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Its so you can spike them into the ground and use them as bowls
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Oct 27, 2018 22:13
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Jobbo_Fett posted:Its so you can spike them into the ground and use them as bowls Ram the spike through a table, now you have a punch bowl!
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Oct 27, 2018 22:15
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the bavarians had their own design
HEY GUNS fucked around with this message at 23:04 on Oct 27, 2018 |
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Oct 27, 2018 22:26
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Ensign Expendable posted:Yes, in a sense. It depends on what you mean by "produced". A T-34-85 that went through combat, broke down/was knocked out, then returned to the factory for refurbishment would be double-counted as produced. If the gun on it was not damaged, it would be reused, so no new gun would be recorded as produced. That seems like a very odd procurement process. Do you have anything posted on your blog about it?
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Oct 27, 2018 22:29
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Raenir Salazar posted:The first two actually tricked me, I noticed the 3rd which made me do a double take and double checked the first two and son of a bitch. Our armed forces are perfectly positioned to surprise the terrorist grandmas who will let their guard down as they enter the living room to watch their soaps.
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Oct 27, 2018 22:43
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Crazycryodude posted:What was the spike even for? Artistic flourish hearkening back to big plumed cavalry helmets? Actual mounting point for actual plume on an infantry helmet in 1914? Goring Frenchmen? Mounting a plume on. The Prussians stole the idea from the Russians, who would stick plumes on there.
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Oct 27, 2018 22:43
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Quinntan posted:That seems like a very odd procurement process. Do you have anything posted on your blog about it? It makes a lot of sense if you want a system of tank accounting that works for the people actually fighting. Regardless of the actual complexities going on, all the commander wants to know is "yes but how many tanks that work do I have?"
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Oct 27, 2018 22:59
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All this camo talk just made me realize even in the most Japanese of RPGs are there knights riding into combat in camo painted armour and I feel like this is an unexplored niche
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Oct 28, 2018 00:17
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Crazycryodude posted:What was the spike even for? Mini-me asked me the same question when we were looking round the Passchendale museum earlier this week. According to a description card there it's to deflect downward sabre strokes.
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Oct 28, 2018 00:20
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The artillery picklehaube had it's spike replaced by a ball for obvious reasons.
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Oct 28, 2018 00:20
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Logistics officer: This picklehaube is needlessly complex and expensive, but at least it is standardized Artillery officer: I just had a great idea...
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Oct 28, 2018 00:38
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Clarence posted:Mini-me asked me the same question when we were looking round the Passchendale museum earlier this week. According to a description card there it's to deflect downward sabre strokes. Hmm. I suppose, but I can't help but think that if protection was a priority, that chunk of metal would be better served being literally anywhere else on the helmet. [joke] A British tommy in WWI sees a german helmet out in the mud in no-mans land. He thinks it would be just the thing to give his little son when he gets back. So after dark he crawls out to get it. But when he tries to pull it up, he finds it is stuck. He grabs the spike and pulls. He heaves and he heaves, and out of the mud comes the head of a German soldier. The German spits out mud and takes a huge breath of air. "Mein gott, thank you. I have been stuck in zis mud. Please, vill you pull me out." "Only as long as I can have your helmet." "Yes, yes of course. Anything." So the tommy starts to pull, but this guy is really stuck. He heaves and heaves for hours, but as dawn is rapidly approaching, the german is still up to his chest in the mud. "I think you might be stuck there mate. Sorry." The German thinks. "Perhaps if vould be easier for you if I took my feet out of ze stirrups?"
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Oct 28, 2018 01:05
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Oct 28, 2018 01:06
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Marxist-Jezzinist posted:I've got one of their funny helmets, it looks very good and modern with the camo cover. Less like a glans than the Naughty German helmets Those East German helmets were designed in 1942 as a replacement for the "Naughty German" helmets. They were never put into production. When the NVA was formed in 1956 they decided they needed their own distinctive helmet. They didn't want to use the "Naughty German" design for obvious reasons, but also didn't want to use Soviet helmets either. So they dusted off the plans of the last helmet the Wehrmacht tested and used those.
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Oct 28, 2018 01:34
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Skanky Burns posted:Logistics officer: This picklehaube is needlessly complex and expensive, but at least it is standardized It was done to avoid stabbing your own fellow gun crewmen over the guns.
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Oct 28, 2018 03:19
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SeanBeansShako posted:The artillery picklehaube had it's spike replaced by a ball for obvious reasons. ...which was?
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Oct 28, 2018 07:26
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butt stuff
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Oct 28, 2018 09:16
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I've been on an ACW kick lately since digging into Stephen Sears's Gettysburg book, but there's something I'd like to clarify with regards to army organization. As I understand it: - a company is composed of about 60 to 80 men, lead by a Captain - ten companies would make up one regiment, composed of about 1,000 men (often less), lead by a Lieutenant Colonel - four to five regiments would make up one brigade, composed of between 4,000 to 5,000 men (again, often less), lead by either a full Colonel or a Brigadier General - three or four brigades would make up a division What I can't quite put together is why the Union army seems to have so many Corps? Sears talks about how Lee used to run the Army of Northern Virginia as a two-corps outfit, and then split it up to three corps of three divisions each prior to Gettysburg, but then I look at the Union OOB and Hooker/Meade has got seven Corps (I, II, III, V, VI, XI, and XII), of which all have three divisions each with the exception of XII Corps with two divisions. And yet these are supposed to be armies of roughly the same size. What am I missing?
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Oct 28, 2018 11:19
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Mr Enderby posted:[joke] I've heard a variant of that joke set in ... any famously muddy place, in my case the East Texas oilfield in the 1930s. Guy sees a nice hat in the muddy street, picks it up, and finds a man under it. "Gee, fella, you're having a bad day." he says to the man, to which the guy chin-deep in the mud replies "Could be worse, you should see my horse."
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Oct 28, 2018 12:50
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Bad Angus! Bad!
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gradenko_2000 posted:I've been on an ACW kick lately since digging into Stephen Sears's Gettysburg book, but there's something I'd like to clarify with regards to army organization. As I understand it: That's the theoretical hardly-ever-seen paper strength in each case. As people die/desert, units get smaller in terms of how many actual people are in them. You have the option of either putting fresh recruits into these units to bring them back up to strength, or forming your fresh recruits into entirely new units and only disbanding your old ones once they've reached a certain minimal size then dispersing them into the new, larger units; the latter approach tends to mean you have more, smaller units, some of which are 100% experienced veterans. That said, I can't find anything to back it up but I had thought it was the Confederacy that did that more than the Union.
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Oct 28, 2018 13:13
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gradenko_2000 posted:I've been on an ACW kick lately since digging into Stephen Sears's Gettysburg book, but there's something I'd like to clarify with regards to army organization. As I understand it: CSA corps were roughly twice the size of Union corps. One example: Union I Corps at Gettysburg had 32 regiments and 5 artillery batteries, strength of 12,222 (6,059 casualties lol). Longstreet's corps contained 55 regiments and 22 artillery batteries. Strength was 20,935 (7,739 casualties). CSA divisions could be nearly as large as Union corps: McLaws division was about 7,100, while Union XII Corps was a little over 9,000. No one is totally sure why each side adopted their respective approaches, but the most likely theory is that the CSA (and Lee in particular) had more faith in his subordinate commanders -- particularly his division commanders -- and so gave them a lot more latitude and combat power. The biggest organizational difference, aside from basic numbers, is that artillery reserves for the CSA were only at the corps, while for the Union they were held at the army echelon.
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Oct 28, 2018 13:58
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Milo and POTUS posted:...which was? See above the post of your question for the answer to this mystery.
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Oct 28, 2018 14:49
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Oh I thought it would be something way more interesting like using it as ammo
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Oct 28, 2018 15:40
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Milo and POTUS posted:Oh I thought it would be something way more interesting like using it as ammo They are very tiny metal balls now. They comically do look slightly bigger than the Spike for dick waving reasons over the infantry. I do love the thought of this idea arriving a bit later after they rolled out the pickelbaubes. Follow the angry screams of pain and swearing to find the guns!
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Oct 28, 2018 15:56
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Well I was looking at the gimages search for it and it looked like something you might shove down like the equivalent of a swivel gun
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Oct 28, 2018 16:12
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bewbies posted:CSA corps were roughly twice the size of Union corps. One example: Union I Corps at Gettysburg had 32 regiments and 5 artillery batteries, strength of 12,222 (6,059 casualties lol). Longstreet's corps contained 55 regiments and 22 artillery batteries. Strength was 20,935 (7,739 casualties). CSA divisions could be nearly as large as Union corps: McLaws division was about 7,100, while Union XII Corps was a little over 9,000. To add to this, IIRC Stonewall Jackson's corps was HUGE compared to Longstreet's, after he died at Chancellorsville Lee split it up into two smaller corps since less experienced generals were replacing him. Also IIRC the Union generally let regiments whither away to nothing while the CSA tended to integrate replacements into existing units - this can also create a huge disparity between them - the Union had way more corps because they had way more divisions because they had way more brigades because each regiment was only 300 men, while there might be 2-3 times as many in a Confederate regiment. It creates a way more bloated officer corps and a lot more support units the way the Union did it, but they had the manpower to make it work, the CSA did not.
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Oct 28, 2018 16:14
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Isn't integrating replacements into existing regiments more efficient anyway, because that way, the new recruits can learn from the more experienced soldiers?
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Oct 28, 2018 16:59
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gradenko_2000 posted:What I can't quite put together is why the Union army seems to have so many Corps? Sears talks about how Lee used to run the Army of Northern Virginia as a two-corps outfit, and then split it up to three corps of three divisions each prior to Gettysburg, but then I look at the Union OOB and Hooker/Meade has got seven Corps (I, II, III, V, VI, XI, and XII), of which all have three divisions each with the exception of XII Corps with two divisions. Political dickwaving between Congress, Lincoln, and McClellan. So way back in early 1862, prior to the Peninsula Campaign, there were no corps in the AotP. Just McClellan herding a dozen The impasse continues until the middle of March, a couple days before the army embarked for the Peninsula, when Lincoln finally sided with Congress. He appointed McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes to command of I through IV Corps, respectively. They were the most senior generals in the army, had been placed in command of divisions before McClellan had joined the army, and all leaned Republican. Coincidentally, they were also the most opposed to McClellan's campaign plan of all the army's division commanders. Total Congressional victory. At this time, all the Union Corps had roughly uniform size of 30-40 thousand men. Not for long. McClellan was not happy with the arrangement, nor was he happy that I Corps got held back from the Peninsula to chase Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. In order to actually get some subordinates that he could tolerate, he split II-IV Corps soon after arriving on the Peninsula, rearranging divisions to create V and VI Corps under his favorite commanders, Porter and Franklin. Suddenly, all the Union Corps have just two divisions each. Meanwhile, the Valley Campaign does its thing, and John Pope is brought east to take command of three different forces and consolidate them into a single army. This army includes the big I Corps (renamed III Corps, Army of Virginia) and two new, much smaller corps that were previously the Valley and Mountain Departments under Banks and Fremont. When these are all folded into the AotP pre-Antietam, I Corps again becomes I Corps, and the other two become XI and XII Corps (VII through X having been formed from various independent commands up and down the east coast). Each corps is either two or three divisions, typically of smaller size since brigades have to be peeled off to fill out all 7 or 8 corps. This is roughly the organization that lasts through Gettysburg. IV Corps is mostly left on the Peninsula and eventually disbanded, IX Corps is with the AotP as long as Burnside is, but that's it until post-Gettysburg. You can't reassign corps without reducing the AotP's strength, you can't disband corps without demoting or firing someone (and likely pissing off some influential Congressman or Governor in the process), and you definitely don't want to increase the number of corps any more. McClellan and Burnside tried to mitigate the army's unwieldiness by placing "wing" commanders in command of two corps each, but that just makes the chain of command taller. Eventually, victory at Gettysburg made Meade politically untouchable, and high casualties allowed him to consolidate and reassign corps as he saw fit. If you liked Sears' Gettysburg, think about checking out his Lincoln's Lieutenants.
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Oct 28, 2018 17:05
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In the long run everyone realised that 2-3 divisions under 1 corps was the most effective org structure. But that's on the assumption that divisions are performing independent missions and corps commanders need to keep track of them.Epicurius posted:Isn't integrating replacements into existing regiments more efficient anyway, because that way, the new recruits can learn from the more experienced soldiers? Really bad idea if in doing so you destroy the group spirit of both the veterans and the recruits. This is an era of warfare where after having basic drill right, the most important thing for soldiers is to not panic and that makes the intangible morale aspect crucial. Alchenar fucked around with this message at 17:30 on Oct 28, 2018 |
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Oct 28, 2018 17:27
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Epicurius posted:Isn't integrating replacements into existing regiments more efficient anyway, because that way, the new recruits can learn from the more experienced soldiers? Every approach has cost and benefit, but in the ACW it was particularly dicey - regiments were enlisted, formed, and trained as single entities, which meant that all of the men in a given regiment usually had the same date of enlistment and the same date for end-of-service. So, you could inject guys to reinforce the regiment, but then you'd likely wind up with a situation where the bulk of the regiment gets sent home after their tour is over, and the replacements are orphans again. Plus, regiments were usually fairly localized, which meant that managing regional frictions was an important consideration.
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Oct 28, 2018 17:31
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Epicurius posted:Isn't integrating replacements into existing regiments more efficient anyway, because that way, the new recruits can learn from the more experienced soldiers? according to 17th century french military theorists, it's important to keep a large veterans:new dudes ratio, otherwise you'll swamp the experienced people with more new guys than they can teach
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Oct 28, 2018 17:38
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Corsair Pool Boy posted:Also IIRC the Union generally let regiments whither away to nothing while the CSA tended to integrate replacements into existing units - this can also create a huge disparity between them - the Union had way more corps because they had way more divisions because they had way more brigades because each regiment was only 300 men, while there might be 2-3 times as many in a Confederate regiment. Union policy here was never really set in stone, and was driven in large part by state governments. A community or individual would gather up a bunch of young men and march them off to become a company, regiment, or even brigade if the recruiting drive were successful enough (this was pretty rare and only happened early in the war, I mention it mostly because it's how we get Dan Sickles). These entered service with state governments, and the state governments appoint their colonels. This is a pretty gigantic patronage scheme. While the army is expanding for the first couple years of the war, nobody's going to bat an eye at the Irish Brigade sending someone home to New York to gather a few more recruits to replace their Antietam losses. But as the size of the Union army starts to stabilize in 1863, and a new cohort of prospective military heroes start pestering their governors about that regiment they were promised in exchange for all those votes in the 1862 elections, brand new regiments start starving the veteran units of replacements. E: Also what bewbies said. An enlistment term might last anywhere from three months (the original post-Sumter drive) to three years (post-Bull Run, and most of the federal drives after that) or anywhere in between (a couple states did two year terms instead of three, Pennsylvania did an emergency nine month term when it looked like Lee might invade in late 1862). A regiment gutted by enlistments ending might have no hope of getting back to full strength on its own. As a side note, it's a funny coincidence that nearly every term of enlistment just happened to end right as a major campaign was getting underway in the east. dublish fucked around with this message at 17:51 on Oct 28, 2018 |
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Oct 28, 2018 17:44
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Can someone clarify the difference between the regular army and the state units? My understanding is that most people preferred to join their state’s respective units rather than the regular army, which was already hurting due to CSA defections at the start of the war and a focus on fighting Natives pre-war. So was there anything notable about the regular army? I have not studied the ACW much.
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Oct 28, 2018 18:28
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dublish posted:E: Also what bewbies said. An enlistment term might last anywhere from three months (the original post-Sumter drive) to three years (post-Bull Run, and most of the federal drives after that) or anywhere in between (a couple states did two year terms instead of three, Pennsylvania did an emergency nine month term when it looked like Lee might invade in late 1862). A regiment gutted by enlistments ending might have no hope of getting back to full strength on its own. If you did your 3 months early were you still eligible for a later enlistment? Cuz man, talk about ripping the band aid off.
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Oct 28, 2018 18:45
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FastestGunAlive posted:Can someone clarify the difference between the regular army and the state units? My understanding is that most people preferred to join their state’s respective units rather than the regular army, which was already hurting due to CSA defections at the start of the war and a focus on fighting Natives pre-war. So was there anything notable about the regular army? I have not studied the ACW much. Well, at the start of the war they were the only trained, experienced dudes?
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Oct 28, 2018 21:23
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feedmegin posted:Well, at the start of the war they were the only trained, experienced dudes? How experienced would they have been? The Mexican-American war had ended a little over a decade before the Civil War started so vets from that were probably starting to get long in the tooth assuming they'd even stayed in the army.
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Oct 28, 2018 21:27
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Grand Prize Winner posted:How experienced would they have been? The Mexican-American war had ended a little over a decade before the Civil War started so vets from that were probably starting to get long in the tooth assuming they'd even stayed in the army. Indian country I guess. I'm not arguing they were Napoleon's Old Guard but they werent people who joined up literally last week at least.
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Oct 28, 2018 21:31
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Grand Prize Winner posted:How experienced would they have been? The Mexican-American war had ended a little over a decade before the Civil War started so vets from that were probably starting to get long in the tooth assuming they'd even stayed in the army.
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Oct 28, 2018 21:45
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FastestGunAlive posted:Can someone clarify the difference between the regular army and the state units? My understanding is that most people preferred to join their state’s respective units rather than the regular army, which was already hurting due to CSA defections at the start of the war and a focus on fighting Natives pre-war. So was there anything notable about the regular army? I have not studied the ACW much. There were three basic organizations in the Union army: regular army, the tiny permanent group of soldiers that were enlisted or USMA graduates prior the war; volunteers, who made up the bulk of wartime manpower and were mostly recruited by state then controlled by federal commanders; and state militias, which were home defense units, controlled by state governors. Commissions and ranks for volunteers were different from regular army rank (ie, Custer was a BG of volunteers, but a LTC in the regular army) and they were always intended to be a temporary, wartime measure. It was broadly similar to how the National Guard is today; states receive funds to train and equip a force, then that force is federalized and controlled by big army. State militias were the "home guard" type units that were at best irregular. They weren't intended to fight regular forces, but rather, deter or maybe beat bushwhackers and raiders that were always all over the place. The CSA used a similar system, but their "regular army" equivalent never really got off the ground as they didn't last long enough.
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Oct 28, 2018 22:12
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Something similar was used again for WWI, modified, and used again for WWII, and only inactivated in 1973 with the cessation of the draft.
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Oct 28, 2018 22:41
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