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Ghost of Reagan Past posted:So help me see how this works. I'm genuinely curious as to where the line is supposed to be drawn, because I still don't know what you precisely mean by applied. none of what you mentioned is patentable as described
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May 31, 2015 15:42
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Kalman posted:That's not what a patent lawyer means by "applied," and SCOTUS was definitely not saying that math on general purpose hardware is unpatentable in Alice. Depends very much on what the claim says the math does. would you mind defining applied in this context then? I'm not the only one who's been left wondering what exactly you mean
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May 31, 2015 15:49
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Condiv posted:would you mind defining applied in this context then? I'm not the only one who's been left wondering what exactly you mean "Sorting", even if implemented, isn't applied to anything. "Sort x things and then do something with the top result" applies sorting (general concept) to a specific problem. It's not that hard.
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May 31, 2015 16:17
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Kalman posted:"Sorting", even if implemented, isn't applied to anything. Based on your description, I could make it patentable by describing it as "a method to sort an arbitrary list using a defined total order relation as the sorting mechanism and producing a list ordered by that total order relation," correct? Or could I do it with "a method to sort a set, given a defined ordering relation, into an ordered set."? Or must I do something that is distinctively not sorting, such as "display on screen" or "output to text file" or what? Both of those are applications of sorting to a specific problem (those might not be patentable because I doubt 'display text' is patentable, but again I'm trying to figure out how the rules of the game work). Or must I do something else? Could I, say, take the top element, search a database for a relevant entry, and add a field that indicates its rank in the list? So nobody could use my sorting algorithm for that purpose, but they could use it for other purposes?
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May 31, 2015 16:41
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Ghost of Reagan Past posted:It actually IS that hard because most of us aren't patent lawyers who know what you're talking about. You're using 'applied' in a specific technical sense, not what 99% of the population thinks of when they think of 'applied math'. We don't know the rules of your game. None of those examples are patentable (insignificant post-solution activity per Alice)
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May 31, 2015 16:45
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Yes, is complicated, which is why the patent bar exists before random people can start filling applications on someone else's behalf
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May 31, 2015 16:47
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WhiskeyJuvenile posted:None of those examples are patentable (insignificant post-solution activity per Alice) Is a solution requiring a "client" and a "server" still tied to a particular machine, or did you figure that one out?
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May 31, 2015 16:51
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ulmont posted:Is a solution requiring a "client" and a "server" still tied to a particular machine, or did you figure that one out? I think Alice basically stands for (among other things) you cannot take something unpatentable, add "via a computer" and make it patentable. I assume "via two computers" would also be covered.
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May 31, 2015 16:52
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If there were a more robust printed matter doctrine, that's take care of a lot of the dumb patents (the semantic meaning of the data in the claims shouldn't distinguish over the prior art)
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May 31, 2015 16:58
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evilweasel posted:I think Alice basically stands for (among other things) you cannot take something unpatentable, add "via a computer" and make it patentable. I assume "via two computers" would also be covered. Client/server was a particular machine after Bilski, and I don't read anything in Alice that repudiates that.
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May 31, 2015 16:59
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ulmont posted:Client/server was a particular machine after Bilski, and I don't read anything in Alice that repudiates that. Insignificant post solution activity
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May 31, 2015 17:00
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Ghost of Reagan Past posted:It actually IS that hard because most of us aren't patent lawyers who know what you're talking about. You're using 'applied' in a specific technical sense, not what 99% of the population thinks of when they think of 'applied math'. We don't know the rules of your game. "Applied mathematics is a branch of mathematics that deals with mathematical methods that find use in science, engineering, business, computer science, and industry." It's not a patent law specific meaning of the word "applied."
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May 31, 2015 17:10
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A sorting algorithm as a computer science topic is applied math in and of itself despite it being pretty far from patentable. All I've learned from my current job and invention disclosures is that "do it with a robot connected to a computer" fulfills any patentability problems. Or at least our patent attorney wants the sweet sweet filing money.
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May 31, 2015 17:14
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Kalman posted:"Sorting", even if implemented, isn't applied to anything. Kalman posted:"Applied mathematics is a branch of mathematics that deals with mathematical methods that find use in science, engineering, business, computer science, and industry." http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/mathematics/18-310c-principles-of-applied-mathematics-fall-2007/ posted:Principles of Applied Mathematics is a study of illustrative topics in discrete applied mathematics including sorting algorithms... I mean, sorting algorithms are easily viewed as an application of lambda calculus, so yes you're using a definition different from the rest of us or you're not being specific enough.
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Jun 1, 2015 01:07
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Kalman posted:"Applied mathematics is a branch of mathematics that deals with mathematical methods that find use in science, engineering, business, computer science, and industry." all of those industries use sorting algorithms.
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Jun 1, 2015 08:14
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Kalman posted:"Applied mathematics is a branch of mathematics that deals with mathematical methods that find use in science, engineering, business, computer science, and industry." Applied mathematics has always been an arbitrary classification that depends on what people consider to be useful at any point in time. The borders between "applied" and related "pure" mathematical fields are blurry at best and in some cases entitely illusory. An application like "sort x things and take the first result" follows trivially from the idea "there exists a function from x things type to some well-ordered type." Finding the cheapest product, shortest route, or whatever other optimal characteristic is simply restating the problem in a procedural manner.
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Jun 1, 2015 09:22
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Lots of non-math law opinions this morning. Thomas and Alito seem to be dissenting/concurring in part on most. Elonis came out (quoting at length a parody of the whitest kids you know sketch about killing the president). Court held that yes, you do in fact need to use the mens rea element to criminal convictions, not just the reaction of a reasonable person.
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Jun 1, 2015 15:32
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They managed to sidestep the 1st Amendment issues raised there because of that
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Jun 1, 2015 15:37
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Hot Dog Day #91 posted:Lots of non-math law opinions this morning. Thomas and Alito seem to be dissenting/concurring in part on most. I agree with an Alito dissent, wasn't expecting that.
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Jun 1, 2015 15:44
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Any thoughts on the cases? Scotusblog didn't really explain any of them or of the results, really, and "mens rea element" means nothing to a layperson.
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Jun 1, 2015 15:47
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silvergoose posted:Any thoughts on the cases? Scotusblog didn't really explain any of them or of the results, really, and "mens rea element" means nothing to a layperson. The case was over what you had to be thinking to be convicted of online threats: Negligence - no intent to threaten the person or awareness your actions would threaten the person but a reasonable person would have realized that you created a risk of making them feel threatened. Recklessness - you did not actually intend to threaten the person and did not actually know you would, but you ignored the obvious risk you would. Intent - you actually intended to threaten the person or were actually aware your actions would threaten them. The court held negligence wasn't enough, but didn't decide if recklessness was.
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Jun 1, 2015 15:57
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Elonis v. United States: to be successfully convicted under federal law for communicating a threat to injure another person via interstate commerce (e.g., the internet), the jury must find - beyond a reasonable doubt - not only that the communication was a threat (nobody disputes this), but also that the defendant at least "should have known" that the communication would be viewed as a threat by a reasonable person (a recklessness standard). In so holding, the Court rejects the government's position that it would be sufficient to instead simply show that a hypothetical reasonable person would have known that that the communication would be viewed as a threat (a negligence standard), which would not look to the defendant's state of mental culpability. The Court does not decide whether the "should have known" standard is appropriate, or if a more stringent standard - that the defendant "actually knew" (a knowledge standard) or the even more stringent "actually intended" (an intent standard) - is required. Alito doesn't like that. Beaten.
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Jun 1, 2015 16:02
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1337JiveTurkey posted:Applied mathematics has always been an arbitrary classification that depends on what people consider to be useful at any point in time. The borders between "applied" and related "pure" mathematical fields are blurry at best and in some cases entitely illusory. I'm going to respectfully disagree with Kalman that the definition of an application of an abstract idea is the plain dictionary definition of "applied mathematics" as it is commonly used, since the common definition (i.e., the use of math in a particular industry or field) would also include "field of use" limitations that have been deemed to be not much help in terms of establishing the patentability of otherwise "abstract" concepts. The problem is determining where to draw the line between "field of use limitation" and "patentable application of the idea." I'd also note that the term "abstract idea" itself is a judicially defined term for a particular category of exception to the broad coverage of section 101, and that it's easy to get tripped up by conflating the dictionary definition of "abstract" with what has been defined by the law as an "abstract idea." There's certainly some overlap, but it's imprecise enough to make discussing the topic difficult if everyone in the discussion isn't on the same page. With all of that said, the boundary line between an abstract idea and an application of the abstract idea is somewhere between the claims of Parker v. Flook and Diamond v. Diehr, two Supreme Court cases decided in the late 70s and early 80s which the Court keeps citing back to in Bilski, Mayo, and Alice. In Flook, the claims were directed to a method for calculating alarm limits in a catalytic converter. The claims used a mathematical formula to determine how to set the alarm limit. This was deemed unpatentable, based in part on the fact that the actual formula to calculate the limits was deemed to be well-known (reading a novelty/non-obviousness inquiry into 101 eligibility). These claims were deemed ineligible for patent protection. In Diehr, the claims were directed to a method for operating a rubber curing press. The claims used the well-known Arrhenius equation to determine when to open the rubber press. These claims were deemed eligible for patent protection. Although much of the reasoning employed in these cases is superseded by Bilski, Mayo, and Alice, these later cases each note the fact that the claims in Flook would still be ineligible under the current test, and the claims in Diehr would be eligible. The problem is that it is pretty hard to reconcile the cases with one another. At least part of the reason for the different decision in Diehr is credited to the fact that Giles Rich (The brain behind the 1952 patent act and judge on the predecessor to the Federal Circuit) threw a shitfit after Flook and convinced the members of the Court to adjust their reasoning a bit in Diehr. One thing that's interesting is that the claims in Flook stopped at the "calculating alarm limits" step of the process, while the claims in Diehr actually affirmatively recited "opening the press". I wonder if the decision in Flook might have been different if the Applicant had actually claimed "detecting the presence of some chemical in the catalytic converter", "determining if the calculated alarm limit has been met" and "sounding the alarm in response to determining that the calculated alarm limit has been met." Based on the recent case law, I'm not sure these features would qualify as the "significantly more" necessary to draw the claims into the patentable realm, as these additions would essentially be employing the "draftsman's art" to make ineligible subject matter eligible. On the other hand, under the reasoning as applied to Diehr, it seems like these additional limitations should be enough. It's pretty tough to reconcile, in my opinion. On the same subject, it looks like Ultramercial has filed a petition for cert after finally getting shot down by the Federal Circuit (under exactly the same reason it was previously upheld at patentable - read Lourie's concurrence in Ultramercial II). I doubt the petition will be granted, but you never know - we may get another Supreme Court decision on 101 sooner rather than later.
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Jun 1, 2015 16:13
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Green Crayons posted:Elonis v. United States: to be successfully convicted under federal law for communicating a threat to injure another person via interstate commerce (e.g., the internet), the jury must find - beyond a reasonable doubt - not only that the communication was a threat (nobody disputes this), but also that the defendant at least "should have known" that the communication would be viewed as a threat by a reasonable person (a recklessness standard). In so holding, the Court rejects the government's position that it would be sufficient to instead simply show that a hypothetical reasonable person would have known that that the communication would be viewed as a threat (a negligence standard), which would not look to the defendant's state of mental culpability.
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Jun 1, 2015 16:23
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FlamingLiberal posted:So the court basically rejected the government's argument but seems to not explain what they feel is a reasons way to approach these kinds of cases? The ruling is unclear to me. It appears the ruling was "You dumbasses used jury instructions for a civil case in a criminal case"
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Jun 1, 2015 16:43
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NJ Deac posted:respectfully disagree you've been interacting with examiners too much
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Jun 1, 2015 16:43
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The problem with the ruling is that they said that the jury instructions were wrong and then punted, Alito of all people dissented saying "you need to actually give trial courts a standard, now they have no idea what to do."Alito posted:The Court’s disposition of this case is certain to cause
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Jun 1, 2015 16:45
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FlamingLiberal posted:So the court basically rejected the government's argument but seems to not explain what they feel is a reasons way to approach these kinds of cases? The ruling is unclear to me. That happens sometimes when the court wants to punt a particular issue that it doesn't have a good grasp on. Now all the lower courts can play around with whatever standard works best and eventually another case will come back up that has a better standard in place for them to rule on. It seems like they're just saying "negligence isn't enough" just to reverse the lower decision without really setting the new rule.
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Jun 1, 2015 16:47
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FlamingLiberal posted:So the court basically rejected the government's argument but seems to not explain what they feel is a reasons way to approach these kinds of cases? The ruling is unclear to me. The ultimate question - what minimum standard of mental culpability is required to convict someone under this law? - had four answers, and in ascending order of culpability, they were: negligence, recklessness, knowledge, intentional. In this case, the Court simply said "nope, not negligence," and now lower courts will have to decide whether the answer is recklessness, knowledge, or intentional. The Court didn't answer the ultimate question fully, and they gave various reasons why, including an insufficient amount of argument given by the parties. These are okay reasons for partially answering the issue. However, I would bet that there were larger disagreements among the majority in terms of what level of mental culpability was sufficient, and what role, if any, the First Amendment played in these considerations. And so punting on a broad answer allowed CJ Roberts to have a narrow opinion with a strong majority, which is the CJ's style.
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Jun 1, 2015 17:21
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Mr. Nice! posted:That happens sometimes when the court wants to punt a particular issue that it doesn't have a good grasp on. Now all the lower courts can play around with whatever standard works best and eventually another case will come back up that has a better standard in place for them to rule on. It may also be that the justices could all agree that negligence wasn't enough, but they couldn't get five justices to agree on what the standard should be. Given that deciding the actual standard would probably require deciding the First Amendment issues, the justices may have decided that it made more sense to write a limited opinion that everyone could agree on than have a confusing mess of conflicting non-majority opinions. If the Supreme Court's opinion is likely to create a circuit conflict, they might as well not issue the opinion and see if the circuits can avoid a conflict left to their own devices.
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Jun 1, 2015 17:37
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WhiskeyJuvenile posted:you've been interacting with examiners too much He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster. And when you gaze long into an abyss the abyss also gazes into you.
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Jun 1, 2015 17:55
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is Elonis going to go back and get another trial now? Or is the ruling dropped and the prosecutor gets to decide whether to try again?
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Jun 1, 2015 17:55
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So am I safe in assuming Thomas's dissent in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch that there should be no EEOC and that explicit private employment discrimination should be legal?
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Jun 1, 2015 19:24
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eSports Chaebol posted:So am I safe in assuming Thomas's dissent in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch that there should be no EEOC and that explicit private employment discrimination should be legal?
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Jun 1, 2015 19:57
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twodot posted:The whole thing turns on the definition of "because of" if you have a policy against hats, and someone wears a hat as a religious practice, and you decline to hire them, is it because of their religious practice of wearing hats, or because of their practice of wearing hats that just so happens to be religious. Thomas argues the latter, which I personally think is the more sane definition policy wise, the example that Scalia gives of "You have to hire someone who refuses to work Saturdays" seems insane and unproductive, but it's also pretty clear what Congress wrote down is the former. Nah, it seems pretty silly to say that an exemption to a religiously neutral policy cannot be considered a reasonable accommodation. Giving people favorable treatment based on their religious practices is like the entire purpose behind the reasonable accommodation requirement. Allowing an observant Muslim to wear a head scarf seems like a very reasonable accommodation, and it's unlikely to cause undue hardship to Abercrombie. Under the majority's opinion a company is still allowed to not hire people who refuse to work Saturdays - they only need to show that giving Saturdays off causes undue hardship. edit: I'm pretty sure none of this stuff was controversial to anyone except Thomas. The case itself was about whether it matters if the employer was notified about or just guessed about the need for accommodation. esquilax fucked around with this message at 20:17 on Jun 1, 2015 |
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Jun 1, 2015 20:08
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esquilax posted:Nah, it seems pretty silly to say that an exemption to a religiously neutral policy cannot be considered a reasonable accommodation. What is "undue hardship"? Seems fairly vague to me.
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Jun 1, 2015 20:57
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AVeryLargeRadish posted:What is "undue hardship"? Seems fairly vague to me. law.txt
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Jun 1, 2015 20:58
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AVeryLargeRadish posted:What is "undue hardship"? Seems fairly vague to me. Those are the words they use in the law. It's basically "decide on a case-by-case basis" It also wasn't a point of controversy in this case. I don't think Abercrombie even attempted to show that they couldn't easily accommodate a headscarf wearer.
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Jun 1, 2015 21:20
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AVeryLargeRadish posted:What is "undue hardship"? Seems fairly vague to me. Basically whether or not something can reasonably be called bullshit.
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Jun 1, 2015 22:15
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esquilax posted:Those are the words they use in the law. It's basically "decide on a case-by-case basis" FAUXTON posted:Basically whether or not something can reasonably be called bullshit. Hmmm, those both sound really vague. It seems like "undue hardship" could mean almost anything you wanted it to.
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Jun 2, 2015 01:42
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