CRISPYBABY posted:

It describes the majority of Canada, USA, and probably most first world countries tbh. Political polls that say that people want both lower taxes/government funding and better social services are pretty much the norm everywhere I think, because collectively people are dumb as poo poo.

apatheticman posted:

It's because the right has been engaged in a 50 year propaganda campaign to tell the public that their government is full of bloat and excess.

RBC posted:

i really hope dougie comes up with another ferris wheel idea and people can start to see hes a loving dolt just like his brother

RBC posted:

i really hope dougie comes up with another ferris wheel idea and people can start to see hes a loving dolt just like his brother

Reince Penis posted:

He's got to make a big show of supporting some social conservative values at some point, they're a huge part of his coalition.

Globe and Mail posted:

Ontario is not immune to political populism

FRANK GRAVES AND MICHAEL VALPY
CONTRIBUTED TO THE GLOBE AND MAIL
PUBLISHED 1 DAY AGO

Frank Graves is president of Ottawa-based EKOS Research Associates. Michael Valpy is a fellow of the School of Public Policy and Governance at the University of Toronto.

Ontario’s coming election, as most residents of Canada’s most populous province likely now know, will be the country’s first acid test of whether conservative populism can find political success. The focus, however, is largely in the wrong place.

There is the same overestimate of the significance of character – in this contest, with Ontario Progressive Conservative Leader Doug Ford; two years ago across the border, the same scenario with now-President Donald Trump – and the same underestimate of the meaning of a frustrated political constituency in search of a leader.

Not all PC supporters are inside the tent of conservative populism. But research by EKOS clearly indicates this ideology is shaping the party’s strength (the late Rob Ford, Mr. Ford’s brother and past mayor of Toronto, was more character than ideology).

The PCs are ahead in every geographical region of the province except the City of Toronto. Their support is more than triple that of the Liberals in Ontario’s deindustrialized southwest, double that of the Liberals and New Democrats combined in Toronto’s suburbs and, puzzlingly, almost double that of the Liberals in Ottawa.

They are leading in every age demographic. Amazingly, they have attracted double the combined support for the Liberals and NDP in the 18-to-34 cohort, which traditionally shows a progressive political bent. PC support among men is huge and the party also leads in support from women, although by a significantly lesser amount.

This is not a right against left schism. It is the fracture in what has come to be known as an ordered against open society, the essential ingredients of which are both economic (security or insecurity) and cultural (values and beliefs).

The open side of the spectrum is future-oriented, welcomes change and is receptive to an open approach to trade and immigration. It tends to be optimistic and progressive and is most evident in those currently seeing themselves as members of the middle and upper class. It is also, it should be acknowledged, the dominant face of inequality.

The ordered side is a darker mirror image. Its adherents feel institutionally abandoned. They see the death of progress. They are both economically and culturally insecure. Their outlook is associated with a more authoritarian view which sees order and obedience as more important than creativity and reason. They tend to be nostalgic for a previous (perhaps apocryphal) era in which comfort and security were enjoyed.

Among ordered-society adherents, support for trade is more tepid, as is support for immigration. They show signs of racial intolerance, whether it’s largely an unconscious negative evaluation or something more malignant. It should also be pointed out that, in Canada, conservative populism draws support from non-white communities as well. (A 2017 national poll by EKOS found that 40 per cent of respondents believe Canada admits too many non-white immigrants – 64 per cent of whom identified as Conservative supporters, 30 per cent as NDP supporters and 15 per cent as Liberal supporters.)

Ordered-society adherents are people who are losing their place in the class system. At the turn of the millennium in both Canada and the United States, more than 70 per cent of adults self-identified as middle class; now less than half do. Those attracted to the closed outlook tend to have lower levels of education and be in the working and poor classes. Many have experienced downward class mobility. Increasingly, the outlook embraces angry young males who see good jobs beyond their reach, with economic growth running at just 2 per cent annually while housing costs in major urban areas rise by 12 per cent.

Finally, a joint 2017 study by Harvard and University of Melbourne researchers found that citizens of stable, liberal democratic societies – especially millennials – are growing jaded with democracy, show a disdain for intellectuals and believe elites can’t be trusted.

The action by media, political and academic elites to dismiss Mr. Ford now, just as Mr. Trump was dismissed before him, will hardly make the adherents of a closed society go away or abandon their anger or their loss of faith in democracy. They are a growing, vociferous constituency in Ontario, wanting to be heard.

Ekos Research posted:

At the Crossroads of Hope and Fear
THE NEW AXIS OF SOCIETAL TENSION

Please click here for a PDF copy of this article.

[Ottawa – February 5, 2018] In this unique ‘populism project’ we are conducting with the Canadian Press, we are trying to gain a better understanding about what many are calling the rise of populism. That term is inadequate to deal with the range of experience and attitudes which are underpinning this movement. A partial list of the closely related concepts relevant to this includes authoritarianism, an ordered versus open outlook, nativism, isolationism, and xenophobia. Questions swirl as to what these forces mean, what is driving them, and how they are distributed in Canada.

Our evidence shows that those who feel that Canada is somehow inoculated from these forces are simply wrong. We are going to examine the linkages across economic anxieties, class formation, and cultural insecurity. Whatever the right language for this debate the new locus of conflict in modern society has shifted from left-right to open-ordered. We will try and explain this with some recent evidence.

Charting the end of progress and its consequences
This research is the latest iteration of work that we have been conducting for the past decade. Around a decade ago, we began to notice that some of the typical outlook on the economy and one’s place in it were fundamentally different than it had been in the last century. The basic ideas of progress, shared prosperity, and subscription to the middle-class dream all appeared to be unravelling.

Since that time, these patterns have only become clearer and are starkly different from the recent notion that the upper North American economies are doing splendidly well. In both Canada and the United States, there has been a large hollowing of the middle class as the ranks of the erstwhile middle class deplete so grows the ranks of the burgeoning working class. While those at the top are doing very well, there is a pervasive sense of stagnation and decline elsewhere. The basic middle class bargain which defined the period of shared prosperity in the last half of the twentieth century is in tatters. For many, we have reached the end of progress. Only one in eight think they are better off than a year ago. An identical 13 per cent think the next generation will enjoy a better life. By more than two to one, Canadians agree that if present trends with inequality at the top continue then we are going to see ‘violent class conflicts’.

The (at the time) shocking Brexit result, and even more astonishing election of President Donald Trump vividly reflect some of these forces. They are both reflections of these forces and may well be adding further impetus to them. As if the economic challenge of restarting middle class progress wasn’t daunting enough, we now see mutation expressing itself in higher levels of cultural insecurity which is linked to a disturbing rise in racism and nativism. In a very real sense, the culture wars of the last century are morphing into the class wars of the 21st Century.

We are going to try and chart some of these trends in Canada. The same surprise which accompanied the Trump and Brexit results is steeped in a denial or blind spot in the institutional status quo. The dismissal of these new unsavoury forces as ‘deplorable’ or an expression of moral or intellectual frailties merely adds fuel to the populist fire.

What we have done to try and clarify this picture is to pull together some of the data that we have assembled over the past year. In particular, we are aggregating two very large random probability samples; one of about 5,700 Canadians conducted in June and another of nearly 8,000 that we have just completed. The data have been aggregated to allow us to provide a statistically reliable picture of the locus of these forces in Canada. We have also linked the data to the settlement that people live in so that we can map the distribution of this new open-ordered axis.

Before considering the quantitative components of what we are calling the open-ordered index, it will be helpful to consider the more qualitative meaning of this term. This brief description reflects some of our other work and the broader literature.

We are arguing that the changes in economic outlook and class formation that have occurred in this century have shifted the traditional left-right axis of societal dispute to this new open-ordered axis. There is a clear lineage connecting the left-right and open-ordered, but the latter has become the more relevant term to describe the fundamental contest for what kind of society we want.

Our argument is that the end of progress and has been critical in fuelling the rise of this recent expression of populism. The collapse of the middle class bargain of shared prosperity and progress has produced profound shifts in the belief in the current economic model operating in upper North America. This shift has been reinforced by a growing consensus that the external world has become a more dangerous place and this too is fuelling a greater apprehension about the merits of trade liberalization, globalization, immigration, and a general belief that those who have been running things are not really concerned about the public interest. This new outlook has fuelled the Brexit and Donald Trump victories and it is very much at play in Canada, albeit with a somewhat different and less intense expression (for now).

Consider some of the terms that capture either end of this continuum. The essential ingredients are both economic (particularly economics security or insecurity) and cultural (broad value orientations and beliefs). The open side of the spectrum is the paradigm under siege. It is future-oriented, welcomes change, and is receptive to an open approach to trade and immigration. It tends to be optimistic and progressive and is most evident in those currently seeing themselves as members of the middle and upper class. We shall see that there several other important features of this outlook. The ‘ordered’ side of the continuum is basically a darker mirror image of the open side; it questions the current institutional order, which has been seen to have abandoned those taking this view. It is both economically and culturally insecure. Support for trade is more tepid as is support for immigration. The outlook is associated with a more authoritarian view which sees order and obedience as more important than creativity and reason. It tends to be nostalgic for a previous (perhaps apocryphal) era where comfort and security were enjoyed. Those attracted to this outlook tend to be in the working and poor classes, many of whom have experienced downward class mobility.

We note that there is an important place for both the ordered and open world views. Healthy societies require both. What is new is the engagement of what Theodor Adorno and others (such as Will Davies and Amanda Taub) called authoritarianism (closely linked to the ordered outlook). While societies without order would be chaotic the problem seems to occur when the ordered type becomes the dominant political power.

With this brief conceptual overview let’s consider the distribution and trajectory of these forces in Canada. We have several different empirical indicators that we have been testing over the past several years. For this exercise we have created an index which measures this axis based on a few key indicators drawn from this research. While an imperfect measure it does seem to capture a large portion of what we talked about above.

The index has strong demographic and attitudinal correlates which perform in a theoretically plausible manner.

Despite strong debate about whether economic insecurity or cultural insecurity is more important, our research suggests that both are inextricably woven together to shape these orientations. It is most likely that economic insecurity triggered this movement. It is, however, arguable whether economic insecurity was more important than this new closing of outlook and the desire to abandon the open society in favour of a more inward-looking, isolationist society which is more allergic to the idea that diversity and multiculturalism are good things.

The open-ordered index
We now have an index which combines (the actual scoring system and index ingredients are presented in Annex I):

Class mobility (moving upward downward of staying the same);
Economic outlook on the future (optimistic, stable, pessimistic);
Ethnic fluency (in ballpark, moderately off, severely exaggerated);
Racial tolerance (too many, too few, or about the right number of visible minorities in Canada); and
Pro-populism (good thing, indifferent, or a bad thing).
In the rest of this release, we will show this continuum is distributed in Canada and how it links to broader attitudes to politics and big policy questions. While there are some intriguing features to the geography of populism in Canada, the more profound connections are to social class, economic outlook, and cultural outlook. The connections to partisanship and political ideology are also very striking.

A few notes on the ingredients of the index:

1. If we chart class membership through time, the patterns are decidedly downward (from middle to working class) (see Figure 6). Asking people their class status of ten years ago and comparing to it their current status provides a more mixed measure with an overwhelming lean to staying the same. But the process of falling backward is strongly linked a more ordered outlook.
2. Economic outlook may be good on Bay Street but it sucks on Main Street. Few Canadians see themselves moving forward in the future and this sense of decline and stagnation is strongly linked to an ordered outlook.
3. A pretty stringent measure of racial intolerance would be the view that too many Canadians simply aren’t white. About one in four hold this view, but it is much stronger among those subscribing to an ordered outlook. Notably, this measure has shown declining racial intolerance over the past few years (as has the more widespread view that there are too many visible minority immigrants) (see Figure 1).
4. Ethnic fluency is pretty sketchy in Canada; we tend to overstate the presence of different minorities. The degree to which the exaggeration exists is strongly linked to racial intolerance and a more ordered world view (see Figure 2).
5. Contrary to the generalized horror that populism seems to engender in established Canada, overall the public aren’t certain whether it’s a good or bad thing. A plurality think it’s indifferent but, of those who have a view, more think it is a bad thing than a good thing (only one in three believe this rise in populism to be a bad thing). This pro-populism ethic is strongly connected to a more ordered outlook.
6. This blend is almost equally composed of indicators of both economic and cultural insecurity. It connects very strongly to the key debates around immigration, diversity, and race, the role of the state, globalization, and trade and class membership. It is also strongly connected to partisanship and political ideology. Before exploring those connections, we will look at the geography of open-ordered outlook in Canada. Which places are most open and welcoming? Which are most wary of openness?

quote:

Methodology:
This report draws on data from two separate surveys. Both surveys were conducted using High Definition Interactive Voice Response (HD-IVR™) technology, which allows respondents to enter their preferences by punching the keypad on their phone, rather than telling them to an operator. In an effort to reduce the coverage bias of landline only RDD, we created a dual landline/cell phone RDD sampling frame for this research. As a result, we are able to reach those with a landline and cell phone, as well as cell phone only households and landline only households.

The field dates for the first survey are June 1-19, 2017. In total, a random sample of 5,658 Canadian adults aged 18 and over responded to the survey. The margin of error associated with the total sample is +/- 1.3 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

The field dates for the second survey are November 7-December 10, 2017. In total, a random sample of 7,882 Canadian adults aged 18 and over responded to the survey. The margin of error associated with the total sample is +/- 1.1 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

Please note that the margin of error increases when the results are sub-divided (i.e., error margins for sub-groups such as region, sex, age, education). All the data have been statistically weighted by age, gender, and region to ensure the sample’s composition reflects that of the actual population of Canada according to Census data.

David Corbett posted:

Helsing posted:

You're describing a folk theory version of the standard theory of democratic inveolvement, in which political parties act as entrepreneurs who min-max their positions to attract the ideal winning coalition of voters. It's intuitive plausible but actually not very well supported empirically. In fact there's a bunch of research indicating that people often get involved in a cause before they develop strong ideological attachments to that cause. A friend gets you to come out to a rally, or you check out a meeting because it looks interesting, etc., then as you're drawn into group activities you internalize the group's ideas and make them your own.

Peaceful Anarchy posted:

LOL at thinking this only applies to first world countries. As much as people love to whine about taxes here in Canada, the mental disconnect between "people pay taxes" and "government provides services" is nowhere near what I've seen from people all across the political spectrum in South America. Admittedly my experience is limited, but the disdain for the concept of personal taxes for middle class people exceeds most Canadian conservatives and the expectation of government services (for them on the right, for everyone on the left) is pretty high. They don't see government as a product of the populace, but as an overclass you vote for every so often.

Helsing posted:

One more Ekos chart, this one's about the Ontario election:

Helsing posted:

One more Ekos chart, this one's about the Ontario election:

Helsing posted:

One more Ekos chart, this one's about the Ontario election:

Martian Manfucker posted:

that's depressing. i'm probably not even going to vote this go around. the NDP isn't running a candidate in my riding that I've been able to find, so I can't pity vote to get that subsidy cash in their pockets. and I actually like the NDP platform horwath put together. Ontario sucks.

Helsing posted:

So in the Globe the other day there was a right up from the guy at Ekos polling describing some research they've been doing into Canadian political attitudes and how they've changed in response to economy over the last ten years:

The Duggler posted:

You should vote instead of not voting

Helsing posted:

Eikos stuff

Martian Manfucker posted:

that's depressing. i'm probably not even going to vote this go around. the NDP isn't running a candidate in my riding that I've been able to find, so I can't pity vote to get that subsidy cash in their pockets. and I actually like the NDP platform horwath put together. Ontario sucks.

Nocturtle posted:

This is interesting to compare with current US politics, where the most relevant factor for Trump's support (as a bellwether for conservative populism) is racial resentment. Ascribing Trump's success to "economic anxiety" risks obscuring the explicitly racist dimension of his support. On the other hand it's hard to look at that breakdown of PC support in Ontario by education/income level (and associated survey) and see it as originating from anything but an economically decaying (non-urban) middle class.

Nocturtle posted:

This is interesting to compare with current US politics, where the most relevant factor for Trump's support (as a bellwether for conservative populism) is racial resentment. Ascribing Trump's success to "economic anxiety" risks obscuring the explicitly racist dimension of his support. On the other hand it's hard to look at that breakdown of PC support in Ontario by education/income level (and associated survey) and see it as originating from anything but an economically decaying (non-urban) middle class.

Martian Manfucker posted:

that's depressing. i'm probably not even going to vote this go around. the NDP isn't running a candidate in my riding that I've been able to find, so I can't pity vote to get that subsidy cash in their pockets. and I actually like the NDP platform horwath put together. Ontario sucks.

vyelkin posted:

I have to run but very briefly:

- high levels of inequality exacerbate status anxiety and make people very worried about where they stand on the social status ladder
- the easiest way to cement your position on the ladder is to keep down those below you
- fear of losing status may have been a more significant motivating factor for Trump voters than economic anxiety itself
- status comes in many forms: economic, racial, gender, etc., status anxiety can manifest along any of these lines

infernal machines posted:

Hey now, The City of Toronto is a strong independent entity with its own special legislation.

We can even levy some of our own tolls and fees! I mean, not for long, because they don't last more than one administration, but we could if we wanted to.

David Corbett posted:

I'm honestly not sure what to make of the future of a government system that pits classes of people together instead of ideas, visions and plans.

DynamicSloth posted:

I can't find any specifics on how EKOS purports to break down Ontario into 4 distinct classes (each with a significant sample size) but it has to be garbage.

The Duggler posted:

See: all of human history (and probably some smart apes too)

Reince Penis posted:

Holy poo poo you're a marxist???

The Duggler posted:

I was supposed to be a paper pusher in the communist utopia... Not whatever THIS is!

Health Services posted:

Respondents self-identify their class in a regular survey question. From what I remember, the proportion identifying as upper class is usually pretty small, in about the 1%-2% range.

Edit: A public report released in 2017 by Ekos has 4% of respondents identifying as upper class.