|
evilweasel posted:i have a special loathing for that sort of argument because every so often I get asked to find a case on a specific point with a stunningly obvious answer and have to explain, after hours of research, "there is no case on point because nobody's ever been stupid enough to claim that to a federal judge, the answer is X and there is no case that says one way or the other because NOBODY ELSE EVEN BOTHERS ASKING THAT" 
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 00:31
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 30, 2024 16:23 |
|
|
the "No Rule Against A Dog Playing Basketball" argument
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 12:53
|
|
|
 3 boxes
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 14:56
|
|
|
Looks like Rosales-Mireles v. United States (16-9493) & Chavez-Meza v. United States (17-5639). reading the opinions now. Edit, those two were criminal procedure ones. Haven't delved into Chavez but more decisions just got posted. Oh poo poo Lozman was back up in front of the court and won again  Wisconson gerrymandering just dropped. reading now. Mr. Nice! fucked around with this message at 15:17 on Jun 18, 2018 |
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 15:08
|
|
|
They're punting Gill
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 15:17
|
|
|
exploded mummy posted:They're punting Gill punted on standing
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 15:19
|
|
|
Pardon my ignorance here, but does that open the door for them to leave the Republican gerrymander in Wisconsin, but remove the Democratic one in Maryland?
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 15:20
|
|
|
It's a win, but a short term one for the Wisconsin gerrymander.
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 15:21
|
|
|
Time for them to punt Benisek and Abbott as well I guess
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 15:25
|
|
|
Benisek hit and it's a per curiam affirmation of the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction but does not at all touch on the merits. Both gerrymandering cases are turds for different reasons even if both technically correct. Yeah, you're right to not issue an injunction while waiting on us to clarify with gill, but we're actually just going to punt gill on standing. e2: Kagan's concurrence in Gill basically lays out how to prove you've got standing in a gerrymandered district and that allows you to challenge the scheme. Mr. Nice! fucked around with this message at 15:32 on Jun 18, 2018 |
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 15:27
|
|
|
Farchanter posted:Pardon my ignorance here, but does that open the door for them to leave the Republican gerrymander in Wisconsin, but remove the Democratic one in Maryland? They punted that one back to the district court as well. In a year or two, both of those will be back in front of the Supreme Court.
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 15:33
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:They punted that one back to the district court as well. In a year or two, both of those will be back in front of the Supreme Court. I think Kagan is setting them up as best she can, but even still she's got 5 against her.
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 15:35
|
|
|
I didn't dig too deep into Gill v Whitford, but did they legitimately not have standing? That sounds like they were trying to use the Efficiency Gap measurement to show standing, which would be ridiculous because your solution to the problem can't actually prove harm.
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 15:59
|
|
|
nessin posted:I didn't dig too deep into Gill v Whitford, but did they legitimately not have standing? That sounds like they were trying to use the Efficiency Gap measurement to show standing, which would be ridiculous because your solution to the problem can't actually prove harm. The essence of the ruling was that you cannot challenge a statewide gerrymander based on damage to you personally, you can only challenge your district. At least based on the theory the plaintiffs alleged - Kagan laid out an alternative theory that could allow a statewide challenge instead. It is resolvable by adding more plaintiffs and evidence of district-by-district cracking and packing and have enough illegal districts you basically blow up the gerrymander (plus adding Kagan's theory), but it makes it very hard to get something done early enough to implement it for 2020.
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 16:01
|
|
|
Mr. Nice! posted:I think Kagan is setting them up as best she can, but even still she's got 5 against her. SCOTUSblog folks say that may not mean anything - Kennedy joining that concurrence would make 5 which would make the overall ruling weird and ambiguous. It's extremely clear why she wrote it the way she did, and I think having 3 others along with her is a good (though expected) sign.
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 16:10
|
|
|
Even if Kagan's theory doesn't get 5 votes, the court laid out a simple way to challenge a statewide gerrymander. You just simply need to find a voter from every district to join your case, with each voter asserting that they were harmed in their district because of gerrymandering. They were too lazy to go to that extreme in Wisconsin (or didn't think it was necessary), but thats apparently what you have to do for standing.
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 16:30
|
|
|
Rigel posted:Even if Kagan's theory doesn't get 5 votes, the court laid out a simple way to challenge a statewide gerrymander. You just simply need to find a voter from every district to join your case, with each voter asserting that they were harmed in their district because of gerrymandering. They were too lazy to go to that extreme in Wisconsin (or didn't think it was necessary), but thats apparently what you have to do for standing. They specifically wanted to challenge the map as a whole and have a clear rule for "no, gerrymandered", because requiring district-by-district challenges allows for Texas-style replacing illegal districts with new illegal districts over and over again so that there are never legal districts.
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 16:32
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:They specifically wanted to challenge the map as a whole and have a clear rule for "no, gerrymandered", because requiring district-by-district challenges allows for Texas-style replacing illegal districts with new illegal districts over and over again so that there are never legal districts. This logic always seemed insane to me. If one district is cracked/packed by definition you have to pack/crack another district to allow it to occur. District borders are all relative to each other.
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 16:43
|
|
|
axeil posted:This logic always seemed insane to me. If one district is cracked/packed by definition you have to pack/crack another district to allow it to occur. District borders are all relative to each other. The state would be required to redraw some amount of neighboring districts. If you get 50 of 90 districts held as illegal you're drawing a new map. But the issue is that if that map is also gerrymandered, you have to re-prove that. The standard proposed would have allowed the court to immediately test it and say "no this is obviously just another illegal gerrymander". Now, that's still a powerful tool - if you can get a map tossed out every two years then grabbing the governor's seat just once lets you force a real map redraw. But it doesn't let you end a gerrymander preventing you from ever retaking the legislature without winning the governors' race.
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 16:47
|
|
|
Well, that's extremely disappointing. Especially if Kennedy retires this year.
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 16:48
|
|
|
Opinions! GILL ET AL. v. WHITFORD ET AL. Holding: The State of Wisconsin, like most other States, entrusts to its legislature the periodic task of redrawing the boundaries of the State’s legislative districts. A group of Wisconsin Democratic voters filed a complaint in the District Court, alleging that the legislature carried out this task with an eye to diminishing the ability of Wisconsin Democrats to convert Democratic votes into Democratic seats in the legislature. The plaintiffs asserted that, in so doing, the legislature had infringed their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But a plaintiff seeking relief in federal court must first demonstrate that he has standing to do so, including that he has “a personal stake in the outcome,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962), distinct from a “generally available grievance about government,” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U. S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam). That threshold requirement “ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives.” Certain of the plaintiffs before us alleged that they had such a personal stake in this case, but never followed up with the requisite proof. The District Court and this Court therefore lack the power to resolve their claims. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings, in the course of which those plaintiffs may attempt to demonstrate standing in accord with the analysis in this opinion. … Over the past five decades this Court has been repeatedly asked to decide what judicially enforceable limits, if any, the Constitution sets on the gerrymandering of voters along partisan lines. Our previous attempts at an answer have left few clear landmarks for addressing the question. … Our considerable efforts in Gaffney, Bandemer, Vieth, and LULAC leave unresolved whether such claims may be brought in cases involving allegations of partisan gerrymandering. In particular, two threshold questions remain: what is necessary to show standing in a case of this sort, and whether those claims are justiciable. Here we do not decide the latter question because the plaintiffs in this case have not shown standing under the theory upon which they based their claims for relief. … A federal court is not “a forum for generalized grievances,” and the requirement of such a personal stake “ensures that courts exercise power that is judicial in nature.” Lance, 549 U. S., at 439, 441. We enforce that requirement by insisting that a plaintiff satisfy the familiar three-part test for Article III standing: that he “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 6). Foremost among these requirements is injury in fact—a plaintiff ’s pleading and proof that he has suffered the “invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized,” i.e., which “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560, and n. 1 (1992). We have long recognized that a person’s right to vote is “individual and personal in nature.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 561 (1964). Thus, “voters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals have standing to sue” to remedy that disadvantage. Baker, 369 U. S., at 206. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that they suffered such injury from partisan gerrymandering, which works through “packing” and “cracking” voters of one party to disadvantage those voters. 1 App. 28–29, 32–33, Complaint ¶¶5, 15. That is, the plaintiffs claim a constitutional right not to be placed in legislative districts deliberately designed to “waste” their votes in elections where their chosen candidates will win in landslides (packing) or are destined to lose by closer margins (cracking). Id., at 32–33, ¶15. To the extent the plaintiffs’ alleged harm is the dilution of their votes, that injury is district specific. An individual voter in Wisconsin is placed in a single district. He votes for a single representative. The boundaries of the district, and the composition of its voters, determine whether and to what extent a particular voter is packed or cracked. … The plaintiffs argue that their claim of statewide injury is analogous to the claims presented in Baker and Reynolds, which they assert were “statewide in nature” because they rested on allegations that “districts throughout a state [had] been malapportioned.” Brief for Appellees 29. But, as we have already noted, the holdings in Baker and Reynolds were expressly premised on the understanding that the injuries giving rise to those claims were “individual and personal in nature,” Reynolds, 377 U. S., at 561, because the claims were brought by voters who alleged “facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals,” Baker, 369 U. S., at 206. … The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate Article III standing...To the extent that the plaintiffs’ alleged harm is the dilution of their votes, that injury is district specific. An individual voter in Wisconsin is placed in a single district. He votes for a single representative. The boundaries of the district, and the composition of its voters, determine whether and to what extent a particular voter is packed or cracked. A plaintiff who complains of gerrymandering, but who does not live in a gerrymandered district, “assert[s] only a generalized grievance against governmental conduct of which he or she does not approve.” … Four of the plaintiffs in this case—Mary Lynne Donohue, Wendy Sue Johnson, Janet Mitchell, and Jerome Wallace—pleaded a particularized burden along such lines. They alleged that Act 43 had “dilut[ed] the influence” of their votes as a result of packing or cracking in their legislative districts. See 1 App. 34–36, Complaint ¶¶20, 23, 24, 26. The facts necessary to establish standing, however, must not only be alleged at the pleading stage, but also proved at trial. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 561. As the proceedings in the District Court progressed to trial, the plaintiffs failed to meaningfully pursue their allegations of individual harm. The plaintiffs did not seek to show such requisite harm since, on this record, it appears that not a single plaintiff sought to prove that he or she lives in a cracked or packed district. … In cases where a plaintiff fails to demonstrate Article III standing, we usually direct the dismissal of the plaintiff ’s claims. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 354 (2006). This is not the usual case. It concerns an unsettled kind of claim this Court has not agreed upon, the contours and justiciability of which are unresolved. Under the circumstances, and in light of the plaintiffs’ allegations that Donohue, Johnson, Mitchell, and Wallace live in districts where Democrats like them have been packed or cracked, we decline to direct dismissal. We therefore remand the case to the District Court so that the plaintiffs may have an opportunity to prove concrete and particularized injuries using evidence—unlike the bulk of the evidence presented thus far—that would tend to demonstrate a burden on their individual votes. Cf. Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, 575 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (remanding for further consideration of the plaintiffs’ gerrymandering claims on a district-by-district basis). We express no view on the merits of the plaintiffs’ case. Lineup: Roberts, joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan, and by Thomas and Gorsuch (other than to Part III, which sends back for remand instead of dismissing). Concurrence by Kagan, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Concurrence in part by Thomas, joined by Gorsuch. Notes From Other Opinions: Kagan (concurring): The Court holds today that a plaintiff asserting a partisan gerrymandering claim based on a theory of vote dilution must prove that she lives in a packed or cracked district in order to establish standing. See ante, at 14–17. The Court also holds that none of the plaintiffs here have yet made that required showing. See ante, at 17. I agree with both conclusions, and with the Court’s decision to remand this case to allow the plaintiffs to prove that they live in packed or cracked districts, see ante, at 21. I write to address in more detail what kind of evidence the present plaintiffs (or any additional ones) must offer to support that allegation...The key point is that the case could go forward in much the same way it did below: Given the charges of statewide packing and cracking, affecting a slew of districts and residents, the challengers could make use of statewide evidence and seek a statewide remedy. I also write separately because I think the plaintiffs may have wanted to do more than present a vote dilution theory. Partisan gerrymandering no doubt burdens individual votes, but it also causes other harms. And at some points in this litigation, the plaintiffs complained of a different injury—an infringement of their First Amendment right of association. The Court rightly does not address that alternative argument: The plaintiffs did not advance it with sufficient clarity or concreteness to make it a real part of the case. But because on remand they may well develop the associational theory, I address the standing requirement that would then apply. As I’ll explain, a plaintiff presenting such a theory would not need to show that her particular voting district was packed or cracked for standing purposes because that fact would bear no connection to her substantive claim. Indeed, everything about the litigation of that claim—from standing on down to remedy—would be statewide in nature. Partisan gerrymandering, as this Court has recognized, is “incompatible with democratic principles.” …[P]artisan gerrymandering injures enough individuals and organizations in enough concrete ways to ensure that standing requirements, properly applied, will not often or long prevent courts from reaching the merits of cases like this one. Or from insisting, when they do, that partisan officials stop degrading the nation’s democracy. … Everything said so far relates only to suits alleging that a partisan gerrymander dilutes individual votes. That is the way the Court sees this litigation. See ante, at 14–17. And as I’ll discuss, that is the most reasonable view. See infra, at 10–11. But partisan gerrymanders inflict other kinds of constitutional harm as well. Among those injuries, partisan gerrymanders may infringe the First Amendment rights of association held by parties, other political organizations, and their members. The plaintiffs here have sometimes pointed to that kind of harm. To the extent they meant to do so, and choose to do so on remand, their associational claim would occasion a different standing inquiry than the one in the Court’s opinion. JUSTICE KENNEDY explained the First Amendment associational injury deriving from a partisan gerrymander in his concurring opinion in Vieth, 541 U. S. 267. “Representative democracy,” JUSTICE KENNEDY pointed out, is today “unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together” to advance their political beliefs. ... As so formulated, the associational harm of a partisan gerrymander is distinct from vote dilution. … [N]othing in the Court’s opinion prevents the plaintiffs on remand from pursuing an associational claim, or from satisfying the different standing requirement that theory would entail. The Court’s opinion is about a suit challenging a partisan gerrymander on a particular ground—that it dilutes the votes of individual citizens. … Because of the way this suit was litigated, I agree that the plaintiffs have so far failed to establish their standing to sue, and I fully concur in the Court’s opinion. But of one thing we may unfortunately be sure. Courts—and in particular this Court—will again be called on to redress extreme partisan gerrymanders. I am hopeful we will then step up to our responsibility to vindicate the Constitution against a contrary law. Thomas (concurring in part and in the judgment): I join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion because I agree that the plaintiffs have failed to prove Article III standing. I do not join Part III, which gives the plaintiffs another chance to prove their standing on remand. When a plaintiff lacks standing, our ordinary practice is to remand the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. E.g., Lance v. Coffman, 549 U. S. 437, 442 (2007) (per curiam); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 354 (2006); United States v. Hays, 515 U. S. 737, 747 (1995). The Court departs from our usual practice because this is supposedly “not the usual case.” Ante, at 21. But there is nothing unusual about it. As the Court explains, the plaintiffs’ lack of standing follows from longestablished principles of law. See ante, at 13–17. After a year and a half of litigation in the District Court, including a 4-day trial, the plaintiffs had a more-than-ample opportunity to prove their standing under these principles. They failed to do so. Accordingly, I would have remanded this case with instructions to dismiss. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1161_dc8f.pdf LOZMAN v. CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA Brief Background: After petitioner Lozman towed his floating home into a slip in a marina owned by the city of Riviera Beach, he became an outspoken critic of the City’s plan to use its eminent domain power to seize waterfront homes for private development and often made critical comments about officials during the public-comment period of city council meetings. He also filed a lawsuit alleging that the City Council’s approval of an agreement with developers violated Florida’s open-meetings laws. In June 2006 the Council held a closed-door session, in part to discuss Lozman’s lawsuit. He alleges that the meeting’s transcript shows that councilmembers devised an official plan to intimidate him, and that many of his subsequent disputes with city officials and employees were part of the City’s retaliation plan. Five months after the closed-door meeting, the Council held a public meeting. During the public-comment session, Lozman began to speak about the arrests of officials from other jurisdictions. When he refused a councilmember’s request to stop making his remarks, the councilmember told the police officer in attendance to “carry him out.” The officer handcuffed Lozman and ushered him out of the meeting. The City contends that he was arrested for violating the City Council’s rules of procedure by discussing issues unrelated to the City and then refusing to leave the podium. Lozman claims that his arrest was to retaliate for his lawsuit and his prior public criticisms of city officials. The State’s attorney determined that there was probable cause for his arrest, but decided to dismiss the charges. … Lozman then filed suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging a number of incidents that, under his theory, showed the City’s purpose was to harass him, including by initiating an admiralty lawsuit against his floating home, see Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U. S. 115. [Lozman lost because the jury instructions said that if there was probable cause for the arrest he lost.] Holding: This case requires the Court to address the intersection of principles that define when arrests are lawful and principles that prohibit the government from retaliating against a person for having exercised the right to free speech. An arrest deprives a person of essential liberties, but if there is probable cause to believe the person has committed a criminal offense there is often no recourse for the deprivation. See, e.g., Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U. S. 146, 153 (2004). At the same time, the First Amendment prohibits government officials from retaliating against individuals for engaging in protected speech. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U. S. 574, 592 (1998). The petitioner in this case alleges that high-level city policymakers adopted a plan to retaliate against him for protected speech and then ordered his arrest when he attempted to make remarks during the public-comment portion of a city council meeting. The petitioner now concedes there was probable cause for the arrest. The question is whether the presence of probable cause bars petitioner’s retaliatory arrest claim under these circumstances. The city of Riviera Beach is on the Atlantic coast of Florida, about 75 miles north of Miami. The petitioner here is Fane Lozman. In 2006 Lozman towed his floating home into a slip in the City-owned marina, where he became a resident. Thus began his contentious relationship with the City’s elected officials. Soon after his arrival Lozman became an outspoken critic of the City’s plan to use its eminent domain power to seize homes along the waterfront for private development. Lozman often spoke during the public-comment period at city council meetings and criticized councilmembers, the mayor, and other public employees. He also filed a lawsuit alleging that the Council’s approval of an agreement with developers violated Florida’s open-meetings laws. In June 2006 the Council held a closed-door session, in part to discuss the open-meetings lawsuit that Lozman recently had filed. According to the transcript of the meeting, Councilmember Elizabeth Wade suggested that the City use its resources to “intimidate” Lozman and others who had filed lawsuits against the City. App. 176. Later in the meeting a different councilmember asked whether there was “a consensus of what Ms. Wade is saying,” and others responded in the affirmative. Id., at 181182. Lozman alleges that these remarks formed an official plan to intimidate him. The City, on the other hand, maintains that the only consensus reached during the meeting was to invest the money and resources necessary to prevail in the litigation against it. In all events, Lozman became embroiled in a number of disputes with city officials and employees over the ensuing years, many of which Lozman says were part of the City’s plan of retaliation. The dispute that led to this litigation took place in 2006. In November of that year, five months after the closed-door meeting where the “intimidate” comment was made, the City Council held a public meeting. The agenda included a public-comment session in which citizens could address the Council for a few minutes. As he had done on earlier occasions and would do more than 200 times over the coming years, see Tr. in No. 9:08–cv– 80134 (SD Fla.), Doc. 785, p. 61, Lozman stepped up to the podium to give remarks. He began to discuss the recent arrest of a former county official. Councilmember Wade interrupted Lozman, directing him to stop making those remarks. Lozman continued speaking, this time about the arrest of a former official from the city of West Palm Beach. Wade then called for the assistance of the police officer in attendance. The officer approached Lozman and asked him to leave the podium. Lozman refused. So Wade told the officer to “carry him out.” The officer handcuffed Lozman and ushered him out of the meeting. The incident was recorded on video. See Record, Def. Exh. 505, Doc. 687, available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/media/ video/mp4files/Lozman_v_RivieraBeach.mp4. According to the City, Lozman was arrested because he violated the City Council’s rules of procedure by discussing issues unrelated to the City and then refused to leave the podium. According to Lozman, the arrest was to retaliate for his open-meetings lawsuit against the City and his prior public criticisms of city officials. Under arrest, Lozman was escorted to police headquarters. He was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence and then released. Later, the State’s attorney determined there was probable cause to arrest Lozman for those offenses but decided to dismiss the charges. Lozman filed this lawsuit under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. The complaint described a number of alleged incidents that, under Lozman’s theory, showed the City’s purpose to harass him in different ways. These ranged from a city employee telling Lozman that his dog needed a muzzle to the City’s initiation of an admiralty lawsuit against Lozman’s floating home—the latter resulting in an earlier decision by this Court. See Lozman v. Riviera Beach, 568 U. S. 115 (2013). The evidence and arguments presented by both parties with respect to all the matters alleged in Lozman’s suit consumed 19 days of trial before a jury. The jury returned a verdict for the City on all of the claims. Before this Court, Lozman seeks a reversal only as to the City’s alleged retaliatory arrest at the November 2006 city council meeting. The District Court instructed the jury that, for Lozman to prevail on this claim, he had to prove that the arresting officer was himself motivated by impermissible animus against Lozman’s protected speech and that the officer lacked probable cause to make the arrest. The District Court determined that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support probable cause for the offenses charged at the time of the arrest (disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence). But the District Court concluded that there may have been probable cause to arrest Lozman for violating a Florida statute that prohibits interruptions or disturbances in schools, churches, or other public assemblies. Fla. Stat. §871.01 (2017). (The City had brought this statute to the District Court’s attention during the course of the litigation.) The District Court allowed the jury to decide whether there was probable cause to arrest for the public-disturbance offense. … The issue before the Court is a narrow one...Lozman’s claim is that, notwithstanding the presence of probable cause, his arrest at the city council meeting violated the First Amendment because the arrest was ordered in retaliation for his earlier, protected speech: his open-meetings lawsuit and his prior public criticisms of city officials. The question this Court is asked to consider is whether the existence of probable cause bars that First Amendment retaliation claim. … Here Lozman does not sue the officer who made the arrest. Indeed, Lozman likely could not have maintained a retaliation claim against the arresting officer in these circumstances, because the officer appears to have acted in good faith, and there is no showing that the officer had any knowledge of Lozman’s prior speech or any motive to arrest him for his earlier expressive activities. Instead Lozman alleges more governmental action than simply an arrest. His claim is that the City itself retaliated against him pursuant to an “official municipal policy” of intimidation. Monell, 436 U. S., at 691. In particular, he alleges that the City, through its legislators, formed a premeditated plan to intimidate him in retaliation for his criticisms of city officials and his open-meetings lawsuit. And he asserts that the City itself, through the same high officers, executed that plan by ordering his arrest at the November 2006 city council meeting...will require objective evidence of a policy motivated by retaliation to survive summary judgment. Lozman, for instance, cites a transcript of a closed-door city council meeting and a video recording of his arrest. There is thus little risk of a flood of retaliatory arrest suits against high-level policymakers. As a final matter, it must be underscored that this Court has recognized the “right to petition as one of the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.” … For these reasons, Lozman need not prove the absence of probable cause to maintain a claim of retaliatory arrest against the City. On facts like these, Mt. Healthy provides the correct standard for assessing a retaliatory arrest claim. The Court need not, and does not, address the elements required to prove a retaliatory arrest claim in other contexts. This is not to say, of course, that Lozman is ultimately entitled to relief or even a new trial. On remand, the Court of Appeals, applying Mt. Healthy and other relevant precedents, may consider any arguments in support of the District Court’s judgment that have been preserved by the City. Among other matters, the Court of Appeals may wish to consider (1) whether any reasonable juror could find that the City actually formed a retaliatory policy to intimidate Lozman during its June 2006 closed-door session; (2) whether any reasonable juror could find that the November 2006 arrest constituted an official act by the City; and (3) whether, under Mt. Healthy, the City has proved that it would have arrested Lozman regardless of any retaliatory animus—for example, if Lozman’s conduct during prior city council meetings had also violated valid rules as to proper subjects of discussion, thus explaining his arrest here. Lineup: Kennedy, joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Dissent by Thomas. Notes From Other Opinions: Thomas (dissenting): We granted certiorari to decide “whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment claim for retaliatory arrest under [42 U. S. C.] §1983.” Ante, at 5. Instead of resolving that question, the Court decides that probable cause should not defeat a “unique class of retaliatory arrest claims.” Ante, at 12. To fall within this unique class, a claim must involve objective evidence, of an official municipal policy of retaliation, formed well before the arrest, in response to highly protected speech, that has little relation to the offense of arrest. See ante, at 11–12. No one briefed, argued, or even hinted at the rule that the Court announces today. Instead of dreaming up our own rule, I would have answered the question presented and held that plaintiffs must plead and prove a lack of probable cause as an element of a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim. I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-21_p8k0.pdf CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES Brief Background: Here, petitioner pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The judge reviewed the Guidelines, determined the range to be 135 to 168 months, and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the range. The Sentencing Commission later lowered the relevant range to 108 to 135 months, and petitioner sought a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(2). Petitioner asked the judge to reduce his sentence to the bottom of the new range, but the judge reduced petitioner’s sentence to 114 months instead. The order was entered on a form certifying that the judge had “considered” petitioner’s “motion” and had “tak[en] into account” the §3553(a) factors and the relevant Guidelines policy statement. On appeal, petitioner argued the sentencing judge did not adequately explain why he rejected petitioner’s request for a 108-month sentence. Holding: This case concerns a criminal drug offender originally sentenced in accordance with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Subsequently, the Sentencing Commission lowered the applicable Guidelines sentencing range; the offender asked for a sentence reduction in light of the lowered range; and the District Judge reduced his original sentence from 135 months’ imprisonment to 114 months’. The offender, believing he should have obtained a yet greater reduction, argues that the District Judge did not adequately explain why he imposed a sentence of 114 months rather than a lower sentence. The Court of Appeals held that the judge’s explanation was adequate. And we agree with the Court of Appeals. … At bottom, the sentencing judge need only “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.” Ibid. When a judge applies a sentence within the Guidelines range, he or she often does not need to provide a lengthy explanation. As we said in Rita, “[c]ircumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence (in terms of §3553(a) and other congressional mandates) in the typical case, and that the judge has found that the case before him is typical.” Id., at 357. … Indeed, the case before us differs from the Guidelines cases that Rita describes in only one significant respect. It concerns a limited form of resentencing. ... The Government, pointing out that this is a sentence-modification case, argues that this fact alone should secure it a virtually automatic victory. That is because, unlike an ordinary Guidelines sentencing case, the statute governing sentence-modification motions does not insist that the judge provide a “reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range.” … We need not go so far. Even assuming (purely for argument’s sake) district courts have equivalent duties when initially sentencing a defendant and when later modifying the sentence, what the District Court did here was sufficient. At the original sentencing, the judge “must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review.” 552 U. S., at 50; see also Rita, 551 U. S., at 356 (“The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority”). Just how much of an explanation this requires, however, depends, as we have said, upon the circumstances of the particular case. … Petitioner argues that the judge should have explained more here because there is, or should be, some kind of presumption that the judge will choose a point within the new lower Guidelines range that is “proportional” to the point previously chosen in the older higher Guidelines range. We are not aware of any law or any convincing reason, however, suggesting that this is so. … This record was before the judge when he considered petitioner’s request for a sentence modification. He was the same judge who had sentenced petitioner originally. Petitioner asked the judge to reduce his sentence to 108 months, the bottom of the new range, stressing various educational courses he had taken in prison. The Government pointed to his having also broken a moderately serious rule while in prison. The judge certified (on a form) that he had “considered” petitioner’s “motion” and had “tak[en] into account” the relevant Guidelines policy statements and the §3553(a) factors. Id., at 106–107 (under seal). He then reduced the sentence to 114 months. The record as a whole strongly suggests that the judge originally believed that, given petitioner’s conduct, 135 months was an appropriately high sentence. So it is unsurprising that the judge considered a sentence somewhat higher than the bottom of the reduced range to be appropriate. As in Rita, there was not much else for the judge to say. Lineup: Breyer, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Alito. Dissent by Kennedy, joined by Sotomayor and Kagan. Gorsuch did not participate. Notes From Other Opinions: Kennedy (dissenting): When the District Court reduced petitioner Adaucto Chavez-Meza’s sentence, it entered its order on a terse “AO–247” form. An example of this form is attached as an Appendix, infra. On the form order, the District Court checked a box next to preprinted language stating that it had “considered” Chavez-Meza’s motion for a reduced sentence and that it had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG §1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U. S. C. §3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable.” App. 106–107 (under seal). The District Court checked another box indicating that Chavez-Meza’s motion was granted, and the court stated that it was reducing his sentence to 114 months. Ibid. But the District Court did not explain why it chose that particular sentence or why it had not sentenced ChavezMeza to the bottom of his Guidelines range, as it had done at his original sentencing. Under these circumstances, in my view the District Court’s order was insufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review, a conclusion that requires this respectful dissent. … The form order discloses no basis for determining why the District Court did not sentence Chavez-Meza to the bottom of his new Guidelines range, as it had when it imposed his original sentence. The Court points out that there is no presumption in favor of a proportional reduction when a judge reduces a prisoner’s sentence pursuant to §3582(c)(2). Ante, at 6–7. That is true, as far as it goes. The issue here, however, is not whether district courts must grant proportional reductions; rather, the issue is what explanation should be required to permit meaningful review of a trial court’s resentencing order. The amount of necessary explanation might be different when a district court grants a proportional reduction—for example, when it sentences a defendant to the top or the bottom of his Guidelines range for both the initial and reduced sentence. In that circumstance, in most instances, an appellate court properly can infer that the district court’s reasons were the same as those it gave when it imposed the initial sentence. … In contrast to a proportional reduction in a prisoner’s sentence, a nonproportional reduction suggests that the district court’s reasons for choosing a particular sentence might be different from those it gave when it imposed the sentence in the first instance. Accordingly, a more specific explanation—but by no means an elaborate one—is necessary for an appellate court to determine why the district court chose a new point on the revised Guidelines range. … Here, for example, the District Court simply could have added a sentence or two to the AO–247 form’s “Additional Comments” box. Or, perhaps preferably, trial courts could use an expanded version of the AO–247 form that allows judges to indicate, even by checking a box, the reason or reasons for choosing a particular sentence. In this case, however, the District Court’s reasons remain a mystery. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-5639_8m59.pdf ROSALES-MIRELES v. UNITED STATES Brief Background: Petitioner Florencio Rosales-Mireles pleaded guilty to illegal reentry into the United States. In calculating the Guidelines range, the Probation Office’s presentence report mistakenly counted a state misdemeanor conviction twice. As a result, the report yielded a Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months, when the correctly calculated range would have been 70 to 87 months. Rosales-Mireles did not object to the error in the District Court, which relied on the miscalculated Guidelines range and sentenced him to 78 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Rosales-Mireles challenged the incorrect Guidelines range for the first time. The Fifth Circuit found that the Guidelines error was plain and that it affected Rosales-Mireles’ substantial rights because there was a “reasonable probability that he would have been subject to a different sentence but for the error.” The Fifth Circuit nevertheless declined to remand the case for resentencing, concluding that Rosales-Mireles had not established that the error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings because neither the error nor the resulting sentence “would shock the conscience.” Holding: Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides that a court of appeals may consider errors that are plain and affect substantial rights, even though they are raised for the first time on appeal. This case concerns the bounds of that discretion, and whether a miscalculation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines range, that has been determined to be plain and to affect a defendant’s substantial rights, calls for a court of appeals to exercise its discretion under Rule 52(b) to vacate the defendant’s sentence. The Court holds that such an error will in the ordinary case, as here, seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, and thus will warrant relief. … Petitioner Florencio Rosales-Mireles pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U. S. C. §§1326(a), (b)(2). The Probation Office in its presentence investigation report mistakenly counted a 2009 state conviction of misdemeanor assault twice. This double counting resulted in a criminal history score of 13, which placed RosalesMireles in criminal history category VI. Combined with his offense level of 21, that yielded a Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months. Had the criminal history score been calculated correctly, Rosales-Mireles would have been in criminal history category V, and the resulting Guidelines range would have been 70 to 87 months. See USSG ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). … Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides that “[a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the [district] court’s attention.” In United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725 (1993), the Court established three conditions that must be met before a court may consider exercising its discretion to correct the error. “First, there must be an error that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned. Second, the error must be plain—that is to say, clear or obvious. Third, the error must have affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” Once those three conditions have been met, “the court of appeals should exercise its discretion to correct the forfeited error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” It is this last consideration, often called Olano’s fourth prong, that we are asked to clarify and apply in this case. … The Fifth Circuit nevertheless declined to exercise its discretion to vacate and remand the case for resentencing because it concluded that Rosales-Mireles failed to establish that the error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. In its view, “the types of errors that warrant reversal are ones that would shock the conscience of the common man, serve as a powerful indictment against our system of justice, or seriously call into question the competence or integrity of the district judge.” Id., at 250 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Because RosalesMireles’ sentence of 78 months fell within the correct range of 70 to 87 months, the Fifth Circuit held that neither the error nor the resulting sentence “would shock the conscience.” Ibid. The Fifth Circuit’s articulation of Olano’s fourth prong is out of step with the practice of other Circuits. We granted certiorari to resolve that conflict, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), and now reverse. … The Court has never said that errors must amount to a “powerful indictment” of the system, a phrase which implies by its terms that the only errors worthy of correction are those that rise to the level of grossly serious misconduct. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit’s emphasis on the “competence or integrity of the district judge” narrows Olano’s instruction that an error should be corrected if it seriously affects “judicial proceedings.” In articulating such a high standard, the Fifth Circuit substantially changed Olano’s fourth prong. The effect of the Fifth Circuit’s heightened standard is especially pronounced in a case like this one. A plain Guidelines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights is precisely the type of error that ordinarily warrants relief under Rule 52(b). In Molina-Martinez, the Court recognized that “[w]hen a defendant is sentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—whether or not the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct range—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error.” … For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Fifth Circuit abused its discretion in applying an unduly burdensome articulation of Olano’s fourth prong and declining to remand Rosales-Mireles’ case for resentencing. In the ordinary case, as here, the failure to correct a plain Guidelines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights will seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. Lineup: Sotomayor, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Dissent by Thomas, joined by Alito. Notes From Other Opinions: Thomas (dissenting): The Court holds that, “in the ordinary case,” a miscalculation of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range will “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Ante, at 1. In other words, a defendant who does not alert the district court to a plain miscalculation of his Guidelines range—and is not happy with the sentence he receives—can raise the Guidelines error for the first time on appeal and ordinarily get another shot at a more favorable sentence. The Court’s decision goes far beyond what was necessary to answer the question presented. And it contravenes long-established principles of plain-error review. I respectfully dissent. … This Court has held that Rule 52(b) is satisfied only when four requirements are met: “(1) there is ‘an error,’ (2) the error is ‘plain,’” “(3) the error ‘affect[s] substantial rights,’” and “(4) . . . ‘the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”’” Henderson v. United States, 568 U. S. 266, 272 (2013). The fourth requirement—the one at issue here—is discretionary. Ibid. It should “be applied on a casespecific and fact-intensive basis.” Puckett, supra, at 142. And it cannot be satisfied by “a plain error affecting substantial rights . . . , without more, . . . for otherwise the discretion afforded by Rule 52(b) would be illusory.” United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 737 (1993). Instead, “only ‘particularly egregious errors’” will meet the fourth prong’s rigorous standard. … The sentence that Rosales-Mireles received was not only within both the improperly and properly calculated Guidelines ranges but also in the bottom half of both possible ranges. See ante, at 4. If the District Court had used the proper Guidelines range at his initial sentencing, then the sentence that it ultimately gave Rosales-Mireles would have been presumptively reasonable on appeal. See 850 F. 3d 246, 250 (CA5 2017); Rita v. United States, 551 U. S. 338, 347 (2007). And the Fifth Circuit determined that his sentence was in fact reasonable. See 850 F. 3d, at 250– 251. Leaving that reasonable sentence in place would not “‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Young, 470 U. S., at 15. A sentence that is substantively reasonable is hardly the kind of “particularly egregious erro[r]” that warrants plain-error relief. Frady, 456 U. S., at 163. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-9493_e0fi.pdf O. JOHN BENISEK, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. LINDA H. LAMONE, ADMINISTRATOR, MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, ET AL. Holding: This appeal arises from the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction in the District Court. Appellants are several Republican voters, plaintiffs below, who allege that Maryland’s Sixth Congressional District was gerrymandered in 2011 for the purpose of retaliating against them for their political views. In May 2017, six years after the Maryland General Assembly redrew the Sixth District, plaintiffs moved the District Court to enjoin Maryland’s election officials from holding congressional elections under the 2011 map. They asserted that “extend[ing] this constitutional offense”— i.e., the alleged gerrymander—“into the 2018 election would be a manifest and irreparable injury.” Record in No. 1:13–cv–3233, Doc. 177–1, p. 3. In order to allow time for the creation of a new districting map, plaintiffs urged the District Court to enter a preliminary injunction by August 18, 2017. Id., at 32. On August 24, 2017, the District Court denied plaintiffs’ motion and stayed further proceedings pending this Court’s disposition of partisan gerrymandering claims in Gill v. Whitford, No. 16–1161. … We now note our jurisdiction and review the District Court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, keeping in mind that a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” … Even if we assume—contrary to the findings of the District Court— that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, the balance of equities and the public interest tilted against their request for a preliminary injunction. First, a party requesting a preliminary injunction must generally show reasonable diligence. That is as true in election law cases as elsewhere. In this case, appellants did not move for a preliminary injunction in the District Court until six years, and three general elections, after the 2011 map was adopted, and over three years after the plaintiffs’ first complaint was filed. … Second, a due regard for the public interest in orderly elections supported the District Court’s discretionary decision to deny a preliminary injunction and to stay the proceedings. Plaintiffs themselves represented to the District Court that any injunctive relief would have to be granted by August 18, 2017, to ensure the timely completion of a new districting scheme in advance of the 2018 election season. Despite the District Court’s undisputedly diligent efforts, however, that date had “already come and gone” by the time the court ruled on plaintiffs’ motion. … On top of this time constraint was the legal uncertainty surrounding any potential remedy for the plaintiffs’ asserted injury. At the time the District Court made its decision, the appeal in Gill was pending before this Court. The District Court recognized that our decision in Gill had the potential to “shed light on critical questions in this case” and to set forth a “framework” by which plaintiffs’ claims could be decided and, potentially, remedied. Lineup: Per Curiam. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-333_b97c.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout]
|
|
#
?
Jun 18, 2018 17:28
|
|
|
Okay, so remember this https://www.npr.org/2018/02/27/589096901/supreme-court-ruling-means-immigrants-can-continue-to-be-detained-indefinitely Anyone know what’s going on in lower courts?
|
|
#
?
Jun 20, 2018 17:56
|
|
|
Silver Nitrate posted:Okay, so remember this Looks like briefing at the 9th circuit, although I haven't pulled the docket. https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/aclu_socal_rodriguez_v_robbins_20180530_petitioners_supplemental_brief.pdf
|
|
#
?
Jun 20, 2018 18:07
|
|
|
Four decisions today: States can collect sales tax on all internet sales ALJs in the SEC are now "officers of the united states" and must be appointed by appropriate personnel. This is going to let a lot of fraudsters weasel out of punishment. An immigration notice to appear does not toll the running of the continuous 10 year clock to avoid deportation if it does not have a specified time/place. Finally, and this one is going to cause some major bullshit down the road, stock options are not monetary compensation under the Railroad Pension act, and that language is probably going to be stretched to allow a lot of tax dodging using options now.
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 16:35
|
|
|
Mr. Nice! posted:Finally, and this one is going to cause some major bullshit down the road, stock options are not monetary compensation under the Railroad Pension act, and that language is probably going to be stretched to allow a lot of tax dodging using options now. What does this practically mean?
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 16:43
|
|
|
Opinions! SOUTH DAKOTA v. WAYFAIR, INC., ET AL. Holding: When a consumer purchases goods or services, the consumer’s State often imposes a sales tax. This case requires the Court to determine when an out-of-state seller can be required to collect and remit that tax. All concede that taxing the sales in question here is lawful. The question is whether the out-of-state seller can be held responsible for its payment, and this turns on a proper interpretation of the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3. In two earlier cases the Court held that an out-of-state seller’s liability to collect and remit the tax to the consumer’s State depended on whether the seller had a physical presence in that State, but that mere shipment of goods into the consumer’s State, following an order from a catalog, did not satisfy the physical presence requirement. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992). The Court granted certiorari here to reconsider the scope and validity of the physical presence rule mandated by those cases. … [T]he Court concludes that the physical presence rule of Quill is unsound and incorrect. The Court’s decisions in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992), and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967), should be, and now are, overruled. … Modern precedents rest upon two primary principles that mark the boundaries of a State’s authority to regulate interstate commerce. First, state regulations may not discriminate against interstate commerce; and second, States may not impose undue burdens on interstate commerce. State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce face “a virtually per se rule of invalidity.” Granholm v. Heald, 544 U. S. 460, 476 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). State laws that “regulat[e] even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest . . . will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” … These principles also animate the Court’s Commerce Clause precedents addressing the validity of state taxes. The Court explained the now-accepted framework for state taxation in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977). The Court held that a State “may tax exclusively interstate commerce so long as the tax does not create any effect forbidden by the Commerce Clause.” Id., at 285. After all, “interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes.” D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U. S. 24, 31 (1988). The Court will sustain a tax so long as it (1) applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services the State provides. See Complete Auto, supra, at 279. … The Court held [in Bellas Hess] that a mail-order company “whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail” lacked the requisite minimum contacts with the State required by both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. Id., at 758. Unless the retailer maintained a physical presence such as “retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State,” the State lacked the power to require that retailer to collect a local use tax. … [T]he Court in Quill overruled the due process holding, but not the Commerce Clause holding; and it thus reaffirmed the physical presence rule. 504 U. S., at 307–308, 317–318. … Quill is flawed on its own terms. First, the physical presence rule is not a necessary interpretation of the requirement that a state tax must be “applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State.” Complete Auto, 430 U. S., at 279. Second, Quill creates rather than resolves market distortions. And third, Quill imposes the sort of arbitrary, formalistic distinction that the Court’s modern Commerce Clause precedents disavow. ... In the absence of Quill and Bellas Hess, the first prong of the Complete Auto test simply asks whether the tax applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State. 430 U. S., at 279. “[S]uch a nexus is established when the taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business’ in that jurisdiction.” Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U. S. 1, 11 (2009). Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and virtual contacts respondents have with the State. The Act applies only to sellers that deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into South Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods and services into the State on an annual basis. … The question remains whether some other principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act. Because the Quill physical presence rule was an obvious barrier to the Act’s validity, these issues have not yet been litigated or briefed, and so the Court need not resolve them here. That said, South Dakota’s tax system includes several features that appear designed to prevent discrimination against or undue burdens upon interstate commerce. First, the Act applies a safe harbor to those who transact only limited business in South Dakota. Second, the Act ensures that no obligation to remit the sales tax may be applied retroactively. S. B. 106, §5. Third, South Dakota is one of more than 20 States that have adopted the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement. This system standardizes taxes to reduce administrative and compliance costs: It requires a single, state level tax administration, uniform definitions of products and services, simplified tax rate structures, and other uniform rules. It also provides sellers access to sales tax administration software paid for by the State. Sellers who choose to use such software are immune from audit liability. See App. 26–27. Any remaining claims regarding the application of the Commerce Clause in the absence of Quill and Bellas Hess may be addressed in the first instance on remand. Lineup: Kennedy, joined by Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, and Gorsuch. Concurrence by Thomas. Concurrence by Gorsuch. Dissent by Roberts, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Notes From Other Opinions: Thomas (concurring): Justice Byron White joined the majority opinion in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967). Twenty-five years later, we had the opportunity to overrule Bellas Hess in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992). Only Justice White voted to do so. See id., at 322 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). I should have joined his opinion. Today, I am slightly further removed from Quill than Justice White was from Bellas Hess. And like Justice White, a quarter century of experience has convinced me that Bellas Hess and Quill “can no longer be rationally justified.” 504 U. S., at 333. The same is true for this Court’s entire negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1). Although I adhered to that jurisprudence in Quill, it is never too late to “surrende[r] former views to a better considered position.” McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U. S. 162, 178 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring). I therefore join the Court’s opinion. Gorsuch (concurring): My agreement with the Court’s discussion of the history of our dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, however, should not be mistaken for agreement with all aspects of the doctrine. The Commerce Clause is found in Article I and authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Meanwhile our dormant commerce cases suggest Article III courts may invalidate state laws that offend no congressional statute. Whether and how much of this can be squared with the text of the Commerce Clause, justified by 2 SOUTH DAKOTA v. WAYFAIR, INC. GORSUCH, J., concurring stare decisis, or defended as misbranded products of federalism or antidiscrimination imperatives flowing from Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause are questions for another day. Roberts (dissenting): I agree that Bellas Hess was wrongly decided, for many of the reasons given by the Court. The Court argues in favor of overturning that decision because the “Internet’s prevalence and power have changed the dynamics of the national economy.” Ante, at 18. But that is the very reason I oppose discarding the physical-presence rule. Ecommerce has grown into a significant and vibrant part of our national economy against the backdrop of established rules, including the physical-presence rule. Any alteration to those rules with the potential to disrupt the development of such a critical segment of the economy should be undertaken by Congress. The Court should not act on this important question of current economic policy, solely to expiate a mistake it made over 50 years ago. This Court “does not overturn its precedents lightly.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 15). Departing from the doctrine of stare decisis is an “exceptional action” demanding “special justification.” Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984). The bar is even higher in fields in which Congress “exercises primary authority” and can, if it wishes, override this Court’s decisions with contrary legislation. … An erroneous decision from this Court may well have been an unintended factor contributing to the growth of e-commerce. See, e.g., W. Taylor, Who’s Writing the Book on Web Business? Fast Company (Oct. 31, 1996), https://www.fastcompany.com/27309/whos-writing-bookweb-business. The Court is of course correct that the Nation’s economy has changed dramatically since the time that Bellas Hess and Quill roamed the earth. I fear the Court today is compounding its past error by trying to fix it in a totally different era. The Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” Art. I, §8. I would let Congress decide whether to depart from the physical-presence rule that has governed this area for half a century. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-494_j4el.pdf LUCIA ET AL. v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Brief Background: The SEC charged petitioner Raymond Lucia with violating certain securities laws and assigned [administrative law judge] Cameron Elliot to adjudicate the case. Following a hearing, Judge Elliot issued an initial decision concluding that Lucia had violated the law and imposing sanctions. On appeal to the SEC, Lucia argued that the administrative proceeding was invalid because Judge Elliot had not been constitutionally appointed. According to Lucia, SEC ALJs are “Officers of the United States” and thus subject to the Appointments Clause. Under that Clause, only the President, “Courts of Law,” or “Heads of Departments” can appoint such “Officers.” But none of those actors had made Judge Elliot an ALJ. Holding: The Appointments Clause of the Constitution lays out the permissible methods of appointing “Officers of the United States,” a class of government officials distinct from mere employees. Art. II, §2, cl. 2. This case requires us to decide whether administrative law judges (ALJs) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) qualify as such “Officers.” In keeping with Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 (1991), we hold that they do. … Lucia asked us to resolve the split by deciding whether the Commission’s ALJs are “Officers of the United States within the meaning of the Appointments Clause.” Pet. for Cert. i. Up to that point, the Federal Government (as represented by the Department of Justice) had defended the Commission’s position that SEC ALJs are employees, not officers. But in responding to Lucia’s petition, the Government switched sides.1 So when we granted the petition, 583 U. S. ___ (2018), we also appointed an amicus curiae to defend the judgment below.2 We now reverse. … [I]f the Commission’s ALJs are constitutional officers, Lucia raises a valid Appointments Clause claim. The only way to defeat his position is to show that those ALJs are not officers at all, but instead non-officer employees—part of the broad swath of “lesser functionaries” in the Government’s workforce. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 126, n. 162 (1976) (per curiam). For if that is true, the Appointments Clause cares not a whit about who named them. See United States v. Germaine, 99 U. S. 508, 510 (1879). Two decisions set out this Court’s basic framework for distinguishing between officers and employees. Germaine held that “civil surgeons” (doctors hired to perform various physical exams) were mere employees because their duties were “occasional or temporary” rather than “continuing and permanent.” Id., at 511–512. Stressing “ideas of tenure [and] duration,” the Court there made clear that an individual must occupy a “continuing” position established by law to qualify as an officer. Id., at 511. Buckley then set out another requirement, central to this case. It determined that members of a federal commission were officers only after finding that they “exercis[ed] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” 424 U. S., at 126. The inquiry thus focused on the extent of power an individual wields in carrying out his assigned functions. Both the amicus and the Government urge us to elaborate on Buckley’s “significant authority” test, but another of our precedents makes that project unnecessary….[I]n Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 (1991), we applied the unadorned “significant authority” test to adjudicative officials who are near-carbon copies of the Commission’s ALJs. As we now explain, our analysis there (sans any more detailed legal criteria) necessarily decides this case. The officials at issue in Freytag were the “special trial judges” (STJs) of the United States Tax Court. The authority of those judges depended on the significance of the tax dispute before them. In “comparatively narrow and minor matters,” they could both hear and definitively resolve a case for the Tax Court. Id., at 873. In more major matters, they could preside over the hearing, but could not issue the final decision; instead, they were to “prepare proposed findings and an opinion” for a regular Tax Court judge to consider. Ibid. The proceeding challenged in Freytag was a major one, involving $1.5 billion in alleged tax deficiencies. See id., at 871, n. 1. After conducting a 14-week trial, the STJ drafted a proposed decision in favor of the Government. A regular judge then adopted the STJ’s work as the opinion of the Tax Court. See id., at 872. The losing parties argued on appeal that the STJ was not constitutionally appointed. This Court held that the Tax Court’s STJs are officers, not mere employees. … To cure the constitutional error, another ALJ (or the Commission itself) must hold the new hearing to which Lucia is entitled.6 We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Kagan, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Concurrence by Thomas, joined by Gorsuch. Concurrence in part and dissent in part by Breyer, joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor (only for Part III). Dissent by Sotomayor, joined by Ginsburg. Notes From Other Opinions: Thomas (concurring): I agree with the Court that this case is indistinguishable from Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 (1991). If the special trial judges in Freytag were “Officers of the United States,” Art. II, §2, cl. 2, then so are the administrative law judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Moving forward, however, this Court will not be able to decide every Appointments Clause case by comparing it to Freytag. And, as the Court acknowledges, our precedents in this area do not provide much guidance. See ante, at 6. While precedents like Freytag discuss what is sufficient to make someone an officer of the United States, our precedents have never clearly defined what is necessary. I would resolve that question based on the original public meaning of “Officers of the United States.” … The Founders likely understood the term “Officers of the United States” to encompass all federal civil officials who perform an ongoing, statutory duty—no matter how important or significant the duty. See Mascott 454. “Officers of the United States” was probably not a term of art that the Constitution used to signify some special type of official. Based on how the Founders used it and similar terms, the phrase “of the United States” was merely a synonym for “federal,” and the word “Office[r]” carried its ordinary meaning. See id., at 471–479. The ordinary meaning of “officer” was anyone who performed a continuous public duty. Breyer (concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part): I agree with the Court that the Securities and Exchange Commission did not properly appoint the Administrative Law Judge who presided over petitioner Lucia’s hearing. But I disagree with the majority in respect to two matters. First, I would rest our conclusion upon statutory, not constitutional, grounds. I believe it important to do so because I cannot answer the constitutional question that the majority answers without knowing the answer to a different, embedded constitutional question, which the Solicitor General urged us to answer in this case: the constitutionality of the statutory “for cause” removal protections that Congress provided for administrative law judges. Cf. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477 (2010). Second, I disagree with the Court in respect to the proper remedy. ... I do not believe that the Administrative Procedure Act permits the Commission to delegate its power to appoint its administrative law judges to its staff...I have found no other statutory provision that would permit the Commission to delegate the power to appoint its administrative law judges to its staff. … The upshot, in my view, is that for statutory, not constitutional, reasons, the Commission did not lawfully appoint the Administrative Law Judge here at issue. And this Court should decide no more than that. … If the Free Enterprise Fund Court’s holding applies equally to the administrative law judges—and I stress the “if ”—then to hold that the administrative law judges are “Officers of the United States” is, perhaps, to hold that their removal protections are unconstitutional. This would risk transforming administrative law judges from independent adjudicators into dependent decision-makers, serving at the pleasure of the Commission. Similarly, to apply Free Enterprise Fund’s holding to high-level civil servants threatens to change the nature of our merit-based civil service as it has existed from the time of President Chester Alan Arthur. See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 540–542 (BREYER, J., dissenting). … Separately [joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor], I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the proper remedy in this case requires a hearing before a different administrative law judge. Ante, at 12– 13. The Securities and Exchange Commission has now itself appointed the Administrative Law Judge in question, and I see no reason why he could not rehear the case. Sotomayor (dissenting): The Court today and scholars acknowledge that this Court’s Appointments Clause jurisprudence offers little guidance on who qualifies as an “Officer of the United States.” See, e.g., ante, at 6 (“The standard is no doubt framed in general terms, tempting advocates to add whatever glosses best suit their arguments”); Plecnik, Officers Under the Appointments Clause, 11 Pitt. Tax Rev. 201, 204 (2014). The lack of guidance is not without consequence. “[Q]uestions about the Clause continue to arise regularly both in the operation of the Executive Branch and in proposed legislation.” 31 Opinion of Office of Legal Counsel 73, 76 (2007) (Op. OLC). This confusion can undermine the reliability and finality of proceedings and result in wasted resources. See ante, at 12–13 (opinion of the Court) (ordering the Commission to grant petitioners a new administrative hearing). As the majority notes, see ante, at 5–6, this Court’s decisions currently set forth at least two prerequisites to officer status: (1) an individual must hold a “continuing” office established by law, United States v. Germaine, 99 U. S. 508, 511–512 (1879), and (2) an individual must wield “significant authority,” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam). … To provide guidance to Congress and the Executive Branch, I would hold that one requisite component of “significant authority” is the ability to make final, binding decisions on behalf of the Government. Accordingly, a person who merely advises and provides recommendations to an officer would not herself qualify as an officer. … Turning to the question presented here, it is true that the administrative law judges (ALJs) of the Securities and Exchange Commission wield “extensive powers.” Ante, at 2. They preside over adversarial proceedings that can lead to the imposition of significant penalties on private parties. See ante, at 2–3 (noting that the proceedings in the present case resulted in the imposition of $300,000 in civil penalties, as well as a lifetime bar from the investment industry). In the hearings over which they preside, Commission ALJs also exercise discretion with respect to important matters. See ante, at 2 (discussing Commission ALJs’ powers to supervise discovery, issue subpoenas, rule on the admissibility of evidence, hear and examine witnesses, and regulate the course of the proceedings). Nevertheless, I would hold that Commission ALJs are not officers because they lack final decision-making authority. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-130_4f14.pdf PEREIRA v. SESSIONS, ATTORNEY GENERAL Holding: Nonpermanent residents, like petitioner here, who are subject to removal proceedings and have accrued 10 years of continuous physical presence in the United States, may be eligible for a form of discretionary relief known as cancellation of removal. 8 U. S. C. §1229b(b)(1). Under the so-called “stop-time rule” set forth in §1229b(d)(1)(A), however, that period of continuous physical presence is “deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).” Section 1229(a), in turn, provides that the Government shall serve noncitizens in removal proceedings with “written notice (in this section referred to as a ‘notice to appear’) . . . specifying” several required pieces of information, including “[t]he time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.” §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).1 The narrow question in this case lies at the intersection of those statutory provisions. If the Government serves a noncitizen with a document that is labeled “notice to appear,” but the document fails to specify either the time or place of the removal proceedings, does it trigger the stop-time rule? The answer is as obvious as it seems: No. A notice that does not inform a noncitizen when and where to appear for removal proceedings is not a “notice to appear under section 1229(a)” and therefore does not trigger the stop-time rule. The plain text, the statutory context, and common sense all lead inescapably and unambiguously to that conclusion. … In 2006, Pereira was arrested in Massachusetts for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. On May 31, 2006, while Pereira was detained, DHS served him (in person) with a document labeled “Notice to Appear.” App. 7–13. That putative notice charged Pereira as removable for overstaying his visa, informed him that “removal proceedings” were being initiated against him, and provided him with information about the “[c]onduct of the hearing” and the consequences for failing to appear. Id., at 7, 10–12. Critical here, the notice did not specify the date and time of Pereira’s removal hearing. Instead, it ordered him to appear before an Immigration Judge in Boston “on a date to be set at a time to be set.” Id., at 9 (underlining in original). More than a year later, on August 9, 2007, DHS filed the 2006 notice with the Boston Immigration Court. The Immigration Court thereafter attempted to mail Pereira a more specific notice setting the date and time for his initial removal hearing for October 31, 2007, at 9:30 a.m. But that second notice was sent to Pereira’s street address rather than his post office box (which he had provided to DHS), so it was returned as undeliverable. Because Pereira never received notice of the time and date of his removal hearing, he failed to appear, and the Immigration Court ordered him removed in absentia. Unaware of that removal order, Pereira remained in the United States. In 2013, after Pereira had been in the country for more than 10 years, he was arrested for a minor motor vehicle violation (driving without his headlights on) and was subsequently detained by DHS. The Immigration Court reopened the removal proceedings after Pereira demonstrated that he never received the Immigration Court’s 2007 notice setting out the specific date and time of his hearing. Pereira then applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that the stop-time rule was not triggered by DHS’ initial 2006 notice because the document lacked information about the time and date of his removal hearing. The Immigration Court disagreed, finding the law “quite settled that DHS need not put a date certain on the Notice to Appear in order to make that document effective.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. The Immigration Court therefore concluded that Pereira could not meet the 10-year physical-presence requirement under §1229b(b), thereby rendering him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, and ordered Pereira removed from the country. ... The Court granted certiorari in this case, 583 U. S. ___ (2018), to resolve division among the Courts of Appeals on a simple, but important, question of statutory interpretation: Does service of a document styled as a “notice to appear” that fails to specify “the items listed” in §1229(a)(1) trigger the stop-time rule?4 Pet. for Cert. i. … [T]he Government’s 2006 notice to Pereira included all of the information required by §1229(a)(1), except it failed to specify the date and time of Pereira’s removal proceedings. See App. 10–12. Accordingly, the dispositive question in this case is much narrower, but no less vital: Does a “notice to appear” that does not specify the “time and place at which the proceedings will be held,” as required by §1229(a)(1)(G)(i), trigger the stop-time rule?5 … The statutory text alone is enough to resolve this case. Under the stop-time rule, “any period of . . . continuous physical presence” is “deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).” 8 U. S. C. §1229b(d)(1). By expressly referencing §1229(a), the statute specifies where to look to find out what “notice to appear” means. Section 1229(a), in turn, clarifies that the type of notice “referred to as a ‘notice to appear’” throughout the statutory section is a “written notice . . . specifying,” as relevant here, “[t]he time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.” §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Thus, based on the plain text of the statute, it is clear that to trigger the stop-time rule, the Government must serve a notice to appear that, at the very least, “specif[ies]” the “time and place” of the removal proceedings. … [C]ommon sense compels the conclusion that a notice that does not specify when and where to appear for a removal proceeding is not a “notice to appear” that triggers the stop-time rule. If the three words “notice to appear” mean anything in this context, they must mean that, at a minimum, the Government has to provide noncitizens “notice” of the information, i.e., the “time” and “place,” that would enable them “to appear” at the removal hearing in the first place. Lineup: Sotomayor, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Concurrence by Kennedy. Dissent by Alito. Notes From Other Opinions: Kennedy (concurring): I agree with the Court’s opinion and join it in full. This separate writing is to note my concern with the way in which the Court’s opinion in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), has come to be understood and applied. The application of that precedent to the question presented here by various Courts of Appeals illustrates one aspect of the problem. The first Courts of Appeals to encounter the question concluded or assumed that the notice necessary to trigger the stop-time rule found in 8 U. S. C. §1229b(d)(1) was not “perfected” until the immigrant received all the information listed in §1229(a)(1). Guamanrrigra v. Holder, 670 F. 3d 404, 410 (CA2 2012) (per curiam); see also Dababneh v. Gonzales, 471 F. 3d 806, 809 (CA7 2006); Garcia-Ramirez v. Gonzales, 423 F. 3d 935, 937, n. 3 (CA9 2005) (per curiam). That emerging consensus abruptly dissolved not long after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reached a contrary interpretation of §1229b(d)(1) in Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (2011). After that administrative ruling, in addition to the decision under review here, at least six Courts of Appeals, citing Chevron, concluded that §1229b(d)(1) was ambiguous and then held that the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable. … In according Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation, some Courts of Appeals engaged in cursory analysis of the questions whether, applying the ordinary tools of statutory construction, Congress’ intent could be discerned, 467 U. S., at 843, n. 9, and whether the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable, id., at 845. In Urbina v. Holder, for example, the court stated, without any further elaboration, that “we agree with the BIA that the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous.” 745 F. 3d, at 740. It then deemed reasonable the BIA’s interpretation of the statute, “for the reasons the BIA gave in that case.” Ibid. This analysis suggests an abdication of the Judiciary’s proper role in interpreting federal statutes. The type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases is troubling. And when deference is applied to other questions of statutory interpretation, such as an agency’s interpretation of the statutory provisions that concern the scope of its own authority, it is more troubling still. Alito (dissenting): Although this case presents a narrow and technical issue of immigration law, the Court’s decision implicates the status of an important, frequently invoked, once celebrated, and now increasingly maligned precedent, namely, Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Under that decision, if a federal statute is ambiguous and the agency that is authorized to implement it offers a reasonable interpretation, then a court is supposed to accept that interpretation. Here, a straightforward application of Chevron requires us to accept the Government’s construction of the provision at issue. But the Court rejects the Government’s interpretation in favor of one that it regards as the best reading of the statute. I can only conclude that the Court, for whatever reason, is simply ignoring Chevron. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-459_1o13.pdf WISCONSIN CENTRAL LTD. ET AL. v. UNITED STATES Holding: As the Great Depression took its toll, struggling railroad pension funds reached the brink of insolvency. During that time before the modern interstate highway system, privately owned railroads employed large numbers of Americans and provided services vital to the nation’s commerce. To address the emergency, Congress adopted the Railroad Retirement Tax Act of 1937. That legislation federalized private railroad pension plans and it remains in force today. Under the law’s terms, private railroads and their employees pay a tax based on employees’ incomes. 26 U. S. C. §§3201(a)–(b), 3221(a)–(b). In return, the federal government provides employees a pension often more generous than the social security system supplies employees in other industries. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U. S. 572, 573–575 (1979). Our case arises from a peculiar feature of the statute and its history. At the time of the Act’s adoption, railroads compensated employees not just with money but also with food, lodging, railroad tickets, and the like. Because railroads typically didn’t count these in-kind benefits when calculating an employee’s pension on retirement, neither did Congress in its new statutory pension scheme. Nor did Congress seek to tax these in-kind benefits. Instead, it limited itself to taxing employee “compensation,” and defined that term to capture only “any form of money remuneration.” §3231(e)(1). It’s this limitation that poses today’s question. To encourage employee performance and align employee and corporate goals, some railroads (like employers in many fields) have adopted employee stock option plans. Typical of many, the plan before us permits an employee to exercise stock options in various ways—purchasing stock with her own money and holding it as an investment; purchasing stock but immediately selling a portion to finance the purchase; or purchasing stock at the option price, selling it all immediately at the market price, and taking the profits. App. 41–42. The government argues that stock options like these qualify as a form of taxable “money remuneration” under the Act because stock can be easily converted into money. The railroads reply that stock options aren’t “money” at all and remind us that when Congress passed the Act it sought to mimic existing industry pension practices that generally took no notice of in-kind benefits. Who has the better of it? Courts have divided on the answer, so we agreed to take up the question. We start with the key statutory term: “money remuneration.”...While stock can be bought or sold for money, few of us buy groceries or pay rent or value goods and services in terms of stock. When was the last time you heard a friend say his new car cost “2,450 shares of Microsoft”? Good luck, too, trying to convince the IRS to treat your stock options as a medium of exchange at tax time. See Rev. Rul. 76–350, 1976–2 Cum. Bull. 396; see also, e.g., In re Boyle’s Estate, 2 Cal. App. 2d 234, 236 (1934) (“[T]he word ‘money’ when taken in its ordinary and grammatical sense does not include corporate stocks”); Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp., 316 U. S. 107, 112 (1942) (distinguishing between “money and . . . stock”). Nor does adding the word “remuneration” alter the calculus. … Even the IRS (then the Bureau of Internal Revenue) seems to have understood all this back in 1938. Shortly after the Railroad Retirement Tax Act’s enactment, the IRS issued a regulation explaining that the Act taxes “all remuneration in money, or in something which may be used in lieu of money.” 26 CFR §410.5 (1938). By way of example, the regulation said the Act taxed things like “[s]alaries, wages, commissions, fees, [and] bonuses.” §410.6(a). But it nowhere suggested that stock was taxable. Nor was the possibility lost on the IRS. The IRS said the Act did tax money payments related to stock— “[p]ayments made by an employer into a stock bonus . . . fund.” §410.6(f). But the agency did not seek to extend the same treatment to stock itself. So even assuming the validity of the regulation, it seems only to confirm our understanding. ... The government and the dissent supply no persuasive proof that Congress sought to invoke their idiosyncratic definition. If Congress really thought everything is money, why did it take such pains to differentiate between money and stock in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939? Why did it so carefully distinguish “money remuneration” in the Act and “all remuneration” in FICA? Why did it include the word “money” to qualify “remuneration” if all remuneration counts as money? And wouldn’t the everything-is-money interpretation encompass railroad tickets, food, and lodging—exactly the sort of in-kind benefits we know the Act was written to exclude? These questions they cannot answer. … The problem with the government’s and the dissent’s position today is not that stock and stock options weren’t common in 1937, but that they were not then—and are not now— recognized as mediums of exchange. he judgment of the Seventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Gorsuch, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Dissent by Breyer, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Notes From Other Opinions: Breyer (dissenting): The case before us concerns taxable “compensation” under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act. The statute defines the statutory word “compensation” as including “any form of money remuneration paid to an individual for services rendered.” 26 U. S. C. §3231(e)(1). Does that phrase include stock options paid to railroad employees “for services rendered”? Ibid. In my view, the language itself is ambiguous but other traditional tools of statutory interpretation point to the answer, “yes.” Consequently, the Government’s interpretation of the language—which it has followed consistently since the inception of the statute—is lawful. I therefore dissent. … Employees at petitioners’ companies who receive and exercise a stock option may keep the stock they buy as long as they wish. But they also have another choice called the “cashless exercise” method. App. 42. That method permits an employee to check a box on a form, thereby asking the company’s financial agents to buy the stock (at the option price) and then immediately sell the stock (at the higher market price) with the proceeds deposited into the employee’s bank account—just like a deposited paycheck. Ibid. About half (around 49%) of petitioners’ employees used this method (or a variation of it) during the relevant time period. Separate App. of PlaintiffsAppellants in No. 16–3300 (CA7), p. 45. The Solicitor General tells us that many more employees at other railroads also use this “cashless exercise” method—93% in the case of CSX, 90% to 95% in the case of BNSF. … Does a stock option received by an employee (along with, say, a paycheck) count as a “form”—some form, “any form”—of “money remuneration?” The railroads, as the majority notes, believe they can find the answer to this question by engaging in (and winning) a war of 1930’s dictionaries. I am less sanguine. True, some of those dictionaries say that “money” primarily refers to currency or promissory documents used as “a medium of exchange.” See ante, at 2–3. But even this definition has its ambiguities. A railroad employee cannot use her paycheck as a “medium of exchange.” She cannot hand it over to a cashier at the grocery store; she must first deposit it. The same is true of stock, which must be converted into cash and deposited in the employee’s account before she can enjoy its monetary value. Moreover, what we view as money has changed over time. Cowrie shells once were such a medium but no longer are, see J. Weatherford, The History of Money 24 (1997); our currency originally included gold coins and bullion, but, after 1934, gold could not be used as a medium of exchange, see Gold Reserve Act of 1934, ch. 6, §2, 48 Stat. 337; perhaps one day employees will be paid in Bitcoin or some other type of cryptocurrency, see F. Martin, Money: The Unauthorized Biography— From Coinage to Cryptocurrencies 275–278 (1st Vintage Books ed. 2015). Nothing in the statute suggests the meaning of this provision should be trapped in a monetary time warp, forever limited to those forms of money commonly used in the 1930’s. … So, where does this duel of definitions lead us? Some seem too narrow; some seem too broad; some seem indeterminate. The result is ambiguity. Were it up to me to choose based only on what I have discussed so far, I would say that a stock option is a “form of money remuneration.” Why? Because for many employees it almost immediately takes the form of an increased bank balance, because it strongly resembles a paycheck in this respect, and because the statute refers to “any form” of money remuneration. A paycheck is not money, but it is a means of remunerating employees monetarily. The same can be said of stock options. … Here, in respect to stock options, the Act’s language has a degree of ambiguity. But the statute’s purpose, along with its amendments, argues in favor of including stock options. The Government has so interpreted the statute for decades, and Congress has never suggested it held a contrary view, despite making other statutory changes. In these circumstances, I believe the Government has the stronger argument. I would read the statutory phrase as including stock options. And, with respect, I dissent from the majority’s contrary view. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-530_6537.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout]
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 16:44
|
|
|
Mr. Nice! posted:ALJs in the SEC are now "officers of the united states" and must be appointed by appropriate personnel. This is going to let a lot of fraudsters weasel out of punishment. I doubt it. The ALJ in question has already been re-appointed by appropriate personnel, and the only remedy is a new hearing in front of an appropriately appointed ALJ. hobbesmaster posted:What does this practically mean? Railroad employees don't pay tax on stock options given by their employer, even if, say, you check a box to immediately buy and sell the option (granted under market price) and have the proceeds deposited in your bank account. About 90% of railroad employees already do this, so I'm not sure how much of a change this is.
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 16:46
|
|
|
ulmont posted:I doubt it. The ALJ in question has already been re-appointed by appropriate personnel, and the only remedy is a new hearing in front of an appropriately appointed ALJ. Thanks! That's good to know. hobbesmaster posted:What does this practically mean? ulmont posted:Railroad employees don't pay tax on stock options given by their employer, even if, say, you check a box to immediately buy and sell the option (granted under market price) and have the proceeds deposited in your bank account. About 90% of railroad employees already do this, so I'm not sure how much of a change this is. Ulmont has the general gist of it. The suit was to determine if the stock options counted as monetary compensation with regards to the federal pension. The court determined that it did not. The expanded logic from this decision is that employers in all fields, not just in the railroads, have a hitch to give stock options as "non-monetary compensation" to dodge taxes.
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 17:34
|
|
|
hobbesmaster posted:What does this practically mean?
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 17:36
|
|
|
Mr. Nice! posted:Thanks! That's good to know. I thought CEOs and the like were taxed on non-monetary compensation because there is a long and storied history of giving them non-monetary compensation to dodge taxes (don't buy your own private plane, the company will buy one and give you exclusive use of it!)
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 17:37
|
|
|
FlamingLiberal posted:Don’t have to pay taxes on stock options, which is what a lot of CEOs get in compensation. They don't have to pay this payroll tax on it. So this could be applicable to FICA? But how would this be relevant to normal income tax?
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 17:40
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:I thought CEOs and the like were taxed on non-monetary compensation because there is a long and storied history of giving them non-monetary compensation to dodge taxes (don't buy your own private plane, the company will buy one and give you exclusive use of it!) They are. This was specific to the Railroad Retirement Tax Act. For much more look at this: https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc427
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 18:09
|
|
|
Is Thomas actually trying to argue that all Federal employees who perform any type of ongoing service should fall under the appointments clause in his Lucia concurrence?
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 18:13
|
|
|
Does the SoDak ruling mean I now have to pay sales tax on Steam?
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 18:27
|
|
|
Nissin Cup Nudist posted:Does the SoDak ruling mean I now have to pay sales tax on Steam? where do you live
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 18:32
|
|
|
Sydin posted:Is Thomas actually trying to argue that all Federal employees who perform any type of ongoing service should fall under the appointments clause in his Lucia concurrence? Yes. quote:The Founders considered individuals to be officers even if they performed only ministerial statutory duties—including recordkeepers, clerks, and tidewaiters (individuals who watched goods land at a customhouse). See Mascott 484–507. Early congressional practice reflected this understanding. With exceptions not relevant here,2 Congress required all federal officials with ongoing statutory duties to be appointed in compliance with the Appointments Clause. See id., at 507–545. That doesn't mean they would all require Senate confirmation, though. These ALJs don't, for example. quote:The Appointments Clause provides the exclusive process for appointing “Officers of the United States.” See SW General, supra, at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 1). While principal officers must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, Congress can authorize the appointment of “inferior Officers” by “the President alone,” “the Courts of Law,” or “the Heads of Departments.” Art. II, §2, cl. 2.
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 18:43
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:I thought CEOs and the like were taxed on non-monetary compensation because there is a long and storied history of giving them non-monetary compensation to dodge taxes (don't buy your own private plane, the company will buy one and give you exclusive use of it!) Options and stock can be taxed at the capital gains rate instead of the income tax rate which makes them attractive to the bigwigs. Little guys in say Silicon Valley otoh, tend to get squeezed because short term cashless transactions from ISO stock count as income when looking at the AMT.
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 18:48
|
|
|
Ron Jeremy posted:Options and stock can be taxed at the capital gains rate instead of the income tax rate which makes them attractive to the bigwigs. When they actually get granted the option or stock though isn't that imputed income at the normal income rate? As if they were paid cash, got taxed on it, and then immediately purchased the option or stock. The gains from that grant would be capital gains though I think.
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 19:12
|
|
|
esquilax posted:When they actually get granted the option or stock though isn't that imputed income at the normal income rate? As if they were paid cash, got taxed on it, and then immediately purchased the option or stock. Yes you’re correct. ISOs are bit taxed when they’re exercised so if you can hold onto them for a while before you sell them, you get taxed at the long term capital gains rate which is a significant savings over income tax especially for for high wave types like directors and C-suite folks. For workers lower on the totem pole, ISOs and ESPP are generally turned around quickly and amount to salary by another means and are taxed as income to reflect that. The part where it gets fuzzy is high wage / high cost of living places like Silicon Valley where even non supervisory workers can be pushed into the AMT by the exercise of ISOs.
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 19:25
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 30, 2024 16:23 |
|
|
What's the process for other states to start getting their taxes held under Wayfair? All 50 states have different rules, and since this was specifically about the SD out-of-state tax act a state with substantially different rules (no minimum requirements, for instance) doesn't automatically apply.
|
|
#
?
Jun 21, 2018 20:44
|
|
