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algebra testes posted:My gut reaction is this extremely stupid and the Supreme Court is a clown show. entirely correct, kennedy spawned a new wave of crybaby conservative litigation just to avoid endorsing an accurate decision that anti-gay discrimination isn't really about religion, but also to avoid ruling that anti-gay discrimination is constitutionally mandated
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Jun 4, 2018 15:52
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I mean it is kinda important that the government at least appear to be impartial, thats probably why this was a 7-2. Unfortunately SCOTUS doesn't know that  is dead but give it time.
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Jun 4, 2018 15:53
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algebra testes posted:My gut reaction is this extremely stupid and the Supreme Court is a clown show. they pinky swear it's not precedent but there's nothing at all stopping anyone from claiming they're being 'singled out' for religious beliefs just like this loving freak and hey guess who's gonna appoint 1 or 2 more judges to the court? It's not a dude who thinks gay people are human, for sure!
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Jun 4, 2018 15:53
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algebra testes posted:My gut reaction is this extremely stupid and the Supreme Court is a clown show. You're not wrong, and that's intentional.
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Jun 4, 2018 15:54
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hobbesmaster posted:I mean it is kinda important that the government at least appear to be impartial, thats probably why this was a 7-2. my feeling is that is more kagan and breyer being worried kennedy was wobbly on the issue (because although he's very pro-gay rights he is also a conservative republican) and giving him cover if he made only a very narrow decision
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Jun 4, 2018 15:58
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nothing really remarkable in the other cases except if someone is promising to pay you with tax returns you better get that poo poo in writing if there's a chance they might go bankrupt. And yeah, I hadn't read the case in full yet and my gf was the one that shouted 5-4 or something so I had just assumed.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:00
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So Kennedy wrote a ruling that's so narrow it applies to wedding cakes as artistic expression, but theoretically can't be extrapolated to other forms of anti-gay discrimination? That seems like a very difficult fence to sit on.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:01
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Mr. Nice! posted:nothing really remarkable in the other cases except if someone is promising to pay you with tax returns you better get that poo poo in writing if there's a chance they might go bankrupt. there's a per curiam overturning of the Jane Doe case where the government tried to prohibit her from having an abortion and they hosed up the timing and whoops baby gone. that will get misinterpreted by some people who will get really mad about it, but it's just a decision saying that because the case got unilaterally mooted by the prevailing party before the losing party could take an appeal, supreme court precedent is to vacate all lower court decisions essentially so there's no precedent nobody had a chance to appeal doesn't matter, since an en banc DC circuit court already ruled once, it's not like people are going to be unclear what the decision will be next time precedent or no precedent. it just means if a panel of 2 of the 3 dissenters gets drawn, they theoretically can issue another bad decision before they get immediately slapped down less than a day later. no district court is going to bother getting summarily reversed unless they're angling for a trump appeals court nomination, in which case they'd be ruling the same way even with the DC circuit precedent.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:03
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vyelkin posted:So Kennedy wrote a ruling that's so narrow it applies to wedding cakes as artistic expression, but theoretically can't be extrapolated to other forms of anti-gay discrimination? That seems like a very difficult fence to sit on. no. he wrote a decision refusing to rule on that issue and just saying that you can't call a bigot a bigot while considering his case, if the bigot is a bigot for sincerely held religious reasons. but the decision explicitly does not decide if you can still prosecute the bigot as long as you're polite about it.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:05
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vyelkin posted:So Kennedy wrote a ruling that's so narrow it applies to wedding cakes as artistic expression, but theoretically can't be extrapolated to other forms of anti-gay discrimination? That seems like a very difficult fence to sit on. kennedy is riding that fence hard, but yeah see EW's post above. evilweasel posted:there's a per curiam overturning of the Jane Doe case where the government tried to prohibit her from having an abortion and they hosed up the timing and whoops baby gone. that will get misinterpreted by some people who will get really mad about it, but it's just a decision saying that because the case got unilaterally mooted by the prevailing party before the losing party could take an appeal, supreme court precedent is to vacate all lower court decisions essentially so there's no precedent nobody had a chance to appeal i wish they had taken the case up instead of mooting it, but it makes sense why they did it. The original case wasn't just about Doe, but rather about every minor seeking an abortion in immigration custody. Texas' law is hosed as well and needs as many challenges as it can get.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:06
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 Opinions! MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP TO FOLLOWLAMAR, ARCHER & COFRIN, LLP v. APPLING Brief Background: The Bankruptcy Code prohibits debtors from discharging debts for money, property, services, or credit obtained by “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud,” 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(2)(A), or, if made in writing, by a materially false “statement . . . respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition,” §523(a)(2)(B). This case is about what constitutes a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition.” Does a statement about a single asset qualify, or must the statement be about the debtor’s overall financial status? The answer matters to the parties because the false statements at issue concerned a single asset and were made orally. So, if the single-asset statements here qualify as “respecting the debtor’s financial condition,” §523(a)(2)(B) poses no bar to discharge because they were not made in writing. If, however, the statements fall into the more general category of “false pretenses, . . . false representation, or actual fraud,” §523(a)(2)(A), for which there is no writing requirement, the associated debt will be deemed nondischargeable. … Respondent R. Scott Appling hired petitioner Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP (Lamar), a law firm, to represent him in a business litigation. Appling fell behind on his legal bills, and by March 2005, he owed Lamar more than $60,000. Lamar informed Appling that if he did not pay the outstanding amount, the firm would withdraw from representation and place a lien on its work product until the bill was paid. The parties met in person that month, and Appling told his attorneys that he was expecting a tax refund of “‘approximately $100,000,’” enough to cover his owed and future legal fees. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. Lamar relied on this statement and continued to represent Appling without initiating collection of the overdue amount. … In March 2006, Lamar sent Appling its final invoice. Five years later, Appling still had not paid, so Lamar filed suit in Georgia state court and obtained a judgment for $104,179.60. Shortly thereafter, Appling and his wife filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. … The Bankruptcy Court held that a statement regarding a single asset is not a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” and denied Appling’s motion to dismiss...The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that “‘statement[s] respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition’ may include a statement about a single asset.” In re Appling, 848 F. 3d 953, 960 (2017). Because Appling’s statements about his expected tax refund were not in writing, the Court of Appeals held that §523(a)(2)(B) did not bar Appling from discharging his debt to Lamar. Id., at 961. Holding: The statutory language makes plain that a statement about a single asset can be a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition.” If that statement is not in writing, then, the associated debt may be discharged, even if the statement was false. … The Court granted certiorari, 583 U. S. ___ (2018), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a statement about a single asset can be a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition.”1 We agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion and affirm. … §523(a)(2) excepts from discharge debts arising from various forms of fraud. Subparagraph (A) bars discharge of debts arising from “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition.” Subparagraph (B), in turn, bars discharge of debts arising from a materially false “statement . . . respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” if that statement is “in writing.” … Had Congress intended §523(a)(2)(B) to encompass only statements expressing the balance of a debtor’s assets and liabilities, there are several ways in which it could have so specified, e.g., “statement disclosing the debtor’s financial condition” or “statement of the debtor’s financial condition.”2 But Congress did not use such narrow language. We also agree that a statement is “respecting” a debtor’s financial condition if it has a direct relation to or impact on the debtor’s overall financial status. A single asset has a direct relation to and impact on aggregate financial condition, so a statement about a single asset bears on a debtor’s overall financial condition and can help indicate whether a debtor is solvent or insolvent, able to repay a given debt or not. Naturally, then, a statement about a single asset can be a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition.” … Further supporting the Court’s conclusion is that Lamar’s interpretation would yield incoherent results. On Lamar’s view, the following would obtain: A misrepresentation about a single asset made in the context of a formal financial statement or balance sheet would constitute a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” and trigger §523(a)(2)(B)’s heightened nondischargeability requirements, but the exact same misrepresentation made on its own, or in the context of a list of some but not all of the debtor’s assets and liabilities, would not. … In addition, a highly general statement like, “I am above water,” would need to be in writing to foreclose discharge, whereas a highly specific statement like, “I have $200,000 of equity in my house,” would not. This, too, is inexplicably bizarre. … Lastly, the statutory history of the phrase “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” corroborates our reading of the text...Between 1926, when the phrase was introduced, and 1978, when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, Courts of Appeals consistently construed the phrase to encompass statements addressing just one or some of a debtor’s assets or liabilities. When Congress used the materially same language in §523(a)(2), it presumptively was aware of the longstanding judicial interpretation of the phrase and intended for it to retain its established meaning. … Lamar contends that Appling’s construction gives §523(a)(2)(B) an implausibly broad reach, such that little would be covered by §523(a)(2)(A)’s general rule rendering nondischargeable debts arising from “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.” That is not so. Decisions from this Court and several lower courts considering the application of §523(a)(2)(A) demonstrate that the provision still retains significant function when the phrase “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” is interpreted to encompass a statement about a single asset. … Lamar asserts that Appling’s interpretation is inconsistent with the overall principle that the Bankruptcy Code exists to afford relief only to the “‘honest but unfortunate debtor,’” Cohen, 523 U. S., at 217, because it leaves “fraudsters” free to “swindle innocent victims for money, property or services by lying about their finances, then discharge the resulting debt in bankruptcy, just so long as they do so orally.” Brief for Petitioner 35. This general maxim, however, provides little support for Lamar’s interpretation….the House Report noted that consumer finance companies frequently collected information from loan applicants in ways designed to permit the companies to later use those statements as the basis for an exception to discharge. … For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that a statement about a single asset can be a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” under §523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is affirmed. Lineup: Sotomayor, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, and joined by Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch as to all but Part III-B (relates to the legislative history through the House Report). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1215_gdhk.pdf HUGHES v. UNITED STATES Brief Background: After petitioner Erik Hughes was indicted on drug and gun charges, he and the Government negotiated a Type-C plea agreement, which stipulated that Hughes would receive a sentence of 180 months but did not refer to a particular Guidelines range. Hughes pleaded guilty. At his sentencing hearing, the District Court accepted the agreement and sentenced him to 180 months. In so doing, it calculated Hughes’ Guidelines range as 188 to 235 months and determined that the sentence was in accordance with the Guidelines and other factors the court was required to consider. Less than two months later, the Sentencing Commission adopted, and made retroactive, an amendment that had the effect of reducing Hughes’ sentencing range to 151 to 188 months. The District Court denied Hughes’ motion for a reduced sentence under §3582(c)(2), and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Both courts concluded that, under the Freeman concurrence, Hughes was ineligible for a reduced sentence because his plea agreement did not expressly rely on a Guidelines range. Holding: The first two questions [presented by this case], relating to Marks, are as follows: (1) “Whether this Court’s decision in Marks means that the concurring opinion in a 4–1–4 decision represents the holding of the Court where neither the plurality’s reasoning nor the concurrence’s reasoning is a logical subset of the other”; and (2) “Whether, under Marks, the lower courts are bound by the four-Justice plurality opinion in Freeman, or, instead, by JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s separate concurring opinion with which all eight other Justices disagreed.” Pet. for Cert. i. The third question is directed to the underlying statutory issue in this case, the substantive, sentencing issue the Court discussed in the three opinions issued in Freeman. That question is: “Whether, as the four-Justice plurality in Freeman concluded, a defendant who enters into a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is generally eligible for a sentence reduction if there is a later, retroactive amendment to the relevant Sentencing Guidelines range.” Pet. for Cert. ii. ... [A] majority of the Court in the instant case now can resolve the sentencing issue on its merits. So it will be unnecessary to consider questions one and two despite the extensive briefing and careful argument the parties presented to the Court concerning the proper application of Marks. … The controlling issue here is whether a defendant may seek relief under §3582(c)(2) if he entered a plea agreement specifying a particular sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). This kind of plea agreement is sometimes referred to as a “Type-C agreement.” In a Type-C agreement the Government and a defendant “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply,” and “such a recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement.” Rule 11(c)(1)(C). When the Government and a defendant enter a Type-C agreement, the district court has three choices: It “may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report.” Rule 11(c)(3)(A). If the court rejects the agreement, the defendant may withdraw his guilty plea. Rule 11(c)(5)(B). In deciding whether to accept an agreement that includes a specific sentence, the district court must consider the Sentencing Guidelines. The court may not accept the agreement unless the court is satisfied that “(1) the agreed sentence is within the applicable guideline range; or (2)(A) the agreed sentence is outside the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons; and (B) those reasons are set forth with specificity.” ... Less than two months after the District Court sentenced Hughes, the Sentencing Commission adopted amendment 782 to the Guidelines. USSG App. C, Amdt. 782 (Supp. Nov. 2012–Nov. 2016). The amendment reduced the base offense level by two levels for most drug offenses. The Commission later made amendment 782 retroactive for defendants who, like Hughes, already had been sentenced under the higher offense levels. Amdt. 788. Under the revised Guidelines, Hughes’ sentencing range is 151 to 188 months—about three to four years lower than the range in effect when he was sentenced. Hughes filed a motion for a reduced sentence under §3582(c)(2). The District Court denied the motion, concluding that Hughes is ineligible for relief; and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 849 F. 3d 1008, 1016 (2017); App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. Both courts concluded that the Freeman concurrence stated the holding of this Court under Marks, and that under the concurrence’s interpretation Hughes was ineligible for a reduced sentence because his plea agreement did not expressly rely on a Guidelines range. ... A sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is no exception to the general rule that a defendant’s Guidelines range is both the starting point and a basis for his ultimate sentence. Although in a Type-C agreement the Government and the defendant may agree to a specific sentence, that bargain is contingent on the district court accepting the agreement and its stipulated sentence. Freeman, 564 U. S., at 529–530. The Sentencing Guidelines prohibit district courts from accepting Type-C agreements without first evaluating the recommended sentence in light of the defendant’s Guidelines range. USSG §6B1.2(c). So in the usual case the court’s acceptance of a Type-C agreement and the sentence to be imposed pursuant to that agreement are “based on” the defendant’s Guidelines range. To be sure, the Guidelines are advisory only, and so not every sentence will be consistent with the relevant Guidelines range….Still, cases like Koons are a narrow exception to the general rule that, in most cases, a defendant’s sentence will be “based on” his Guidelines range. In federal sentencing the Guidelines are a district court’s starting point, so when the Commission lowers a defendant’s Guidelines range the defendant will be eligible for relief under §3582(c)(2) absent clear demonstration, based on the record as a whole, that the court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the Guidelines. … In this case the District Court accepted Hughes’ Type-C agreement after concluding that a 180-month sentence was consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines. App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a. The court then calculated Hughes’ sentencing range and imposed a sentence that the court deemed “compatible” with the Guidelines. Id., at 36a, 47a. Thus, the sentencing range was a basis for the sentence that the District Court imposed. That range has “subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” so Hughes is eligible for relief under §3582(c)(2). The Court expresses no view as to whether the District Court should exercise its discretion to reduce Hughes’ sentence after considering the §3553(a) factors and the Commission’s relevant policy statements. See 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2). For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Kennedy, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Gorsuch. Concurrence by Sotomayor. Dissent by Roberts, joined by Thomas and Alito. Notes From Other Opinions: Sotomayor (concurring): Freeman ended in a 4–1–4 decision that left lower courts confused as to whether the plurality or the concurring opinion controlled. The plurality of four Justices in Freeman concluded that defendants who plead guilty pursuant to a so-called “Type-C agreement” may be eligible for a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(2) because Type-C sentences are “based on the Guidelines” “to whatever extent the sentencing range in question was a relevant part of the analytic framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the agreement.” … Parting ways with all eight of my colleagues, I concurred only in the judgment. Id., at 534–544. I held the view that sentences imposed under Type-C agreements are typically “based on” the agreements themselves, not on the Guidelines...Specifically, I clarified that §3582(c)(2) relief was available in cases where the Type-C agreement “call[s] for the defendant to be sentenced within a particular Guidelines sentencing range,” or in cases where the “plea agreement . . . provide[s] for a specific term of imprisonment . . . but also make[s] clear that the basis for the specified term is a Guidelines sentencing range.” Id., at 538–539. Because Freeman’s agreement presented one such case, I agreed with the plurality that he was eligible for a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(2). See id., at 542–544. I continue to believe that my Freeman concurrence sets forth the most convincing interpretation of §3582(c)(2)’s statutory text. But I also acknowledge that my concurrence precipitated a 4–1–4 decision that left significant confusion in its wake. … I therefore join the majority in full because doing so helps to ensure clarity and stability in the law and promotes “uniformity in sentencing imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct.” Today’s majority opinion charts a clear path forward: It mitigates the inconsistencies and disparities occasioned (at least in part) by my concurrence. It ensures that similarly situated defendants are subject to a uniform legal rule. It studiously adheres to “this Court’s precedents since Freeman,” which firmly establish “that the Guidelines remain the foundation of federal sentencing decisions.” Roberts (dissenting): Seven years ago, four Justices took the position that a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment specified in a binding plea agreement may have been sentenced “based on” a Sentencing Guidelines range, simply because the district court must consider the Guidelines in deciding whether to accept the agreement. Freeman v. United States, 564 U. S. 522, 529–530 (2011) (plurality opinion). That view has since garnered more votes, but has not gotten any more persuasive. A defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction following a retroactive Guidelines amendment if he was “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2). When a defendant enters into a binding “Type-C” plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), however, the resulting sentence is “dictated by the terms of the agreement entered into by the parties, not the judge’s Guidelines calculation.” Freeman, 564 U. S., at 536 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment). Five Justices recognized as much in Freeman. See ibid.; id., at 544 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting). … The point is a very practical one: Hughes pleaded guilty and entered into a binding agreement because he otherwise was looking at life in prison. Although the District Court dutifully performed the required Guidelines calculations, Hughes’s sentence was based on the agreement, not the Guidelines range. Hughes should not receive a windfall benefit because that range has been changed. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-155_2bo2.pdf TIMOTHY D. KOONS, KENNETH JAY PUTENSEN, RANDY FEAUTO, ESEQUIEL GUTIERREZ, AND JOSE MANUEL GARDEA, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES Brief Background: [Basically a companion case to Hughes above] The five petitioners pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy charges that subjected them to mandatory minimum sentences under 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)...The court departed downward from the mandatory minimums under 18 U. S. C. §3553(e) to reflect petitioners’ substantial assistance to the Government in prosecuting other drug offenders. In settling on the final sentences, the court considered the relevant “substantial assistance factors” set out in the Guidelines, but it did not consider the original Guidelines ranges that it had earlier discarded. After petitioners were sentenced, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines and reduced the base offense levels for certain drug offenses, including those for which petitioners were convicted. Petitioners sought sentence reductions under §3582(c)(2), which makes defendants eligible if they were sentenced “based on a sentencing range” that was later lowered by the Sentencing Commission. The courts below held that petitioners were not eligible because they could not show that their sentences were “based on” the now-lowered Guidelines ranges. Holding: Under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2), a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction if he was initially sentenced “based on a sentencing range” that was later lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission. The five petitioners in today’s case claim to be eligible under this provision. They were convicted of drug offenses that carried statutory mandatory minimum sentences, but they received sentences below these mandatory minimums, as another statute allows, because they substantially assisted the Government in prosecuting other drug offenders. We hold that petitioners’ sentences were “based on” their mandatory minimums and on their substantial assistance to the Government, not on sentencing ranges that the Commission later lowered. Petitioners are therefore ineligible for §3582(c)(2) sentence reductions. … For a sentence to be “based on” a lowered Guidelines range, the range must have at least played “a relevant part [in] the framework the [sentencing] judge used” in imposing the sentence…[T]he District Court did not consider those ranges in imposing its ultimate sentences. On the contrary, the court scrapped the ranges in favor of the mandatory minimums, and never considered the ranges again; as the court explained, the ranges dropped out of the case. … Now, as then, district courts calculate the advisory Guidelines ranges, see USSG §1B1.1(a)(7); discard them in favor of the mandatory minimum sentences, §§1B1.1(a)(8), 5G1.1(b); and then may use the substantial-assistance factors to determine how far to depart downward, §§1B1.1(b), 5K1.1(a). See §3553(e). Those resulting sentences, like the sentences here, are not “based on” a lowered Guidelines range—they are “based on” the defendants’ mandatory minimums and substantial assistance to the Government. And those defendants, like petitioners, are not eligible for sentence reductions under §3582(c)(2). For these reasons, we affirm. Lineup: Alito, unanimous. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-5716_jhek.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout]
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Jun 4, 2018 16:12
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vyelkin posted:So Kennedy wrote a ruling that's so narrow it applies to wedding cakes as artistic expression, but theoretically can't be extrapolated to other forms of anti-gay discrimination? That seems like a very difficult fence to sit on. Kennedy knew what he was doing, he wrote it so that if you call someone a bigot because of a thing they claim is a genuine religious view then the court now has said it's a valid option to wave their hands and say 'bup bup bup, BOTH parties need to be respected here (so that means the bigot can keep discriminating)'. Kagan is a loving coward who promises that this is just a narrow little ruling but even Fox News has their legal people saying 'no this can be applied anywhere that's a ~religious liberty~ issue' because why keep the scam up when you've won?
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Jun 4, 2018 16:12
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Opinion! MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP INSIDE MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL. v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ET AL. Brief Background: Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., is a Colorado bakery owned and operated by Jack Phillips, an expert baker and devout Christian. In 2012 he told a same-sex couple that he would not create a cake for their wedding celebration because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriages—marriages that Colorado did not then recognize—but that he would sell them other baked goods, e.g., birthday cakes. The couple filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (Commission) pursuant to the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), which prohibits, as relevant here, discrimination based on sexual orientation in a “place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place offering services . . . to the public.” [Phillips raised a First Amendment defense.] Holding: In 2012 a same-sex couple visited Masterpiece Cakeshop, a bakery in Colorado, to make inquiries about ordering a cake for their wedding reception. The shop’s owner told the couple that he would not create a cake for their wedding because of his religious opposition to samesex marriages—marriages the State of Colorado itself did not recognize at that time. The couple filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. The Commission determined that the shop’s actions violated the Act and ruled in the couple’s favor. The Colorado state courts affirmed the ruling and its enforcement order, and this Court now must decide whether the Commission’s order violated the Constitution. The case presents difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation of at least two principles. The first is the authority of a State and its governmental entities to protect the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face discrimination when they seek goods or services. The second is the right of all persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedoms asserted here are both the freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion. The free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected speech. This is an instructive example, however, of the proposition that the application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen our understanding of their meaning. One of the difficulties in this case is that the parties disagree as to the extent of the baker’s refusal to provide service. If a baker refused to design a special cake with words or images celebrating the marriage—for instance, a cake showing words with religious meaning—that might be different from a refusal to sell any cake at all. In defining whether a baker’s creation can be protected, these details might make a difference. The same difficulties arise in determining whether a baker has a valid free exercise claim. A baker’s refusal to attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is cut the right way, or a refusal to put certain religious words or decorations on the cake, or even a refusal to sell a cake that has been baked for the public generally but includes certain religious words or symbols on it are just three examples of possibilities that seem all but endless. Whatever the confluence of speech and free exercise principles might be in some cases, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s consideration of this case was inconsistent with the State’s obligation of religious neutrality. The reason and motive for the baker’s refusal were based on his sincere religious beliefs and convictions. The Court’s precedents make clear that the baker, in his capacity as the owner of a business serving the public, might have his right to the free exercise of religion limited by generally applicable laws. Still, the delicate question of when the free exercise of his religion must yield to an otherwise valid exercise of state power needed to be determined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on the part of the State itself would not be a factor in the balance the State sought to reach. That requirement, however, was not met here. When the Colorado Civil Rights Commission considered this case, it did not do so with the religious neutrality that the Constitution requires. Given all these considerations, it is proper to hold that whatever the outcome of some future controversy involving facts similar to these, the Commission’s actions here violated the Free Exercise Clause; and its order must be set aside. … Today, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) carries forward the state’s tradition of prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation. Amended in 2007 and 2008 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as well as other protected characteristics, CADA in relevant part provides as follows: “It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation.” Colo. Rev. Stat. §24–34–601(2)(a) (2017). The Act defines “public accommodation” broadly to include any “place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place offering services . . . to the public,” but excludes “a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes.” … Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint against Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips in August 2012, shortly after the couple’s visit to the shop. App. 31. The complaint alleged that Craig and Mullins had been denied “full and equal service” at the bakery because of their sexual orientation, id., at 35, 48, and that it was Phillips’ “standard business practice” not to provide cakes for same-sex weddings, id., at 43. … Phillips sought review here [first lost before an administrative law judge, appealed to Colorado Civil Rights Commission and lost, appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals and lost, and appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court which ducked the case], and this Court granted certiorari. 582 U. S. ___ (2017). He now renews his claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. … Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must, protect them in the exercise of their civil rights. The exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be given great weight and respect by the courts. At the same time, the religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression. … It is unexceptional that Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the same terms and conditions as are offered to other members of the public. And there are no doubt innumerable goods and services that no one could argue implicate the First Amendment … Phillips claims, however, that a narrower issue is presented. He argues that he had to use his artistic skills to make an expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation. ... [A]ny decision in favor of [Phillips] would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest all purveyors of goods and services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in effect be allowed to put up signs saying “no goods or services will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,” something that would impose a serious stigma on gay persons. But, nonetheless, Phillips was entitled to the neutral and respectful consideration of his claims in all the circumstances of the case. The neutral and respectful consideration to which Phillips was entitled was compromised here, however. The Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of his case has some elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection. That hostility surfaced at the Commission’s formal, public hearings, as shown by the record. On May 30, 2014, the seven-member Commission convened publicly to consider Phillips’ case. At several points during its meeting, commissioners endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and persons are less than fully welcome in Colorado’s business community. … Another indication of hostility is the difference in treatment between Phillips’ case and the cases of other bakers who objected to a requested cake on the basis of conscience and prevailed before the Commission. As noted above, on at least three other occasions the Civil Rights Division considered the refusal of bakers to create cakes with images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, along with religious text. Each time, the Division found that the baker acted lawfully in refusing service. It made these determinations because, in the words of the Division, the requested cake included “wording and images [the baker] deemed derogatory,” Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X, at 4; featured “language and images [the baker] deemed hateful,” Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X, at 4; or displayed a message the baker “deemed as discriminatory, Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X, at 4. … A principled rationale for the difference in treatment of these two instances cannot be based on the government’s own assessment of offensiveness. … For the reasons just described, the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint…[T]he Commission was obliged under the Free Exercise Clause to proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs. The Constitution “commits government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.” … The Commission’s hostility was inconsistent with the First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion. Phillips was entitled to a neutral decisionmaker who would give full and fair consideration to his religious objection as he sought to assert it in all of the circumstances in which this case was presented, considered, and decided. In this case the adjudication concerned a context that may well be different going forward in the respects noted above. However later cases raising these or similar concerns are resolved in the future, for these reasons the rulings of the Commission and of the state court that enforced the Commission’s order must be invalidated. The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market. The judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals is reversed. Lineup: [deep breath] Kennedy, joined by Roberts, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Concurrence by Kagan, joined by Breyer. Concurrence by Gorsuch, joined by Alito. Concurrence in part by Thomas, joined by Gorsuch. Dissent by Ginsburg, joined by Sotomayor. Notes From Other Opinions: Kagan (concurring): I join the Court’s opinion in full because I believe the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not satisfy that obligation. I write separately to elaborate on one of the bases for the Court’s holding. The Court partly relies on the “disparate consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of [three] other bakers” who “objected to a requested cake on the basis of conscience.” Ante, at 14, 18. In the latter cases, a customer named William Jack sought “cakes with images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, along with religious text”; the bakers whom he approached refused to make them. ... What makes the state agencies’ consideration yet more disquieting is that a proper basis for distinguishing the cases was available—in fact, was obvious. The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) makes it unlawful for a place of public accommodation to deny “the full and equal enjoyment” of goods and services to individuals based on certain characteristics, including sexual orientation and creed. Colo. Rev. Stat. §24–34–601(2)(a) (2017). The three bakers in the Jack cases did not violate that law. Jack requested them to make a cake (one denigrating gay people and same-sex marriage) that they would not have made for any customer. In refusing that request, the bakers did not single out Jack because of his religion, but instead treated him in the same way they would have treated anyone else—just as CADA requires. By contrast, the same-sex couple in this case requested a wedding cake that Phillips would have made for an opposite-sex couple. In refusing that request, Phillips contravened CADA’s demand that customers receive “the full and equal enjoyment” of public accommodations irrespective of their sexual orientation. Ibid. The different outcomes in the Jack cases and the Phillips case could thus have been justified by a plain reading and neutral application of Colorado law—untainted by any bias against a religious belief. I read the Court’s opinion as fully consistent with that view... Colorado can treat a baker who discriminates based on sexual orientation differently from a baker who does not discriminate on that or any other prohibited ground. But only, as the Court rightly says, if the State’s decisions are not infected by religious hostility or bias. I accordingly concur. Gorsuch (concurring): [W]e know this with certainty: when the government fails to act neutrally toward the free exercise of religion, it tends to run into trouble. Then the government can prevail only if it satisfies strict scrutiny, showing that its restrictions on religion both serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored. Today’s decision respects these principles. As the Court explains, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission failed to act neutrally toward Jack Phillips’s religious faith...As the Court also explains, the only reason the Commission seemed to supply for its discrimination was that it found Mr. Phillips’s religious beliefs “offensive.” Ibid. That kind of judgmental dismissal of a sincerely held religious belief is, of course, antithetical to the First Amendment and cannot begin to satisfy strict scrutiny. The Constitution protects not just popular religious exercises from the condemnation of civil authorities. It protects them all. Because the Court documents each of these points carefully and thoroughly, I am pleased to join its opinion in full. The only wrinkle is this. In the face of so much evidence suggesting hostility toward Mr. Phillips’s sincerely held religious beliefs, two of our colleagues have written separately to suggest that the Commission acted neutrally toward his faith when it treated him differently from the other bakers—or that it could have easily done so consistent with the First Amendment. See post, at 4–5, and n. 4 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting); ante, at 2–3, and n. (KAGAN, J., concurring). But, respectfully, I do not see how we might rescue the Commission from its error. … The problem here is that the Commission failed to act neutrally by applying a consistent legal rule...If Mr. Phillips’s objection is “inextricably tied” to a protected class, then the bakers’ objection in Mr. Jack’s case must be “inextricably tied” to one as well. For just as cakes celebrating same-sex weddings are (usually) requested by persons of a particular sexual orientation, so too are cakes expressing religious opposition to same-sex weddings (usually) requested by persons of particular religious faiths. In both cases the bakers’ objection would (usually) result in turning down customers who bear a protected characteristic. In the end, the Commission’s decisions simply reduce to this: it presumed that Mr. Phillip harbored an intent to discriminate against a protected class in light of the foreseeable effects of his conduct, but it declined to presume the same intent in Mr. Jack’s case even though the effects of the bakers’ conduct were just as foreseeable. … The Commission cannot have it both ways. The Commission cannot slide up and down the mens rea scale, picking a mental state standard to suit its tastes depending on its sympathies. Either actual proof of intent to discriminate on the basis of membership in a protected class is required (as the Commission held in Mr. Jack’s case), or it is sufficient to “presume” such intent from the knowing failure to serve someone in a protected class (as the Commission held in Mr. Phillips’s case). … Only one way forward now remains. Having failed to afford Mr. Phillips’s religious objections neutral consideration and without any compelling reason for its failure, the Commission must afford him the same result it afforded the bakers in Mr. Jack’s case. The Court recognizes this by reversing the judgment below and holding that the Commission’s order “must be set aside.” Ante, at 18. Maybe in some future rulemaking or case the Commission could adopt a new “knowing” standard for all refusals of service and offer neutral reasons for doing so. But, as the Court observes, “[h]owever later cases raising these or similar concerns are resolved in the future, . . . the rulings of the Commission and of the state court that enforced the Commission’s order” in this case “must be invalidated.” Ibid. Thomas (concurring): I agree that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (Commission) violated Jack Phillips’ right to freely exercise his religion. As JUSTICE GORSUCH explains, the Commission treated Phillips’ case differently from a similar case involving three other bakers, for reasons that can only be explained by hostility toward Phillips’ religion. See ante, at 2–7 (concurring opinion). The Court agrees that the Commission treated Phillips differently, and it points out that some of the Commissioners made comments disparaging Phillips’ religion. See ante, at 12–16. Although the Commissioners’ comments are certainly disturbing, the discriminatory application of Colorado’s public-accommodations law is enough on its own to violate Phillips’ rights. To the extent the Court agrees, I join its opinion. While Phillips rightly prevails on his free-exercise claim, I write separately to address his free-speech claim. The Court does not address this claim because it has some uncertainties about the record. See ante, at 2. Specifically, the parties dispute whether Phillips refused to create a custom wedding cake for the individual respondents, or whether he refused to sell them any wedding cake (including a premade one). But the Colorado Court of Appeals resolved this factual dispute in Phillips’ favor. The court described his conduct as a refusal to “design and create a cake to celebrate [a] same-sex wedding.” Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P. 3d 272, 276 (2015); see also id., at 286 (“designing and selling a wedding cake”); id., at 283 (“refusing to create a wedding cake”). And it noted that the Commission’s order required Phillips to sell “‘any product [he] would sell to heterosexual couples,’ ” including custom wedding cakes. Id., at 286 (emphasis added). … The conduct that the Colorado Court of Appeals ascribed to Phillips—creating and designing custom wedding cakes—is expressive. Phillips considers himself an artist. The logo for Masterpiece Cakeshop is an artist’s paint palate with a paintbrush and baker’s whisk. Behind the counter Phillips has a picture that depicts him as an artist painting on a canvas. Phillips takes exceptional care with each cake that he creates—sketching the design out on paper, choosing the color scheme, creating the frosting and decorations, baking and sculpting the cake, decorating it, and delivering it to the wedding. Examples of his creations can be seen on Masterpiece’s website. See http://masterpiececakes.com/wedding-cakes (as last visited June 1, 2018). … Accordingly, Phillips’ creation of custom wedding cakes is expressive. The use of his artistic talents to create a well-recognized symbol that celebrates the beginning of a marriage clearly communicates a message—certainly more so than nude dancing, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560, 565–566 (1991), or flying a plain red flag, Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369 (1931).3 By forcing Phillips to create custom wedding cakes for same-sex weddings, Colorado’s public-accommodations law “alter[s] the expressive content” of his message. … Because Phillips’ conduct (as described by the Colorado Court of Appeals) was expressive, Colorado’s public-accommodations law cannot penalize it unless the law withstands strict scrutiny...The Court of Appeals did not address whether Colorado’s law survives strict scrutiny, and I will not do so in the first instance. There is an obvious flaw, however, with one of the asserted justifications for Colorado’s law. According to the individual respondents, Colorado can compel Phillips’ speech to prevent him from “‘denigrat[ing] the dignity’” of same-sex couples, “‘assert[ing] [their] inferiority,’” and subjecting them to “‘humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment.’”These justifications are completely foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence. States cannot punish protected speech because some group finds it offensive, hurtful, stigmatic, unreasonable, or undignified. “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” Johnson, supra, at 414. A contrary rule would allow the government to stamp out virtually any speech at will. … In Obergefell, I warned that the Court’s decision would “inevitabl[y] . . . come into conflict” with religious liberty, “as individuals . . . are confronted with demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages between same-sex couples.” 576 U. S., at ___ (dissenting opinion) (slip op., at 15). This case proves that the conflict has already emerged. Because the Court’s decision vindicates Phillips’ right to free exercise, it seems that religious liberty has lived to fight another day. But, in future cases, the freedom of speech could be essential to preventing Obergefell from being used to “stamp out every vestige of dissent” and “vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy.” Id., at ___ (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 6). If that freedom is to maintain its vitality, reasoning like the Colorado Court of Appeals’ must be rejected. Ginsburg (dissenting): There is much in the Court’s opinion with which I agree. “[I]t is a general rule that [religious and philosophical] objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.” Ante, at 9. “Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the same terms and conditions as are offered to other members of the public.” Ante, at 10. “[P]urveyors of goods and services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons [may not] put up signs saying ‘no goods or services will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages.’ ” Ante, at 12. Gay persons may be spared from “indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.” Ante, at 18. I strongly disagree, however, with the Court’s conclusion that Craig and Mullins should lose this case. All of the above-quoted statements point in the opposite direction. The Court concludes that “Phillips’ religious objection was not considered with the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires.” Ante, at 17. This conclusion rests on evidence said to show the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s (Commission) hostility to religion. Hostility is discernible, the Court maintains, from the asserted “disparate consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of ” three other bakers who refused to make cakes requested by William Jack, an amicus here. Ante, at 18. The Court also finds hostility in statements made at two public hearings on Phillips’ appeal to the Commission. Ante, at 12–14. The different outcomes the Court features do not evidence hostility to religion of the kind we have previously held to signal a free-exercise violation, nor do the comments by one or two members of one of the four decision-making entities considering this case justify reversing the judgment below. … Statements made at the Commission’s public hearings on Phillips’ case provide no firmer support for the Court’s holding today. Whatever one may think of the statements in historical context, I see no reason why the comments of one or two Commissioners should be taken to overcome Phillips’ refusal to sell a wedding cake to Craig and Mullins. The proceedings involved several layers of independent decisionmaking, of which the Commission was but one. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a–6a. First, the Division had to find probable cause that Phillips violated CADA. Second, the ALJ entertained the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Third, the Commission heard Phillips’ appeal. Fourth, after the Commission’s ruling, the Colorado Court of Appeals considered the case de novo. What prejudice infected the determinations of the adjudicators in the case before and after the Commission? The Court does not say. Phillips’ case is thus far removed from the only precedent upon which the Court relies, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993), where the government action that violated a principle of religious neutrality implicated a sole decision-making body, the city council, see id., at 526–528. For the reasons stated, sensible application of CADA to a refusal to sell any wedding cake to a gay couple should occasion affirmance of the Colorado Court of Appeals’ judgment. I would so rule. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-111_j4el.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout]
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Jun 4, 2018 16:12
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Hughes is a good decision, imo.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:13
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evilweasel posted:there's a per curiam overturning of the Jane Doe case where the government tried to prohibit her from having an abortion and they hosed up the timing and whoops baby gone. that will get misinterpreted by some people who will get really mad about it, but it's just a decision saying that because the case got unilaterally mooted by the prevailing party before the losing party could take an appeal, supreme court precedent is to vacate all lower court decisions essentially so there's no precedent nobody had a chance to appeal Yeah, not interesting enough to include, especially since even the 4 decisions blew the 50000 character limit.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:13
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Mr. Nice! posted:Hughes is a good decision, imo. I think they were all good other than Masterpiece Cakeshop. As the other opinions all make clear, the court's opinion is an amazing piece of motivated reasoning attempting to duck as many issues as possible and give everybody something to cling to.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:15
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evilweasel posted:no. he wrote a decision refusing to rule on that issue and just saying that you can't call a bigot a bigot while considering his case, if the bigot is a bigot for sincerely held religious reasons. but the decision explicitly does not decide if you can still prosecute the bigot as long as you're polite about it. As others in this thread have said, this is a narrower ruling than many expected, but that ain't going to stop a shitload of bigots from challenging their local anti-discrimination laws now.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:16
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ulmont posted:Yeah, not interesting enough to include, especially since even the 4 decisions blew the 50000 character limit. Yeah, I just note it because I read a Washington Post article that described it in a way that completely missed the decision was technical and not on the merits and I feel like plenty of people (reasonably) aren't going to know to check the actual decision before getting mad at the article 
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Jun 4, 2018 16:16
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Is it now legal for me to open a shop and refuse to serve Christians based on my "deeply held" religious beliefs? Because if so every company in America should do this. loving SCOTUS.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:21
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The entire Jane Doe case is a loving clusterfuck. It should never be a question that someone who asks for an abortion get it, but the government did everything in their power to prevent it aided by TX's extremely restrictive abortion laws. It was literally the GAL working with the doctor to come in early as gently caress on their day off to even get everything done. Texas has a 24 hour waiting period following counseling and the doctor that gives counseling must be the one that performs the abortion, but because of workload and limited offices most doctors do not work every day at each clinic. The timeline is she gets into immigration custody and asks for an abortion. She's told no and sues. District court enters TRO favoring Doe and she goes to get counseling. While this is going on, gov appeals, and gets TRO overturned. Doe appeals again and wins. The gov doesn't rush to get in another appeal the same day because Texas law would require Doe to go through the 24 hour counseling with a new doctor. At 4 in the loving morning she gets her abortion before she gets appealed again.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:22
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axeil posted:Is it now legal for me to open a shop and refuse to serve Christians based on my "deeply held" religious beliefs? They punted on that issue, but when you get charged with discrimination they have to be polite about it.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:23
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Good to know that Kennedy is still poo poo whenever religion is invoked (see also- Hobby Lobby).
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Jun 4, 2018 16:24
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axeil posted:Is it now legal for me to open a shop and refuse to serve Christians based on my "deeply held" religious beliefs? No, and bakers cannot refuse to serve people because they're gay. In this case the baker won because the Colorado commission and court disregarded the baker's sincerely held beliefs instead of just taking them at face value like they were supposed to. This is impermissible religious animus and it's why it was overturned. They specifically did not rule on whether or not the baker could be required to bake the cake under colorado law.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:25
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Excellent ruling despite what many of the morons here think (or don't, rather)!!
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Jun 4, 2018 16:29
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FlamingLiberal posted:Good to know that Kennedy is still poo poo whenever religion is invoked (see also- Hobby Lobby). Because unlike you he actually understands law?
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Jun 4, 2018 16:31
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Mr. Nice! posted:No, and bakers cannot refuse to serve people because they're gay. In this case the baker won because the Colorado commission and court disregarded the baker's sincerely held beliefs instead of just taking them at face value like they were supposed to. This is impermissible religious animus and it's why it was overturned. And when the 'sincerely held belief' is 'I don't have to serve gay people' I wonder what precedent this sets regardless....
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Jun 4, 2018 16:33
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sexpig by night posted:And when the 'sincerely held belief' is 'I don't have to serve gay people' I wonder what precedent this sets regardless.... That government employees can't say at a hearing that you're a bigot.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:34
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why not, it's objectively true.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:36
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hobbesmaster posted:That government employees can't say at a hearing that you're a bigot. 'I just want to discriminate' 'this rhetoric has been used for bigotry and discrimination constantly and forgive me if I don't take it seriously at face value' 'im being oppressed'
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Jun 4, 2018 16:37
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Groovelord Neato posted:why not, it's objectively true. Because the government isn't allowed to have opinions on religious beliefs.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:37
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Sinteres posted:Because the government isn't allowed to have opinions on religious beliefs. which is a fine rule that cannot coexist with the idea that only "sincerely held" beliefs qualify the correct rule is that your religious beliefs are irrelevant when the issue is about your interaction with others
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Jun 4, 2018 16:38
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Groovelord Neato posted:why not, it's objectively true. You're supposed to sarcastically say "uhuh" and roll your eyes.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:39
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Sinteres posted:Because the government isn't allowed to have opinions on religious beliefs. their religious beliefs are immaterial - you cannot discriminate against others no matter what you hold sincerely in your diseased brain.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:40
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That would be fine if there weren't groups out there that are ready to claim 'religious discrimination' in order to fight against civil rights they don't agree with (gay rights, abortion), as we saw in the Hobby Lobby case. The actions of the plaintiffs should absolutely be under scrutiny.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:40
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The Macaroni posted:That's basically what Kagan's getting at in her dissent. There was probably a valid way forward to rule against the baker under Colorado law, but the Colorado officials asked the wrong question and said some dumb things that opened the door to appeal. If Trump's idiotic tweets can have impact on legal proceedings, then comments in public meetings of officials are fair game too. Hopefully at least the various people who have to shoot down the bigots' challenges will be able to read Kagan's concurrence as a guide for how to use anti-discrimination laws to prohibit bigotry without also having to allow other forms of bigotry-trolling (i.e. the guy who wanted anti-gay-marriage cakes).
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Jun 4, 2018 16:41
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evilweasel posted:which is a fine rule that cannot coexist with the idea that only "sincerely held" beliefs qualify Groovelord Neato posted:their religious beliefs are immaterial - you cannot discriminate against others no matter what you hold sincerely in your diseased brain. Right, which is why the civil rights board hosed up. They should have just ruled that the discrimination was illegal without weighing in on the beliefs at all. Maybe Kennedy wouldn't have gone for that either, but he got an easy out this time.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:42
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FlamingLiberal posted:That would be fine if there weren't groups out there that are ready to claim 'religious discrimination' in order to fight against civil rights they don't agree with (gay rights, abortion), as we saw in the Hobby Lobby case. The actions of the plaintiffs should absolutely be under scrutiny. Basically, you have a right to your religious beliefs, sincerely held or not. You do not have a right to a particular job. If your religious beliefs conflict with your job, either you rationalize a way to do your job or you find another job. Like if you're a pharmacist and object to giving abortion pills to teenagers, tough luck. That's part of being a pharmacist. Either do it despite your qualms or do something else for a living.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:47
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'The Colorado board messed up in their comments' was a convenient out for them not having to really rule on the main issue in the case. Not to say this hasn't happened before, but if you start to go down a path where people can yell 'RELIGION' and get a license to do what they feel like, you have a major problem on your hands.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:47
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Deteriorata posted:Basically, you have a right to your religious beliefs, sincerely held or not. You do not have a right to a particular job. If your religious beliefs conflict with your job, either you rationalize a way to do your job or you find another job.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:48
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Or say being a county clerk and refuse to sign off on marriage licenses for TEH GAYZ.axeil posted:Is it now legal for me to open a shop and refuse to serve Christians based on my "deeply held" religious beliefs? I think you'll find that FOR SOME REASON this only applies if said "Sincerely Held Beliefs" are American Christianity in nature. See the various issues with the niqab and drivers licenses.
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Jun 4, 2018 16:50
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