|
Rygar201 posted:By the plain wording of the executive order, these travel restrictions aren't discriminatory. I think you've got Justice Neil Gorsuch spot on right there.
|
#
?
Jun 3, 2017 05:54
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 9, 2024 08:36 |
|
|
I know it's been beaten to death but this is actually happening. Unfortunately it seems to be some kind of Austin municipal thing so can't pull it up on pacer.
|
|
#
?
Jun 5, 2017 03:58
|
|
|
KernelSlanders posted:I know it's been beaten to death but this is actually happening. Unfortunately it seems to be some kind of Austin municipal thing so can't pull it up on pacer. It's because the first stage is filing a complaint with Austin's Equal Employment and Fair Housing Office. Only after the office finds that a violation occurred and can't reconcile it, does it go to the city attorney's office. What I find weird about the statue is that specifically states that it should be interpreted according to Title VII, regardless of the nature of the discrimination. Does that mean that Alamo could make a bona fide occupation (accommodation) quality defense? 
|
|
#
?
Jun 5, 2017 05:31
|
|
|
The Supreme Court (a) summarily affirmed the lower court decisions holding that North Carolina state redistricting was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander and (b) unanimously vacated the order requiring special elections in 2017, on the basis that is a fairly drastic remedy and the district court decision did not really consider any of the factors involved in coming to the decision special elections were appropriate and was extremely brief on the reasoning behind it. The decision for (b) wasn't that a district court can't order special elections to remedy a racial gerrymander, but that if you do something that drastic you've got to explain why so that an appeals court can actually consider it. It's in the order list rather than a separate order: https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/060517zor_e18f.pdf All in all, a good decision.
|
|
#
?
Jun 5, 2017 16:06
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:The Supreme Court (a) summarily affirmed the lower court decisions holding that North Carolina state redistricting was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander and (b) unanimously vacated the order requiring special elections in 2017, on the basis that is a fairly drastic remedy and the district court decision did not really consider any of the factors involved in coming to the decision special elections were appropriate and was extremely brief on the reasoning behind it. The decision for (b) wasn't that a district court can't order special elections to remedy a racial gerrymander, but that if you do something that drastic you've got to explain why so that an appeals court can actually consider it. It's a fair decision. I wish the district court did the legwork for the special election, especially seeing as there've been 3 elections under these gerrymandered maps. Honeycutt v. U.S. came down too, chipping away at civil forfeiture. Basically, a unanimous decision that "Co-conspirators who do not personally benefit from illegal proceeds cannot be ordered to forfeit property" (per SCOTUSBlog) https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-142_7l48.pdf
|
|
#
?
Jun 5, 2017 17:06
|
|
|
Brute Squad posted:It's a fair decision. I wish the district court did the legwork for the special election, especially seeing as there've been 3 elections under these gerrymandered maps. This civil forfeiture ruling is way overdue. It's insane in this day and age that anyone at any level could be thinking, "It would be great if the police could just seize property even if it's not actually associated with criminal activity!"
|
|
#
?
Jun 5, 2017 18:50
|
|
|
tetrapyloctomy posted:This civil forfeiture ruling is way overdue. It's insane in this day and age that anyone at any level could be thinking, "It would be great if the police could just seize property even if it's not actually associated with criminal activity!" my favorite part is where they seize drugs as an asset instead of evidence and then use all the drugs after any legal action involving them is over. that happened constantly to the coke and weed dealers in my home town.
|
|
#
?
Jun 5, 2017 19:53
|
|
|
Sorry for the delay - had an AC repairman arrive at exactly the wrong time. Opinions! NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL. v. SANDRA LITTLE COVINGTON, ET AL. Holding: [The District Court has to take a harder look before requiring a special election in response to a racial gerrymander.] [W]e cannot have confidence that the court adequately grappled with the interests on both sides of the remedial question before us. And because the District Court’s discretion “was barely exercised here,” its order provides no meaningful basis for even deferential review. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 27 (2008). For these reasons, we vacate the District Court’s remedial order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Per Curiam. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-1023_m64o.pdf ADVOCATE HEALTH CARE NETWORK ET AL. v. STAPLETON ET AL. Holding: [Church plans exempt from ERISA include plans maintained by churches but not established by churches.] A plan maintained by a principal-purpose organization qualifies as a “church plan,” regardless of who established it. Pp. 5–15. (a) The term “church plan” initially “mean[t]” only “a plan established and maintained . . . by a church.” But subparagraph (C)(i) provides that the original definitional phrase will now “include” another—“a plan maintained by [a principal-purpose] organization.” (b) Both parties’ accounts of Congress’s purpose in enacting subparagraph (C)(i) tend to confirm this Court’s reading that plans maintained by principal-purpose organizations are eligible for the church-plan exemption, whatever their origins. Lineup: Majority opinion by Kagan, joined by all other Members (except Gorsuch, who took no part). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-74_5i36.pdf KOKESH v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Holding: Because SEC disgorgement operates as a penalty under §2462, any claim for disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action must be commenced within five years of the date the claim accrued. (a) The definition of “penalty” as a “punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or offen[s]e against its laws,” Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 667, gives rise to two principles. First, whether a sanction represents a penalty turns in part on “whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual.” Id., at 668. Second, a pecuniary sanction operates as a penalty if it is sought “for the purpose of punishment, and to deter others from offending in like manner” rather than to compensate victims. (b) The application of these principles here readily demonstrates that SEC disgorgement constitutes a penalty within the meaning of §2462. (c) The Government responds that SEC disgorgement is not punitive but a remedial sanction that operates to restore the status quo. It is not clear, however, that disgorgement simply returns the defendant to the place he would have occupied had he not broken the law. It sometimes exceeds the profits gained as a result of the violation. And, as demonstrated here, SEC disgorgement may be ordered without consideration of a defendant’s expenses that reduced the amount of illegal profit. Lineup: Majority opinion by Sotomayor, joined by all other Members. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-529_i426.pdf HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES Holding: Because forfeiture pursuant to §853(a)(1) is limited to property the defendant himself actually acquired as the result of the crime, that provision does not permit forfeiture with regard to Terry Honeycutt, who had no ownership interest in his brother’s store and did not personally benefit from the illegal sales. Pp. 3–11. (a) Section 853(a) limits forfeiture to property flowing from, §853(a)(1), or used in, §853(a)(2), the crime itself—providing the first clue that the statute does not countenance joint and several liability, which would require forfeiture of untainted property. (b) Joint and several liability is also contrary to several other provisions of §853. (c) The plain text and structure of §853 leave no doubt that Congress did not, as the Government claims, incorporate the principle that conspirators are legally responsible for each other’s foreseeable actions in furtherance of their common plan. Lineup: Majority opinion by Sotomayor, joined by all other Members (except Gorsuch, who took no part). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-142_7l48.pdf TOWN OF CHESTER, NEW YORK v. LAROE ESTATES, INC. Holding: [Court of Appeals has to sort out what is really going on with Laroe as a potential intervenor.] 1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) must meet the requirements of Article III standing if the intervenor wishes to pursue relief not requested by a plaintiff. 2. The Court of Appeals is to address on remand the question whether Laroe seeks different relief than Sherman. If Laroe wants only a money judgment of its own running directly against the Town, then it seeks damages different from those sought by Sherman and must establish its own Article III standing in order to intervene. The record is unclear on that point, and the Court of Appeals did not resolve that ambiguity. Lineup: Majority opinion by Alito, joined by all other Members. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-605_kjfl.pdf
|
|
#
?
Jun 5, 2017 19:53
|
|
|
KOKESH v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Kids, if you're going to defraud other people financially stall till you hit the statue of limitations.
|
|
#
?
Jun 6, 2017 01:59
|
|
|
We don't have any meaningful guesses on when the court will decide on whether or not hear the case for the muslim ban, do we? I'm a little surprised we haven't heard yet, but this is the first case I've followed from this early in its life.
|
|
#
?
Jun 6, 2017 02:01
|
|
|
Spiritus Nox posted:We don't have any meaningful guesses on when the court will decide on whether or not hear the case for the muslim ban, do we? I'm a little surprised we haven't heard yet, but this is the first case I've followed from this early in its life. Won't be before tuesday, since they requested comments by 3 pm monday.
|
|
#
?
Jun 6, 2017 02:10
|
|
|
silvergoose posted:Won't be before tuesday, since they requested comments by 3 pm monday. Tuesday as in tomorrow? Or Tuesday as in next week?
|
|
#
?
Jun 6, 2017 02:36
|
|
|
Spiritus Nox posted:Tuesday as in tomorrow? Or Tuesday as in next week? Sorry. Next week. Per scotusblog (UPDATE: The justices have asked the challengers to file responses to the petition for review and the requests for stays of the lower courts’ rulings. Those responses are due on or before 3 p.m. on Monday, June 12.)
|
|
#
?
Jun 6, 2017 02:52
|
|
|
silvergoose posted:Sorry. Next week. Got it, thanks a lot.
|
|
#
?
Jun 6, 2017 16:59
|
|
|
incoherent posted:KOKESH v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION As usual the law isn't written very well. Or maybe it was written extremely well. 
|
|
#
?
Jun 6, 2017 17:01
|
|
|
incoherent posted:KOKESH v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION *defraud other people financially longer than the statute of limitations
|
|
#
?
Jun 6, 2017 20:55
|
|
|
hobbesmaster posted:As usual the law isn't written very well. you know darn bent money touchers wrote that in.
|
|
#
?
Jun 6, 2017 21:37
|
|
|
Opinions! VIRGINA, ET AL. v. DENNIS LEBLANC Holding: [The Virginia trial court did not unreasonably apply the Graham rule (requiring juvenile offenders to be given "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation") and so the 4th Circuit is reversed based on the AEDPA.] Lineup: Per Curiam. Ginsburg concurs based on the understanding that the Virginia Supreme Court has interpreted Virginia law to require the parole board to provide such a meaningful opportunity under the geriatric release program. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-1177_m648.pdf HENSON ET AL. v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC. Holding: A company may collect debts that it purchased for its own account, like Santander did here, without triggering the statutory definition in dispute [and becoming subject to the Fair Debt Collection Act obligations as a "debt collector"]. By defining debt collectors to include those who regularly seek to collect debts “owed . . . another,” the statute’s plain language seems to focus on third party collection agents regularly collecting for a debt owner—not on a debt owner seeking to collect debts for itself. [Left open: (1) if Santander is a debt collector because it also does third party collection and (2) if Santander is a debt collector because its principal purpose is to collect debts.] Lineup: Majority opinion by Gorsuch, joined by all other Members. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-349_c07d.pdf MICROSOFT CORP. v. BAKER ET AL. Holding: Federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction under §1291 to review an order denying class certification (or, as here, an order striking class allegations) after the named plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice. [That is to say, a putative class-action plaintiff can't lose at the class certification stage, then dismiss their individual claim in order to be able to appeal the class denial. Use Rule 23(f) for a discretionary appeal or litigate the case to a final judgment. The concurring opinion gets to the same conclusion but thinks that there is no longer any Article III case-or-controversy for the plaintiffs to appeal after dismissing their individual claims.] Lineup: Majority opinion by Ginsburg, joined by Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Concurring opinion by Thomas, joined by Roberts and Alito. Gorsuch took no part. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-457_6j37.pdf SESSIONS v. MORALES-SANTANA Holding: 1. The gender line Congress drew [requiring an unwed US citizen mother to be in the US continuously for 1 year before a child's birth to transmit US citizenship to a child born abroad from a non-US citizen, while requiring an unwed US citizen father to have been in the US for 10 years, with 5 years after age 14] is incompatible with the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that the Government accord to all persons “the equal protection of the laws.” Pp. 6–23. 2. Because this Court is not equipped to convert §1409(c)’s exception for unwed U. S.-citizen mothers into the main rule displacing §§1401(a)(7) and 1409(a), it falls to Congress to select a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender. In the interim, §1401(a)(7)’s current requirement should apply, prospectively, to children born to unwed U. S.-citizen mothers. [This is not normal. Normally this sort of inequity is handled by giving the more favorable treatment, but here the Court believes that Congress would rather be meaner to US citizen unwed mothers than nicer to US citizen unwed fathers. Thomas and Alito think the case is moot because they do not believe the Court has the power to give the requested remedy, i.e. a grant of citizenship on a basis not prescribed by Congress.] Lineup: Majority opinion by Ginsburg, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Concurring opinion by Thomas, joined by Alito. Gorsuch took no part. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1191_2a34.pdf SANDOZ INC v. AMGEN INC. ET AL. Holding: Section 262(l)(2)(A) [requiring an applicant seeking FDA approval of a biosimilar to provide its application and manufacturing information to the sponsor, basically to decide if there will be a patent lawsuit or not] is not enforceable by injunction under federal law, but the Federal Circuit on remand should determine whether a state-law injunction is available. An applicant may provide notice under §262(l)(8)(A) prior to obtaining licensure. (a) Section 262(l)(2)(A)’s requirement that an applicant provide the sponsor with its application and manufacturing information is not enforceable by an injunction under federal law. (b) The Federal Circuit should determine on remand whether an injunction is available under state law to enforce §262(l)(2)(A). Whether Sandoz’s conduct was “unlawful” under California’s unfair competition statute is a question of state law, and the Federal Circuit thus erred in attempting to answer that question by referring only to the BPCIA. (c) An applicant may provide notice of commercial marketing before obtaining a license. [Breyer writes separately to note that the FDA may be able to change the Court's interpretation later if it wants to.] Lineup: Majority opinion by Thomas, joined by all other members. Breyer concurred. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1039_1b8e.pdf ulmont fucked around with this message at 15:48 on Jun 12, 2017 |
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 15:41
|
|
|
Just read the first paragraph of the Gorsuch opinion. He is a terrible writer.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 16:56
|
|
|
I'm not much of a court watcher, but is this an unusual number of Thomas-written decisions?
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 17:07
|
|
|
Jethro posted:I'm not much of a court watcher, but is this an unusual number of Thomas-written decisions? Generally opinion writing duties are primarily spread between the justices Thomas is sitting about even, excluding Gorush. Kennedy is surprisingly low though.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 17:15
|
|
|
Jethro posted:I'm not much of a court watcher, but is this an unusual number of Thomas-written decisions? Like Exploded Mummy said, everyone gets about the same amount as much as possible. However because Thomas is a complete nutjob he usually only gets the unanimous decisions that he can't manage to lose a majority with.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 17:27
|
|
|
Jethro posted:I'm not much of a court watcher, but is this an unusual number of Thomas-written decisions? Not really. This isn't updated for today's decisions, but you can see Thomas looks more or less even. Alito and Kennedy are light. http://www.scotusblog.com/statistics/
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 17:28
|
|
|
just wanna say thanks ulmont for the write-ups. i don't contribute much to this thread because it's really not my area of expertise, but i read it closely. it's one of the most informative threads thanks to all the people with actual knowledge 
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 19:26
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:Like Exploded Mummy said, everyone gets about the same amount as much as possible. However because Thomas is a complete nutjob he usually only gets the unanimous decisions that he can't manage to lose a majority with. Complete nutjob is harsh. Can we go with orthogonal jurisprudence instead.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 19:33
|
|
|
ulmont posted:SESSIONS v. MORALES-SANTANA Wasn't the justification for the difference based on the fact that an unwed mother is far more likely to produce a stateless child than an unwed father? It feels particularly cruel to apply the stricter of the two standards.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 19:35
|
|
|
xrunner posted:Wasn't the justification for the difference based on the fact that an unwed mother is far more likely to produce a stateless child than an unwed father? It feels particularly cruel to apply the stricter of the two standards. It's deliberate action to force Congress to act because they know they won't otherwise but will probably be ignored until a functioning government is installed again.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 19:47
|
|
|
xrunner posted:Wasn't the justification for the difference based on the fact that an unwed mother is far more likely to produce a stateless child than an unwed father? It feels particularly cruel to apply the stricter of the two standards. quote:But there is little reason to believe that a statelessness concern prompted the diverse physical-presence requirements. Nor has the Government shown that the risk of statelessness disproportionately endangered the children of unwed mothers. [...] The justification for §1409’s gender-based dichotomy, however, was not the child’s plight, it was the mother’s role as the “natural guardian” of a nonmarital child. [...] Taking account of the foreign laws actually in force, these experts concluded, “the risk of parenting stateless children abroad was, as of [1940 and 1952], and remains today, substantial for unmarried U. S. fathers, a risk perhaps greater than that for unmarried U. S. mothers.” quote:The Government, however, neglected to expose this supposed “protection” to a reality check.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 20:04
|
|
|
twodot posted:The government argued this, but the opinion doesn't think the argument was successful: Fair enough. Although the quoted section seems to argue for applying the weaker standard, rather than the harsher. Mr. Nice! posted:It's deliberate action to force Congress to act because they know they won't otherwise but will probably be ignored until a functioning government is installed again. It comes across as a fairly lovely way to force them to act, honestly. Wouldn't enforcing the stronger standard across the board be as likely to motivate political action as the weaker one? Putting somebody in a position where they must be more generous unless they act seems more defensible than putting potentially very vulnerable people at greater risk to make a point. But what do I know.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 20:21
|
|
|
xrunner posted:Fair enough. Although the quoted section seems to argue for applying the weaker standard, rather than the harsher. quote:For if §1409(c)’s one-year dispensation were extended to unwed citizen fathers, would it not be irrational to retain the longer term when the U. S.-citizen parent is married? Disadvantageous treatment of marital children in comparison to nonmarital children is scarcely a purpose one can sensibly attribute to Congress.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 20:46
|
|
|
exploded mummy posted:Kennedy is surprisingly low though. Kennedy is usually the deciding vote on controversial 5-4 cases so he gets a lot of those opinions and they always get handed down late in the term. So, this is normal.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 20:48
|
|
|
xrunner posted:Fair enough. Although the quoted section seems to argue for applying the weaker standard, rather than the harsher. "You wrote a lovely law now deal with the lovely consequences of your lovely law" is a time honored judicial response. The idea being it's not the court's job to fix the law, just decide it, so they decide it harshly to get congress to fix it. If they decided it favorably, congress wouldn't learn and/or rely on the courts to bail them out (that's the idea, reality is much different obviously)
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 20:54
|
|
|
All the opinions so far have been 8/9-0 sweeps. When are the bullshit 5-4 decisions coming?
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 20:55
|
|
|
The problem is the assumption that Congress cares Bout the effects of the laws it passes
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 20:55
|
|
|
Nissin Cup Nudist posted:All the opinions so far have been 8/9-0 sweeps. When are the bullshit 5-4 decisions coming? There were only 8 justices for a lot of them, so a lot of contentious issues might not have gotten resolved Hieronymous Alloy posted:The problem is the assumption that Congress cares Bout the effects of the laws it passes Well, you see, where Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence in 1776, and later James Madison wrote the constitution in 1777, the word "care" actually meant "do nothing at all", therefore ceteris paribus you don't deserve healthcare EwokEntourage fucked around with this message at 21:01 on Jun 12, 2017 |
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 20:58
|
|
|
Nissin Cup Nudist posted:All the opinions so far have been 8/9-0 sweeps. When are the bullshit 5-4 decisions coming? There might be fewer of them this term because the horrible Conservative Legal Movement test case shops more or less put on the breaks when Scalia died. Expect them to spin up again for next term.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 20:58
|
|
|
Nissin Cup Nudist posted:All the opinions so far have been 8/9-0 sweeps. When are the bullshit 5-4 decisions coming? Those come later in the term as they take more time to decide among themselves. The blowouts are always first because they're much easier to decide and write up.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 21:27
|
|
|
duz posted:Those come later in the term as they take more time to decide among themselves. The blowouts are always first because they're much easier to decide and write up. It's june, it's near the end of the term.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 21:29
|
|
|
botany posted:just wanna say thanks ulmont for the write-ups. Glad you're enjoying them - I wanted to be sure we had something in the thread about each case, even if only a little bit. xrunner posted:Wasn't the justification for the difference based on the fact that an unwed mother is far more likely to produce a stateless child than an unwed father? It feels particularly cruel to apply the stricter of the two standards. DOJ said that, but it wasn't really true. The real reason was an assumption that an unwed mother was stuck with the child and an unwed father wasn't. As the Court notes: quote:As the Court of Appeals pointed out, with one exception, nothing in the congressional hearings and reports on the 1940 and 1952 Acts “refer[s] to the problem of statelessness for children born abroad.” 804 F. 3d, at 532–533. See Collins 2205, n. 283 (author examined “many hundreds of pre-1940 administrative memos . . . defend[ing] or explain[ing] recognition of the nonmarital foreign-born children of American mothers as citizens”; of the hundreds, “exactly one memo by a U. S. official . . . mentions the risk of statelessness for the foreign-born nonmarital children of American mothers as a concern”). Reducing the incidence of statelessness was the express goal of other sections of the 1940 Act. See 1940 Hearings 430 (“stateless[ness]” is “object” of section on foundlings). The justification for §1409’s gender-based dichotomy, however, was not the child’s plight, it was the mother’s role as the “natural guardian” of a nonmarital child. On applying the stricter being cruel, the idea here is to get the result Congress would have preferred given the two options. I suspect the Court got that right. quote:“[W]hen the ‘right invoked is that to equal treatment,’ the appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment, a result that can be accomplished by withdrawal of benefits from the favored class as well as by extension of benefits to the excluded class.” Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 740 (1984) (quoting Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239, 247 (1931); emphasis deleted). “How equality is accomplished . . . is a matter on which the Constitution is silent.” Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U. S. 413, 426–427 (2010). The choice between these outcomes is governed by the legislature’s intent, as revealed by the statute at hand.
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 21:39
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 9, 2024 08:36 |
|
|
evilweasel posted:It's june, it's near the end of the term. They didn't take that many high-profile burners with an 8 person Court. SCOTUSblog only thinks there are 2 major cases left. http://www.scotusblog.com/statistics/
|
|
#
?
Jun 12, 2017 21:39
|
|