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Did anyone catch the oral argument for the Wayfair (sales tax nexus) case? Kagan and Sotomayor were roasting the state position pretty hard, and so it may come down to the conservative justices. I think there's some concern about the administrative lengths states and localities will go in collecting and (possibly) assessing retroactively. There is also this boogeyman about it hurting small businesses.
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Apr 18, 2018 23:42
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Imagine someone who has an Etsy shop needing to collect tax for all fifty states. It would be onerous to say the least.
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Apr 18, 2018 23:49
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kefkafloyd posted:Imagine someone who has an Etsy shop needing to collect tax for all fifty states. It would be onerous to say the least. The states aren't saying that if you make one sale to an in-state customer that you have nexus. South Dakota, the state at issue in the Wayfair, is defending a statute that requires sales tax remittance where an out-of-state vendor has 100k of sales or 200 transactions with South Dakota customers. At that point, it's not terribly burdensome to start collecting with regard to that state. A vendor that has the sales volume that would obligate it to collect and remit in every sales tax jurisdiction is not a simple Etsy shop.
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Apr 19, 2018 00:06
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Fair enough, but as a small-time vendor I've had to comply with sales tax in states I don't live in when I vend at conventions those states and it's a royal pain in the rear end, and I don't have nearly that level of revenue. However, that's when I am selling and physically present in that state. I don't see what would stop them from going after Etsy the company to force people using their platform to collect taxes or third-party Amazon sales when they provide a large, unified storefront. I'm still not sure how "I'm selling to people in your state" creates a nexus when you have no operations at all in that state, though. This has been settled forever with catalog sales and the like. What's new about this case in particular? The Massachusetts DOR tried to force Town Fair Tire in NH to collect sales tax for sales made to people with Massachusetts addresses and the state supreme court told the DOR to pound sand and I guess they never appealed it after that. How is this different? edit: Looked up the oral arguments on SCOTUSblog. http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/04/a...remote-sellers/ quote:The chief justice pressed Stewart on whether there is a constitutional minimum by which a small Internet retailer facing the burdens of complying with state sales-tax obligations might have a claim for relief. I guess you could put the onus on the organization to collect and remit the taxes, which would be a solution, but if you're not using something like Etsy or Amazon... good luck dealing with filing requirements in all those states. kefkafloyd fucked around with this message at 00:31 on Apr 19, 2018 |
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Apr 19, 2018 00:22
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Syzygy Stardust posted:My mom changed the house locks on my stepdad when he was out of town to make a point once. He owned the house. If he’d broken in (she eventually let him in once her point was made) you’d probably want that to be crime. Why would you want that to be a crime?
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Apr 19, 2018 00:32
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More and more states are requiring state income tax filing for days spent there on business, including amortized vesting of stock. My employer took care of things, but one year I had to file 4 extra returns and pay a few hundred to each. (I think New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Colorado?)
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Apr 19, 2018 00:57
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kefkafloyd posted:Fair enough, but as a small-time vendor I've had to comply with sales tax in states I don't live in when I vend at conventions those states and it's a royal pain in the rear end, and I don't have nearly that level of revenue. However, that's when I am selling and physically present in that state. I don't see what would stop them from going after Etsy the company to force people using their platform to collect taxes or third-party Amazon sales when they provide a large, unified storefront. The difference here comes down to the venue: this is a case asking the court to revisit its catalog sales decision in Quill, which has formed the constitutional backbone as to why out of state sellers without in state physical presence don't collect sales tax. Of course, in 1992 catalog sales didn't form the lifeblood of the economy the way that internet sales do today and so it is arguably unfair that these out of state vendors have a price advantage over in state sellers. I think that is why this is an issue worth revisiting. The deputy solicitor general (does not represent the states) is quoted there with respect to a question that is (hopefully) academic. Practically speaking, most states would follow the South Dakota approach with a defined threshold. But anyways, there are a lot of ways to approach this issue, like leaving it to the intermediary as you note. Unfortunately, the supreme court largely punted this issue to congress back in 1992, but congress hasn't acted, and likely won't. This leaves the states scrambling to find a solution, and one way or another, the catalog sales rationale is in dire need of an update.
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Apr 19, 2018 01:22
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Platystemon posted:Why would you want that to be a crime? If you’re locked out of your property there’s probably a good reason and your self help has a good chance of leading to some related law breaking. Call a locksmith or the police and see if you can convince them of the merits. Or if there’s truly no adversarial party no one will know of your crime and go ahead.
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Apr 19, 2018 04:50
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Unless there's some sort of court order or other legal document barring entry involved, nah, being locked out of your own property is Not Ok and whatever smashing is required to get back in is entirely reasonable.
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Apr 19, 2018 05:18
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Syzygy Stardust posted:If you’re locked out of your property there’s probably a good reason and your self help has a good chance of leading to some related law breaking. Call a locksmith or the police and see if you can convince them of the merits. Or if there’s truly no adversarial party no one will know of your crime and go ahead. California’s burglary statute doesn’t actually make it a crime, though. Forcing entry to your own home is legal (black Harvard professors aside), and you wouldn’t be violating the burglary statute if you went inside and made a sandwich and started watching TV. Those aren’t felonies.
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Apr 19, 2018 05:29
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I’m sure this depends if you live there or not. You can break into your rental property.
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Apr 19, 2018 06:52
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Vahakyla posted:I’m sure this depends if you live there or not. You can break into your rental property.
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Apr 19, 2018 16:49
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Syzygy Stardust posted:If you’re locked out of your property there’s probably a good reason and your self help has a good chance of leading to some related law breaking. Call a locksmith or the police and see if you can convince them of the merits. Or if there’s truly no adversarial party no one will know of your crime and go ahead. you cannot be legally locked out of your own property by a co-owner. this is a pretty bizarre argument.
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Apr 19, 2018 16:54
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It would be cool if your dad, who you've vaguely insinuated was abusive or a deadbeat or something, could lock his wife out and make her beg the police to get back into her own home.
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Apr 19, 2018 17:03
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twodot posted:In the case of rental properties I imagine there will be some legal document describing when and how entry is allowed. In most (all?) states, you don't even need an agreement for protection - simply occupying a reasonably discrete unit for a certain amount of time confers residency rights that generally prohibit the owner from entering your space without permission, except in very narrow circumstances or with a court order. Rental agreements are more for the owner's protection than the renter's in that regard (though owner's do illegal stuff all the time, so it's good to know they understand). That's why squatters and tenants who skip rent are (rightfully) difficult to remove.
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Apr 19, 2018 17:56
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evilweasel posted:you cannot be legally locked out of your own property by a co-owner. this is a pretty bizarre argument. My point is that CA (alleged by people in this thread) makes it a felony to break into your own property, whether you or a co-owner or a bank agent or a drugged up stranger is responsible for locking you out. If they aren’t just crazy/stupid for failing to include a “I live here” exception there might be some fringe cases they were thinking of where they wanted this to be a criminal act.
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Apr 19, 2018 19:16
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Syzygy Stardust posted:My point is that CA (alleged by people in this thread) makes it a felony to break into your own property, whether you or a co-owner or a bank agent or a drugged up stranger is responsible for locking you out. If they aren’t just crazy/stupid for failing to include a “I live here” exception there might be some fringe cases they were thinking of where they wanted this to be a criminal act. There was a case about this decades ago (People v. Gauze, 15 Cal. 3d 710 (1975)). To sum up: quote:[W]e conclude defendant cannot be guilty of burglarizing his own home, and the judgment of conviction for burglary must therefore be reversed.
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Apr 19, 2018 20:02
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The truly hosed up part is what rear end of a judge and prosecutor shoved their common sense up their rear end to think taking a case like that was a good thing.
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Apr 19, 2018 23:37
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xxEightxx posted:The truly hosed up part is what rear end of a judge and prosecutor shoved their common sense up their rear end to think taking a case like that was a good thing. well the guy marched into a shared room with a shotgun and shot someone it's not exactly terrible they threw every charge they could think of at him, it's just that particular one was a stretch
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Apr 20, 2018 00:34
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evilweasel posted:well the guy marched into a shared room with a shotgun and shot someone who among us
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Apr 20, 2018 00:50
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To the surprise of very few people, the 9th Circuit has affirmed the district court in the Naruto (Monkey Selfie) case, holding that animals do not have standing to sue under the Copyright Act.quote:We must determine whether a monkey may sue humans, corporations, and companies for damages and injunctive relief arising from claims of copyright infringement. Our court’s precedent requires us to conclude that the monkey’s claim has standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Nonetheless, we conclude that this monkey—and all animals, since they are not human—lacks statutory standing under the Copyright Act.1 We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
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Apr 23, 2018 17:14
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ulmont posted:To the surprise of very few people, the 9th Circuit has affirmed the district court in the Naruto (Monkey Selfie) case, holding that animals do not have standing to sue under the Copyright Act. Can this ruling be used against corporations claiming copyright since they too are not human?
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Apr 23, 2018 17:17
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Unless the monkey incorporates, of course. ... Can they do that? I would assume not, but...
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Apr 23, 2018 17:18
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Oracle posted:Can this ruling be used against corporations claiming copyright since they too are not human? Polygynous posted:Unless the monkey incorporates, of course. No, and No.
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Apr 23, 2018 18:06
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Rigel posted:No, and No. However, the recent Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc. case taught me that Apes can be copyrighted. Or did I not read that decision right
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Apr 23, 2018 18:25
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Devor posted:However, the recent Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc. case taught me that Apes can be copyrighted. 
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Apr 23, 2018 22:28
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 Opinions! OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC v. GREENE’S ENERGY GROUP, LLC, ET AL. Brief Background: Inter partes review authorizes the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to reconsider and cancel an already-issued patent claim in limited circumstances. See 35 U. S. C. §§311–319. Any person who is not the owner of the patent may petition for review. §311(a). If review is instituted, the process entitles the petitioner and the patent owner to conduct certain discovery, §316(a)(5); to file affidavits, declarations, and written memoranda, §316(a)(8); and to receive an oral hearing before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, §316(a)(10). A final decision by the Board is subject to Federal Circuit review. §§318, 319. Petitioner Oil States Energy Services, LLC, obtained a patent relating to technology for protecting wellhead equipment used in hydraulic fracturing. It sued respondent Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, in Federal District Court for infringement. Greene’s Energy challenged the patent’s validity in the District Court and also petitioned the PTO for inter partes review. Both proceedings progressed in parallel. The District Court issued a claim-construction order favoring Oil States, while the Board issued a decision concluding that Oil States’ claims were unpatentable. Oil States appealed to the Federal Circuit. In addition to its patentability arguments, it challenged the constitutionality of inter partes review, arguing that actions to revoke a patent must be tried in an Article III court before a jury. Holding: In this case, we address whether inter partes review violates Article III or the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution. We hold that it violates neither. ... Over the last several decades, Congress has created administrative processes that authorize the PTO to reconsider and cancel patent claims that were wrongly issued. In 1980, Congress established “ex parte reexamination,” which still exists today. See Act To Amend the Patent and Trademark Laws, 35 U. S. C. §301 et seq. Ex parte reexamination permits “[a]ny person at any time” to “file a request for reexamination.” §302. If the Director determines that there is “a substantial new question of patentability” for “any claim of the patent,” the PTO can reexamine the patent. §§303(a), 304. The reexamination process follows the same procedures as the initial examination. §305. In 1999, Congress added a procedure called “inter partes reexamination.” See American Inventors Protection Act, §§4601–4608, 113 Stat. 1501A–567 to 1501A–572. Under this procedure, any person could file a request for reexamination. 35 U. S. C. §311(a) (2006 ed.). The Director would determine if the request raised “a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent” and, if so, commence a reexamination. §§312(a), 313 (2006 ed.). The reexamination would follow the general procedures for initial examination, but would allow the thirdparty requester and the patent owner to participate in a limited manner by filing responses and replies. §§314(a), (b) (2006 ed.). Inter partes reexamination was phased out when the America Invents Act went into effect in 2012. The America Invents Act replaced inter partes reexamination with inter partes review, the procedure at issue here. See id., at 299. Any person other than the patent owner can file a petition for inter partes review. ... Once inter partes review is instituted, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board—an adjudicatory body within the PTO created to conduct inter partes review—examines the patent’s validity. See 35 U. S. C. §§6, 316(c). The Board sits in three-member panels of administrative patent judges. See §6(c). During the inter partes review, the petitioner and the patent owner are entitled to certain discovery, §316(a)(5); to file affidavits, declarations, and written memoranda, §316(a)(8); and to receive an oral hearing before the Board, §316(a)(10). The petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. §316(e). ... Oil States sought review in the Federal Circuit. In addition to its arguments about patentability, Oil States challenged the constitutionality of inter partes review. Specifically, it argued that actions to revoke a patent must be tried in an Article III court before a jury. While Oil States’ case was pending, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion in a different case, rejecting the same constitutional arguments. MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F. 3d 1284, 1288–1293 (2015). The Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the Board’s decision in this case. 639 Fed. Appx. 639 (2016). We granted certiorari to determine whether inter partes review violates Article III or the Seventh Amendment. 582 U. S. ___ (2017). We address each issue in turn. Article III vests the judicial power of the United States “in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” §1. Consequently, Congress cannot “confer the Government’s ‘judicial Power’ on entities outside Article III.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 484 (2011). When determining whether a proceeding involves an exercise of Article III judicial power, this Court’s precedents have distinguished between “public rights” and “private rights.” Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted). Those precedents have given Congress significant latitude to assign adjudication of public rights to entities other than Article III courts. See ibid.; Stern, supra, at 488–492. This Court has not “definitively explained” the distinction between public and private rights, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 69 (1982), and its precedents applying the public-rights doctrine have “not been entirely consistent,” Stern, 564 U. S., at 488. But this case does not require us to add to the “various formulations” of the public-rights doctrine. Ibid. Our precedents have recognized that the doctrine covers matters “which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 50 (1932). In other words, the public-rights doctrine applies to matters “‘arising between the government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it.’” Ibid. (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 451 (1929)). ... Inter partes review falls squarely within the public rights doctrine. This Court has recognized, and the parties do not dispute, that the decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public rights—specifically, the grant of a public franchise. Inter partes review is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct that reconsideration. Thus, the PTO can do so without violating Article III. ... Oil States challenges this conclusion, citing three decisions that recognize patent rights as the “private property of the patentee.” American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S., at 370; see also McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 606, 609 (1898) (“[A granted patent] has become the property of the patentee”); Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 197 (1857) (“[T]he rights of a party under a patent are his private property”). But those cases do not contradict our conclusion. Patents convey only a specific form of property right—a public franchise. See Pfaff, 525 U. S., at 63–64. And patents are “entitled to protection as any other property, consisting of a franchise.” Seymour, 11 Wall. at 533 (emphasis added). As a public franchise, a patent can confer only the rights that “the statute prescribes.” Gayler, supra, at 494; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 663–664 (1834) (noting that Congress has “the power to prescribe the conditions on which such right shall be enjoyed”). It is noteworthy that one of the precedents cited by Oil States acknowledges that the patentee’s rights are “derived altogether” from statutes, “are to be regulated and measured by these laws, and cannot go beyond them.” Brown, supra, at 195.2 One such regulation is inter partes review. ... The Patent Clause in our Constitution “was written against the backdrop” of the English system. Graham, 383 U. S., at 5. Based on the practice of the Privy Council, it was well understood at the founding that a patent system could include a practice of granting patents subject to potential cancellation in the executive proceeding of the Privy Council. The parties have cited nothing in the text or history of the Patent Clause or Article III to suggest that the Framers were not aware of this common practice. Nor is there any reason to think they excluded this practice during their deliberations. And this Court has recognized that, “[w]ithin the scope established by the Constitution, Congress may set out conditions and tests for patentability.” Id., at 6. We conclude that inter partes review is one of those conditions.4 For similar reasons, we disagree with the dissent’s assumption that, because courts have traditionally adjudicated patent validity in this country, courts must forever continue to do so. See post, at 8–10. Historical practice is not decisive here because matters governed by the public rights doctrine “from their nature” can be resolved in multiple ways...That Congress chose the courts in the past does not foreclose its choice of the PTO today. Finally, Oil States argues that inter partes review violates Article III because it shares “every salient characteristic associated with the exercise of the judicial power.” Brief for Petitioner 20. Oil States highlights various procedures used in inter partes review: motion practice before the Board; discovery, depositions, and crossexamination of witnesses; introduction of evidence and objections based on the Federal Rules of Evidence; and an adversarial hearing before the Board. See 35 U. S. C. §316(a); 77 Fed. Reg. 48758, 48761–48763 (2012). Similarly, Oil States cites PTO regulations that use terms typically associated with courts—calling the hearing a “trial,” id., at 48758; the Board members “judges,” id., at 48763; and the Board’s final decision a “judgment,” id., at 48761, 48766–48767. But this Court has never adopted a “looks like” test to determine if an adjudication has improperly occurred outside of an Article III court. The fact that an agency uses court-like procedures does not necessarily mean it is exercising the judicial power. ... In addition to Article III, Oil States challenges inter partes review under the Seventh Amendment. The Seventh Amendment preserves the “right of trial by jury” in “Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.” This Court’s precedents establish that, when Congress properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, “the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.” ... Because inter partes review does not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Lineup: Thomas, joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Concurrence by Breyer, joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Dissent by Gorsuch, joined by Roberts. Notes From Other Opinions: Breyer (concurring): I join the Court’s opinion in full. The conclusion that inter partes review is a matter involving public rights is sufficient to show that it violates neither Article III nor the Seventh Amendment. But the Court’s opinion should not be read to say that matters involving private rights may never be adjudicated other than by Article III courts, say, sometimes by agencies. Our precedent is to the contrary. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 494 (2011); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U. S. 833, 853–856 (1986); see also Stern, supra, at 513 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (“The presence of ‘private rights’ does not automatically determine the outcome of the question but requires a more ‘searching’ examination of the relevant factors”). Gorsuch (dissenting): After much hard work and no little investment you devise something you think truly novel. Then you endure the further cost and effort of applying for a patent, devoting maybe $30,000 and two years to that process alone. At the end of it all, the Patent Office agrees your invention is novel and issues a patent. The patent affords you exclusive rights to the fruits of your labor for two decades. But what happens if someone later emerges from the woodwork, arguing that it was all a mistake and your patent should be canceled? Can a political appointee and his administrative agents, instead of an independent judge, resolve the dispute? The Court says yes. Respectfully, I disagree. ... [H]ow do we know which cases independent judges must hear? The Constitution’s original public meaning supplies the key, for the Constitution cannot secure the people’s liberty any less today than it did the day it was ratified. The relevant constitutional provision, Article III, explains that the federal “judicial Power” is vested in independent judges. As originally understood, the judicial power extended to “suit[s] at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” ... As I read the historical record presented to us, only courts could hear patent challenges in England at the time of the founding...The last time an executive body (the King’s Privy Council) invalidated an invention patent on an ordinary application was in 1746, in Darby v. Betton, PC2/99, pp. 358–359; and the last time the Privy Council even considered doing so was in 1753, in Baker v. James, PC2/103, pp. 320–321. ... Today’s decision may not represent a rout but it at least signals a retreat from Article III’s guarantees. Ceding to the political branches ground they wish to take in the name of efficient government may seem like an act of judicial restraint. But enforcing Article III isn’t about protecting judicial authority for its own sake. It’s about ensuring the people today and tomorrow enjoy no fewer rights against governmental intrusion than those who came before. And the loss of the right to an independent judge is never a small thing. It’s for that reason Hamilton warned the judiciary to take “all possible care . . . to defend itself against” intrusions by the other branches. The Federalist No. 78, at 466. It’s for that reason I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-712_87ad.pdf SAS INSTITUTE INC. v. IANCU, DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, ET AL. Brief Background: Inter partes review allows private parties to challenge previously issued patent claims in an adversarial process before the Patent Office. At the outset, a party must file a petition to institute review, 35 U. S. C. §311(a), that identifies the challenged claims and the grounds for challenge with particularity, §312(a)(3). The patent owner, in turn, may file a response. §313. If the Director of the Patent Office determines “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition,” §314(a), he decides “whether to institute . . . review . . . pursuant to [the] petition,” §314(b). “If . . . review is instituted and not dismissed,” at the end of the litigation the Patent Trial and Appeal Board “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.” §318(a). Petitioner SAS sought review of respondent ComplementSoft’s software patent, alleging that all 16 of the patent’s claims were unpatentable. Relying on a Patent Office regulation recognizing a power of “partial institution,” 37 CFR §42.108(a), the Director instituted review on some of the claims and denied review on the rest. The Board’s final decision addressed only the claims on which the Director had instituted review. On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected SAS’s argument that §318(a) required the Board to decide the patentability of every claim challenged in the petition. Holding: A few years ago Congress created “inter partes review.” The new procedure allows private parties to challenge previously issued patent claims in an adversarial process before the Patent Office that mimics civil litigation. Recently, the Court upheld the inter partes review statute against a constitutional challenge. Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, ante, p. ___. Now we take up a question concerning the statute’s operation. When the Patent Office initiates an inter partes review, must it resolve all of the claims in the case, or may it choose to limit its review to only some of them? The statute, we find, supplies a clear answer: the Patent Office must “issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.” 35 U. S. C. §318(a) (emphasis added). In this context, as in so many others, “any” means “every.” The agency cannot curate the claims at issue but must decide them all. ... We find that the plain text of §318(a) supplies a ready answer. It directs that “[i]f an inter partes review is instituted and not dismissed under this chapter, the [Board] shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner . . . .” §318(a) (emphasis added). This directive is both mandatory and comprehensive. The word “shall” generally imposes a nondiscretionary duty. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 35 (1998). And the word “any” naturally carries “an expansive meaning.” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997). When used (as here) with a “singular noun in affirmative contexts,” the word “any” ordinarily “refer[s] to a member of a particular group or class without distinction or limitation” and in this way “impl[ies] every member of the class or group.” Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed., Mar. 2016), https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/8973 (OED) (emphasis added) (all Internet materials as last visited Apr. 20, 2018). So when §318(a) says the Board’s final written decision “shall” resolve the patentability of “any patent claim challenged by the petitioner,” it means the Board must address every claim the petitioner has challenged. That would seem to make this an easy case. ... Moving past the statute’s text and context, the Director attempts a policy argument. He tells us that partial institution is efficient because it permits the Board to focus on the most promising challenges and avoid spending time and resources on others...Policy arguments are properly addressed to Congress, not this Court. ... Even under Chevron, we owe an agency’s interpretation of the law no deference unless, after “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” we find ourselves unable to discern Congress’s meaning. 467 U. S., at 843, n. 9. And after applying traditional tools of interpretation here, we are left with no uncertainty that could warrant deference. ... Because everything in the statute before us confirms that SAS is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged and nothing suggests we lack the power to say so, the judgment of the Federal Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Gorsuch, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Dissent by Ginsburg, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Dissent by Breyer, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan (except for Part III-A, which says that Chevron is just a rule of thumb rather than always giving agencies leeway to fill every gap). Notes From Other Opinions: Ginsburg (dissenting): Given the Court’s wooden reading of 35 U. S. C. §318(a), and with “no mandate to institute [inter partes] review” at all, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 9), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board could simply deny a petition containing challenges having no “reasonable likelihood” of success, §314(a). Simultaneously, the Board might note that one or more specified claims warrant reexamination, while others challenged in the petition do not. Petitioners would then be free to file new or amended petitions shorn of challenges the Board finds unworthy of inter partes review. Why should the statute be read to preclude the Board’s more rational way to weed out insubstantial challenges? For the reasons stated by JUSTICE BREYER, the Court’s opinion offers no persuasive answer to that question, and no cause to believe Congress wanted the Board to spend its time so uselessly. Breyer (dissenting): This case requires us to engage in a typical judicial exercise, construing a statute that is technical, unclear, and constitutes a minor procedural part of a larger administrative scheme. I would follow an interpretive technique that judges often use in such cases. Initially, using “traditional tools of statutory construction,” INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 446 (1987), I would look to see whether the relevant statutory phrase is ambiguous or leaves a gap that Congress implicitly delegated authority to the agency to fill. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–843 (1984). If so, I would look to see whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. Id., at 843. Because I believe there is such a gap and because the Patent Office’s interpretation of the ambiguous phrase is reasonable, I would conclude that the Patent Office’s interpretation is lawful. ... [L]et us return to the question at hand, the meaning of the phrase “any patent claim challenged by the petitioner” in §318(a). Do those words unambiguously refer, as the majority believes, to “any patent claim challenged by the petitioner” in the petitioner’s original petition? The words “in the petitioner’s original petition” do not appear in the statute. And the words that do appear, “any patent claim challenged by the petitioner,” could be modified by using different words that similarly do not appear, for example, the words “in the inter partes review proceeding.” But without added words, the phrase “challenged by the petitioner” does not tell us whether the relevant challenge is one made in the initial petition or only one made in the inter partes review proceeding itself. And, linguistically speaking, there is as much reason to fill that gap with reference to the claims still being challenged in the proceeding itself as there is to fill it with reference to claims that were initially challenged in the petition but which the Board weeded out before the inter partes review proceeding began. Which reading we give the statute makes a difference. The first reading, the majority’s reading, means that in my example, the Board must consider and write a final, and appealable, see §319, decision in respect to the challenges to all 16 claims, including the 15 frivolous challenges. The second reading requires the Board to write a final, appealable decision only in respect to the challenge to the claim (number 16 in my example) that survived the Board’s initial screening, namely, in my example, the one challenge in respect to which the Board found a “reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail.” §314(a). I cannot find much in the statutory context to support the majority’s claim that the statutory words “claim challenged by the petitioner” refer unambiguously to claims challenged initially in the petition. After all, the majority agrees that they do not refer to claims that initially were challenged in the petition but were later settled or withdrawn. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-969_f2qg.pdf JESNER ET AL. v. ARAB BANK, PLC Brief Background: Petitioners filed suits under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), alleging that they, or the persons on whose behalf they assert claims, were injured or killed by terrorist acts committed abroad, and that those acts were in part caused or facilitated by respondent Arab Bank, PLC, a Jordanian financial institution with a branch in New York...While the litigation was pending, this Court held, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 108, that the ATS does not extend to suits against foreign corporations when “all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States,” id., at 124, but it left unresolved the Second Circuit’s broader holding in its Kiobel decision: that foreign corporations may not be sued under the ATS. Deeming that broader holding binding precedent, the District Court dismissed petitioners’ ATS claims and the Second Circuit affirmed. Holding: The Judiciary Act [of 1789] also included what is now the statute known as the ATS. §9, id., at 76. As noted, the ATS is central to this case and its brief text bears repeating. Its full text is: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1350. The ATS is “strictly jurisdictional” and does not by its own terms provide or delineate the definition of a cause of action for violations of international law. Sosa, 542 U. S., at 713–714. But the statute was not enacted to sit on a shelf awaiting further legislation. Id., at 714. Rather, Congress enacted it against the backdrop of the general common law, which in 1789 recognized a limited category of “torts in violation of the law of nations.” Ibid...As understood by Blackstone, this domain included “three specific offenses against the law of nations addressed by the criminal law of England: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” ... The Court’s recent precedents cast doubt on the authority of courts to extend or create private causes of action even in the realm of domestic law, where this Court has “recently and repeatedly said that a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of cases.”...This caution extends to the question whether the courts should exercise the judicial authority to mandate a rule that imposes liability upon artificial entities like corporations. ... Neither the language of the ATS nor the precedents interpreting it support an exception to these general principles in this context. In fact, the separation-of-powers concerns that counsel against courts creating private rights of action apply with particular force in the context of the ATS...[A]bsent further action from Congress it would be inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations. ... The ATS was intended to promote harmony in international relations by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a remedy for international-law violations in circumstances where the absence of such a remedy might provoke foreign nations to hold the United States accountable. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 7. But here, and in similar cases, the opposite is occurring. ... Accordingly, the Court holds that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS. Lineup:  KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–B–1, and II–C, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II–A, II–B–2, II–B–3, and III, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., and GORSUCH, J., filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. Notes From Other Opinions: Kennedy (Parts II-A, II-B-2, II-B-3, and III are best understood as a concurrence): In modern times, there is no doubt, of course, that “the international community has come to recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic human rights,” leading “the nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual and collective interest.” ... It does not follow, however, that current principles of international law extend liability—civil or criminal—for human-rights violations to corporations or other artificial entities. This is confirmed by the fact that the charters of respective international criminal tribunals often exclude corporations from their jurisdictional reach. The Charter for the Nuremberg Tribunal, created by the Allies after World War II, provided that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over natural persons only. ... [T]he logical place to look for a statutory analogy to an ATS common-law action is the TVPA—the only cause of action under the ATS created by Congress rather than the courts. As explained above, Congress drafted the TVPA to “establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of action” under the ATS. H. R. Rep., at 3; S. Rep., at 4–5. Congress took care to delineate the TVPA’s boundaries. In doing so, it could weigh the foreign-policy implications of its rule. Among other things, Congress specified who may be liable, created an exhaustion requirement, and established a limitations period. Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 117. In Kiobel, the Court recognized that “[e]ach of these decisions carries with it significant foreign policy implications.” Ibid. The TVPA reflects Congress’ considered judgment of the proper structure for a right of action under the ATS. Absent a compelling justification, courts should not deviate from that model. The key feature of the TVPA for this case is that it limits liability to “individuals,” which, the Court has held, unambiguously limits liability to natural persons. ... Other considerations relevant to the exercise of judicial discretion also counsel against allowing liability under the ATS for foreign corporations, absent instructions from Congress to do so. It has not been shown that corporate liability under the ATS is essential to serve the goals of the statute. As to the question of adequate remedies, the ATS will seldom be the only way for plaintiffs to hold the perpetrators liable. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §1091 (criminal prohibition on genocide); §1595 (civil remedy for victims of slavery). And plaintiffs still can sue the individual corporate employees responsible for a violation of international law under the ATS. If the Court were to hold that foreign corporations have liability for international-law violations, then plaintiffs may well ignore the human perpetrators and concentrate instead on multinational corporate entities. ... With the ATS, the First Congress provided a federal remedy for a narrow category of international-law violations committed by individuals. Whether, more than two centuries on, a similar remedy should be available against foreign corporations is similarly a decision that Congress must make. Thomas (concurring): I join the Court’s opinion in full because it correctly applies our precedents. I also agree with the points raised by my concurring colleagues. Courts should not be in the business of creating new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute, see post, at 2–5 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), especially when it risks international strife, see post, at 3–7 (ALITO, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). And the Alien Tort Statute likely does not apply to suits between foreign plaintiffs and foreign defendants. See post, at 5–14 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). Alito (concurring): Creating causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute against foreign corporate defendants would precipitate exactly the sort of diplomatic strife that the law was enacted to prevent. As a result, I agree with the Court that we should not take that step, and I join Parts I, II–B–1, and II–C of the opinion of the Court. I write separately to elaborate on why that outcome is compelled not only by “judicial caution,” ante, at 27 (majority opinion), but also by the separation of powers. ... Sosa interpreted the ATS to authorize the federal courts to create causes of action as a matter of federal common law. We have repeatedly emphasized that “in fashioning federal [common law] principles to govern areas left open by Congress, our function is to effectuate congressional policy.” United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U. S. 715, 738 (1979). Fidelity to congressional policy is not only prudent but necessary: Going beyond the bounds of Congress’s authorization would mean unconstitutionally usurping part of the “legislative Powers.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §1. ... Creating causes of action under the ATS against foreign corporate defendants would be a no-win proposition. Foreign corporate liability would not only fail to meaningfully advance the objectives of the ATS, but it would also lead to precisely those “serious consequences in international affairs” that the ATS was enacted to avoid. Sosa, 542 U. S., at 715. Under those circumstances, federal courts have a duty to refrain from acting. Although that may make it more difficult for aliens to hold foreign corporations liable for human rights abuses, we have repeatedly rejected the view that the ATS was meant to transform the federal courts into forums for the litigation of all human rights suits. See ante, at 8–9, 25–27 (majority opinion); Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 123–124; Sosa, supra, at 715– 718. Declining to extend the ATS to foreign corporate defendants is thus not about “[i]mmunizing corporations that violate human rights,” post, at 34, but rather about furthering the purpose that the ATS was actually meant to serve—avoiding diplomatic strife. Gorsuch (concurring): I believe there are two more fundamental reasons why this lawsuit must be dismissed. A group of foreign plaintiffs wants a federal court to invent a new cause of action so they can sue another foreigner for allegedly breaching international norms. In any other context, a federal judge faced with a request like that would know exactly what to do with it: dismiss it out of hand. Not because the defendant happens to be a corporation instead of a human being. But because the job of creating new causes of action and navigating foreign policy disputes belongs to the political branches. For reasons passing understanding, federal courts have sometimes treated the Alien Tort Statute as a license to overlook these foundational principles. I would end ATS exceptionalism. We should refuse invitations to create new forms of legal liability. And we should not meddle in disputes between foreign citizens over international norms. I write because I am hopeful that courts in the future might pause to consider both of these reasons for restraint before taking up cases like this one. Whatever powers courts may possess in ATS suits, they are powers judges should be doubly careful not to abuse. Sotomayor (dissenting): The Court today holds that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U. S. C. §1350, categorically forecloses foreign corporate liability. In so doing, it absolves corporations from responsibility under the ATS for conscience-shocking behavior. I disagree both with the Court’s conclusion and its analytic approach. ... The plurality assumes without deciding that whether corporations can be permissible defendants under the ATS turns on the first step of the two-part inquiry set out in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692 (2004). ... In Sosa, the Court considered whether a Mexican citizen could recover under the ATS for a claim of arbitrary detention by a Mexican national who had been hired by the Drug Enforcement Administration to seize and transport him to the United States. See 542 U. S., at 697–698. The Court held that the ATS permits federal courts to “recognize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations,” id., at 724, without the need for any “further congressional action,” id., at 712. The Court then articulated a two-step framework to guide that inquiry. First, a court must determine whether the particular international-law norm alleged to have been violated is “accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms,” i.e., “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id., at 724–725. Only if the norm is “‘specific, universal, and obligatory’” may federal courts recognize a cause of action for its violation. ... Sosa’s norm-specific first step is inapposite to the categorical question whether corporations may be sued under the ATS as a general matter. International law imposes certain obligations that are intended to govern the behavior of states and private actors. See id., at 714–715; 1 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, pt. II, Introductory Note, pp. 70–71 (1987) (Restatement). Among those obligations are substantive prohibitions on certain conduct thought to violate human rights, such as genocide, slavery, extrajudicial killing, and torture. See 2 Restatement §702. Substantive prohibitions like these are the norms at which Sosa’s step-one inquiry is aimed and for which Sosa requires that there be sufficient international consensus. Sosa does not, however, demand that there be sufficient international consensus with regard to the mechanisms of enforcing these norms, for enforcement is not a question with which customary international law is concerned. ... The text of the ATS also reflects this distinction between prohibiting conduct and determining enforcement. The statute provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1350. The phrase “of the law of nations” modifies “violation,” not “civil action.” The statutory text thus requires only that the alleged conduct be specifically and universally condemned under international law, not that the civil action be of a type that the international community specifically and universally practices or endorses. ... Taken to its natural conclusion, the plurality’s focus on the practice of international criminal tribunals would prove too much. No international tribunal has been created and endowed with the jurisdiction to hold natural persons civilly (as opposed to criminally) liable, yet the majority and respondent accept that natural persons can be held liable under the ATS. See ante, at 26; Tr. of Oral Arg. 62. It cannot be persuasive evidence for purposes of ascertaining the availability of corporate civil liability under the ATS, then, that the jurisdiction of the handful of international criminal tribunals that states have seen fit to create in the last 75 years has not extended to corporate defendants. Ultimately, the evidence on which the plurality relies does not prove that international law distinguishes between corporations and natural persons as a categorical matter. To the contrary, it proves only that states’ collective efforts to enforce various international-law norms have, to date, often focused on natural rather than corporate defendants. In fact, careful review of states’ collective and individual enforcement efforts makes clear that corporations are subject to certain obligations under international law. For instance, the United States Military Tribunal that prosecuted several corporate executives of IG Farben declared that corporations could violate international law. ... In addition, various international agreements require signatory states to impose liability on corporations for certain conduct.4 Of particular relevance here, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism provides: “Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out” an act of terrorism. Dec. 9, 1999, Art. 2, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106–49, 2178 U. N. T. S. 230. It then requires each signatory state, “in accordance with its domestic legal principles,” to “take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity,” violated the Convention. ... Instead of asking whether there exists a specific, universal, and obligatory norm of corporate liability under international law, the relevant inquiry in response to the question presented here is whether there is any reason—under either international law or our domestic law—to distinguish between a corporation and a natural person who is alleged to have violated the law of nations under the ATS. As explained above, international law provides no such reason. See Kiobel, 621 F. 3d, at 175 (Leval, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he answer international law furnishes is that it takes no position on the question”). Nor does domestic law. The text, history, and purpose of the ATS plainly support the conclusion that corporations may be held liable. ... The Court urges that “[t]he political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns.” Ante, at 19. I agree that the political branches are well poised to assess the foreign-policy concerns attending ATS litigation, which is why I give significant weight to the fact that the Executive Branch, in briefs signed by the Solicitor General and State Department Legal Advisor, has twice urged the Court to reach exactly the opposite conclusion of the one embraced by the majority. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 5 (“This Court should vacate the decision below, which rests on the mistaken premise that a federal commonlaw claim under the ATS may never be brought against a corporation”); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., O. T. 2012, No. 10– 1491, p. 7 (“Courts may recognize corporate liability in actions under the ATS as a matter of federal common law. . . . Sosa’s cautionary admonitions provide no reason to depart from the common law on this issue”). At oral argument in this case, the United States told the Court that it saw no “sound reason to categorically exclude corporate liability.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 29. It explained that another country would hold the United States accountable for not providing a remedy against a corporate defendant in a “classic” ATS case, such as one involving a “foreign officia[l] injured in the United States,” id., at 32–33, and suggested that foreclosing the ability to recover from a corporation actually would raise “the possibility of friction,” id., at 33. Notably, the Government’s position that categorically barring corporate liability under the ATS is wrong has been consistent across two administrations led by Presidents of different political parties. Likewise, when Members of Congress have weighed in on the question whether corporations can be proper defendants in an ATS suit, it has been to advise the Court against the rule it now adopts. ... Immunizing corporations that violate human rights from liability under the ATS undermines the system of accountability for law-of-nations violations that the First Congress endeavored to impose. It allows these entities to take advantage of the significant benefits of the corporate form and enjoy fundamental rights, see, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. ___ (2014), without having to shoulder attendant fundamental responsibilities. I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout]
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Apr 24, 2018 17:00
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On the bright side, SAS was widely seen as a case taken just to strike down Chevron, and they didn't, so at least there's that. (Also, Gorsuch's writing continues to be terrible.)
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Apr 24, 2018 17:54
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https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2016/08/super-pac-candidate-name-court-ruling-226563 I know of a candidate who has a website called "lastnameforcongress.com", a PAC called Lastname for Congress Committee, the website says at the bottom it doesn't take corporate donations, and there's an unaffiliated PAC called Lastname for Congress which takes a lot of corporate donations. Hypothetically, is there any way for that candidate to get the PAC to stop using its name, such as suing for defamation or using intellectual property?
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Apr 24, 2018 19:23
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galenanorth posted:https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2016/08/super-pac-candidate-name-court-ruling-226563 Lawsuit for violating their right of publicity would be one approach. (This is state law specific, though. Consult a local lawyer.)
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Apr 24, 2018 20:40
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galenanorth posted:https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2016/08/super-pac-candidate-name-court-ruling-226563 Wasn’t
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Apr 25, 2018 09:12
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Kalman posted:On the bright side, SAS was widely seen as a case taken just to strike down Chevron, and they didn't, so at least there's that. You don't need to strike down Chevron if you never hold that it applies because nothing is ambiguous because the right-wing's preferred interpretation is always right.
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Apr 25, 2018 17:25
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Platystemon posted:Wasn’t https://www.washingtonpost.com/news.../?noredirect=on Oh, thanks for pointing that out. That was the FEC in 2015 and the previous article linked was about the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals overruling the FEC in 2016. the sentence "FEC rules state that committees can only use a federal candidate's name if they're authorized by that candidate" is interesting, seeing as how the unaffiliated ("nonconnected") PAC is older than both articles.
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Apr 25, 2018 21:26
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Is there any legal reason that the federal government can't ban short-term rental properties such as AirBnB, or is it one of those things where Congress has decided not to get involved for now and let localities be laboratories
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May 4, 2018 00:31
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galenanorth posted:Is there any legal reason that the federal government can't ban short-term rental properties such as AirBnB, or is it one of those things where Congress has decided not to get involved for now and let localities be laboratories Yeah, I'm sure they could regulate with the interstate commerce clause. There's no political will to do so, because AirBnB is popular, and very few people oppose it (outside of old cranky neighbors in vacation destinations, and gently caress those people), so any attempt would meet resistance.
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May 4, 2018 01:10
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Rigel posted:Yeah, I'm sure they could regulate with the interstate commerce clause. There's no political will to do so, because AirBnB is popular, and very few people oppose it (outside of old cranky neighbors in vacation destinations, and gently caress those people), so any attempt would meet resistance. Actually, Airbnb Drives Up Rent Costs in Manhattan and Brooklyn, Report Says quote:Airbnb’s growing influence caused rents to increase significantly in tourist areas and gentrifying neighborhoods in Manhattan and Brooklyn, where the majority of the company’s rentals are concentrated, according to a report released on Thursday by the city comptroller’s office. So it's not harmless, it makes housing shortages worse. As you point out, though, while Congress has the authority to act, it's an area left to local authorities as a national policy would be a rather blunt instrument for dealing with it.
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May 4, 2018 01:41
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galenanorth posted:Is there any legal reason that the federal government can't ban short-term rental properties such as AirBnB, or is it one of those things where Congress has decided not to get involved for now and let localities be laboratories This sort of local property use is the sort of thing that's generally reserved to local governments (not even state governments), there's no reason to regulate it on a national level.
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May 4, 2018 01:45
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Yeah. Also, the court has (rightly imo) become a lot more skeptical of that sort of pro forma “and the economy is interconnected maaaaannnnn” commerce-clause argument.
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May 4, 2018 03:02
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rjmccall posted:Yeah. Also, the court has (rightly imo) become a lot more skeptical of that sort of pro forma “and the economy is interconnected maaaaannnnn” commerce-clause argument. I don't know if I'd go so far as to say "rightly", considering how much of a predictable disaster state regulation competition is. Not to mention the fact that many parts are the economy (especially retail) are far more interconnected than even 20 years ago. Housing, on the other hand, is still necessarily local! The federal government hasn't been afraid to shut down at least some *sharing services when they hinder federal regulatory efforts. The FAA shut down a flight-sharing service that brought together non-commercially licensed small plane pilots and people who wanted to hitch a ride in exchange for gas/maintenance money. The concern was (and still is) that it bringing a large number of effectively commercial passengers onto less-regulated and inherently less safe flights with non-commercial pilots would lead to injuries and fatalities with murky liability. E: And a bill to legalize formal flightsharing is coming to congress. Stickman fucked around with this message at 05:52 on May 4, 2018 |
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May 4, 2018 05:48
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By “rightly” I just meant that it seems legally correct to me, not that it’s always great policy. Airspace law is pretty unique. The federal government originally just unilaterally claimed the unique right to regulate airspace, all the way to the ground. Causby rejected the “to the ground” part but otherwise accepted that state law doesn’t go infinitely up; where exactly the threshold is is unclear, except it’s probably no more than 500ft. We’ll almost certainly get some clarification of the balance of power here in the next ten years because of drones, which everybody everywhere wants to regulate.
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May 4, 2018 09:46
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