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I checked my sources and it looks like that the Ark of Covenant wouldn't be of much use against the RAF, but could still be used effectively in the Unternehmen Seelöwe:quote:When the Ark was borne by Levites into the bed of the Jordan River, the waters parted as God had parted the waters of the Red Sea, opening a pathway for the entire host to pass.[3][4]
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May 23, 2016 11:49
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Saint Celestine posted:Hello friends. Can anyone recommend a good book about the history of the Cold War? Which part? I'm not really up to speed with the hottest historiography but AFAIK it's a very fractured field.
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May 23, 2016 12:12
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One of the things I'm aware of is that the M18 managed a very respectable performance in WW2 via shoot-and-scoot type tactics, but that the idea of "tank destroyers" (apologies) was abandoned after the war. I'm also aware a lot of other countries down-classed the importance of armouring their tanks post-war, because HEAT was starting to get silly-good levels of penetration. Given the environment armoured conflict was envisaged to be in post-war and the benefit of high mobility demonstrated in WW2, why did early cold war tanks draw off the american heavy tank tank, rather than drawing off things like the M18 and looking more like the Leopard or AMX-13?
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May 23, 2016 13:57
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spectralent posted:One of the things I'm aware of is that the M18 managed a very respectable performance in WW2 via shoot-and-scoot type tactics, but that the idea of "tank destroyers" (apologies) was abandoned after the war. I'm also aware a lot of other countries down-classed the importance of armouring their tanks post-war, because HEAT was starting to get silly-good levels of penetration. Given the environment armoured conflict was envisaged to be in post-war and the benefit of high mobility demonstrated in WW2, why did early cold war tanks draw off the american heavy tank tank, rather than drawing off things like the M18 and looking more like the Leopard or AMX-13? I thought this was more like in the 1960s and also with the widespread introduction of ATGMs, rather than tanks in service in the early Cold War which were largely those designed during World War 2 and just coming into service as it was ending. The Leopard 1 came into service in 1965, for example.
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May 23, 2016 14:10
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spectralent posted:One of the things I'm aware of is that the M18 managed a very respectable performance in WW2 via shoot-and-scoot type tactics, but that the idea of "tank destroyers" (apologies) was abandoned after the war. I'm also aware a lot of other countries down-classed the importance of armouring their tanks post-war, because HEAT was starting to get silly-good levels of penetration. Given the environment armoured conflict was envisaged to be in post-war and the benefit of high mobility demonstrated in WW2, why did early cold war tanks draw off the american heavy tank tank, rather than drawing off things like the M18 and looking more like the Leopard or AMX-13? Bear in mind that the American 'heavy heavy tank' (I assume you mean the M26) was by 1945 a medium tank by anyone's standards. It was also an extremely solid design that scaled well with the ability to replace the engine and gun and that's why it survived in one form or another until becoming the M60. While AT weapon penetration increased substantially, don't forget that great strides were also being taken in air-dropped ordinance and proximity-fuzed artillery. There clearly wasn't much point being hidden behind 200mm of steel, but equally you didn't want to be on a Cold War battlefield in an open-top vehicle.
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May 23, 2016 15:09
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Trin Tragula posted:Late Night Spike Milligan Interlude  I seriously love the late 18th/early 19th century so much. It's like they couldn't decide whether they wanted to live in the 17th century or the 21st century, so they mixed it all together in the most eccentric, fabulous, and incompetent ways possible. Alchenar posted:You can't galvanize resistance without tanks, trucks, artillery etc. Well, as I see it, Sealion itself was rather a "well, uh, what now?" plan rather than a serious endeavor. I don't think Germany had any serious prospect of invading Britain, but they couldn't just sit there and ignore Britain either as long as a state of war continued. The real question, I think, is "was there anything that Germany could have done to force Britain to the peace table without losing"? In 1940, I think the options for that were relatively limited - as long as the RAF and the Royal Navy were intact, the British Isles were safe and well-supplied, and Churchill was in charge, war would continue until Germany was defeated regardless of how long it took. Sealion was not a good plan, but I'm not sure there was anything Germany could do that constituted a "good plan" at that point. It's kind of pointless to criticize individual plans when the real mistake was getting into a war with Britain in the first place without any real means of attacking them.
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May 23, 2016 15:25
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spectralent posted:One of the things I'm aware of is that the M18 managed a very respectable performance in WW2 via shoot-and-scoot type tactics, but that the idea of "tank destroyers" (apologies) was abandoned after the war. I'm also aware a lot of other countries down-classed the importance of armouring their tanks post-war, because HEAT was starting to get silly-good levels of penetration. Given the environment armoured conflict was envisaged to be in post-war and the benefit of high mobility demonstrated in WW2, why did early cold war tanks draw off the american heavy tank tank, rather than drawing off things like the M18 and looking more like the Leopard or AMX-13? A couple of factors. Firstly, "Not Invented Here Syndrome" and secondly, you need to consider what each nation was using at the end of WW2. The UK had been working on the Centurion, and this had come from their previous experience that fast, poorly armored tanks like the Cromwell are not sufficient. The USA had the Patton, and came from the the Sherman where again the thought was "a better gun and armor would be kinda nice". The USSR ended the war with the the T-44 and IS-3 in design/production but not in service, continuing from their well known predecessors. The Germans of course, had nothing, being the losers and all  So, at the start of the Cold war, you had some inertia still happening that wasn't without reason. However the trends were clear; to have a useful level of armor you could only afford to put it all on the front and leave the sides and rear basically unarmored against AT weapons. For example, the side of the Leopard 1 could be penetrated by a PTRD 14.5mm shot, let alone that of a anti-tank gun. So when the Germans got back into making tanks at the same time that HEAT-FS was known to make all existing armor obsolete, they reasonably decided that any tank armor that they would make was going to be superseded by tank armament very shortly afterwards anyway, so why bother? Focus instead on mobility, armament and reliability. This trend could be seen with the US, UK and USSR all abandoning their heavy tank designs and moving onto their respective spiritual successors of the medium tank, the MBT. The French also had the same conclusions and applied them with their AMX-30 series, but I know little about French tanks. Light, mobile tank destroyers did indeed get a brief time in the sun with vehicles like the AMX-13 as you note, but soon afterwards the advent of ATGMs took over their purpose as anything from a tank to a man could carry an ATGM that would be dangerous to any vehicle from any angle. Also consider that you can't make a tank faster than past a certain point. So if you can't improve the speed anymore, then you might as well improve other aspects, like the armor. The Leopard, AMX-13 and T-64 all had similar speeds and HP/ton ratios. So while all 3 of these could destroy each other from the side or rear, the AMX-13 could be knocked out by anything, the Leopard from the front needed at least serious AT weapons and the T-64 needed even better still weapons. So in short, the maximum speed that you can make a light tank is about the same as what a full-size tank can do in the cold war, so in a land-based slugging match you want the extra advantage that having decent armor brings, even if it just means the enemy must use the real stuff against you instead of WW2 surplus. Of course, light tanks still have roles where raw weight is the primary concern, such as Amphibious, Parachute or air-transport operations but that's a different topic.
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May 23, 2016 15:27
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Hogge Wild posted:I checked my sources and it looks like that the Ark of Covenant wouldn't be of much use against the RAF, but could still be used effectively in the Unternehmen Seelöwe: This is some gay black Hitler talk. Sure, if they'd tried that, it might have worked; but how the hell would they get the Levites to do it for them?
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May 23, 2016 15:35
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Main Paineframe posted:
Spike Milligan was a dude who fought in World War 2...(the mention of a jazz band is a bit of a clue, there).
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May 23, 2016 15:52
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feedmegin posted:The RAF and the Fleet Air Arm are separate organisations with separate training pipelines (and the British carrier fleet was rather smaller than the US/Japanese) though... I was referring to the scale of the pipeline (unless for some reason the FAA's was much wider). And I had kind of forgotten the degree to which they were stuck with the decks they started the war with. Man did the war builds take a long time to show up.
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May 23, 2016 15:54
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feedmegin posted:Spike Milligan was a dude who fought in World War 2...(the mention of a jazz band is a bit of a clue, there).
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May 23, 2016 16:46
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Xerxes17 posted:So, at the start of the Cold war, you had some inertia still happening that wasn't without reason. However the trends were clear; to have a useful level of armor you could only afford to put it all on the front and leave the sides and rear basically unarmored against AT weapons. For example, the side of the Leopard 1 could be penetrated by a PTRD 14.5mm shot, let alone that of a anti-tank gun. So when the Germans got back into making tanks at the same time that HEAT-FS was known to make all existing armor obsolete, they reasonably decided that any tank armor that they would make was going to be superseded by tank armament very shortly afterwards anyway, so why bother? Focus instead on mobility, armament and reliability. This trend could be seen with the US, UK and USSR all abandoning their heavy tank designs and moving onto their respective spiritual successors of the medium tank, the MBT. The French also had the same conclusions and applied them with their AMX-30 series, but I know little about French tanks. Now y'see, I always thought that the abandoning of heavies and the shift to MBTs was partially a consequence of having long development times - work enough, and you can have the speed of a medium tank, and the firepower of a heavy; and partially because everybody learned the importance of standardization in tank designs, so it was just smart logistics to have a tank that could do everything. It's a good point though: with heavy metal protection obsolete, who needs heavies?
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May 23, 2016 17:19
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I wonder whether he'll end up being more famous in the end as an excellent war diarist. If anyone in the thread hasn't read the war memoirs (just get them all* you miss a lot with the abridged versions) you owe it to yourself to do so. Aside from being hilarious, it never lets you forget that the majority of people who fight wars wherever they are are young men with the following priorities: Don't die Get hosed (Not necessarily in that order) Edit: It's probably the most accurate depiction of the British soldier's experience anyway, which can be accurately summed up in the majority by: 39-40 smoked, had a wank 41-45 smoked, had a wank, got shot at, some people died, had another wank, where the gently caress are my fags, stole someone else's fags, smoked * especially mussolini: his part in my downfall, because spike talking about shellshock and depression is agonisingly sad lenoon fucked around with this message at 17:25 on May 23, 2016 |
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May 23, 2016 17:19
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Arquinsiel posted:He's more famous for being a commedian really. He bloody hated that Warsaw Concerto.
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May 23, 2016 17:47
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Thanks for all the responses; they were fascinating! I hadn't considered that the view of the insufficiency of armour was reflected in the deactivation of heavy tanks. Given the focus on reliability, armament and speed, as mentioned, is there a reason the Pattons had increases to armour but no significant boost in speed (in fact, looking at it power to weight dropped, with the top speed listed as 48km/h)? Chieftain at least looks like a decision to go all-in on "more gun".
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May 23, 2016 17:54
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spectralent posted:Thanks for all the responses; they were fascinating! I hadn't considered that the view of the insufficiency of armour was reflected in the deactivation of heavy tanks. The reasoning, I believe, was to make it protected from the BMP-1's main gun, which scared the poo poo out of NATO for a time. Later on the Russians scrapped it for an autocannon on the BMP-2 because it was much much more practical than the inaccurate 73mm gun.
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May 23, 2016 18:03
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It's the classic Dreadnought problem. You have three major components: armament/firepower, speed/mobility, and protection. Each takes a significant amount of mass. In a given footprint (dictated by things like drydock and canal sizes, or for tanks, width, bridges, etc), any improvement in one category necessarily dictates a loss of capability in another (within the same technical generation). Therefore, putting more armor necessitates either having less speed/mobility, or less armament/firepower. Over time, significant improvements in technology mean you get more bang for your buck in any area at a similar mass, but at the point of design, it's hard to improve one thing without a sacrifice in another. When you talk about the Patton, are you talking about the M48 or the M60? For instance, the M48A3 had an improved power pack that gave it significantly longer range and higher reliability for lower mass due to technological improvements. The A5 added the L7, which was close to the same mass as the 90mm, due to technological improvements in guns. Historically, updateability is probably the most important part of armored vehicle design. It's a lot cheaper to re-engine and upgun 2,000 tanks than to go to the drawing board and build 2,000 new tanks, especially since mechanical parts wear out and need replacing anyway. Plus, the best tank is the one you have where you need a tank. Better to have 2,500 decent tanks than 1,000 superlative ones.
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May 23, 2016 18:16
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Panzeh posted:The reasoning, I believe, was to make it protected from the BMP-1's main gun, which scared the poo poo out of NATO for a time. Aaah; makes sense. KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:It's the classic Dreadnought problem. You have three major components: armament/firepower, speed/mobility, and protection. Each takes a significant amount of mass. In a given footprint (dictated by things like drydock and canal sizes, or for tanks, width, bridges, etc), any improvement in one category necessarily dictates a loss of capability in another (within the same technical generation). Therefore, putting more armor necessitates either having less speed/mobility, or less armament/firepower. I'm aware of that; more armour is more steel so a lower power-weight. I'm just curious why, in an environment where the big party everyone was gearing up for was a massive fully-mechanised conflict in europe where weapons existed that made armour somewhat irrelevant, armour was chosen as a priority to upgrade when peers were choosing to emphasise speed and firepower. quote:Over time, significant improvements in technology mean you get more bang for your buck in any area at a similar mass, but at the point of design, it's hard to improve one thing without a sacrifice in another. When you talk about the Patton, are you talking about the M48 or the M60? For instance, the M48A3 had an improved power pack that gave it significantly longer range and higher reliability for lower mass due to technological improvements. The A5 added the L7, which was close to the same mass as the 90mm, due to technological improvements in guns. Historically, updateability is probably the most important part of armored vehicle design. It's a lot cheaper to re-engine and upgun 2,000 tanks than to go to the drawing board and build 2,000 new tanks, especially since mechanical parts wear out and need replacing anyway. Plus, the best tank is the one you have where you need a tank. Better to have 2,500 decent tanks than 1,000 superlative ones. I mean the M46 to M60; through that line there's several uparmourings, steadily worsening power-to-weight, and no increase in maximum speed. Though, looking at it there's a jump in engine horsepower between the M47 and M48, but not enough to make the power-to-weight better. As I said, it seemed curious given the environment I would have assumed they were designing around, and decisions of allied states at the time. EDIT: That said I do feel fairly confidently answered; I was just explaining my rationale for asking. spectralent fucked around with this message at 19:22 on May 23, 2016 |
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May 23, 2016 19:16
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spectralent posted:I mean the M46 to M60; through that line there's several uparmourings, steadily worsening power-to-weight, and no increase in maximum speed. Though, looking at it there's a jump in engine horsepower between the M47 and M48, but not enough to make the power-to-weight better. As I said, it seemed curious given the environment I would have assumed they were designing around, and decisions of allied states at the time. It's possible that's all that they felt they could do with the design. Speed is more than just power to weight ratios, it also involves suspensions and gearbox capabilities and the Patton suspension was possibly not suited for "gofast".
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May 23, 2016 19:24
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The Pattons all had a two forward, one reverse transmission whereas the Leo 1 used a four forward, two reverse transmission, which accounts for some of the difference in top speed.
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May 23, 2016 19:37
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Speed, even taking into account tactical applications, says very little about operational or strategic mobility. Which includes stuff like mileage, ground pressure, and reliability to begin with, and extends into larger questions of simplicity in training and serviceability.
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May 23, 2016 19:47
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Also note that you don't have to armor just to protect from the biggest gently caress off gun out there. If the Soviet MBT with the newest biggest gun can kill your tank at 500 yards that's unfortunate but you still want to be able to mostly ignore WW2 vintage AT guns owned by third tier powers.
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May 23, 2016 20:52
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Main Paineframe posted:
I've seen the argument that if the Battle of Britain/Luftwaffe in general hadn't been so terribly mismanaged they might have achieved air superiority over Britain, but obviously that's not going to facilitate Sealion or force anyone to the bargaining table on its own. You have to go deep into Gay Black Hitler territory for any scenario in which Germany becomes capable of overcoming the British Empire, really.
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May 23, 2016 21:03
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Cyrano4747 posted:Also note that you don't have to armor just to protect from the biggest gently caress off gun out there. If the Soviet MBT with the newest biggest gun can kill your tank at 500 yards that's unfortunate but you still want to be able to mostly ignore WW2 vintage AT guns owned by third tier powers. Also you don't want every Tom, Dick, and Ivan to be able to open up your tank with light weapons, but to have to work at it (such as larger, heavier and thus fewer disposable AT weapons, a full up ATGM or what have you), and for a vehicle not to be able to beat your armor at range with an autocannon.
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May 23, 2016 21:47
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Fuligin posted:I've seen the argument that if the Battle of Britain/Luftwaffe in general hadn't been so terribly mismanaged they might have achieved air superiority over Britain, but obviously that's not going to facilitate Sealion or force anyone to the bargaining table on its own. You have to go deep into Gay Black Hitler territory for any scenario in which Germany becomes capable of overcoming the British Empire, really. Well, when the Luftwaffe was targeting RAF airfields, they were slowly winning.
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May 23, 2016 22:03
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Autocannon weren't really A Thing during the design of the M46-7-8. Everyone was rocking battle taxis with HMGs at most, except the wacky Germans with the HS.30 / SPz 12-3. The BMP-1 was the first Warsaw Pact vehicle that really posed a threat to Western tanks. The most common opponents would be the BTR-40, BTR-152, BTR-60 all of which carried a DShK or KPVT 14.5mm at most. You're right that it starts to become more of a design decision once the BMP-1 and other true infantry fighting vehicles come about, but that wasn't until later in the design (the M60, really) that such things were considered. People were mostly prepping for tank-on-tank crime or trying to make their opponents at least make larger diameter (and thus heavier) man portable HEAT systems.
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May 23, 2016 22:08
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Nebakenezzer posted:Well, when the Luftwaffe was targeting RAF airfields, they were slowly winning. So assuming the Luftwaffe won the Battle of Britain what would be the real effects of it? Like Britain moves closer to a peace deal, shipping avoids the channel, etc? Im also talking about allied reactions to what they think Germany can do; it doesnt matter if Sealion is a farce if the generals think its a possibility and react accordingly.
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May 23, 2016 23:44
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Communist Zombie posted:So assuming the Luftwaffe won the Battle of Britain what would be the real effects of it? Like Britain moves closer to a peace deal, shipping avoids the channel, etc? Im also talking about allied reactions to what they think Germany can do; it doesnt matter if Sealion is a farce if the generals think its a possibility and react accordingly. Same question but with U-boats. Churchill is quoted as saying "The only thing that really scared me during the War was the U-Boat menace". Was it actually an existential "lose another convoy and we have to start negotiating with Germany" threat? What does that look like?
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May 23, 2016 23:49
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Communist Zombie posted:So assuming the Luftwaffe won the Battle of Britain what would be the real effects of it? Like Britain moves closer to a peace deal, shipping avoids the channel, etc? Im also talking about allied reactions to what they think Germany can do; it doesnt matter if Sealion is a farce if the generals think its a possibility and react accordingly. It seems like people often forget that Germany really had no significant interest in fighting the British, outside of simply securing their western borders and their supply routes across the Mediterranean. Hitler, much like Wilhelm, was quite the anglophile and really, really wanted the UK to partner up with him to take on the Soviet hordes. Point being, the conquest/annexation of the UK was never a primary goal for Germany, which I think is a fact that gets lost very quickly in the quarterly Sea Lion alt history discussion. Had the Battle of the Atlantic guerre de course really squeezed Britain hard...and I mean, REALLY hard (much harder than they ever managed in real life), I think there was a reasonable chance of Churchill being replaced by someone less bellicose and a quick, negotiated peace being hammered out. The Germans didn't really want much that the British had (transit rights through Gibraltar maybe?) and if the British were facing serious food and supply shortages because they lost the shipping war, things would have looked pretty bleak from their perspective insofar as actually defeating Germany is concerned. I get why people tend towards the binary outcomes of INVASION AND ANNEXATION OF THE UK versus THE FEW THAT WON THE BATTLE as it makes for a good narrative and everything, and for whatever reason people really get off on pointing out the various impracticalities and impossibilities of Sea Lion, but that often ends up overlooking a variety of other possible outcomes.
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May 24, 2016 00:06
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Yeah, loosing the battle of the Atlantic would have kept the Royal Navy in port for lack of fuel (short of fending off an invasion, and neutered the British as a military threat to Germany. Loosing the battle of Britain would have given Germany air superiority. What they do with it is I guess curbstomp British Industry, once again making them not a threat to Germany?* Like bewbies said, it still doesn't equate the British Isles being annexed. *This is assuming the Luftwaffe could actually do this. Once again, the Germans had no strategic bombers and even with a viable design, they didn't have the resources, especially oil, to build a large fleet. This also assumes that the British don't do like the Germans did, and spread out their industry/move it beyond the range of medium bombers. The battle of the Atlantic is the plauseable way Britain could have been rendered inoffensive to Germany; it's also plausible the Germans could have won the battle of Britain, but unless they can exploit that victory it doesn't get them much. So it's...quadroon bi Hitler?
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May 24, 2016 00:28
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So I'm going to Gettysburg tomorrow and I don't know if this has an answer but why the hell did Lee order Pickett's charge? The confederates plan was wrecked when the union retook Culp's hill in a dawn attack. Even if the Union center was weak Meade could order to reinforce it from the flanks while Pickett was still making his way across the field. Was there some pressing reason he couldn't have waited another day to design another plan?
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May 24, 2016 01:04
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Raskolnikov38 posted:So I'm going to Gettysburg tomorrow and I don't know if this has an answer but why the hell did Lee order Pickett's charge? The confederates plan was wrecked when the union retook Culp's hill in a dawn attack. Even if the Union center was weak Meade could order to reinforce it from the flanks while Pickett was still making his way across the field. Was there some pressing reason he couldn't have waited another day to design another plan? Lee was neck-deep in hostile territory with unsecured communication and supply lines. Plan B was something he needed available before the battle even started. I don't think Lee ever considered that he might need a new plan. What he did at Gettysburg seems to me to indicate a complete disregard for the capabilities of Meade and the Army of the Potomac. He expected every attack to carry fortified positions and he barely tried to involve himself in the battle at all, despite his reliance on two new corps commanders and absent cavalry. Granted, Chancellorsville two months prior convinced him that his army could do anything, but Hooker had made all the mistakes that Lee supposedly said Meade wouldn't. It's not much of an exaggeration to say the only thing Lee got right at Gettysburg was after Pickett's Charge when he said it was all his fault.
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May 24, 2016 02:15
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Great Britain was extremely dependent on imports to meet basic needs so the goal would be to force Britain to a negotiating position of something like Vichy neutrality at the most favorable or true neutrality with Mediterranean transit rights at worst. It could have maybe been accomplished with gay black Hitler and a lot more u-boats and FW-200s.
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May 24, 2016 03:15
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dublish posted:Lee was neck-deep in hostile territory with unsecured communication and supply lines. Plan B was something he needed available before the battle even started. I thought the general line on Gettysburg was that Lee, being highly reliant on battlefield intelligence from people like Stuart in order to be as bold as he was, was rushing in relatively blind because Stuart didn't show up until far too late. The lack of that awareness (in enemy territory, against a prepared foe, etc) meant he was figuring out what he was up against on the fly.
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May 24, 2016 03:41
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Raskolnikov38 posted:So I'm going to Gettysburg tomorrow and I don't know if this has an answer but why the hell did Lee order Pickett's charge? The confederates plan was wrecked when the union retook Culp's hill in a dawn attack. Even if the Union center was weak Meade could order to reinforce it from the flanks while Pickett was still making his way across the field. Was there some pressing reason he couldn't have waited another day to design another plan? It was kind of an understandable decision for a couple of reasons: he'd seen his army repeatedly outfight the Army of the Potomac; Meade had, at least ostensibly, stripped his center to reinforce both of his flanks from the fighting the days prior and earlier that morning, and the CSA position for artillery was, again at least ostensibly, superb, and the allure of finally achieving that DECISIVE BATTLE was a giant huge juicy carrot...the enemy was right drat there, after all. Those things were enough to convince Lee it'd succeed; various histories suggest that he was quite as riled up as a sickly middle aged man could be at the time he made the decision. Of course, once Longstreet et al got a good look at the field they knew immediately it was at best a long shot and a bunch of people tried to tell him so, but oh well. As to what he might've done otherwise, I think Lee was right that there was something to keeping up the morale of his formation by not retreating from a still-willing opponent, but even with that in mind I think that Longstreet's idea - disengage to the southeast, take up a strong defensive position, demonstrate a bit against the capital such that the politicians lose their mind and demand Meade do something, then just watch things unfold like they did at Fredericksburg - was a very good one, and was the best course of action. Then I'd be discussing the great Confederate victory at Taneytown while some poor black guy does my laundry.
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May 24, 2016 03:42
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So Im rereading the Sea Lion wargame, and Im not seeing any chemical weapons used. Was the invasion going so badly for the Nazis that the British didn't feel the need to deploy it?
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May 24, 2016 06:37
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bewbies posted:the allure of finally achieving that DECISIVE BATTLE was a giant huge juicy carrot...the enemy was right drat there, after all. Those things were enough to convince Lee it'd succeed; various histories suggest that he was quite as riled up as a sickly middle aged man could be at the time he made the decision. also longstreet remains Good And Cool
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May 24, 2016 08:09
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FAUXTON posted:I thought the general line on Gettysburg was that Lee, being highly reliant on battlefield intelligence from people like Stuart in order to be as bold as he was, was rushing in relatively blind because Stuart didn't show up until far too late. The lack of that awareness (in enemy territory, against a prepared foe, etc) meant he was figuring out what he was up against on the fly.
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May 24, 2016 08:24
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so what the gently caress was with the Sheridan? who thought that missilegun was a good idea?
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May 24, 2016 09:08
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Well, the Soviets got theirs to work  Well in concept it's a good idea. An ATGM capability that doesn't impair NBC protection while reloading. Also keeps the crew within the hull and protected from more conventional threats. For example the ATGM on BMD's has to be aimed outside of the turret, exposing the gunner. The BMP needs to open a hatch to replace the Falanga after firing.
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May 24, 2016 09:20
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