" and go off their own judgment if they think that will improve chances of achieving objectives. I would guess that the observations there are based upon what their military officials saw when they came over to the US before the war and saw what the US was doing in training. Mistaking a lack of funding and support (esp. for the army) for inflexibility perhaps?
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 02:08 |
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MrMenshevik posted:I think the guy means that the American military discourages improvisation, so junior officers are more likely to break off an attack that has gone awry instead of just figuring some poo poo out and pressing on. If the plan isn't working and you're not allowed to redesign as you go, then you just stop and wait for the brass to engineer a new plan for you. To me it reads like a degree of chauvinism about their opponents, the same way that Americans get chauvinistic about the small-mindedness of say Japanese troops, or Soviet troops, or pretty much everyone who isn't European.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 02:11 |
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ArchangeI posted:"The Americans rely heavily on plans and won't delegate power to subordinates. They will abandon their plans at the first sign of difficulty. These two sentences do not contradict each other." There's no contradiction. The document makes it clear the the Americans are expected to delegate the formulation of new plans on relatively high level command, giving the Japanese an opportunity to strike between the moment when the American troops realize their inability to fulfill their plans, and their commanders' authoritative response, since this intermediary period should be primarily defined by inertia of the American force. Compare that with the Japanese model which effectively negated the role of the division command (and higher) and led to an extreme exaggeration of low-level authority. Of course we nowadays know that the Japanese model was a disaster that encouraged individual officers' tactical entrepreneurship at the cost of any sort of coordination, but at the time the analysis was written the Japanese government still believed that their lack of centralized authority was an advantage.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 02:15 |
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Taerkar posted:I would guess that the observations there are based upon what their military officials saw when they came over to the US before the war and saw what the US was doing in training. Mistaking a lack of funding and support (esp. for the army) for inflexibility perhaps? This is possible; the army they would have seen in the 20s and 30s was something like 25 regiment-sized units spread across twice as many posts (thanks local politicians) so there was almost no routine training at echelons higher than a battalion. That'd make it very difficult to get a bead on how larger sized units operated. edit - I forgot the Civilian Conservation Corps: it had a mobilized military cohort that was larger than the operational force of the time and they were scattered even more thinly than the army's units were. bewbies fucked around with this message at 02:26 on Dec 16, 2014 |
# ? Dec 16, 2014 02:24 |
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And likely a significant budget draw-down due to the GD making what training and practice that does occur very scripted and limited in what can be done.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 02:26 |
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steinrokkan posted:There's no contradiction. The document makes it clear the the Americans are expected to delegate the formulation of new plans on relatively high level command, giving the Japanese an opportunity to strike between the moment when the American troops realize their inability to fulfill their plans, and their commanders' authoritative response, since this intermediary period should be primarily defined by inertia of the American force. I think that the document is essentially confronting a fundamental cultural difference between the two nations. Both militaries understood the need for flexibility in command, and often accused the other of having inflexible doctrines (the Imperial Japanese Navy is particularly singled out). The Japanese approached flexibility by constructing broadly-worded orders of battle that could be easily interpreted on the field by field officers. The Americans approached flexibility by allowing field officers the ability to adapt or disregard the plans as written when required. When Japanese commands were faced with orders that conflicted with the needs of the field, they often did not enjoy the ability to disobey them. This document's author is looking at the highly specific orders of battle created by the Americans (i.e. multiple rally points organized by company or platoon, with a high level of complexity) and not understanding that what allows for such specificity is the ability for junior officers to change those plans when required. Kaal fucked around with this message at 02:45 on Dec 16, 2014 |
# ? Dec 16, 2014 02:43 |
GhostofJohnMuir posted:Sometimes you look back at history and are surprised by how familiar everything is to the present and sometimes you're surprised by how utterly different it is. I was just reading about Lincoln's inspection of Richmond after it's fall and the whole thing is bananas. Lincoln, his 12 year old son and a ranking admiral walk two miles through the city the day after it fell, protected only by a single civilian body guard and ten Navy sailors. The idea of a modern sitting President entering a major enemy city, much less their capitol, only a day after it fell with any amount of security seems incredibly iffy, let alone less than a dozen men in the open air. With that little attention to security it's a wonder Lincoln lasted as long as he did before being killed. Pretty sure there weren't any 1000 yard sniper rifles or portable missiles et al during Lincoln's days. He got shot to death from a few feet away; he was probably safer in the street with a dozen guys around him than sitting in that chair.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 03:08 |
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Kaal posted:I think that the document is essentially confronting a fundamental cultural difference between the two nations. Both militaries understood the need for flexibility in command, and often accused the other of having inflexible doctrines (the Imperial Japanese Navy is particularly singled out). There's a subtlety here you've missed. The Japanese Navy had a very inflexible grand strategic doctrine, but on a tactical level their training and tactics were excellent (although that was partly because they had trained to a fever pitch before the war, but were never able to achieve that sort of excellence during the war). Vincent Van Goatse fucked around with this message at 03:27 on Dec 16, 2014 |
# ? Dec 16, 2014 03:23 |
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Slavvy posted:Pretty sure there weren't any 1000 yard sniper rifles or portable missiles et al during Lincoln's days. He got shot to death from a few feet away; he was probably safer in the street with a dozen guys around him than sitting in that chair. Tell that to Leonidas Polk.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 03:45 |
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PittTheElder posted:Tell that to Leonidas Polk. Sedgwick and his final words are also apropos. Actually checking it out, the sharp shooter that took him down did so from about a 1,000 yards, so very apropos.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 03:48 |
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Slavvy posted:Pretty sure there weren't any 1000 yard sniper rifles or portable missiles et al during Lincoln's days. He got shot to death from a few feet away; he was probably safer in the street with a dozen guys around him than sitting in that chair. Pretty much, though to be fair the average rifle used in the Civil War had accuracy out to 400 yards. More importantly though, while he might have only had a detail of 12 sailors he also was surrounded by 125,000 soldiers who pretty much worshipped the ground he walked on by the end of the war. This reminds me though, of one of the Civil War's many little ironies: Lincoln signed the authorization creating the Secret Service on April 15, 1865 - later that evening he went to Ford's Theater and was shot dead. Of course at the time the Secret Service was primarily a special department of the treasury focused on combating counterfeiting, and it would not be until the assassination of President McKinley in 1901 that the service would assume responsibility for the protection of the president. That history is why the Secret Service has such a diverse array of responsibilities - being as much accountants as they are policemen. Now many people might know that. Something they might not know, is that the Secret Service's role as protectors of the executive was actually predated by another group many years earlier. In 1776, Gen. George Washington created a group known as the Commander-in-Chief's Guard, a company of some 180 "neat and spruce" men, who watched over Washington throughout the duration of the Revolutionary War. While the unit never saw combat, they did have an incident where a member of the guard, Sgt. Thomas Hickey, was disgraced and imprisoned, and offered an unlikely story of British conspiracy before being convicted of mutiny and sedition and executed before a crowd of 20,000 spectators. What caused his initial fall from grace? Counterfeiting. Boom. Kaal fucked around with this message at 04:20 on Dec 16, 2014 |
# ? Dec 16, 2014 03:51 |
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Kaal posted:Pretty much, though to be fair the average rifle used in the Civil War had accuracy out to 400 yards. More importantly though, while he might have only had a detail of 12 sailors he also was surrounded by 125,000 soldiers who pretty much worshipped the ground he walked on by the end of the war. 125,000 soldiers who weren't posted in the outlying area the party landed at and who didn't know the president was in the city until the party had walked over a mile and finally found someone on picket duty. They just had the advantage of surprise and luck on their side.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 04:38 |
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GhostofJohnMuir posted:125,000 soldiers who weren't posted in the outlying area the party landed at and who didn't know the president was in the city until the party had walked over a mile and finally found someone on picket duty. They just had the advantage of surprise and luck on their side. I can't imagine there was a single person in the country who didn't know what Abraham Lincoln looked like, but I'm sure that what you're reading is a pretty fascinating account. I don't suppose there's an online version available? It sounds really detailed and interesting. Kaal fucked around with this message at 04:53 on Dec 16, 2014 |
# ? Dec 16, 2014 04:50 |
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Kaal posted:I can't imagine there was a single person in the country who didn't know what Abraham Lincoln looked like, but I'm sure that what you're reading is a pretty fascinating account. I don't suppose there's an online version available? It sounds really detailed and interesting. IIRC, most of the people left in the area he was visiting were newly freedmen, and they were pretty stoked to see him. Not all the residents were unhappy with the federales at that point.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 05:07 |
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ALL-PRO SEXMAN posted:There's a subtlety here you've missed. The Japanese Navy had a very inflexible grand strategic doctrine, but on a tactical level their training and tactics were excellent (although that was partly because they had trained to a fever pitch before the war, but were never able to achieve that sort of excellence during the war). Even on the level of battlefield strategy they were rather inflexible and stubborn. Many of the bad decisions made during Midway resulted of the whole 'This is how things are done' approach. Their tactical stuff suffered from the 'personal glory' issue (especially for fighter pilots) and a rather miserable level of coordination made that even worse.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 05:07 |
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sullat posted:IIRC, most of the people left in the area he was visiting were newly freedmen, and they were pretty stoked to see him. Not all the residents were unhappy with the federales at that point. Yeah they'd make a lot of references to him as being Father Abraham, as in the biblical patriarch who was father of the Covenant and the nations of God, who led his people away from the bondage of Egypt and the sin of Sodom and Gomorrah, and established them in the Land of Canaan. For the freedmen, who were extremely religious since that was pretty much their only education and nominal escape from slavery, it was a pretty big deal. They absolutely loved him.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 05:22 |
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Mightypeon posted:They got the American artillery-hapiness pretty much right. And the Japanese are really bad in night battles because they have bad eyesight at night. Oh whoops we just lost a bunch of ships.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 05:37 |
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Radar says there's some contacts moving this way? Oh it's clearly malfunctioning.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 05:57 |
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GhostofJohnMuir posted:125,000 soldiers who weren't posted in the outlying area the party landed at and who didn't know the president was in the city until the party had walked over a mile and finally found someone on picket duty. They just had the advantage of surprise and luck on their side. It helped that American forces were sick and tired of southern poo poo by then and would have happily turned the city into an iron-fisted garrison if it went towards stamping out those embers.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 06:00 |
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Taerkar posted:Radar says there's some contacts moving this way? Oh it's clearly malfunctioning. You know, all that gunfire we hear is just the other pair of cruisers doing unplanned night-time fire support. Now, turn off the radar, they might be able to detect the emissions and home in on us.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 06:52 |
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Don't shoot, they might be friendly! Granted, that happened to both the Americans and the Japanese with the same results for the ones being attacked (Getting hosed up).
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 07:11 |
Don Gato posted:Don't shoot, they might be friendly! Alternatively: "Nazis in the open! Down in that clearing! *fucks up a whole lot of allied paratroopers*"
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 07:52 |
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Slavvy posted:Alternatively: "Nazis in the open! Down in that clearing! *fucks up a whole lot of allied paratroopers*" Generation Kill, first battle, casualty reports from Task Force Taurawa, elements of which drove through and entire city of Iraqis. 18 casualties: 8 from enemy fire, 10 because some A-10 pilot thought that one unmistakably ugly AMTRAC was a fat Iraqi or something
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 11:15 |
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What would be the worst case of friendly fire in recorded history? I know it is a broad question, but it is purposefully so. As an aside - I finally finished Nothing to Envy. Wow, just... wow. I'm gonna try and track down Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, but I should finish Signals of War to make an effortpost about the Falklands war here
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 11:17 |
GhostofJohnMuir posted:Sometimes you look back at history and are surprised by how familiar everything is to the present and sometimes you're surprised by how utterly different it is. I was just reading about Lincoln's inspection of Richmond after it's fall and the whole thing is bananas. Lincoln, his 12 year old son and a ranking admiral walk two miles through the city the day after it fell, protected only by a single civilian body guard and ten Navy sailors. The idea of a modern sitting President entering a major enemy city, much less their capitol, only a day after it fell with any amount of security seems incredibly iffy, let alone less than a dozen men in the open air. With that little attention to security it's a wonder Lincoln lasted as long as he did before being killed. Lincoln was probably the last very publicly available president of the United States. There are in fact people who think Lincoln engaged in fatalistic and suicidal behaviours at times when the war was going poorly (inspecting fortifications very recklessly) but I don't think this is an example, given the army probably would have burnt the whole city down in retribution.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 11:19 |
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Azran posted:What would be the worst case of friendly fire in recorded history? I know it is a broad question, but it is purposefully so. Here's an opening bid: British infantry tries to use gas for the first time at Loos in 1915, the wind changes at the wrong moment and blows it back the wrong way, causing about 2,500 casualties. The initial concentration was designed to be heavy enough to completely overwhelm a gas mask, and indeed it was. (Only a very few actually died, but 2,500 blokes trying to cough their lungs up will still put a major crimp in your offensive.)
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 11:43 |
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Going to get the semi-apocryphal Battle of Karánsebes out of the way. It's questionable whether the battle actually happened, but after hearing HeyGal's tales from the Thirty Years War, I can see SOME sort of a ruckus happening due to stingy cavalry not wanting to share their booze. Now, panic ensuing, it escalating to an artillery barrage, and 10,000 dead, that might be a bit excessive.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 11:49 |
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How about that one time when a whole bunch of bombers dropped their loads short and killed the guy who came up with American Tank Destroyer doctrine?
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 12:05 |
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Throatwarbler posted:How about that one time when a whole bunch of bombers dropped their loads short and killed the guy who came up with American Tank Destroyer doctrine? That's pretty much this entire thread collapsed into a singularity.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 12:31 |
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Azran posted:What would be the worst case of friendly fire in recorded history? I know it is a broad question, but it is purposefully so. They dropped a nuke on a small town in North Carolina?
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 15:59 |
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There was the ever-classic Austria -Hungary.bat which I can't think of the name of.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 16:06 |
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Azran posted:What would be the worst case of friendly fire in recorded history? I know it is a broad question, but it is purposefully so.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 16:06 |
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The joint American-Canadian invasion of... Attu, I think? One of the Aleutians. Had something like 300 fatalities recapturing an uninhabited island.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 16:08 |
Stonewall Jackson's demise has got to be one of the costlier incidents in history. Vietnam was also quite bad. A lot of working out the kinks in CAS.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 16:20 |
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HMS Camperdown ramming and sinking the HMS Victoria, in peacetime.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 16:42 |
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Azran posted:What would be the worst case of friendly fire in recorded history? I know it is a broad question, but it is purposefully so. Does sinking three German ships filled with concentration camp prisoners and killing about 5000 of them count?
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 16:51 |
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Phanatic posted:Does sinking three German ships filled with concentration camp prisoners and killing about 5000 of them count? Jesus, what happened there?
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 17:12 |
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Azran posted:What would be the worst case of friendly fire in recorded history? I know it is a broad question, but it is purposefully so. Would the Allies accidentally bombing Switzerland count?
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 17:18 |
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# ? Jun 12, 2024 18:35 |
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sullat posted:The joint American-Canadian invasion of... Attu, I think? One of the Aleutians. Had something like 300 fatalities recapturing an uninhabited island. From wiki: The invaders landed to find the island abandoned. Under the cover of fog, the Japanese had successfully removed their troops on 28 July. The Army Air Force had bombed abandoned positions for almost three weeks without suspecting the Japanese were no longer there. The day before the withdrawal, the U.S. Navy fought an inconclusive and possibly meaningless Battle of the Pips 80 mi (70 nmi; 130 km) to the west. The Japanese may have been gone, but Allied casualties on Kiska nevertheless numbered 313. All were the result of friendly fire, booby traps, disease, or frostbite. As with Attu, Kiska offered an extremely hostile environment.
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# ? Dec 16, 2014 17:22 |