|
One can only hope that Legalism works as well for Xi as it did for Qin Shihuang's son.
|
#
?
Sep 9, 2015 21:28
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 22, 2024 00:14 |
|
|
I was reading a Peter Hessler book wherein he quotes another guy remarking how there are no manor houses in the Chinese countryside like there is in Europe. Why is that? Were they all burned down during the civil war or the cultural revolution or were they never there to begin with (somehow)?
|
|
#
?
Sep 9, 2015 22:37
|
|
|
What exactly is a manor house? Just a big rural mansion where the rural land owning class lived?
|
|
#
?
Sep 9, 2015 23:07
|
|
|
Yeah, like Downton Abbey and stuff.
|
|
#
?
Sep 9, 2015 23:22
|
|
|
poo poo I wonder why the Chinese don't have a lot of intact bourgeoisie homes in the countryside
|
|
#
?
Sep 9, 2015 23:27
|
|
|
Instead they buy apartments in Vancouver, LA, london, etc
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 00:20
|
|
|
Per posted:I was reading a Peter Hessler book wherein he quotes another guy remarking how there are no manor houses in the Chinese countryside like there is in Europe. It's a complicated answer but basically none of them would have survived the 50s, but even before that the tendency for large land owners was to be absent landlords (where they live in the city/elsewhere). Also it was fairly common for the Chinese peasants to own property.
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 00:28
|
|
|
Daduzi posted:For example the line with the Hong Kong protests was that they were coordinated by the CIA to keep China weak, not that they were young people going against their elders. As much as Confucianism emphasizes deference to your elders, it also emphasizes deference to your rulers. There's a reason Lee Kuan Yew seized on it as part of his Asian Values push and why Asian authoritarians are such big fans. Hence the push for Confucius Institutes overseas and that Confucius statue they put up in Tiananmen in 2011.
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 00:31
|
|
|
Bloodnose posted:As much as Confucianism emphasizes deference to your elders, it also emphasizes deference to your rulers. Confucianism is more about emphasising the duty of rulers over the ruled than the need for the ruled to obey their rulers. The latter is really more of a Legalist principle. Bloodnose posted:There's a reason Lee Kuan Yew seized on it as part of his Asian Values push and why Asian authoritarians are such big fans. Hence the push for Confucius Institutes overseas and that Confucius statue they put up in Tiananmen in 2011. "Confucius Institutes" are named because they wanted to copy the naming of the Goethe Institute and Confucius is pretty much the only Chinese writer known outside of China. As for the statue, notice that while it was put up it was also moved a few months later. I mean, do the CCP play up the name of Confucius as part of their attempt to locate themselves as a legitiate extension of Chinese history? Sure. They do the same with a lot of great Chinese historical figures. That's not the same as pushing Confucian ideas, however. I'm still not seeing much evidence of the that.
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 01:44
|
|
|
Daduzi posted:Confucianism is more about emphasising the duty of rulers over the ruled than the need for the ruled to obey their rulers. The latter is really more of a Legalist principle. The big-budget film Kongzi that was made with state support a few years back is an great example of the CCP trying to push a specific version of Confucius. In the movie, he's portrayed as a the forward-thinking enemy of base superstition and the protector of women and the underclass against the aristocracy. This is not untrue, per se, but it definitely shows what kind of Confucianism Beijing wants to see revived. There's also the new elder care laws, which show how the CCP is trying to revive Confucian ideals to a specific end. There's apparently an epidemic in China of just abandoning mom and dad at the old folks' homes. This sort of thing was attracting a lot of bad press, so the Party passed these laws mandating (though without real teeth) that children visit their parents, while at the same time promoting examples of good Confucian archetypes (you see these on TV a lot too; it's always the noble parent sacrificing all for their children).
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 02:24
|
|
|
In HK there is at least a push for ~~harmony~~ If you read back on HK political campaigns decades ago ~~harmony~~ was touted as being Confucian, explicitly so Filial Piety was also a reeeeally popular phrase in newspapers about 2 years ago here
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 14:44
|
|
|
computer parts posted:It's a complicated answer but basically none of them would have survived the 50s, but even before that the tendency for large land owners was to be absent landlords (where they live in the city/elsewhere). Also it was fairly common for the Chinese peasants to own property. China also never had feudalism so the tradition of a landed aristocracy keeping a self sufficient, fortified position to administer the region wasn't a thing.
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 15:32
|
|
|
I don't think Confucian social values are the problem, I think it's the lack of a liberal/individualistic intellectual and political tradition. I don't think Chinese culture is incapable of developing one, but it takes time for stuff like that, and until then I don't think lots of China's problems are solvable
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 15:36
|
|
|
RocknRollaAyatollah posted:China also never had feudalism so the tradition of a landed aristocracy keeping a self sufficient, fortified position to administer the region wasn't a thing. BY CONFUCIUS' BEARD THAT IS WRONG
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 15:37
|
|
|
RocknRollaAyatollah posted:China also never had feudalism so the tradition of a landed aristocracy keeping a self sufficient, fortified position to administer the region wasn't a thing. They had feudalism in Tibet
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 15:40
|
|
|
simplefish posted:In HK there is at least a push for ~~harmony~~ Harmony's hardly a purely Confucian concept, though. It appears in all the major Chinese philosophies (admittedly less so Legalism). It's used differently, though: Daoism: harmony = man acting in accordance with nature Confucianism: harmony = the state that inevitably results from rulers actuing virtuously and following the rites Mohism: harmony = something rulers should maintain by controlling dangerous elements in society I'd say the CCP is definitely cribbing more from the Mohist tradition than the Confucian here. I know I'm being ultra-pedantic here, but the blanket labelling of Chinese/East Asian culture as "Confucian" (ignoring the many other influential philosophies) is a pet peeve of mine. It results in concepts that are Daoist, Legalist, Mohist etc. being mislabelled as "Confucian" (the above being an arguable example), which just makes it harder to understand the actual roots of the cultre.
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 16:10
|
|
|
I was under the impression Legalism is basically just a strawman villain ideology for Confucianism to triumph over in the traditional Qin unification story?
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 16:45
|
|
|
Daduzi posted:Harmony's hardly a purely Confucian concept, though. It appears in all the major Chinese philosophies (admittedly less so Legalism). It's used differently, though: Sure, okay, but when its the Chinese themselves callimg it Confucianism (for right or for wrong) then it's less about what Confucius said as what he's being used to represent
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 16:45
|
|
|
icantfindaname posted:I don't think Confucian social values are the problem, I think it's the lack of a liberal/individualistic intellectual and political tradition. I don't think Chinese culture is incapable of developing one, but it takes time for stuff like that, and until then I don't think lots of China's problems are solvable One would think that after 5,000 years you'd at least have the ol' college try.
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 22:24
|
|
|
Do you need to have an individualistic tradition to develop a tradition of not literally and metaphorically making GBS threads all over everything and everyone?
|
|
#
?
Sep 10, 2015 23:24
|
|
|
VideoTapir posted:Do you need to have an individualistic tradition to develop a tradition of not literally and metaphorically making GBS threads all over everything and everyone? well since that's liberalism.txt i'd say no
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 02:28
|
|
|
simplefish posted:Sure, okay, but when its the Chinese themselves callimg it Confucianism (for right or for wrong) then it's less about what Confucius said as what he's being used to represent Yeah, like I said I'm just being pedantic because it's a pet peeve. The Chinese themselves are still wrong, though. It's Moist damnit, Moist! 
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 07:32
|
|
|
Alright I'm going to jump into this thread just to ask questions because I don't fully understand China but what I know of their transition from the 19th to 20th centuries (Starting with the Opium Wars and ending with the conclusion of the Civil War) I know I am loving fascinated. How such a massive, complex, anciently airtight and vast chunk of the Asian continent had its traditionalist roof blown in and then experienced so much invasion, meddling, new technology and imported ideology that it exploded in the largest populist revolution (or maybe reaction?) in the history of humanity (over about 100+ years) is something that I really wish I knew more about. Most of what I know about that period came from research I did for a 18 page paper on the Yihuetan(?) Movement / Boxer revolt or rebellion or reaction or whatever is the best term for it. That a coalition of modern imperial militaries that would be murdering each other by the millions in just 5 years initiated the permanent collpase of a Dynastic system so extravagant that it seems like something you'd find in Game of Thrones is just... such an insane thing in so many ways, I don't feel like culture clash of that scale really happens anymore. That there isn't a massive, multi-jazillion dollar HBO epic of China's transition boggles my mind because if it was even half decent I would eat that poo poo up. Also the Empress Dowager Cixi might be the most fascinating historical figure I've ever read about. But anyway what can you guys tell me about the Warlord Era?
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 08:00
|
|
|
ISIS have advertised in their latest Issue 11 of their magazine Dabiq that they're publicly ransoming a Norwegian and Chinese man. Full page glossy ads for each, with the personal details (age, hometown, etc). News seems to be kept relatively quiet in China; at least the people I work with had never heard of this. But searching for "Fan Jinghui" brings up some hits on Baidu. I wonder how the government's going to react to this? I'm guessing they'll simply bring down the ban-hammer and hope the general population doesn't notice.
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 08:03
|
|
|
quote:That there isn't a massive, multi-jazillion dollar HBO epic of China's transition boggles my mind because if it was even half decent I would eat that poo poo up. Too many Asian characters, it'd never catch on. Laszlow Montgomery has spent a lot of time on the 19th and early 20th centuries, if you're looking for a quick overview. http://chinahistorypodcast.com/category/podcasts
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 08:21
|
|
|
VideoTapir posted:
Iono gimme 2 seasons of the legation siege from the perspective of white people, chinese christians and the japanese. I just want to see that world explored. VideoTapir posted:
Oh wicked, thank you.
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 08:31
|
|
|
Daduzi posted:Yeah, like I said I'm just being pedantic because it's a pet peeve. Ever read The Chinese Machiavelli? Really cool book in how it outlines how Mao and the CCP developed and evolved their ideology from older Chinese schools of thought.
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 13:50
|
|
|
DeliciousPatriotism posted:That there isn't a massive, multi-jazillion dollar HBO epic of China's transition boggles my mind because if it was even half decent I would eat that poo poo up. It's called "90% of every non-fantasy movie ever made in China."
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 13:56
|
|
|
I write a article, so, here: China will never dominate the world of the 21st century in the way that the United States did the world of the 20th century. To understand why, we have to first understand why the 20th century was sometimes called "the American century" and compare these reasons with China's situation point-by-point. #1: The United States became the economic center of the world from the 1940s, only losing that status in the early 21st century. This turn of events only came about because Europe, the economic center of the world from perhaps the late 18th century onwards, utterly destroyed itself in the World Wars. The wealthiest European economies were devastated, including Britain, which had in the 19th century been the undisputed pre-eminent power on the globe. Communism and the legacy of colonialism suppressed growth in other major economies, and the United States was the only economy left that had not been devastated in the wars, crippled by the legacy of colonialism, or suppressed by communist ideology. That economic center has swung back to Europe in the early 21st century, though nation-state-focused statistics often don't show it. #2: The United States sits on a vast stock of natural resources with a relatively small population. Aside from America's legendary productivity rates, it also just has lots of resources per capita. The United States is a major -- and in the 1950s was the major -- producer of a vast range of commodities, from its corn and wheat fields to its oil and natural gas reserves to its iron, gold, and aluminum mines, extensive forest, etc. In short the United States is free of certain constraints, like arable land or clean water, that plague other states. California's water crisis, for example, is more a question of shortsighted policy than real lack of water; millions of acres in the well-watered Great Lakes region or Mississippi valley are available for cultivation. #3: The United States received, and still receives, many of the best and brightest from around the world. The world-class U.S. education system, its permissive immigration environment for students and the highly-skilled, and its relatively high quality of life attract the ambitious, talented, and wealthy from all over the world. Barely more than half of Chinese graduate students studying in the US, for example, return to China after completing their degrees. This effect was even more pronounced in the mid 20th century, when European economic migrants and asylum-seekers were still headed to the US in large numbers. The demand for a US education and accompanying demographic boon doesn't seem likely to go away any time soon, especially as foreign elites are insensitive to the rising price of a US education. #4: The United States is ideally placed for military dominance of our water planet. The US has free access to the great oceans of Earth, with no conceivable threats to that access in the foreseeable future. The American coasts are enormous, and the Atlantic and Pacific they face are vast and empty. The US has only two borders with other states, both friendly and in no position to offer a military threat worth American consideration. This geographical position and great wealth have allowed the United States to dominate the seas of Earth to the point that military conflict on the open ocean -- not just with the US, but anywhere, at all, between anyone -- no longer happens. The United States' propensity to invade other countries is the most visible sign of its real dominance: an ability to enforce its will (or at least give it a try) anywhere on the globe. #5: The United States is, for whatever ideological quirks it may exhibit domestically and in foreign policy, part of a universalist and inclusive world ideological community loosely known as Liberalism. Despite its differences with the other states and peoples of "The West" the US broadly subscribes to the same world view as Europe, the other Anglophone states, and the Latin American republics. This loose ideological community rooted in the European intellectual tradition unites about one third of the population of Earth. The United States is, for all its faults and squabbles, the oft-maligned leader of that vague and fractious ideological community. Liberalism as well, for all its faults, is appealing to many people in states that are not now part of that Liberal ideological community. This gives the United States tremendous "soft power" in the world; other (wealthy) states share a general world-view with the US and are likely to if not agree at least engage in constructive dialog based on mutually accepted premises. Now that we've enumerated the strengths that allowed the US to grow into its current status as pre-eminent state on the world stage, let's examine why China lacks these strengths and is not likely to grow into them in the 21st century: #1: There is no great catastrophe looming on the horizon to deliver the world's economic capital to Asia. Europe is wealthy and despite its current economic malaise it has extensive room to grow especially in the eastern economies. The United States shows no signs of lagging the other developed economies in growth, and barring another civil war is immune to the kind of devastating war that ravaged Europe in the 20th century. China's days of catch-up growth are ending. There are plenty of reasons: shocking wealth and income inequality that only continues to grow, government meddling, state-owned-enterprise inefficiency, and an inadequate and inflexible education system are only some of the culprits. Whatever the cause, China's double-digit growth has stalled and doesn't seem likely to ever come back even if real-estate, construction, and white-collar job growth can't be brought into some sort of normalcy. Though it is now the 2nd-largest economy by GDP, in per-capita terms it is still 4-6 times poorer than the US. Put simply, China seems unlikely to be the benefactor of the same historical accident that catapulted the US from major player to pre-eminent economy in the mid-20th century, and doesn't seem likely to vault ahead of everyone else without a push. #2: In contrast to the United States, China is very much constrained by its limited access to natural resources. Arable land and clean water are of particular concern. China was never blessed with a huge amount of arable land to begin with, and its massive population and extensive heavy metal contamination of arable soil make the situation much worse. The government has instituted agricultural land-preservation policies, but use of contaminated land is already widespread and soil pollution is classified as a state secret. To make matters worse, there is a major desertification problem in North China's wheat belt. In energy the situation looks even worse; China has little on-shore oil reserves and only the poorest-quality coal deposits. Unlike the US example of Californian agricultural problems and unused Mississipian and Great Lake land, China has no vast swathes of well-watered land sitting idle. It is unclear where China can make up for its lost arable land as desertification continues to encroach on the North China Plain. A continental power dependent on food and energy imports, as China may well be by the mid 21st century, is not a good candidate for dominating the globe. #3: In stark contrast to the US, China suffers from a brain drain problem and does not attract talent from around the world. The brain drain is serious enough for its provincial education ministries to begin cracking down on study-abroad programs last year. Almost all of China's intellectual elites boast foreign diplomas, but many simply do not return to the country's stifling and dishonest intellectual environment. The Chinese education system is inadequate for its own population and attracts no one other than Chinese-language-learners. Furthermore, Chinese visa laws and investment laws are hostile and getting more hostile each year. There exists no concept of foreign cultural assimilation in mainland China, and China does not seem likely to grow a welcoming immigrant culture in the foreseeable future. Indeed Chinese education, media, and government rhetoric routinely otherize, demonize, and fetishize foreigners, but contains few examples of healthy social and intellectual relationships with people from the outside world. In short, China is not an appealing destination and it is unlikely to be one in the foreseeable future. This is even more troubling in light of China's upcoming demographic crisis caused by the 1950s baby boom and the one-child policy. China's workforce is already shrinking, and by mid-century will have reached demographic-crisis levels. #4: China's geographical location is wretched for power projection. China is a continental power, with the historically aggressive and antagonistic Russia on its longest border. But it also has an island problem: China's long Pacific coast is hemmed in with island states that China perceives as hostile. This perception is self-fulfilling in that states like the Philippines and Japan are pursuing naval armament programs because of Chinese aggression. China even has a name for these troublesome barriers: the "first island chain" and "second island chain" made up of US allies or states that China is rapidly pushing into the US security sphere. China's access to the world ocean is precarious, and it of course has no access to the Atlantic Ocean. For a state that is supposed to dominate the world, this is a major problem. How is China ever supposed to dominate its immediate watery neighborhood, much less the world, when its theoretical future fleets can't even make it 200 kil0meters from port without being sunk by land-based missiles? The Chinese don't have a clear answer. Indeed, this conundrum is made even worse by the US commitment to guaranteeing international norms of freedom of navigation. China sees challenging US dominance and its international norms as inevitable, but if it were ever to succeed in breaking them down it would cut off its own access to the world ocean. #5: China is not part of the Liberal universalist ideological community. In fact, China explicitly sets itself up as an opponent of this community. But China is not part of some opposed ideological sphere. Instead, China clings to idea systems like "socialism with Chinese characteristics," "confucian values," and even more vague ideas like the "China model" or "authoritarianism" that do not even have a clear label. Make no mistake: "socialism with Chinese characteristics" is in no way a coherent idea, much less an intellectual tradition paralleling the Liberal universalist tradition. In fact, China not only does not represent a broad alternative ideological community to the Liberal tradition, it is profoundly insecure about its own ideology in the modern post-socialist China. Not only does China not represent a credible ideological alternative for the world, it does not present a credible ideology to itself. What is "socialism with Chinese characteristics?" After 30 years of capitalism, rampant corruption, and opaque party infighting, that question does not have a clear answer. How, then, is China supposed to gain the ideological consensus of the world in the way that the United States did by the late 20th century? The only way China could gain this sort of intellectual approval from the world is by inventing some radical new universalist ideological structure, somehow revitalizing defunct Communist ideas, or joining the loose Liberal community. In order to do any of those things, it would first have to radically reconstruct itself. In short, it would not be the China that we know anymore. I don't believe anyone would say that the United States of the early 20th century had to radically reconstruct itself politically and ideologically in order to arrive at the United States of 1950. America of the 20th century dominated the world economically, militarily, and ideologically. China of the 21st century is unlikely to dominate the world economically, militarily, and ideologically. Perhaps pointing out that China of the 21st century will not be the US of the 20th century is trivially obvious. But the closer one looks, the more carefully one compares, the wider the chasm between the two becomes, until even the phrase " The Chinese Century" -- chosen for its obvious parallel to "The American Century" -- becomes ludicrous in its false equivalence. Will China's new role in the world be important in the 21st century? Absolutely. China's rise will easily be the most important new factor in world economics and politics this century. The change in China's importance -- from virtual irrelevance fifty years ago to major world player now -- is the largest change of our time. But will it be the most influential country in the world in absolute terms? No. It lacks the economic, military, and especially ideological resources for that. Europe and the United States will continue to dominate the globe to a greater extent than China in the 21st century, just as they did in the 19th and 20th centuries.
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 14:40
|
|
|
DeliciousPatriotism posted:Alright I'm going to jump into this thread just to ask questions because I don't fully understand China but what I know of their transition from the 19th to 20th centuries (Starting with the Opium Wars and ending with the conclusion of the Civil War) I know I am loving fascinated. How such a massive, complex, anciently airtight and vast chunk of the Asian continent had its traditionalist roof blown in and then experienced so much invasion, meddling, new technology and imported ideology that it exploded in the largest populist revolution (or maybe reaction?) in the history of humanity (over about 100+ years) is something that I really wish I knew more about. First off, the anciently airtight thing is imaginary. The Qing dynasty were foreign conquerors and China has been conquered by outsiders or cosmopolitan reaching back really to the earliest days of its history. As far as I can tell the ultra-Chinese we-are-pure others-become-us interpretation of history gained credence in the Ming dynasty in the intellectual reaction to the Mongol conquest. The earliest recorded ancestor of the First Emperor was a barbarian stablemaster in the western sticks. For the boxer movement: analyzing the Boxers in a vacuum could only result in serious misunderstanding. The Boxer Rebellion can only be understood in the wake of the Taiping Rebellion, which was much, much larger and did far more to destabilize the government. The Taiping Rebellion in turn can only be understood in the light of the massively disruptive economic situation in mid-19th-century China. For reasons I don't want to go into again, tens of millions of people were economically displaced which lead directly to the Taiping Rebellion and indirectly to the Boxer Rebellion. Third, foreign invasions are overblown in Chinese and Western historiography for different reasons. Yes, China was invaded by foreign powers. Yes, foreign powers carved out spheres of extraterritorial government, even colonies. But when you look at those colonies on a map, it's hard to explain China at the time in the language of invasion and colonialism. Simply put the territories seized by the Western powers were small and the battles they fought were similarly small. The Qing state (and it's important to distinguish the Chinese state from the Chinese nation, since Chinese historiography is so dead-set on conflating them!) was collapsing even without western intervention. Indeed it's ironic that Cixi saw the Boxer Rebellion as a potential ally against the foreign armies (really more like foreign marine expeditionary forces) when the Boxers were just as anti-Qing as they were anti-foreign and would no doubt have killed Cixi given half a chance. Fourth, the dynastic system was extravagant sure but by the late Qing it was all just stage performance. The Qing government never really recovered from the Taiping Rebellion in the mid-19th century. They didn't rule south of the Yellow River, and their inability to deal with the Boxers without foreign help calls into question their rule even in the capital area. In terms of culture clash, what you're really seeing is the culture of the Qing Imperial Court clashing with the West because China in general was moving beyond that. The Imperial Court may have continued until 1911 but it was little more than a fancy house in Beijing by the turn of the century. Early 20th century Chinese culture is indeed interesting but it's not the culture of the Qing court. Empress Dowager Cixi was a shortsighted nitwit, a terrible ruler, and murdered her nephew out of spite.
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 14:56
|
|
|
The USSR battled the U.S. for dominance in a multi polar world despite dubious access to oceans and having a hosed up navy.
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 15:04
|
|
|
The USSR was also never an actual threat to American dominance outside the fever dreams of American right-wingers. What international cachet the USSR had was based on being the leader of Communism and getting a bunch of allied movements and people within the Third World for free. China doesn't have that outside of base-level 'gently caress the USA' sentiment
icantfindaname fucked around with this message at 15:15 on Sep 11, 2015 |
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 15:06
|
|
|
Vladimir Putin posted:The USSR battled the U.S. for dominance in a multi polar world despite dubious access to oceans and having a hosed up navy. int: no.
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 15:15
|
|
|
icantfindaname posted:The USSR was also never an actual threat to American dominance outside the fever dreams of American right-wingers. What international cachet the USSR had was based on it being the leader the Communist movement, which China doesn't have outside of base-level 'gently caress the USA' sentiment That's arguable. It's easy to say that looking backwards after the collapse of the USSR, but I don't think that many people could have accurately predicted that outcome at various points during the Cold War. Being the leader of the communist movement meant something that is true, but it was mostly a geopolitical struggle for global dominance that was existential in some capacity. The outcome wasn't assured despite the USSR being 'encircled' but U.S. Allies and having no real presence in the naval sphere.
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 15:17
|
|
|
Vladimir Putin posted:having no real presence in the naval sphere. Well, other than all those submarines and Backfires with incredibly huge cruise missiles. For the main purpose the Soviet Union actually needed a Navy for (interfering with US supply convoys across the Atlantic), it was fairly tooled up.
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 15:22
|
|
|
feedmegin posted:Well, other than all those submarines and Backfires with incredibly huge cruise missiles. For the main purpose the Soviet Union actually needed a Navy for (interfering with US supply convoys across the Atlantic), it was fairly tooled up. Generally speaking when you don't have a good surface fleet or are getting dominated by another power that controls the oceans then you go to things like submarines and anti-ship ballistic missiles. The USSR did have some carriers but they were light years behind American designs and numbers. You can argue either way but traditionally you dominate the water ways with you surface fleet and if you can't you try to mitigate with subs and other asymmetric factors.
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 15:37
|
|
|
When people talk about Confucianism's influence on China I'm pretty sure they mean stuff like this http://www.chinasmack.com/2015/digest/restaurant-holds-ceremony-forcing-staff-to-show-gratitude.html
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 15:39
|
|
|
Vladimir Putin posted:Generally speaking when you don't have a good surface fleet or are getting dominated by another power that controls the oceans then you go to things like submarines and anti-ship ballistic missiles. The USSR did have some carriers but they were light years behind American designs and numbers. You can argue either way but traditionally you dominate the water ways with you surface fleet and if you can't you try to mitigate with subs and other asymmetric factors. You also have less need for carriers when you're already on the continent the war is going to be fought on. Carriers don't help you bludgeon your way through the Fulda Gap.
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 15:47
|
|
|
Vladimir Putin posted:Generally speaking when you don't have a good surface fleet or are getting dominated by another power that controls the oceans then you go to things like submarines and anti-ship ballistic missiles. The USSR did have some carriers but they were light years behind American designs and numbers. You can argue either way but traditionally you dominate the water ways with you surface fleet and if you can't you try to mitigate with subs and other asymmetric factors. So are you saying... America dominated the globe and the USSR didn't? Here's a hint: look at where the US exercised military, economic, and ideeological influence and where the USSR did. The US is everywhere, the USSR is either near its own borders or in some podunk-rear end country like Cuba or Vietnam and on a smaller scale than US intervention to boot. The US also is the leader of an ideological community of wealthy nations and the USSR is the leader of a community of states that can't wait to get away from the USSR and are poor as gently caress.
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 15:52
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 22, 2024 00:14 |
|
|
it's time for peopel with avatars of cute anime girls with general hats to weigh in on the logistics of naval warfare
|
|
#
?
Sep 11, 2015 15:54
|
|