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The majority opinion made a good point that a client might hate the thought of jail so much that they would rather risk the death penalty for even a chance at acquittal no matter how farfetched. Or might be indifferent to death vs prison and so again prefer the outlandish hope of an acquittal to pleading to a lesser charge. Even if the only possible defense would have to sound crazypants insane against the overwhelming evidence of guilt, it's not the lawyer's place to decide for the client what the objective of the defense should be, beyond warning him that the defense he wants would almost certainly fail and that any professional evaluation of the client's best interests would conclude that he should try to argue he's guilty of something but not of a capital crime.
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May 14, 2018 20:07
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axeil posted:Ah okay. I was just wondering if the same logic that threw this out would apply there/to other gambling bans The logic in this case also doesn't apply to the UIGEA, so poker advocates can't file a "me too" lawsuit against it. The difference is that the congress commanded the state legislatures to pass laws (or in this case forbid them from repealing laws) on sports gambling. They can't do that. The state is always free to pass or repeal their state laws however they please, and if a state law is later pre-empted (or was already) by a federal ban, then so be it. The Feds could easily pass a national ban on sports gambling and have the DOJ enforce the new federal law. Thats exactly what they did for online poker, they passed a federal law banning wagers across state lines. This is one of the few times I disagree with a RBG opinion. Not the severability issue, I'm not sure how I feel about that, and most of her opinion was basically "even if the majority is right, they didn't have to strike the whole law down", but she then made the argument that the feds can command states to pass, not pass, repeal, or not repeal state laws. In her mind its just meaningless semantics, she says ordering states to not repeal state bans is the same thing as creating a federal ban, but its not, because the Feds are then asking the state to pay to enforce a ban they no longer want. If the Feds want to ban sports wagering, they can pass a federal law and appropriate the necessary funds for the DOJ to enforce their federal law.
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May 14, 2018 20:19
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FuriousxGeorge posted:Supreme Court strikes down ban on sports betting in victory for New Jersey This analogy really doesn't work, when poker sites stopped easily taking money the number of US players plummeted online and generally the whole nature of the game changed in really short order. Of course some people found ways around it but a lot of people just stopped entirely, which really isn't the case with drugs. A natural experiment is that some states in the US allow sports betting online so you have a look there. I suppose it could be the case that gambling dollars are fungible and banning poker just had those dollars flow to other easier legal sources and it would be neat to look at the problem from that perspective. But I think the general point holds-- that there's a large amount of people who, given easy legal options, would throw a 20 to sportsblahbook.com and gamble on a couple prop bets occasionally, but also be perfectly content with never doing that if it was illegal and difficult to do so. Much like when the poker prohibition went through you didn't see a huge flight to underground shady casinos, but rather the populations general interest in texas-hold em greatly declined (holy poo poo the mid 2000s were nuts). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poker_boom The major tournaments still see the same amount of action but it's because internationally (where it's usually quite easy to play online) it's booming but you can indeed see a precipitous drop off in legal and illegal US poker gambling directly following the passage of the UIGEA. The poker subforum here used to be one of the most active SA pages and now it doesn't even exist, and though it is fair to say some of that was natural the UIGEA really put the stake in the coffin.
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May 14, 2018 20:48
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evilweasel posted:So these are two different questions. For the first, if the client told me beforehand he's lying I can't put him on the stand and ask question designed to elicit that lie. But I can absolutely put him up on the stand if I don't believe him but he hasn't told me it's a lie. As to the second, if the client insists on doing something stupid despite the lawyer's fervent insistence that they not do something stupid that is their right. In civil litigation generally at that point you resign but in criminal trials, the client would be prejudiced so you can't resign unless they have new counsel (they can, however, fire you). What if he says it’s a lie but you’re pretty sure it is actually the truth? That sounds contrived, but bear with me. It could be something like “I can’t have murdered those kids at eight because that’s when I was banging my mistress”. His mistress says that’s where he was and so does the clerk at the hotel across town. But he’s still telling you privately that it’s a lie and he would never cheat on his wife.
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May 15, 2018 02:43
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Platystemon posted:What if he says it’s a lie but you’re pretty sure it is actually the truth? Well you as the lawyer can’t ask him questions about the affair when you know he will commit perjury about the affair. He can testify in a narrative form without the lawyer asking questions though. But you’re saying based on common sense he’s obviously lying to you about the affair but doesn’t admit he’s lying? See evilweasel’s answer, you don’t know for a fact he’s lying. yronic heroism fucked around with this message at 07:03 on May 15, 2018 |
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May 15, 2018 06:57
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He’s telling you “I wasn’t with my mistress but I’m going to go on the stand and say that I was”. You believe he actually was with his mistress and that he’ll be telling the truth on the stand. It seems he has some weird hangup about admitting the affair to you but he is prepared to admit it to the court to save himself.
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May 15, 2018 07:18
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Platystemon posted:He’s telling you “I wasn’t with my mistress but I’m going to go on the stand and say that I was”. I would need to consult my state ethics rules since this is a crazy scenario but my instinct is if I think it might be the truth I can elicit it.
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May 15, 2018 14:00
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evilweasel posted:I would need to consult my state ethics rules since this is a crazy scenario but my instinct is if I think it might be the truth I can elicit it. Pretty sure that's the case almost universally. IIRC suborning perjury requires actual knowledge. e: quick search agrees. Mr. Nice! fucked around with this message at 14:30 on May 15, 2018 |
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May 15, 2018 14:26
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Why is the NCAA the party in the sports gambling case and not a governmental person
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May 15, 2018 15:39
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Nissin Cup Nudist posted:Why is the NCAA the party in the sports gambling case and not a governmental person quote:PASPA does not make sports gambling a federal crime (and thus was not anticipated to impose a significant law enforcement burden on the Federal Government).24 Instead, PASPA allows the Attorney General, as well as professional and amateur sports organizations, to bring civil actions to enjoin violations. §3703. Basically because the federal act was written so that the NCAA could sue, but New Jersey is of course a governmental person involved in that case...
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May 15, 2018 15:50
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axeil posted:Does the sports gambling decision re-legalize online poker or is this limited in scope? Listening to the radio today I heard an ad for online poker. It included a disclaimer that you could only play if you were a resident of New Jersey.
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May 15, 2018 17:20
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Hackan Slash posted:Listening to the radio today I heard an ad for online poker. It included a disclaimer that you could only play if you were a resident of New Jersey. NJ and Nevada have legal online poker.
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May 15, 2018 18:02
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ulmont posted:The Louisiana Supreme Court essentially said "yeah, English was proper hosed here." At some point competency has to come into play doesn't it? How bad does it have to be before that works?
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May 16, 2018 04:45
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KernelSlanders posted:At some point competency has to come into play doesn't it? How bad does it have to be before that works? If you read the (Louisiana) opinion, the plea of not guilty foreclosed an insanity defense.
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May 16, 2018 05:44
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I feel like that this is a lovely edge case, but lovely edge cases like this are less bad than letting (potentially unethical) lawyers override the defendant's chosen defense.
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May 17, 2018 07:46
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evilweasel posted:I would need to consult my state ethics rules since this is a crazy scenario but my instinct is if I think it might be the truth I can elicit it. I feel like this scenario falls in the gap of it not being perjury under the legal definition because there's no intent to deceive if you think the affair story is actually the truth, but also if the affair alibi really turns out to be a lie good luck convincing a judge/your state's bar of that. "Well yes my client did straight-up say 'I am going to lie on the stand and I need you to help me' but I thought he was lying about that first part so you see..."
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May 17, 2018 15:10
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VitalSigns posted:"Well yes my client did straight-up say 'I am going to lie on the stand and I need you to help me' but I thought he was lying about that first part so you see..." Clearly the solution is to lie and deny your client told you he would be lying.
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May 17, 2018 15:13
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Javid posted:I feel like that this is a lovely edge case, but lovely edge cases like this are less bad than letting (potentially unethical) lawyers override the defendant's chosen defense.
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May 17, 2018 17:18
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If that happened the state of Louisiana could make the exact same arguments that prevailed in this case about the defendant's right to decide the objective of his own defense to show that there wasn't ineffective counsel, and win, so I don't see the problem.
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May 17, 2018 18:06
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Dead Reckoning posted:OK, but if we're going to go this route, then we have to let the attorney off the hook for allowing the defendant to proceed with a defense his attorney knew was doomed to failure, and foreclose appeals for ineffective assistance of counsel. That latter is the big one in my mind: I would guess that, if his lawyer had allowed his obviously terrible "I didn't do it, I was gang stalked" defense to go forward, there would have been an appeal based on ineffective assistance. you don't get ineffective assistance of counsel for ignoring your attorney's strong advice
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May 17, 2018 18:24
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lol at the idea of IAC claims succeeding in general
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May 17, 2018 20:45
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disjoe posted:lol at the idea of IAC claims succeeding in general "the record reflects that the defendant's attorney was either drunk enough to be unable to walk straight or passed out for the entirety of the trial, is not actually an attorney, and appears to be an alcoholic chimpanzee someone put in a suit and gave a briefcase. neverthless..."
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May 17, 2018 20:48
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Platystemon posted:Clearly the solution is to lie and deny your client told you he would be lying. Never thought I'd see you here Rudy
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May 18, 2018 01:01
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FAUXTON posted:Never thought I'd see you here Rudy Why not. You say "Rudy" and the first thing I think of is "goon."
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May 20, 2018 16:00
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 more of our labor rights. Boilerplate mandatory binding arbitration clause in every employment contract prevents class action. 5-4 with gorsuch writing.
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May 21, 2018 15:13
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 Opinions! EPIC SYSTEMS CORP. v. LEWIS Brief Background: In each of these cases, an employer and employee entered into a contract providing for individualized arbitration proceedings to resolve employment disputes between the parties. Each employee nonetheless sought to litigate Fair Labor Standards Act and related state law claims through class or collective actions in federal court. Although the Federal Arbitration Act generally requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements as written, the employees argued that its “saving clause” removes this obligation if an arbitration agreement violates some other federal law and that, by requiring individualized proceedings, the agreements here violated the National Labor Relations Act. The employers countered that the Arbitration Act protects agreements requiring arbitration from judicial interference and that neither the saving clause nor the NLRA demands a different conclusion Holding: Should employees and employers be allowed to agree that any disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with their employers? As a matter of policy these questions are surely debatable. But as a matter of law the answer is clear. In the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms—including terms providing for individualized proceedings. Nor can we agree with the employees’ suggestion that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) offers a conflicting command. It is this Court’s duty to interpret Congress’s statutes as a harmonious whole rather than at war with one another. And abiding that duty here leads to an unmistakable conclusion. The NLRA secures to employees rights to organize unions and bargain collectively, but it says nothing about how judges and arbitrators must try legal disputes that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or arbitral forum. This Court has never read a right to class actions into the NLRA—and for three quarters of a century neither did the National Labor Relations Board. Far from conflicting, the Arbitration Act and the NLRA have long enjoyed separate spheres of influence and neither permits this Court to declare the parties’ agreements unlawful. … Congress adopted the Arbitration Act in 1925 in response to a perception that courts were unduly hostile to arbitration. No doubt there was much to that perception...So Congress directed courts to abandon their hostility and instead treat arbitration agreements as “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 U. S. C. §2. The Act, this Court has said, establishes “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements. … [T]he employees suggest the Arbitration Act’s saving clause creates an exception for cases like theirs. By its terms, the saving clause allows courts to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” §2. That provision applies here, the employees tell us, because the NLRA renders their particular class and collective action waivers illegal. In their view, illegality under the NLRA is a “ground” that “exists at law . . . for the revocation” of their arbitration agreements, at least to the extent those agreements prohibit class or collective action proceedings. … [T]he saving clause recognizes only defenses that apply to “any” contract. In this way the clause establishes a sort of “equal-treatment” rule for arbitration contracts. Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 4). The clause “permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.’” Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 339. At the same time, the clause offers no refuge for “defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” Ibid. Under our precedent, this means the saving clause does not save defenses that target arbitration either by name or by more subtle methods, such as by “interfer[ing] with fundamental attributes of arbitration.” … Even if the Arbitration Act normally requires us to enforce arbitration agreements like theirs, the employees reply that the NLRA overrides that guidance in these cases and commands us to hold their agreements unlawful yet. This argument faces a stout uphill climb. When confronted with two Acts of Congress allegedly touching on the same topic, this Court is not at “liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments” and must instead strive “‘to give effect to both.’” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974). A party seeking to suggest that two statutes cannot be harmonized, and that one displaces the other, bears the heavy burden of showing “‘a clearly expressed congressional intention’” that such a result should follow. … [Section 7] does not even hint at a wish to displace the Arbitration Act—let alone accomplish that much clearly and manifestly, as our precedents demand. Neither should any of this come as a surprise. The notion that Section 7 confers a right to class or collective actions seems pretty unlikely when you recall that procedures like that were hardly known when the NLRA was adopted in 1935. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 didn’t create the modern class action until 1966; class arbitration didn’t emerge until later still; and even the Fair Labor Standards Act’s collective action provision postdated Section 7 by years. … What all these textual and contextual clues indicate, our precedents confirm. In many cases over many years, this Court has heard and rejected efforts to conjure conflicts between the Arbitration Act and other federal statutes. In fact, this Court has rejected every such effort to date (save one temporary exception since overruled), with statutes ranging from the Sherman and Clayton Acts to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Credit Repair Organizations Act, the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. … The policy may be debatable but the law is clear: Congress has instructed that arbitration agreements like those before us must be enforced as written. While Congress is of course always free to amend this judgment, we see nothing suggesting it did so in the NLRA—much less that it manifested a clear intention to displace the Arbitration Act. Because we can easily read Congress’s statutes to work in harmony, that is where our duty lies. The judgments in Epic, No. 16–285, and Ernst & Young, No. 16–300, are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment in Murphy Oil, No. 16–307, is affirmed. Lineup: Gorsuch, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Concurrence by Thomas. Dissent by Ginsburg, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Notes From Other Opinions: Thomas (concurring): I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to add that the employees also cannot prevail under the plain meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act. The Act declares arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2. As I have previously explained, grounds for revocation of a contract are those that concern “‘the formation of the arbitration agreement.’” American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U. S. 228, 239 (2013) (concurring opinion) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 353 (2011) (THOMAS, J., concurring)). The employees argue, among other things, that the class waivers in their arbitration agreements are unenforceable because the National Labor Relations Act makes those waivers illegal. But illegality is a public-policy defense. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§178–179 (1979); McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 639, 669–670 (1899). Because “[r]efusal to enforce a contract for public-policy reasons does not concern whether the contract was properly made,” the saving clause does not apply here. Concepcion, supra, at 357. For this reason, and the reasons in the Court’s opinion, the employees’ arbitration agreements must be enforced according to their terms. Ginsburg (dissenting): The employees in these cases complain that their employers have underpaid them in violation of the wage and hours prescriptions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq., and analogous state laws. Individually, their claims are small, scarcely of a size warranting the expense of seeking redress alone. See Ruan, What’s Left To Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates That Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1103, 1118–1119 (Ruan). But by joining together with others similarly circumstanced, employees can gain effective redress for wage underpayment commonly experienced. See id., at 1108– 1111. To block such concerted action, their employers required them to sign, as a condition of employment, arbitration agreements banning collective judicial and arbitral proceedings of any kind. The question presented: Does the Federal Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act or FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., permit employers to insist that their employees, whenever seeking redress for commonly experienced wage loss, go it alone, never mind the right secured to employees by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U. S. C. §151 et seq., “to engage in . . . concerted activities” for their “mutual aid or protection”? §157. The answer should be a resounding “No.” In the NLRA and its forerunner, the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA), 29 U. S. C. §101 et seq., Congress acted on an acute awareness: For workers striving to gain from their employers decent terms and conditions of employment, there is strength in numbers. A single employee, Congress understood, is disarmed in dealing with an employer. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 33–34 (1937). The Court today subordinates employeeprotective labor legislation to the Arbitration Act. In so doing, the Court forgets the labor market imbalance that gave rise to the NLGA and the NLRA, and ignores the destructive consequences of diminishing the right of employees “to band together in confronting an employer.” NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U. S. 822, 835 (1984). Congressional correction of the Court’s elevation of the FAA over workers’ rights to act in concert is urgently in order. … If these untoward consequences stemmed from legislative choices, I would be obliged to accede to them. But the edict that employees with wage and hours claims may seek relief only one-by-one does not come from Congress. It is the result of take-it-or-leave-it labor contracts harking back to the type called “yellow dog,” and of the readiness of this Court to enforce those unbargained-for agreements. The FAA demands no such suppression of the right of workers to take concerted action for their “mutual aid or protection.” Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Fifth Circuit in No. 16–307 and affirm the judgments of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in Nos. 16– 285 and 16–300. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-285_q8l1.pdf UPPER SKAGIT INDIAN TRIBE v. LUNDGREN ET VIR Brief Background: The Upper Skagit Indian Tribe purchased a roughly 40-acre plot of land and then commissioned a boundary survey. The survey convinced the Tribe that about an acre of its land lay on the other side of a boundary fence between its land and land owned by Sharline and Ray Lundgren. The Lundgrens filed a quiet title action in Washington state court, invoking the doctrines of adverse possession and mutual acquiescence, but the Tribe asserted sovereign immunity from the suit. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court rejected the Tribe’s immunity claim and ruled for the Lundgrens, reasoning that, under County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U. S. 251, tribal sovereign immunity does not apply to in rem suits. Holding: Lower courts disagree about the significance of our decision in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U. S. 251 (1992). Some think it means Indian tribes lack sovereign immunity in in rem lawsuits like this one; others don’t read it that way at all.* We granted certiorari to set things straight. … Yakima did not address the scope of tribal sovereign immunity. Instead, it involved only a much more prosaic question of statutory interpretation concerning the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887. … Indian reservations today sometimes contain two kinds of land intermixed in a kind of checkerboard pattern: trust land held by the United States and fee-patented land held by private parties. See Yakima, supra, at 256. Yakima concerned the tax consequences of this checkerboard. Recall that the amended version of §6 of the General Allotment Act rendered allottees and their fee-patented land subject to state regulations and taxes. 25 U. S. C. §349. Despite that, in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), this Court held that §6 could no longer be read as allowing States to impose in personam taxes (like those on cigarette sales) on transactions between Indians on fee-patented land within a reservation. Id., at 479–481. Among other things, the Court pointed to the impracticality of using the ownership of a particular parcel within a reservation to determine the law governing transactions taking place upon it. See id., at 478–479. Despite Moe and some years later, this Court in Yakima reached a different conclusion with respect to in rem state taxes. The Court held that allowing States to collect property taxes on fee-patented land within reservations was still allowed by §6...In short, Yakima sought only to interpret a relic of a statute in light of a distinguishable precedent; it resolved nothing about the law of sovereign immunity. Commendably, the Lundgrens acknowledged all this at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. Instead of seeking to defend the Washington Supreme Court’s reliance on Yakima, they now ask us to affirm their judgment on an entirely distinct alternative ground. At common law, they say, sovereigns enjoyed no immunity from actions involving immovable property located in the territory of another sovereign. … We leave it to the Washington Supreme Court to address these arguments in the first instance. Although we have discretion to affirm on any ground supported by the law and the record that will not expand the relief granted below, Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U. S. 27, 30 (1984), in this case we think restraint is the best use of discretion. Lineup: Gorsuch, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Concurrence by Roberts, joined by Kennedy. Dissent by Thomas, joined by Alito. Notes From Other Opinions: Roberts (concurring): I join the opinion of the Court in full. But that opinion poses an unanswered question: What precisely is someone in the Lundgrens’ position supposed to do? There should be a means of resolving a mundane dispute over property ownership, even when one of the parties to the dispute—involving non-trust, nonreservation land—is an Indian tribe. The correct answer cannot be that the tribe always wins no matter what; otherwise a tribe could wield sovereign immunity as a sword and seize property with impunity, even without a colorable claim of right. … I do not object to the Court’s determination to forgo consideration of the immovable-property rule at this time. But if it turns out that the rule does not extend to tribal assertions of rights in non-trust, non-reservation property, the applicability of sovereign immunity in such circumstances would, in my view, need to be addressed in a future case. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. ___, ___, n. 8 (2014) (slip op., at 16, n. 8) (reserving the question whether sovereign immunity would apply if a “plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe[ ] has no alternative way to obtain relief for offreservation commercial conduct”). Thomas (dissenting): We granted certiorari to decide whether “a court’s exercise of in rem jurisdiction overcome[s] the jurisdictional bar of tribal sovereign immunity.” Pet. for Cert. i; 583 U. S. ___ (2017). State and federal courts are divided on that question, but the Court does not give them an answer. Instead, it holds only that County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U. S. 251 (1992), “resolved nothing about the law of [tribal] sovereign immunity.” Ante, at 5. Unfortunately, neither does the decision today—except to say that courts cannot rely on County of Yakima. As a result, the disagreement that led us to take this case will persist. The Court easily could have resolved that disagreement by addressing respondents’ alternative ground for affirmance. Sharline and Ray Lundgren—whose family has maintained the land in question for more than 70 years— ask us to affirm based on the “immovable property” exception to sovereign immunity. That exception is settled, longstanding, and obviously applies to tribal immunity— as it does to every other type of sovereign immunity that has ever been recognized. Although the Lundgrens did not raise this argument below, we have the discretion to reach it. I would have done so. The immovable-property exception was extensively briefed and argued, and its application here is straightforward. Addressing the exception now would have ensured that property owners like the Lundgrens can protect their rights and that States like Washington can protect their sovereignty. Because the Court unnecessarily chooses to leave them in limbo, I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-387_ap6c.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout]
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May 21, 2018 15:45
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Mr. Nice! posted:
I'm not good with legal writing but could a functioning congress pass a law to fix it?
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May 21, 2018 15:57
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Raenir Salazar posted:I'm not good with legal writing but could a functioning congress pass a law to fix it? Easily. The only way this changes, though, is with a congress that supports labor over their donors and  at that.This wasn't a ruling on constitutional grounds, but rather statutory interpretation. Congress could pass a short bill that says "SCOTUS got it wrong. Binding arbitration does not defeat class action. This bill specifically overrides the decision."
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May 21, 2018 16:00
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Raenir Salazar posted:I'm not good with legal writing but could a functioning congress pass a law to fix it? Yes.
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May 21, 2018 16:00
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Raenir Salazar posted:I'm not good with legal writing but could a functioning congress pass a law to fix it? A functional congress passed the VRA. This court may not be brazen enough to gently caress with a law fixing it but it doesn't mean it won't happen in the future.
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May 21, 2018 16:01
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Yet another in a long line of terrible decisions interpreting the FAA.
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May 21, 2018 16:14
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Raenir Salazar posted:I'm not good with legal writing but could a functioning congress pass a law to fix it? Yes but the SCOTUS showed with decisions like Shelby County that they don't give a gently caress what Congress does because their opinion is the final say since neither Congress nor the WH are willing to step up and say "yeah no, your ruling is bullshit and won't be followed."
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May 21, 2018 16:40
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Raenir Salazar posted:I'm not good with legal writing but could a functioning congress pass a law to fix it? Yes, but without the constitutional right to judicial remedy that employees should have in any sane system, it can just be broken again by the next group of assholes. Mr. Nice! posted:Easily. The only way this changes, though, is with a congress that supports labor over their donors and Does this mean that there's still room for a sane SCOTUS (lol) to make a due process determination without having to deal with precedent from this decision? Stickman fucked around with this message at 16:57 on May 21, 2018 |
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May 21, 2018 16:55
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There will be 20-30 years before the SCOTUS is not conservative without adding extra justices so not likely.
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May 21, 2018 17:07
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Ginsburg read her dissent from the bench. And it's a great one.
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May 21, 2018 19:06
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Ugh, Gorsuch's writing is so offputting, and it's super obvious that he's going out of his way to act as the wise learned judge - especially when the mask slips every so often and lets a much more casual and comfortable Gorsuch peek through.
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May 21, 2018 20:51
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I wonder how Neal Katyal is feeling about himself today.
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May 21, 2018 21:24
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Can this decision translate over to consumer class action?
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May 21, 2018 22:59
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ulmont posted:
Boy was this one fun to get a company-wide email about this morning. This is also the day of Epic's monthly staff meeting so it was also definitely very fun to watch our CEO talk for like a loving hour and not bring it up once.
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May 21, 2018 23:01
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| # ? May 9, 2024 10:23 |
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Lamebot posted:Can this decision translate over to consumer class action? Probably, yeah.
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May 21, 2018 23:15
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