|
wateroverfire posted:I think we continually get hung up on concepts when we talk about this stuff. Yeah, but B thinks that he is A. Which means that, if you think you're A, there's a chance that you're actually B. There are two people who think they're A. You are one of them. The probability is 50% that you are actually A!
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:22
|
|
|
|
| # ? Jun 7, 2024 15:18 |
|
|
wateroverfire posted:I think we continually get hung up on concepts when we talk about this stuff. No, but, don't you see, when you sleep, you lose stream of consciousness, so like we're all already dead maaaaan. 
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:23
|
|
|
Lt. Danger posted:Tautological and I suspect also irrelevant to Oh dear me. Pretty sure this is bait but I'll go ahead and say that it shouldn't be irrelevant because the individuals are still identical to one another in the same way (qualitatively) that Oh dear me's late sister would be identical to her clone. They're also different in the same way (numerically) that the late sister is different from her clone: In both scenarios, we know which is which. Not sure how it's tautological.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:25
|
|
|
Who What Now posted:They could tell each other apart because they would have different memories and experiences post-cloning. But they could not tell which was the original and which was the clone. vintagepurple posted:Your thoughts are gone. Your sister is still dead. There's just an uncanny valley clone walking about thinking it's the person you guys were. My thoughts would not be gone, they would be happening in another organism. My sister would not be dead, the body that used to be hers would be dead. Those clones you are describing so disparagingly would be us, in every respect that matters to me. Apparently there is something about your current body that really, really matters to you, but I could very happily accept a substitute for mine..
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:25
|
|
|
WampaLord posted:No, but, don't you see, when you sleep, you lose stream of consciousness, so like we're all already dead maaaaan. I guess what I'm saying is, how do you know your stream of consciousness is a real stream of consciousness and not just a memory of one? There's nothing requiring that continuity to be an absolute, infallible perception of truth. I'm not saying the stream of consciousness forks into two at the moment of cloning, but that in any particular moment, all you have is the memory of your past consciousness by which you can decide who you really are.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:27
|
|
|
Oh dear me posted:But they could not tell which was the original and which was the clone. Sure they could. The clone is the one who came in to existence somewhere where the original did not. If I go into a room that is red knowing that a clone of me will be created in a room that is blue then when the clone comes into being seeing a blue room he will know that he is the clone.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:28
|
|
|
Who What Now posted:Sure they could. The clone is the one who came in to existence somewhere where the original did not. Yeah but what if at the moment of cloning you alter the clone's memory so that he thinks the clone comes out of the red room 
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:29
|
|
|
I don't get how folks in a post Phinneas Gage world can think any sort of essentialism here makes any sense. If damage to my brain can change my personality - who "I" am, then an utterly identical reconstruction of my brain is also me. "I" am a group of atoms arranged in a particular pattern, not a particular group of atoms arranged in a particular pattern. If that pattern ceases to exist, and then begins existing in another group of atoms, then yes, "I" am still alive, for all intents and purposes. I don't have the academic chops to put it in more high-minded language, but the screeching about identity seems to come from much the same place as concerns as authenticity and "natural" food. Edit: was there some part of the thread where we all decided that Numerical Identity in relation to people was a given or what?
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:30
|
|
|
Boing posted:Yeah, but B thinks that he is A. Which means that, if you think you're A, there's a chance that you're actually B. Yeah, I mean, I guess my reaction would be that it doesn't matter. Once the duplication occurs, A and B are both fully human. Whether I'm A or B would be nothing more than a (very emotionally charged) curiosity. And maybe not relevant to you, Boing, but before someone else tries to pounce on this, I'll say that, yes, if I'm A's brother, and I walk in and see A and B standing on opposite sides of the room, it does matter to me which is which. It just doesn't matter to either A or B, although the question will probably bother the poo poo out of both of them. The same can be said of teleportation. Once it happens, it doesn't matter; I just wouldn't want it to happen in the first place.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:31
|
|
|
Boing posted:Yeah, but B thinks that he is A. Which means that, if you think you're A, there's a chance that you're actually B. This path of argument is being generated off of ambiguity about the word "you" and not anything actually interesting. =( Like...if you and your clone were mixed us up in the lab somehow, sure, there is no way an outside observer could tell you two apart and you'd make identical claims about being the original. Ok. There's a 50% chance that your clone would be misidentified as you. But that doesn't change the fact that if you started out as A, you're still A. You have a true belief that you're A, and your clone has a false belief that they're A. With 100% probability, you are A.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:31
|
|
|
Who What Now posted:Sure they could. The clone is the one who came in to existence somewhere where the original did not. So the only difference between them would be utterly unimportant, both to them and to me. It's like suggesting I should love my sister less because she woke up in a different room.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:32
|
|
|
Boing posted:Yeah but what if at the moment of cloning you alter the clone's memory so that he thinks the clone comes out of the red room That's what the secret contingencies I left for myself to discover come into play. Also, regardless of who is the clone and who is the original, both my clone and I are distinct individuals who just share some memories prior to the cloning event. In no sense are we literally the same person twice just as soon as our sense experiences differ in even the slightest way.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:32
|
|
|
wateroverfire posted:This path of argument is being generated off of ambiguity about the word "you" and not anything actually interesting. =( But ambiguity about the word 'you' is entirely the point of this thread.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:34
|
|
|
Agents are GO! posted:I don't get how folks in a post Phinneas Gage world can think any sort of essentialism here makes any sense. If damage to my brain can change my personality - who "I" am, then an utterly identical reconstruction of my brain is also me. "I" am a group of atoms arranged in a particular pattern, not a particular group of atoms arranged in a particular pattern. So if we clone you then both you and the clone are "you"? Or am I misunderstanding? quote:Edit: was there some part of the thread where we all decided that Numerical Identity in relation to people was a given or what? No, I'm just shouting the phrase with mounting stridency until everybody who disagrees with me just gives up and stops posting.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:36
|
|
|
Oh dear me posted:So the only difference between them would be utterly unimportant, both to them and to me. It's like suggesting I should love my sister less because she woke up in a different room. It's largely an academic difference, yes. I don't actually give a poo poo if you love your clone-sister or not, and on a practical level I'd agree with you. Agents are GO! posted:I don't get how folks in a post Phinneas Gage world can think any sort of essentialism here makes any sense. If damage to my brain can change my personality - who "I" am, then an utterly identical reconstruction of my brain is also me. "I" am a group of atoms arranged in a particular pattern, not a particular group of atoms arranged in a particular pattern. Yes, but your clone will immediately have a distinct and unique brain pattern the moment it experiences something different than you do, making it a different person, albeit one that is veeeeeeeery similar to the original you.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:37
|
|
|
Here's another angle: Yes, the teleporter breaks you up into your component atoms to transmit to another location, effectively destroying your physical body. However, if it then reassembles those same atoms, now at the destination, into the exact same configuration they were in prior to taking you apart, who is to say that isn't still the "original you?" That is to say, how different is that from taking to vast extremes the idea of medically re-attaching an amputated limb such that it still functions? How "dead" do you have to be before coming back in the same material body before you are no longer the same individual? What about people who died on the operating table and were resuscitated there by a doctor? Even if we say that our consciousness as we know it is bound completely up into our brain meats, and there is no metaphysical "soul" that is also bound to said meats: is it not the same brain, composed of the same meticulously scanned and indexed atoms? And, if there is a metaphysical component, why would it not stay bound to those atoms upon reconstruction and reactivation, unless it's true that a person before and after resuscitation are actually different individuals from each other?
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:38
|
|
|
deadly_pudding posted:Here's another angle: Yeah, that's still you. That's also a completely different scenario than the one in the OP, which specified that the original is destroyed and a copy is made.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:40
|
|
|
Who What Now posted:It's largely an academic difference, yes. I don't actually give a poo poo if you love your clone-sister or not, and on a practical level I'd agree with you. You don't think that, if you chose the clone, your decision would haunt you in a way that choosing the original would not?
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:41
|
|
|
Peta posted:You don't think that, if you chose the clone, your decision would haunt you in a way that choosing the original would not? Wait, now I have to choose which one dies?
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:42
|
|
|
Who What Now posted:Wait, now I have to choose which one dies? Or choose which one to keep as your sister or w/e.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:43
|
|
|
Peta posted:Or choose which one to keep as your sister or w/e. Why wouldn't I just value both of them?
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:51
|
|
|
Peta posted:So if we clone you then both you and the clone are "you"? Or am I misunderstanding? Yes. Who What Now posted:Yes, but your clone will immediately have a distinct and unique brain pattern the moment it experiences something different than you do, making it a different person, albeit one that is veeeeeeeery similar to the original you. I think you're still hung up on absolute uniqueness - lets say the clones are conscious for an entire day seperately, we will have deviated only by .0007439%, which makes both of us still overwhelmingly me.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:51
|
|
|
Who What Now posted:Why wouldn't I just value both of them? Because life is just not fair!
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:53
|
|
|
Who What Now posted:Yeah, that's still you. That's also a completely different scenario than the one in the OP, which specified that the original is destroyed and a copy is made. In such a case, what if we don't index as thoroughly, and what if we use an entirely different batch of atoms at the other end? What makes one specimen of the atom Carbon-14 different from another one, for example? If we map all the exact same varieties of matter to where they were before, is it still a different body? I suppose, probably, it is. But where's the difference, then? If we had the medical capacity to transplant a brain into a new body, identical to its old one, without telling that person, and without complications, the brain would go about its life not knowing that it's in a different body. What if you could do it one lobe at a time, in such a way that the brain is very much dead and in pieces, but somehow undamaged damaged, and then reactivate it after everything is back in order? What if all you could do was copy the electrochemical state of a brain into a new brain of identical physical composition and structure? I would argue that it's only a "new individual" in the final of those cases, and then only because it's physically possible to have multiple copies of that electrochemical brain-state recorded.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 16:56
|
|
|
Peta posted:Pretty sure this is bait but I'll go ahead and say that it shouldn't be irrelevant because the individuals are still identical to one another in the same way (qualitatively) that Oh dear me's late sister would be identical to her clone. They're also different in the same way (numerically) that the late sister is different from her clone: In both scenarios, we know which is which. To be clear, I was saying "which is original and which is the copy" would be irrelevant to Oh dear me, since the sister-entities are both the same set of thoughts/memories/opinions and therefore, as far as I think Oh dear me is concerned, the same person. You seem to be suggesting these perfect duplicates would immediately become different upon awaking in two separate rooms, since they're now experiencing different thoughts/memories/opinions, and this then retroactively makes the duplication imperfect. They're different because they're now different somehow translates into them being always, essentially, different, even though at one point they were identical. I really enjoyed this season of Farscape.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:01
|
|
|
Who What Now posted:Yes, but your clone will immediately have a distinct and unique brain pattern the moment it experiences something different than you do, making it a different person, albeit one that is veeeeeeeery similar to the original you.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:06
|
|
|
Agents are GO! posted:I don't get how folks in a post Phinneas Gage world can think any sort of essentialism here makes any sense. If damage to my brain can change my personality - who "I" am, then an utterly identical reconstruction of my brain is also me. "I" am a group of atoms arranged in a particular pattern, not a particular group of atoms arranged in a particular pattern. For all intents and purposes except that the original you, the one that is experiencing posting in this thread, is dead and no longer experiencing things.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:07
|
|
|
Why does numericality a matter here and not with split organisms
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:08
|
|
|
Boing posted:But ambiguity about the word 'you' is entirely the point of this thread. Philosophy: A discipline built around being unable to track a reference. IDK, I think the ambiguity is entirely artificial and generated solely for the purposes of argument.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:12
|
|
|
GlyphGryph posted:Why does numericality a matter here and not with split organisms With split organisms the original is destroyed and two or more new entities are created. None of them has a claim on being the original.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:13
|
|
|
wateroverfire posted:With split organisms the original is destroyed and two or more new entities are created. None of them has a claim on being the original. you have been completely incapable of saying anything that isnt stupid and internally inconsistant while dismissing people for the things you are doing and they are not so this basically exactly the nonsense position i expected you to take despite it being contrary to the already stated position of the person i actually asked.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:18
|
|
|
GlyphGryph posted:you have been completely incapable of saying anything that isnt stupid and internally inconsistant while dismissing people for the things you are doing and they are not so this basically exactly the nonsense position i expected you to take despite it being contrary to the already stated position of the person i actually asked. Do tell! Point out the stupid or internally inconsistent things in this thread for arguing about things. edit: You're the guy who was naval gazing about his fuzzy sense of self so I am disinclined to trust that your unsupported opinion on anything else is grounded.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:21
|
|
|
Agents are GO! posted:Yes. No, you don't understand, even standing in a different spot is functionally non-identical. Even if you and your clone stand side by side one of you will have a memory of standing on the left while the other has a memory of standing on the right. Every single second of every single day you and the clone are becoming more and more different. Let's say that you are cloned, but your clone is then immediately sent off to fight ISIS. Your clone undergoes training and spends five years in an active warzone with local militants. When you meet that clone, are you still going to assert that he is overwhelmingly you, despite having a completely different set of experiences and memories of the last five years? How long does the separation have to be before you consider the clone to be a unique individual? deadly_pudding posted:In such a case, what if we don't index as thoroughly, and what if we use an entirely different batch of atoms at the other end? What makes one specimen of the atom Carbon-14 different from another one, for example? If we map all the exact same varieties of matter to where they were before, is it still a different body? Then that would be a new person. Albeit, again, one that is completely indistinguishable from you in any practical sense. quote:I suppose, probably, it is. But where's the difference, then? The difference is that it's a new body and brain. quote:If we had the medical capacity to transplant a brain into a new body, identical to its old one, without telling that person, and without complications, the brain would go about its life not knowing that it's in a different body. If they were never told then yeah, they would probably never know. But that person not knowing the truth doesn't change the fact that their brain is not in its original body. I'd argue that that's the same person, though, because I believe personhood is largely tied to the functionality of a brain. quote:What if you could do it one lobe at a time, in such a way that the brain is very much dead and in pieces, but somehow undamaged damaged, and then reactivate it after everything is back in order? What if all you could do was copy the electrochemical state of a brain into a new brain of identical physical composition and structure? First scenario is the same as the first except needlessly hosed up. The second creates a new person, yes. GlyphGryph posted:As i have pointed out to you now multiple times this argument means the original me no longer exists because it is equally true of both organisms. They are both almost but not quite current me and the only property people are claiming one has that the other doesnt is meaningless and irrelevent even to those desperate for it to matter by their own admission I've also said multiple times that the differences don't really matter in any practical sense, so maybe unbunch those panties a bit.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:22
|
|
|
vintagepurple posted:I really can't make sense of oh dear me's point unless they're of the belief that they/their sister will just wake up in the new copied body. It's not about the "original organism." It's about you being absolutely dead and replaced. Your thoughts are gone. Your sister is still dead. There's just an uncanny valley clone walking about thinking it's the person you guys were. That's not what uncanny valley means, as the person wandering around presumably would be indistinguishable from the original rather than very close but just off enough to cause unease. The whole argument against sister cloning comes across as a fetishism of authenticity or religious fervor. If the only way to tell the difference is to be told which is the original then authenticity loses all meaning to the observer. This is wholly different from saying you'd be ok doing it to yourself.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:22
|
|
|
wateroverfire posted:Philosophy: A discipline built around being unable to track a reference. This but unironically. (it could actually be an R. Scott Bakker tweet)
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:29
|
|
|
Boing posted:This but unironically. What did I just read. That feed is like a mental enema.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:33
|
|
|
wateroverfire posted:What did I just read. That feed is like a mental enema. If you can't get on board with quote:Trump - Suit that fucks cards who differ you have no stream of consciousness 
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:38
|
|
|
Boing posted:If you can't get on board with I didn't say I didn't enjoy it  
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:41
|
|
|
Lt. Danger posted:To be clear, I was saying "which is original and which is the copy" would be irrelevant to Oh dear me, since the sister-entities are both the same set of thoughts/memories/opinions and therefore, as far as I think Oh dear me is concerned, the same person. I mean, I was trying to tease out the confession of a preference for authenticity, all other things being equal, were he forced to make a choice. quote:You seem to be suggesting these perfect duplicates would immediately become different upon awaking in two separate rooms, since they're now experiencing different thoughts/memories/opinions, and this then retroactively makes the duplication imperfect. They're different because they're now different somehow translates into them being always, essentially, different, even though at one point they were identical. Oh no, I'm aiming for the opposite. They'd wake up in identical rooms, be exposed to identical stimuli, etc. Better yet, they're both suspended in sleep until Oh dear me makes his choice. While I agree with Who What Now when he talks about the technical significance of even infinitesimal differences post-replication, my point is more about "authenticity" (I'm not sure if that word captures either the concept or the tone that I'm striving for). GlyphGryph posted:Why does numericality a matter here and not with split organisms Numerical identity signals which individual is the original and which is the replica. If an organism splits into two separate, fully functional organisms, such that each organism is 50 percent original and 50 percent replacement, then the scenario is not analogous - there's no complete original, and nothing has been replicated.
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:47
|
|
|
|
| # ? Jun 7, 2024 15:18 |
|
|
So we don't argue past eachother more than necessary, it may be worth laying out what seem to be the competing concepts of identity being laid out in this thread. 1) A person is a snapshot of attributes, however defined, such that if the attributes are perfectly copied the person is also copied. Therefore a perfect copy is for all intents and purposes original. Or alternately, being original doesn't matter if no one can tell the difference. 2) A person is a continuous stream of attributes, however defined, such that starting a new stream from a snapshot of the original creates a new entity that is distinct from the original. Or alternately, being original does matter because that other guy over there is not me and I'M not indifferent about which of us you kill, thank you very much. Does that seem like a fair starting point?
|
|
#
?
Apr 7, 2016 17:55
|
|