|
Tias posted:So, I'm reading Omer Bartovs "Hitlers Army", and I'm wondering what you guys think of it? It seems to be so enthusiastic about demolishing the myth of the clean wehrmacht, that it sort of ends in the other ditch, making the case that all wehrmacht soldiers were fire-eyed banzaijugend who saw Hitler as jesus christ. Bartov is great He definitely has a point to make and he concentrates on that. That said as someone who has worked extensively with that era and nazi education in particular a lot of the cohort who made up the lions share of the soldiers ca 1941 were pretty much behind the regime. They got a lot of indoctrination in the hj and the schools as kids and often followed it up with labor service or some other nationalistic community service. Also remember that in 41 hitler was considered a great leader. A lot of people gave him credit for fixing the economy and he had instituted a semi welfare state to the benefit of ethnic Germans frequently using goods and money appropriated from repressed groups. See goetz ally "hitlers beneficiaries" for more on that. He was also leading a war that in two years had accomplished what all of ww1 hadn't. Even the military people who thought invading France was insane were behind him. Of course this doesn't mean every last guy in the military felt that way but it was common enough to color how the institution worked. Once people who are supporters are in the majority a lot more things become possible. Also remember that promotion was political in part. Guys who got drafted and thought the nsdap was lovely tended not to get into leadership positions.
|
#
?
Aug 25, 2015 19:33
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 21, 2024 06:27 |
|
|
Alekanderu posted:I think doctrinal changes in the 70's had a lot to do with why the Strv 103 was kept around for as long as it was; with the increased emphasis on a large, low-tech but resilient infantry force (IB66/IB77 etc) rather than a smaller, more mechanized army, there simply wasn't the political will to go ahead with the acquisition of a new MBT until about two decades after it should have happened. A sound argument but I'm not sure about the causality. As far as I've understood it the doctrinal changes came from the economic restrictions, more than the other way around. The army didn't want to reduce the number of brigades when the budget was reduced, but something had to give and it ended up being equipment and refresher exercises. Have you read Claës Skoglund's Det bästa försvarsbeslut som aldrig kom till stånd? It's been a while since I read it but I'm pretty sure he describes it as the army heads at the time wanting to keep quantity at all costs despite the probable threat looking more and more like a coup than a full scale conventional war. TheFluff fucked around with this message at 19:44 on Aug 25, 2015 |
|
#
?
Aug 25, 2015 19:38
|
|
|
Nenonen posted:
|
|
#
?
Aug 25, 2015 19:54
|
|
|
Murgos posted:As far as the KUB, I am not questioning the capabilities of medium range air defenses, I think they are well proven, what I am contending is that SHORAD prior to ~1980 was effective enough to warrant any serious consideration. The one exception being the Operation Model 5 raid which pretty much is the exception that proves the rule, things had to go just right. I dunno, Cold War doctrine for World War 3 generally did involve a lot of planes moving at a very low height precisely to avoid medium-range AA (see also why Britain started out Gulf War 1 doing low-level attacks on Iraqi airfields in Tornadoes). And in that environment, the Soviets with Shilkas were going to kill a lot more pilots than the US with M163s. The extant combat history shows they are effective against Western low-flying aircraft when they see them. World War 3 would have involved lots of that. Actual history has involved very little of that because we haven't had World War 3, so the West has generally operated with air superiority against technologically and numerically inferior foes, so we haven't seen tons of planes shot down by SHORAD. That doesn't mean it would be ineffective in the least in the scenario for which it was actually designed.
|
|
#
?
Aug 25, 2015 21:18
|
|
|
feedmegin posted:The extant combat history shows they are effective against Western low-flying aircraft when they see them. quote:World War 3 would have involved lots of that. Actual history has involved very little of that because we haven't had World War 3, so the West has generally operated with air superiority against technologically and numerically inferior foes, so we haven't seen tons of planes shot down by SHORAD. That doesn't mean it would be ineffective in the least in the scenario for which it was actually designed.
|
|
#
?
Aug 25, 2015 21:49
|
|
|
The point of air defense is not to kill enemy aircraft but to make it much harder for them to operate.
|
|
#
?
Aug 25, 2015 23:45
|
|
|
Murgos posted:I don't think it does. One case of F4's in 1973 being fed directly into their optimal use case due to several snafu's != effective. Particularly when you realize that they have been deployed everywhere pretty much continuously for 50 years because they are cheap and ubiquitous. is it? I gave a specific example of cold war doctrine being applied in gulf war 1 and it resulted in losses. Do you think the A10 was designed to go in high?
|
|
#
?
Aug 25, 2015 23:55
|
|
|
Rincewind posted:I really like the juxtaposition of le cafard with another jaunty Herbert Sulzbach update. I do enjoy doing this sort of thing. It speaks right to the whole point of the blog: these different battles and fronts and experiences don't happen in a vacuum, isolated from each other, it's all going off at the same time in one big ridiculous pile of blanco and bullshit. PS: For anyone who's missing Our Advertising Feature, I went on Twitter, and I found this.  And they tell us that the Edwardians were a bunch of prudish stuffed shirts!
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 00:03
|
|
|
feedmegin posted:I gave a specific example of cold war doctrine being applied in gulf war 1 and it resulted in losses. No, you didn't, you made some off hand comment about Tornadoes going in low.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 00:05
|
|
|
Trin Tragula posted:PS: For anyone who's missing Our Advertising Feature, I went on Twitter, and I found this. Stuffed something, anyway.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 03:32
|
|
|
Cyrano4747 posted:Bartov is great Okay, but he does go a bit beyond that point in this book, often and insistently making the point that every wehrmacht soldier on the eastern front had a quasi-religious faith in Hitler and a nihilistic conviction that a final victory must be created over the corpses of Russia - or at least, was brutalized to the point where they happily went along nazi indoctrination.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 07:37
|
|
|
Koesj posted:Re: 1990s plans. Ehhhhhh, we've never seen the real™ Soviet plans which are still locked away, or more likely, shredded to tiny bits. Then again, I'll once more recommend Lautsch' article (in German, you'll manage Yeah, that article mostly confirms what officers in my Bundeswehr-days talked about. They found it really funny that both sides always assumed in their planning the war would be started from the other side. 
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 12:09
|
|
) on what seems to be genuine operational planning for/by Warsaw Pact countries. There were serious plans for attack on at least the Eastern side of the border, though the one I linked was an East German paper plan (the real one would come out of Wünsdorf/GSFG HQ). Okay, allegedly under the aegis of 'preemptive attack', but even the NVA forum had people admitting that this might not have been because of a direct military threat by the revanchist class enemy.
|
Okay let's back up a little bit... Ground Forces in Europe: Air Defense Artillery (ADA) in ~1980 We started talking about how the differing theaters in WWII informed ADA development and doctrine two pages ago, with ADA being used as a specific example of how US (and British) doctrine developed separately from the Soviet one (and possibly also the Bundeswehr, coming from German experiences on the Ostfront). Bewbies then claimed that the number of systems in US forces at least was actually up to par, whereupon Alchenar stated that those systems were poo poo compared to others (disputed by Bewbies), while Murgos added the impression that NATO's plans would have called for air superiority first. Let me analyze the first part of those statements by looking at differences between a couple of countries' Tables of Order & Equipment (TO&Es) in 1980. I not only chose this year because I've got some decent sources for it, but also because it kinda represents a period of last throes of some lesser-quality systems before their replacements showed up (Kub → Buk, Krug → S-300, Hawk → Patriot).  All four countries in the above table deployed infrared guided (IR) shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADS) at lower levels (Battalion, II, or downwards) of their TO&Es. Soviet maneuver Regiments (III, comparable with NATO Brigade-sized units, X) were pretty unique in that they had their own, organic short range air defense (SHORAD), whereas NATO countries would have cascaded divisional ADA forces down to their Brigades. These Soviet SHORAD systems were amalgamated in a ADA Battalion, of which Battalion-level MANPADS were also part (I think), but their actual strength was two Platoons of ZSU-23 Shilkas and Strela-1s (wheeled SA-9) each, or in case of the latter: Strela-10s (tracked SA-13) when they became available. At the divisional level, the Soviets ran five medium range Kub (SA-6) Batteries (Company-sized) in an ADA Regiment, though some divisions had been, and still were. switching over to the somewhat shorter ranged (but fully integrated, radar+missiles on a single vehicle) Osa (SA-8). A US division made do with two Batteries of Vulcans plus two Btys of Chapparals, for a total of four, in an ADA Battalion. The British were lagging behind with a Rapier Battery per Division (later upgraded to a Battalion, or Regiment in UK parlance - uuuughhh) and the W. Germans had a pretty big FlakPz Regiment (first with M42, being replaced by Gepard), comprising six Batteries. At the higher Corps- (or USSR Army-) level, these countries deployed a Krug (SA-4) Brigade, a Hawk Brigade, two Rapier 'Regiments', and a mixed FlakPz (Regiment) / Roland (two Battalions) Brigade respectively. Note that the (very rough) analogues of, say, Osa - Rapier and Roland - can only be found in numbers at these higher levels, while the Soviets actually had them attached to their divisions. The British and W. Germans lacked a true medium range system like Hawk, Kub or Krug at this level entirely, having to make do with SHORAD even at the Corps level. In case of the Germans this was compensated for by their contribution to the NATO SAM Belt (Hawk, Nike Hercules at the back), but the Dutch and Belgians had to pick up the UK's slack after the latter's budget-cutting withdrawal. Finally, note that Hawk and Rapier (pre-1983 tracked Rapier) are the least mobile of all these systems, not being self-propelled, and therefore less suited for maneuver warfare. This was particularly problematic with Rapier, since these had to be cascaded down to the maneuver level! So what's the ADA strength of these armed forces, and can we infer how the threat of air power informed their posture? Let's take a look at notional Regimental/Brigade level strength:  US Brigades would have gotten a mixed Vulcan + Chapparal Battery attached (12 veh. - pretty large!), UK Brigades probably a Rapier Platoon only (or rather: a 'Troop', 4-6 launchers, and non-self propelled to boot!), and W. German Brigades a FlakPz Battery (6 veh.). To me it's remarkable how varied the ADA that the Soviets brought to bear at this level was. Beyond MANPADS you had: a Shilka Platoon (4 veh.), a Strela Platoon (4 veh.), in the majority of cases a full Kub / Osa Battery (one out of five divisional ones, 5 veh.), and all this quite possibly backed up by some Krugs from the Army ADA Brigade even, when a Regiment was part of the 'main effort'. Compared to this, from what I know, US Hawk forces stayed well in the back, UK Corps level Rapiers were very much needed in their rear areas, and W. German Rolands (version 1, with IR missiles I believe) were thin on the ground and also tasked for protection of rear elements (a little bit closer still than rear areas). This leads me to the conclusion that Soviet Regimental ADA was indeed much more varied beyond MANPADS: radar-guided AA and IR missiles as organic SHORAD, radar-guided medium range missiles cascaded down from the divisional level, possibly some radar guided long range missiles (with no NATO analogues) from the Army level... all these were self-propelled and mobile! Compare US radar ranging AA (indeed, Vulcan had no search radar) and IR missiles (Chapparal), self propelled. UK radar-guided short/barely medium ranged missiles, towed (Rapier). And FRG gun-based systems (only radar guided when their FlakBtys got Gepard during this period). Also, and I'd say this strongly supports the quantitative argument, I'm strictly comparing equal(ish) level and size formations here. This does not accurately reflect how a conflict was expected to play out! The expectation was that the Soviets would have been fighting at the full Regimental level in attack at the minimum, while NATO equivalent defensive effort was at the Battalion or even Company level. With this in mind, what does a WWIII engagement look like, and what's the air defense situation on either side? Within a Soviet regimental attack you get four Shilkas, four Strelas, and most probably five Kubs protecting maneuver forces. This is a lot more ADA than what a divvied-up NATO brigade could bring on the defense. In case of a US battalion this would have been about a Platoon's worth of Vulcans/Chapparals (4 vehicles). A German one makes do with a couple of FlakPzs, and the Brits have a 50/50 chance of getting gently caress all. One engagement area, a 3-on-1 quantitative advantage in ADA for the Soviets, and more variety in systems. Hmmm. With that, while the Soviet Regiment already has its SHORAD organically attached, they also bring a Hawk-level system with them, on the battlefield as well. For me, the big takeaway of 1973 is that the presence of such medium-ranged systems forced Israeli pilots into SHORAD engagement ranges, vastly multiplying the potential effectiveness of 'lovely' systems like the early ZSU-23, or all those MANPADS in case of the Central European battlefield. Adversary air forces then get forced into suboptimal attack profiles, need to rely on situational awareness way more, have to bring planes capable of suppression of radar guided systems with them, etc. I don't think US ADA was poo poo, but it was limited compared to Soviet ADA, with the Brits faring worse, and the Germans relying on gun systems at the frontline ADA level* over missiles. I really think the Soviets put a lot more onus on air defense than NATO forces. I don't think NATO expected to have (at least early) air superiority in a European conflict, the issue of whether or not this would have fundamentally diminished air denial by ground-based systems in any case notwithstanding. Murgos posted:That link doesn't support your claim that SPAAGs (or AAA in general) in high quantity can be effective. 'Literally 1000's of AAA sites' were not materially disruptive to the strike. Once the SEAD Weasels left some SAM sites became effictive but it's not stated which those are. The reason I mentioned the Package Q Strike is that these quantities of ADA systems, and the variety of threats, can achieve a 'good enough' mission kill by denial on a pretty large air strike, even when flown by a vastly superior force, with air superiority firmly established. In this case they managed to do this through stresses on pilots alone. Murgos posted:As far as the KUB, I am not questioning the capabilities of medium range air defenses, I think they are well proven, what I am contending is that SHORAD prior to ~1980 was effective enough to warrant any serious consideration. The one exception being the Operation Model 5 raid which pretty much is the exception that proves the rule, things had to go just right. I think the performance of Soviet-developed ADA in 1973 was a seminal moment in showing how SHORAD of limited capability should work in concert with longer ranged systems, and I think it is telling that even at their most basic unit of action, the Regiment, the Soviets planned for these systems to work together. This to me is not an exception that proves the rule, but a well thought-out way of changing those rules in order to suit their burgeoning technological capability in SHORAD better. I also think that later Shilkas, Strela-10, and Osa were quite a bit more effective than what the Egyptians used in '73. quote:The comment was made that US/NATO SHORAD was junk compared to what the USSR was fielding during the height of the cold war and after having looked into it, I think it was probably all junk. I believe the comment was made that individual US SHORAD systems were junk, which I don't agree with because admittedly the Shilka's radar wasn't that great an addition compared to a basic gun system like Vulcan, and because Chapparal was a very decent IR missile system. I'd say the US did lack a self-propelled, more medium ranged system fighting with SHORAD at the brigade level, or at least a non-IR system that might compensate for problems with earlier infrared guided missiles (or the lack of early warning with the Vulcan for that matter). I think this was recognized by the US Army itself as well, ref. Sgt. York, Roland, and ADATS as successive (though failed) procurement solutions to those very problems. Cyrano4747 posted:It's also a real pain in the dick if you rely on helicopters a lot. I think this is a very, very good point. Murgos posted:No, you didn't, you made some off hand comment about Tornadoes going in low. I think you're being kind of a dick. Finally, I think that even if we nitpick lovely individual weapons - which they indeed were more often than not, in case of the early ones - we can admire the Soviet approach as a system of systems, and kinda infer that it might have been informed by the Ostfront. e: *added for clarity Koesj fucked around with this message at 13:17 on Aug 26, 2015 |
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 12:20
|
|
|
Murgos posted:No, you didn't, you made some off hand comment about Tornadoes going in low. Alright, here you go - http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/RAFTornadoAircraftLosses.cfm For instance, ' As they approached the Iraqi border at low level, the formation encountered AAA fire which became progressively more intense towards the target. All four aircraft delivered their weapons and turned onto the northerly heading. As the aircraft turned on to the next, easterly, track a fireball was seen by one of the crews. ' TL;DR the RAF bombed Iraqi airfields in the exact same manner they would have bombed Soviet airfields or armoured formations and they lost poo poo due to short-range air defences, both missile and gun, and those defences were relatively elderly poo poo crewed by the Iraqi military rather than the latest and greatest crewed by Soviets. To say 'all SHORAD is poo poo and wouldn't have done much good in World War 3' is not borne out by the (little) operational evidence we actually have.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 12:37
|
|
|
Koesj posted:Germans relying on gun systems over missiles I'm a bit confused by this point, the only main gun system Germany developed was the Gepard-line of AA-tanks. And the Gepard was meant for close-range support against helicopters and other low-flying threats. The main air-defense was meant to be shouldered by the Roland -a missile tank. And by batteries of Nike Ajax + Hercules and HAWK-FlaRak. That's kind of the opposite of relying on guns for air-defense. Edit: During the Cold War the German Luftwaffe even held on to two differently sized nuclear warheads for the missile batteries Ajax and Hercules, since those systems according to NATO-plans could be used for ground-to-ground attacks. I guess tactical nukes would have been deployed like that. Libluini fucked around with this message at 12:42 on Aug 26, 2015 |
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 12:39
|
|
|
Surprisingly few vehicles even with the soviets, or do I completely misunderstand the capability of AA systems?
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 12:41
|
|
|
Koesj posted:Finally, I think that even if we nitpick lovely individual weapons - which they indeed were more often than not in case of the early ones - we can admire the Soviet approach as a system of systems, and kinda infer that it might have been informed by the Ostfront.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 12:43
|
|
|
TheFluff posted:Great post, thanks! The system-of-systems thinking often gets lost in these internet debates, people tend to only look at their favorite vehicle/airplane and compare it to some single competitor thing without considering the context. Somewhere, Hob_Gadling feels pleased and doesn't know why That was a great post Koesj!
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 12:45
|
|
|
Thanks for the likes! I'll clean up my post a bit, spelling and grammar aren't my strong points.Libluini posted:I'm a bit confused by this point, the only main gun system Germany developed was the Gepard-line of AA-tanks. And the Gepard was meant for close-range support against helicopters and other low-flying threats. The main air-defense was meant to be shouldered by the Roland -a missile tank. And by batteries of Nike Ajax + Hercules and HAWK-FlaRak. That's kind of the opposite of relying on guns for air-defense. At the divisional and lower level I do believe they relied on gun-based SHORAD! Where you have Gepard as close-range, frontline support in Heer units (or M42s still, leading up to the 1980s) the Soviets are already deploying the whole gamut of systems up to Kub. 'Main air defense' would indeed have been picked up by Roland, but from what I remember reading these were cascaded down from the Corps-level Roland ADA Battalions to rear elements like HQs and artillery at the Division and maybe Brigade levels. I'm not sure though, maybe you can help me out here! Hawk and Nike were strictly Bundesluftwaffe affairs, right? I find it interesting how, both with the BW and the Dutch military, area air defense was an Air Force thing compared to the US/Soviet ground Armies' tasking.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 12:59
|
|
|
First, I want to thank Koesj for making that effort post. Good stuff. Second, yes I was being a dick, but making obscure comments and then going 'See!' is pretty annoying. Thirdly: feedmegin posted:Alright, here you go - I still don't think that supports your claim. Where investigation was possible, in all but one case, the aircraft were lost to SAM activity although the reports don't guess as to what type of SAM. In all cases the strikes were successfully carried out. Where heavy AAA is noted it is not commented on as thought to be a contributing factor other than that it was present and certainly doesn't seem to have influenced the behavior of the pilots. There may be effective use of SHORAD in those engagements but the reports given do not support the claim. e: Also, I am finding it hard to credit a couple of losses (10ish total and half of those questionable?) in wars with sorties in the 10's if not 100's of thousands as being effective. Not when the SHORAD components were fielded in large quantities in what amounts to standard doctrinal layered use. If the standard to be met is perfection I don't think we can have a rational discussion. Murgos fucked around with this message at 13:48 on Aug 26, 2015 |
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 13:20
|
|
|
I continue to check out this ancient review of Wallenstein's published letters during my free time: This isn't a military academy because there are none yet. (Wallhausen tried to start one in the early 1600s and like five people showed up.) Wallenstein's established it because well-meaning projects designed to advance the common good is a thing he likes. The Italian is because it's the language of high culture and during this century also of Imperial administration, and these guys are small Imperialist nobles. The 17th century is probably the least well-bathed century Western Europe ever experienced, so Wallenstein is probably fighting an uphill battle to get his students to clean themselves up. This is also why the superintendent eventually just cut their hair off. HEY GUNS fucked around with this message at 13:57 on Aug 26, 2015 |
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 13:43
|
|
|
Koesj posted:Thanks for the likes! I'll clean up my post a bit, spelling and grammar aren't my strong points. Maybe someone in translation got confused by the Führungsgefechtsstand Roland (FGR)? That was a version of the Roland to coordinate groups of ADA-systems. Setting those into the rear elements makes sense, if you want to avoid those command units from being overrun. And yes, Luftabwehr was primarily Luftwaffe. Interestingly, Rolands and Gepards were mainly Heer (army) units, Luftwaffe and Bundesmarine had their own, slightly different versions. Some more interesting things about the Roland was it's specialized ammunition: The LFK-Rolands 1 and 2 (only the 2 was actually adopted into the Bundeswehr) used flow deviation for flight stabilisation, instead of wings like most other missiles. They were maintenance-free, you could freely switch their warheads on- and off even in midflight and they came with an emergency-selfdestruct in case friendly aircraft came too close. The Roland also used a (allegedly) widely feared optical targeting mode: With a trained gunner, the Roland could optically target aircraft and the LFK would be lead into the enemy aircraft by the gunner, using optical instruments. This, together with a hybrid-mode combining optics and radar, meant the Roland wasn't as dependent on working radar bowls and could be a hard-to-find target for enemy forces. In a real war, they probably would have been employed in ambushes, waiting until large groups of enemy aircraft had entered their missile envelope, then the Rolands would use primarily optical targeting for maximum surprise effect. After that, they would have switched to radar-mode to hunt down surviving aircraft. The FGR followed a similar mindset: It would have been the only visible target for Sowjet-aircraft, thanks to being the only thing actively using radar. The dozens of ADA-systems using a FGR for coordination would practically be invisible until someone could get close enough for optical recon.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 13:49
|
|
|
Rabhadh posted:Why haven't they made a Wargame: Secret Weapons of the Cold War I was hoping and praying for a full scifi Wargame as their next release. Wargame 2050 with Lasertanks! and Emp bombs etc etc. Unfortunately although it is near future, they've gone with an old school 90's style RTS which looks like an updated C&C Generals. 3 factions, Tech trees, limited variety of upgradable units, superweapons etc. http://www.actofaggression-game.com/ I wish them well but I've no interest in revisiting that old style of gameplay. Edit: Holy poo poo, steam says i've played 344 hours of Red Dragon. Deptfordx fucked around with this message at 14:38 on Aug 26, 2015 |
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 14:35
|
|
|
100 Years Ago Good news! I've managed to get my workload under enough control to stop flagrantly ignoring the Eastern Front! Fortunately, the last few months are easily TL;DRed, as the Russians retreat, retreat, and then retreat some more. There's also an instructive moment for trying to get your head round the scale of all this. The Germans on the Western Front advanced 300 miles in 1914, and nearly got into Paris. The Germans on the Eastern Front have by this point advanced 300 miles in 1915 and they're only just getting out of Galicia and Poland, and into Belorussia. They're still a thousand miles from Moscow and St Petersburg. Meanwhile, Kenneth Best returns to Gallipoli and immediately gets back into the swing of life at the front by installing himself in an absent friend's tent.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 15:06
|
|
|
HEY GAL posted:
Why did he say their hair was so short they looked like Jews? Is this some gross new stereotype I've never seen before?
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 15:32
|
|
|
I'm going to go ahead and concede the argument about SHORAD and say that I am wrong. From the USAAF Gulf War Air Power Survey (here: http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/) quote:Most Iraqi AAA fell into two categories: (1) the ZSU-23/2, 23mm cannon systems, and 14.5mm heavy machine guns firing contact-fuzed or kinetic energy rounds; and (2) larger guns firing rounds with time-delay fuzes. Guns in the first category had high rates of fire, and rela¬tively short effective ranges, and had to achieve a direct hit to inflict damage. As a general rule, they were used for barrage fire. Guns in the second category fired longer range exploding shells at a slower rate of fire. The primary damage mechanism was the collision of the fragments from the exploding shells with the aircraft. These larger weapons were used mainly in aimed and sector fire. The ZSU-23/4 falls into a separate category. A self-propelled, four-barrelled system with an integral Gun Dish fire control radar, it was capable of delivering a high volume of accurate fire against individual high-speed tar¬gets. In the case of the Gulf War, IR SAM and AAA are suspected to be the #1 and #2 cause of downings. That's exactly counter to my argument, however it is due to the fact that the larger SAM systems (OSA, BUK, HAWK and etc...) were effectively suppressed by SEAD. Murgos fucked around with this message at 15:46 on Aug 26, 2015 |
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 15:43
|
|
|
House Louse posted:Why did he say their hair was so short they looked like Jews? Is this some gross new stereotype I've never seen before?
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 16:23
|
|
|
Tias posted:Okay, but he does go a bit beyond that point in this book, often and insistently making the point that every wehrmacht soldier on the eastern front had a quasi-religious faith in Hitler and a nihilistic conviction that a final victory must be created over the corpses of Russia - or at least, was brutalized to the point where they happily went along nazi indoctrination. It's been a few years since I've read it and my copy is in storage so I'm not going to fight and die on this point, but I don't recall him claiming that it was every single soldier. From what I remember of it his general argument was that these problems were so prevalent throughout the force that there was little functional resistance. The brutalization is important to remember too, as it makes even those who might have not been behind the Party's program really not give a poo poo and tolerate all sorts of crazy bullshit. This is especially true when you look at how anti-Jewish and anti-partisan operations were frequently confounded or merged. Cyrano4747 fucked around with this message at 17:03 on Aug 26, 2015 |
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 16:51
|
|
|
Cyrano4747 posted:It's been a few years since I've read it and my copy is in storage so I'm not going to fight and die on this point, but I don't recall him claiming that it was every single soldier. From what I remember of it his general argument was that these problems were so prevalent throughout the force that there was little functional resistance. The brutalization is important to remember too, as it makes even those who might have not been behind the Party's program really not give a poo poo and tolerate all sorts of crazy bullshit. This is especially true when you look at how anti-Jewish and anti-partisan operations were frequently confounded or merged. I'm inclined to believe him, but it's just the way he uses language and keeps repeating himself that seems sticky. Like how it's always "Hitler's soldiers" instead of "soldiers" or "members of the Wehrmacht", little things like that. I am totally on board with the fact that extreme brutalization made even people who weren't fanatic nazis complicit in the atrocities, but the figures he puts out just seem, I don't know, more extreme than anything I've read before.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 16:55
|
|
|
Murgos posted:In the case of the Gulf War, IR SAM and AAA are suspected to be the #1 and #2 cause of downings. That's exactly counter to my argument, however it is due to the fact that the larger SAM systems (OSA, BUK, HAWK and etc...) were effectively suppressed by SEAD. quote:As with surface-to-air missiles, most of the AAA systems were older but were still potentially dangerous. Not even Buk, 'just' Kub, which (though a dangerous system) was thoroughly compromised by that point; late-build models were captured in Chad in 1987. SA-2 (durr Vietnam) and -3 were even worse in that regard, the latter coming to the fore in 1973 when full systems were captured and exploited by the Israelis. Roland and Osa were considered to be more dangerous, though shorter ranged, and were indeed part of the reason why Coalition aircraft stayed above 20,000ft AGL if I recall correctly. Roland shot down a Harrier in the Falklands (Rapier had 1 confirmed, 2 probable, and 2 possible kills in that particular conflict). I'll have to quote Kopp (an internet shitlord, but this page is pretty decent) but at least he knows something about radars and stuff: quote:In comparison with the Warpac and Western TVD PVO/PVO-VS IADS, the Iraqis lacked the latest weapons and some types such as the cumbersome SA-4 and SA-5 systems, but the high fraction of SA-3, SA-6 and SA-8 systems was easily comparable to the central European theatre. Since Soviet doctrine opposes forward deployment of the latest/best systems, it is fair to say the Iraqis had a representative implementation of the Soviet IADS as forward deployed in Eastern Europe. I don't exactly agree with his point about Soviet C. European forces being comparable. Instead of SA-6 (Kub) you had SA-11 (Buk), SA-4 and -5 were largely replaced by S-300 (SA-10) at that point (a system which is still in the news sometimes these days, see Iran). These weren't exploited like the older ones at that point. Also, in this case, air superiority did make a big difference, Air Forces had gotten better than they were in, say, 1980!
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 17:01
|
|
|
This was an edit, but part if it pertains to what you said so I'll move it here: Edit: if it feels like he's really harping on how the vast, vast majority of soldiers out there were more or less OK with what was going on (either through conviction or because they were involved in the worst land campaign of the war and didn't give two shits about anyone's survival than their own and their comrades) you have to remember that a huge part of the Clean Wehrmacht myth involves admiring the "normal guy who was stuck in an evil situation but did his professional best and didn't take part in the bad stuff." It's not just people who say the Wehrmacht in general didn't commit crimes, it's also people who say that while some crimes were committed by it there was a significant portion of the rank and file who were normal dudes and not crazy Nazis. Celebrating that section of it is problematic because it casts the whole organization in a better light and lets people (frequently mil nerds) engage in some creative thinking that lets you remove the military from its context. It should also be pointed out that the over-arching point of most contemporary holocaust research (and here I'm going a bit beyond Bartov, but it's part of the conversation that he's participating in) is that these men were normal guys and that these kinds of abuses aren't as far away from any other fighting force, people, or culture as we'd like to believe. All of that Nazi indoctrination had a huge part to do with it, but that was only making an atmosphere that was extremely permissive to all the worst kinds of things that people are prone to doing anyways. gently caress, atrocities were enshrined as a public good. Just look at the Fuehrerbefehl that went out immediately before the invasion and the subsequent widely published anti-partisan policies. To look at it from another direction, just look at how poorly behaved soldiers can be in a democratic, relatively progressive, relatively liberal (compared to your average totalitarian dictatorship - I won't want this to go D&D on modern politics) society with a hitherto never before seen accountability on the part of the military to both the government and (via media) the population at large. From Mai Lai to throwing puppies off of cliffs there are all manner of things we can point to in just the TV-era US military that no one is too proud of. Now imagine that takes place in an environment where a huge chunk of your squad is a true believer in a racist nation-state cult where the standing orders from above enable summary executions and massacres. Add to that the stresses of combat and a long-term fear for your life and poo poo can get ugly fast. Tias posted:I'm inclined to believe him, but it's just the way he uses language and keeps repeating himself that seems sticky. Like how it's always "Hitler's soldiers" instead of "soldiers" or "members of the Wehrmacht", little things like that. Again, he's trying to fight people who consciously put distance between Hitler and the Wehrmacht. By emphasizing that it's Hitler's army he's drawing a closer connection between the policies of the Third Reich and the actions of its armies in the field. Also, it's not even just a semantic stretch to cut down apologists. You really can describe the 1941 Wehrmacht as Hitler's army. Everyone involved in the government or military - Officers, soldiers, even civil servants - were required to take a loyalty oath to Hitler himself, not the state. This allegiance was to him personally over any law, constitution, etc which is what makes it very different from similar oaths sworn in most militaries. Something like the line in the US officer's oath where they pledge to protect the constitution from enemies both without AND within would not fly in the Nazi system for obvious reasons. Also note that this oath came into effect in 1934. This wasn't something that was a new measure, by this point it was very much part of the institutional fabric of the armed forces, especially on the level of the men and line officers who probably didn't have a decade+ experience in uniform. It should also be noted that the WW2 Wehrmacht was essentially built by Hitler. Before he shredded the treaty restrictions it was a rump force at best and it owed its entire expanded existence to him, personally. THere are a lot of military men who became long-time supporters of him when he shredded Versailles and threw all the resources at the Wehrmacht (and Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarine, etc - this wasn't just the Heer). The military was a huge part of the alliance that got him his chancelorship in the first place. Now take that widely expanded force that owes its current shape to him and throw in a loyalty oath that directly ties it to him and not the state or constitution PLUS political alliances at its most senor levels that go back to 1933 and you can see why it's not just anti-Wheraboo semantics to call it Hitler's army. It's informative to look at just how bad poo poo got before he faced major dissension in his own ranks. The July plot happens after poo poo has totally fallen apart in the East and it's very clear that the Western Allies have a strong toe-hold in the West that isn't going to be dislodged short of a miracle. That's where everyone with any education in military theory knows that the situation is 110% hosed. THey're looking at their situation boards and seeing Overloard and Bagration at the same time. EVEN THEN it's a relatively small cabal of officers who try to off him and they don't even do it because he's an evil son of a bitch. They do it because they think he has taken to direct control of the army and is leading them into inevitable defeat. The whole point was to get rid of the person who was the most politically toxic to the west and regroup to change the tide in the east. This isn't a virtuous stand on moral principles it's a military decision made to try to salvage a completely hosed situation.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 17:17
|
|
|
All this talk about air defence and the Cold War makes me want to break out my copy of this: https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/3712/tac-air Also the experiences of aircrews in the Gulf War reminds of the overriding theme of the officers leading that war, which was that NATO had been playing pretend since at least the mid-80's and were totally unprepared for anything resembling a real war with the Soviet Union. There was a real  story by a Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineer saying that the Challenger was such an unreliable piece of poo poo that they had to strip the engines and tracks out of every tank in Germany to get enough working tanks in Iraq. Cue some bigwig general checking out the British army bases in Germany and finding all the tanks up on cinder blocks with a gaping hole where the engine would be and really, really hoping that today wasn't going to be the day the Soviets tried to cross the border.(Great post Koesj!)
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 17:56
|
|
|
MikeCrotch posted:All this talk about air defence and the Cold War makes me want to break out my copy of this: https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/3712/tac-air Of course, the Soviets were also having the same problems on their side and were similarly terrified. There's a story by an American officer who went to see a Russian silo shortly after the end of the Cold War and found it falling apart and full of algae-choked water.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 18:08
|
|
|
MikeCrotch posted:All this talk about air defence and the Cold War makes me want to break out my copy of this: https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/3712/tac-air 
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 18:09
|
|
|
The impact of SHORAD would also influence local air superiority struggles, wouldn't it? If the Warsaw Pact doctrine says that defenses in a given sector can blunt enemy air attacks, it opens up opportunities to concentrate air assets and potentially achieve air superiority in other sectors.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 18:26
|
|
|
Zorak of Michigan posted:The impact of SHORAD would also influence local air superiority struggles, wouldn't it? If the Warsaw Pact doctrine says that defenses in a given sector can blunt enemy air attacks, it opens up opportunities to concentrate air assets and potentially achieve air superiority in other sectors. Ayup, but that'd call for the Red Army and Air Force communicating with each other effectively in the first place, and in a highly degraded comms environment to boot. An (at the time) USSR client state, Egypt, couldn't pull off anything of the kind, and IIRC shot down more of their own aircraft than Israeli ones in '73. Re: Cold War issues coming to light during (the buildup towards) Desert Storm: grapevine has it that UK forces had to go hat in hand to the US Army for 203mm artillery shells, after fully depleting their own stocks in Germany mind you. I think their intended ammo was strictly of the 'area X-ray and third degree burns'-illuminating kind.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 19:57
|
|
|
Chamale posted:Of course, the Soviets were also having the same problems on their side and were similarly terrified. There's a story by an American officer who went to see a Russian silo shortly after the end of the Cold War and found it falling apart and full of algae-choked water. That story is from an agent book.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 20:05
|
|
|
Koesj posted:Re: Cold War issues coming to light during (the buildup towards) Desert Storm: grapevine has it that UK forces had to go hat in hand to the US Army for 203mm artillery shells, after fully depleting their own stocks in Germany mind you. I think their intended ammo was strictly of the 'area X-ray and third degree burns'-illuminating kind. One of the things that seems to run through all accounts of modern warfare is that everybody always uses way more ammunition than previously expected. Is it really that hard to accurately predict how many tons of ammo an artillery battery fires per day when you have accurate logs from previous wars and exercises? Or is it just that when faced with a choice between buying an extra ten thousand tons of ammo (plus storage capacity) and buying a new fighter jet, most militaries will pick the fighter jet because big pallets of ammo aren't sexy?
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 21:26
|
|
|
ArchangeI posted:One of the things that seems to run through all accounts of modern warfare is that everybody always uses way more ammunition than previously expected. Is it really that hard to accurately predict how many tons of ammo an artillery battery fires per day when you have accurate logs from previous wars and exercises? Or is it just that when faced with a choice between buying an extra ten thousand tons of ammo (plus storage capacity) and buying a new fighter jet, most militaries will pick the fighter jet because big pallets of ammo aren't sexy? Does the phrase "fitted for but not with" ring a bell? Koesj posted:Ayup, but that'd call for the Red Army and Air Force communicating with each other effectively in the first place, and in a highly degraded comms environment to boot. An (at the time) USSR client state, Egypt, couldn't pull off anything of the kind, and IIRC shot down more of their own aircraft than Israeli ones in '73. I always got the impression that Egypt was useless at anything not rehearsed ahead of time for reasons not necessarily shared with the USSR.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 21:42
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 21, 2024 06:27 |
|
|
In the First World War, a huge part of the problem was that it was the first major war since quick-fire technology had matured with guns like the soixante-quinze. Artillery went from being able to fire at most two rounds a minute with an experienced crew to being able to fire 20-30 rounds a minute with an experienced crew, and that with much greater accuracy. Couple that to the advent of multi-day battles and then static warfare, and it's easy to see how even the most generous estimates of how much ammunition they'd need were completely inadequate.
|
|
#
?
Aug 26, 2015 21:43
|
|