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So they tailored field uniforms like dress uniforms?
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Mar 8, 2019 22:32
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Next you'll be telling me some Nazis tried pulling Hugh Jackman's dehydration routine to have that muscley-veiney look when they go into battle.
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Mar 8, 2019 23:00
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Cyrano4747 posted:So they tailored field uniforms like dress uniforms? Americans were somewhat alone in the wieldy field uniform-department in WW2 compared to a lot of peers.
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Mar 8, 2019 23:03
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Cyrano4747 posted:So they tailored field uniforms like dress uniforms? It's more like they didn't really draw a distinction between dress, service, and field uniforms. In theory they did. In theory the "dress" uniform was the "Waffenrock:"  The "service" and "field" uniforms were the typical "feldbluse:"  And there was also a uniform called the "Arbeitsbluse" ("work uniform," sorta) made out of twill cotton:  There were, of course, all sorts of variations here. Summer uniforms made out of twill, winter coats, etc, etc, etc. But in broad, general terms most soldiers never saw a "Waffenrock" and the "Arbeitsbluse" was left back in barracks. They'd wear the "feldbluse" for everything. This might sound like a simpler, more consolidated and efficient system (only one uniform!), but it isn't. In practice the feldbluse was as difficult to produce and as tailored as a modern dress uniform - as a result, using it for everything is a huge waste. You wouldn't wear and expensive tailored suit to dig holes or fight - you'd trash a tailored suit if you did - but that's exactly what they wound up doing. Eventually they figured out that this was a bad idea. As early as 1940 they were taking steps to economize a bit, like leaving off the dark green felt collars and simplifying the pockets. They also tried ideas like making a uniform that was cut like the "arbeitsbluse" and made out of green cloth for use as a summer-weight uniform. But all of these ideas were stop-gap measures and phased in gradually over time. If you know what to look for you can generally tell when a uniform was made depending on what corners were cut, but it's never exact as they half-assed this sort of thing. In 1944 they overhauled their uniforms entirely, resulting in a uniform that was similar to British "Battle Dress" and a bit simplified:  This retained some of the features of the old uniforms and was generally badly made (a lot of the fibers came from pulped captured Soviet uniforms, resulting in a brownish color), and they were never universally issued. At the very tail end of the war they (and so far I've only talked Wehrmacht, not Waffen SS) were moving towards the idea of sharing uniform designs with the SS, specifically making a uniform that was a simplified camouflage uniform without all the fussiness - like a modern utility uniform - but these came far too late:  The camouflage is called "Leibermuster" and it was only produced in very small numbers in 1945. tl;dr - In practice their uniforms were ALL dress uniforms of a sort, and just as expensive, so trashing them in combat was wasteful. Cessna fucked around with this message at 23:13 on Mar 8, 2019 |
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Mar 8, 2019 23:08
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Where was the effortpost on Wehrmacht uniforms with all the gory details of the belt hooks and poo poo? I can't find it Edit: never mind, found it
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Mar 8, 2019 23:16
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GotLag posted:Where was the effortpost on Wehrmacht uniforms with all the gory details of the belt hooks and poo poo? I can't find it Click the question mark below Cessna's avatar.
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Mar 8, 2019 23:19
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Cessna posted:The helmets weren't custom fitted per se, it's just that they could not be adjusted beyond 1 cm increments. The inner headbands came in sizes in 2 cm increments and you could tighten or loosen up the leather a bit (supposedly 1 cm either way) but that's it. And the helmets themselves - the steel part - were sized as well, so they'd only fit the interior liner they came with. If you picked up another person's helmet and their head was a bit smaller, you're out of luck, and a bigger helmet would flop around your head. The Finnish army bought a whole load of German and Austrian WW1 vintage helmets between the wars, as the newborn state was aching to gear up to even some level of equipment and surplus German stuff could be had for cheap. A hobbyist site (https://pkymasehist.fi/sakskyp.html) gives the figures of 95,000 helmets total before the Winter War and about 140,000 of them between 1940-44. Finland first bought Swedish M37 helmets during and after the war, and after it was produced here as the M60 steel helmet, so called "Wärtsilän Borsa" (Wärsilä was the factory that made them and borsa was a sland word for a hat of any kind, after the Borsalino hats from Italy, which were fashionable here). The various iterations of German helmets were used even after the war and while the M60 was replaced in National Service active use somewhere in the 90's it's still supposedly stored for the use of reserve units. The M37/M60 helmets had an adjustable liner and it's one-size-fits-all, in sharp contrast with the German stuff. There was also this Chezhoslovakian helmet (https://www.swat.fi/test9/windows?product_id=5090) that can be seen in wartime photos. The webstore selling them states that 50,000 of them were bought and delivered in 1940 and it's not rare to see this kind of helmet in photos.
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Mar 8, 2019 23:20
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SlothfulCobra posted:Click the question mark below Cessna's avatar. (it's in the previous thread)
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Mar 8, 2019 23:26
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https://twitter.com/snowdriftless/status/1104173184818053121?s=21
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Mar 9, 2019 02:42
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That one's rad as gently caress because it's got an actual V12 Merlin on the inside: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIj2GVfua84 Acebuckeye13 fucked around with this message at 04:16 on Mar 9, 2019 |
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Mar 9, 2019 03:57
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Mar 9, 2019 04:07
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Does anybody have any quotes or dialogue from The Battle of Castle Itter? I thought it would make a great subject for a 5-7 minute dramatic talk project, but it would be better if there was a little bit of actual dialog recounted somewhere to use.
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Mar 9, 2019 07:01
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Acebuckeye13 posted:That one's rad as gently caress because it's got an actual V12 Merlin on the inside: Ladies and gentlemen, we have a winner and all-time grand champion in the "my car is cooler than your car" competition. Nominations for second place are now being accepted. Pro-click of the pro-clicks mllaneza fucked around with this message at 07:37 on Mar 9, 2019 |
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Mar 9, 2019 07:30
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Maybe this one? Although it seems like there are quite a few cars with Rolls Royce Merlin engines in them. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-NaLzg5c26o
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Mar 9, 2019 07:33
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I've always been partial to John Dodd's "Beast" but that's probably because he made it into a station wagon: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=snP0Qx3AX0c&t=228s
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Mar 9, 2019 08:12
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Acebuckeye13 posted:That one's rad as gently caress because it's got an actual V12 Merlin on the inside: This owns but as usual stay out of those comments
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Mar 9, 2019 11:30
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Cool I love checking on on this thread to learn about the latest developments in dumb cars from reality tv can you update me on the aliens and ancient civilizations too?
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Mar 9, 2019 14:40
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Pryor on Fire posted:Cool I love checking on on this thread to learn about the latest developments in dumb cars from reality tv can you update me on the aliens and ancient civilizations too? Nice meltdown.
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Mar 9, 2019 14:42
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Alright then have this tidbit you big baby For every 100 Italian soldiers captured by the Russians in WW2, only 14 of them came back alive.
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Mar 9, 2019 14:55
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Jobbo_Fett posted:Alright then have this tidbit you big baby Is this just an artifact of the bulk of them having been captured around Stalingrad in very poor condition? e: looks like it https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_prisoners_of_war_in_the_Soviet_Union
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Mar 9, 2019 15:03
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If you want to talk about poor bastard Italian soldiers dying in the middle of nowhere in Russia, look to the 1812 retreat.
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Mar 9, 2019 15:08
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Pryor on Fire posted:Cool I love checking on on this thread to learn about the latest developments in dumb cars from reality tv can you update me on the aliens and ancient civilizations too? There’s actually a car discussion occurring in the Nintendo switch right now, if we can get your assistance over there, officer
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Mar 9, 2019 16:40
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this car talk reminded me of a boat i ran into with WW2 aircraft engines. there's a pretty cool boat in the thunderbird lodge on lake tahoe. it's got Allison V-1710's. its dissipated opium-smoking rich-boy owner who retreated to his lodge during the depression to party his rear end off and watch the world burn would hide this boat for all of WW2 because he was afraid the government would take his engines for the war effort i took a tour of the lodge once (it's an odd place, odd story, definitely pretty) and the guy who maintains the boat/engines was in the boathouse, he clearly has his dream job and it was cool to watch him talk about the engine and the boat. i think actual boat rides are some rich people poo poo that i'd have to spend way too much on, sadly here's a video showing the engines starting: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r9DGUItTamI&t=270s and a pretty promo video that doesn't have much engine noise but shows the boat itself off better: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9OvE7XRGedk here's a link to the thunderbird lodge's site which has more info on the boat and the weird-rear end owner: https://thunderbirdtahoe.org/yacht-history edit: this is like the second time this week i've awkwardly tied lake tahoe in to a topic itt oystertoadfish fucked around with this message at 17:34 on Mar 9, 2019 |
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Mar 9, 2019 17:31
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oystertoadfish posted:edit: this is like the second time this week i've awkwardly tied lake tahoe in to a topic itt Be very careful that elements of the thread don't run you out on a rail
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Mar 9, 2019 18:35
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aphid_licker posted:Is this just an artifact of the bulk of them having been captured around Stalingrad in very poor condition? According to Sacrifice on the Steppe, its a mixture of a forced march withdrawal that lasted 14-20 days (iirc), then mixed with capture with a forced march for another 2 to 3 weeks. Then the train-rides to the various camps around Russia that also took weeks. Add in malnutrition because they withdrew and because the Russians couldnt spare it, days and days of frigid qeather with little to no heat and poor clothing, lack of medical facilities and services. Then add Typhus and other diseases intermittently and you have the generic experience of being captured by the Russians and sent to a POW/Labor camp. Edit: the numbers dont make sense on that wiki page. SotS states 85k (approx.) Italians were captured, dead, or MIA. 10k were repatriated between 45 and 54-56. I forget the number estimated to have died during the withdrawal from fighting and varioud causes. Everything else is losses due to the Davai marches and camp conditions. Jobbo_Fett fucked around with this message at 19:19 on Mar 9, 2019 |
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Mar 9, 2019 19:14
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Engine chat is great, especially pre-jet era aero engines. Everyone appreciates the sound of those V12/V16 monsters that were in some ways the pinnacle of piston engine performance to this day. I have a family friend that's an old Englishman and we disagree on alot of stuff like when he says "America would be better off if it'd stayed part of the British Empire", but one time we were hanging out around the time of Seafair in Seattle and a P-51 flew right over us. We both stopped talking mid sentence and just listened until it was out of earshot. Here's a couple of my favorite blogs on that topic while we're at it. I'm pretty sure I picked them both up in this thread or the Aeronautical Insanity thread. https://oldmachinepress.com/ http://enginehistory.org/
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Mar 9, 2019 19:40
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On a different topic I need some on a couple things. The first is help ID'ing a couple helmets. There were a few knowledgeable posts about world war era helmets recently so I hope someone can fill in missing info for me. They're both inherited from my grandfather who collected all sorts of random war memorabilia. Alot of it was garbage replicas but these two helmets look pretty legit to me. The first is (I think) a brodie The outside surface is heavily textured almost like sandpaper. I can't find any marking on it aside from the giant 7 right in the middle:   The second is obviously a stahhelm but I'm not sure exactly which version. My cursory googling seems to point to model 1917, but the liner doesn't match the pictures I've seen. Its also missing a chinstrap.   The only markings I can find on it, up between the webbing and a little hard to read:  The second is about where the best place to possibly send some historical documents. A year or so ago I posted the COMBAT DOPE SHEETS that my grandfather brought back from his WWII naval service. Sadly he passed away a couple months after I posted all that. My mom has the originals stored away carefully, but we talked about trying to find a museum or other archival place to donate them to. What's a good place to look into? WWII museum in NOLA? Is there a naval museum somewhere? Find a good blog to upload all the scans to? example 
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Mar 9, 2019 20:02
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This probably isn't the best thread, but HEY GUNS will probably appreciate it. https://earlymodernmedicine.com/the-man-with-an-elephants-nose/quote:in sixteenth-century Leuven, a troubled man sent for a physician to help him with his unusually long nose. The man believed that his nose was of ‘such a prodigious length’, it resembled the ‘snoute’ of an elephant. It hindered him in everything he did, to the extent that sometimes it ‘lay in the dish’ where his supper was served. His physician, at this point, artfully and carefully, ‘conveighed a long pudding’ onto the nose of the desperate man, and then with a Barber’s razor ‘finely cut away’ the offending pudding nose while his patient was drowsy from a sleeping draft. The physician prescribed him a wholesome diet and sent the man away, relieved of his extraordinarily long nose, and the burden of ‘fear of harme and inconvenience’.[i]
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Mar 9, 2019 20:16
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I really want to know the deets on that nose.
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Mar 9, 2019 20:20
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IS-1 (IS-85) Queue: IS-2 (object 240), Production of the IS-2, IS-2 modernization projects, GMC M8, First Soviet assault rifles, Stahlhelm in WWI, Stahlhelm in WWII, SU-76 with big guns, Panther trials in the USSR, Western spherical tanks, S35 in German service, SU-152 combat debut, 57 mm gun M1, T-34 applique armour projects, Challenger I, military use of scale models, PzIV Ausf.F-G, Schmeisser's work in the USSR, Kalashnikov's debut works, Kalashnikov-Petrov self-loading carbine, Medium Tank M4A4, Hellcat, Heavy Tank T29, Hotchkiss H 35 and H 39, Experimental Polish tanks of the 1930s, Medium Tank M3 use in the USSR, HMC T82, HMC M37, GMC M41, Archer, T-29-5, Avenger I, FIAT 3000, FIAT L6-40, [M13/40, M14/41, M15/42], Carro Armato P40 and prospective Italian heavy tanks, Grosstraktor, Panzer IV/70, SU-85, KV-85, Tank sleds, Proposed Soviet heavy tank destroyers, IS-2 mod. 1944, Airborne tanks, Soviet WWII pistol and rifle suppressors, SU-100, DS-39 tank machinegun, Flakpanzers on the PzIV chassis Available for request:  Object 237 (IS-1 prototype) T-80 (the light tank) MS-1 production SU-76M (SU-15M) production S-51 SU-76I T-26 with mine detection equipment T-34M/T-44 (1941) ISU-122  Comet  Heavy Tank T32 NEW  Jagdpanzer IV Gebirgskanone M 15 Maus development in 1943-44 German anti-tank rifles Czech anti-tank rifles in German service Hotchkiss H 39/Pz.Kpfw.38H(f) in German service Flakpanzer 38(t) 15 cm sFH 13/1 (Sf) Grille series Oerlikon and Solothurn anti-tank rifles     Trials of the LT vz. 35 in the USSR
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Mar 9, 2019 20:29
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Every time I ask if people want one of my walls-o-text about something I worry isn't really right for this thread I get told to  , so here, without any warning is:Royal Navy Officer Training in WW2 Going into the Second World War there were four main elements to the naval service as far as manning and recruitment went – the regular RN and three reserves. The Royal Fleet Reserve (RFR) was instigated in 1900, and was a register of RN regulars who had left the service but were still young and fit enough to be recalled if needed.  The 'straight lace' officer insignia of the regular Royal Navy, 1864-present The Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) had been founded in 1869 – the first formal reserve force for the British military. It consisted of professional seamen from the merchant and fishing fleets who would undertake initial training and then carry out drill and further training at regular intervals in between their civilian work, with occasional at-sea service with the fleet to provide further training and experience. RNR Divisions were set up in most of the major merchant and fishing ports in the UK. The RNR recruited both ratings and officers – the former were distinguished by ‘RNR’ script on their cap bands, the latter by uniform rank insignia consisting of twin thin lines of interwoven lace, in place of the thicker straight stripes of the RN.  The intertwined lace officer insignia of the Royal Naval Reserve, 1869-1951 The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) was formed in 1903 after decades of agitation and false-start attempts to create a civilian naval reserve, against the fierce opposition of the Admiralty. This became the first volunteer reserve, recruiting otherwise untrained civilians with no previous relevant experience, in the British military. The RNVR took both ratings and officers and quickly became known as the ‘Wavy Navy’ - ratings had waved white lines on their collars (which were straight on RN and RNR uniforms) and officers’ cuff insignia consisted of zig-zag braid stripes.  The 'Wavy Navy' officer insignia of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, 1903-1951 Background - Mistrust and Misuse (1903-1939) The regular RN initially had a very low opinion of the RNR and RNVR, with widespread feeling that only the RN’s training and service could produce sailors of the correct calibre. A widespread shortage of junior officers in the RN in the early 20th century led to 250 RNR officers being given regular RN commissions. These officers were generally spurned by the RN establishment and in 1913 the Commander-in-Chief of the China Station wrote to the Admiralty arguing against the commissioning of the final batch of 100 RNR officers, saying: “They are of no use on board, as on watch they do not relieve the Captain of any responsibility and the seamen will not do anything for them. Out of the whole of the last lot you could count on the fingers of one hand those that were of any use.” That attitude played a large part in the reservists being under- and mis-used during WW1. On mobilisation a large part of the RNR and virtually the entire RNVR (4000 men in 1914) was formed into the infamous Royal Naval Division, which served as light infantry at Antwerp, Gallipoli and on the Western Front.  In a mix of Army uniforms with Navy caps, badges and insignia, men of the Royal Naval Division march along a British street in 1914. The pre-war notion that a reservist could never command a King’s Ship of any sort was lifted in mid-1915 and RNR officers would command destroyers, sloops, gunboats, Q-ships, motor launches and other such vessels, as well as serving under RN commanders as specialists (especially navigation and engineering) on major ships. By contrast the disdain and lack of confidence in the RNVR continued. In 1916 a survey of the Grand Fleet found that only one RNVR officer had attained a position of any significance (a turret captain on Royal Sovereign). This contempt caused the Admiralty a major problem pre-war, as until 1916 all new-intake officers were commissioned into the regular RN on standard service terms. When it became clear that the war would not be over soon and it would not be solved by a massive clash of opposing battle fleets but in a war of attrition carried out by blockade, interdiction, convoy duty, minesweeping and anti-submarine patrol, the need for junior officers to man minor warships grew. New officers were instead given commissions into the RNVR. None the less the glut of regular RN officers from the early days of the war remained and became even more of a problem in the post-war years when the RN was not only demobilised but significantly drawn-down even from its pre-war size. The Admiralty found itself over-staffed with junior officers on regular service terms who were equally hard to find roles for and equally hard to get rid of. Doing so caused a lot of trouble in the corridors of the Admiralty and, with an excess of officers chasing service roles or facing early retirement, created intra-service hostility and an unpleasant back-stabbing streak to the RN’s culture in the 1920s and early 1930s. None of this helped the attitude of the regulars to the reservists. A Lieutenant-Commander, RNR, summed up the attitude of the mid-1930s: “the RN…looked with disdain on the RNR, who were often from lowly backgrounds, had risen up the ranks of the merchant service through decades of sea time and were, quite literally, ‘in trade’, which was always beyond the pale. At best they tolerated the RNVR, who tended to be ‘gentlemen’ of the right background and habits even if they could never be seamen. There was a popular saying then: RN – gentlemen and seamen; RNR- seamen but not gentlemen; RNVR – gentlemen trying to be seamen. The RNR was not without fault as well, looking down on the RNVR as bumbling amateurs.” In 1921 the RNVR was reconstituted under direct Admiralty jurisdiction, putting it on the same legal status as the RN and RNR, with both reserve forces coming under the command of Admiral Commanding, Reserves. At the same time the system of ‘Qualified Officers’ was introduced for both RNR and RNVR, whereby a reserve officer who had undergone sufficient training and experience would be deemed to have the same status and seniority as his RN equivalent. Each time such an officer was promoted he would lose his Qualified status until he had met the new standards again, thus in effect making promotion a two-stage process. None the less it opened the possibility for reserve officers to stand charge of a watch or even command a ship if the opportunity arose. In 1936 Britain began its rearmament programme. This was a sudden reversal of policy which since 1919 had been based on a drawing-down of naval strength. Having only just cleared itself of the difficult backlog of junior officers recruited during WW1 and those made redundant in the post-war cuts, the Admiralty suddenly found itself with a potential officer shortage once again. In October 1936 the Admiralty created the Royal Naval Volunteer Supplementary Reserve (RNVSR). While part of the naval service, it was simply a means of creating a body of men who could, at some indefinite point in the future, be called up and trained to be officers. Applicants had to demonstrate that they had a certain level of sea-going experience. The response was unexpectedly strong - by February 1937 over 1000 men had joined the RNVSR and the list soon reached 3000, at which point it was closed. Many of the applicants were amateur yachtsmen or other sailors - a group perhaps surprisingly under-represented in the RNVR as the commitment (two drill sessions a week and two weeks' fleet service a year at the time) meant that many would not be able to otherwise enjoy their hobby. The British Reserve Fleet was mobilised on May 26, 1939 which required calling up 15,000 members of the RNR, RNVR and RNVSR and the RN's own Fleet Reserve. The Fleet was ready for service by June 15. Mass-Producing Officers (and Gentlemen) With memories of the personnel problems of its own making during WW1, when WW2 began the Admiralty had a different plan, based from the start on the assumption that it would have to recruit a large number of officers with no previous sea-experience and that the conflict would last several years. And there would be no repear of the mistake of the Royal Naval Division - in this war all naval recruits would serve the navy directly, preferrably at sea. Those who volunteered or were called-up for the Navy from September 1939 were put on ‘Hostilities Only’ service terms (for ratings) or were given ‘Temporary’ commissions (for officers). All officers would be commissioned into the RNVR – there would be no repeat of the over-manning problems of WW1. By contrast all new ratings were inducted into the regular RN. This meant that with the exception of the ratings who had joined the RNVR before the war (7600 men), the ‘Wavy Navy’ became an officers-only organisation for the duration. A dedicated training centre was needed to turn these civilians into naval officers. The site selected was a newly-built (in fact, not quite fully completed) municipal lido/dance hall/car park complex on the seafront at Hove, West Sussex, on the south coast of England – 40 miles east of Portsmouth and 45 miles south of London. The first deployment of the war for many of the peacetime RNVR contingent was to be stationed in Hove to assist in turning the ‘Hove Marina’ complex into a ‘stone frigate’ - HMS King Alfred, named after the 9th-century king of Wessex and, in popular national mythology at least, the founder of what would become the Royal Navy. Even while the conversion of the facility was ongoing, members of the RNVSR were arriving in batches of 140 for a whirlwind 10-day instructional course before they were commissioned and sent to the fleet. The first four classes of would-be RNVR officers arrived at King Alfred in early October, 1939. These were the first of the wartime officer intake for the RNVR which was to be the training establishment’s speciality. These would-be officers came from three sources: Direct Entrants: These were (in the words of the Admiralty guidelines) ‘mature gentlemen of appropriate age and education.’ While not set in hard-and-fast rules, these were usually university graduates from the professional classes aged between 25 and 35, although recruiters were able to take into account career experience or other qualifications. These men would be commissioned on call-up, even if it was into the distinctly uninspiring rank of Acting Temporary Probationary Sub-Lieutenant. On completion of training they would cease to be ‘Acting’ and after three months’ active service they would no longer be ‘Probationary.’ CW Candidates: These were ratings who had been nominated by their commanding officers for promotion to either commissioned or warrant officer rank – they had to have at least three months’ sea service on the lower deck to qualify. The Y-Scheme: This recruited school- and university leavers (the qualification was a School Certificate or better) who demonstrated ‘potential officer material.’ Upon call-up they underwent basic training as ratings before transferring to King Alfred. Those arriving under the CW or Y-Schemes were ranked as cadets, which meant they effectively began as junior rates, then senior rates. They would not be considered (or treated) as ‘Officers Under Training’ until the final two weeks of the 12-week training course, at the end of which they would be commissioned. Those under 19.5 years of age were commissioned as Midshipmen, RNVR while those older would become Temporary Probationary Sub-Lieutenants, RNVR. Although set at 12 weeks, the lack of capacity at King Alfred and the demand for junior officers to man the rapidly-expanding number of convoy escorts meant that in the autumn and winter of 1939 this was often cut to 10 or even just eight weeks. By early 1940 additional sites around Hove had been acquired and the demand for officers had slackened sufficiently that a more in-depth, three-tier training structure could be introduced. The Making of a 'Twelve-Week Terror' (1941-1945) As the training programme matured, it settled down as a 12-week, three-stage course conducted at three sites around Hove. By 1941 it had reached the form it would retain for the rest of the war. The first site was King Alfred (M), stationed in the premises of the former Mowden School (which had been evacuated to the safety of Shropshire, leaving its building and grounds unused). Ratings joining the ‘ship’ were billeted at local hotels and private homes in the area. On their arrival cadets were given a medical examination before undergoing the Admiralty Selection Board (which had moved from its traditional home in Portsmouth in the spring of 1941), which was a series of physical tasks, mental assessments and interviews. Those that passed the Board became Cadet Ratings, entitled to wear a white ‘halo’ band around their caps in place of their ship’s name tally. Even ashore, the navy maintained its beloved Divisional system – Cadet Ratings were assigned to one division (between 10 and 22 operated at any one time depending on demand), each named alphabetically after a famous naval figure from history. Ratings would stay with their assigned division as it passed through the various stages of King Alfred and on completion of the course the name would be reassigned to an incoming group of cadets at Mowden. The naval tradition of Divisions (all divisions on the ‘ship’ mustering for inspection by the commanding officer) was carried out every morning in all weathers at Mowden, with the school’s playing field serving as the ‘quarterdeck’. Cadets stayed at King Alfred (M) for two weeks. In general this was a period of basic training, restating skills and behaviour that the CW Candidates should already have been well-familiar with – parade drill, rifle drill, naval terminology, air raid and gas attack drill, teamwork exercises, inter-divisional competitions, physical training and basic seamanship such as rope handling and rigging. But there were also a few more advanced areas such as elementary navigation and use of the sextant – these had to be mastered to show the potential to move onto more advanced stages. More crucially, cadets were watched at every moment to be sure they maintained OLQs (Officer-Like Qualities). If they displayed LDA (Lower Deck Attitude) they could, at any stage, be returned to their original ship or, for Y-Scheme entrants, sent off to train and serve as a rating.  Cadet Ratings (distinguished by the 'halo' white cap bands, are inspected at Lancing by the High Commissioner for New Zealand in 1942. HMS King Alfred did not only train British officers, but also men from Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India and Kenya, with each dominion or colony having its own localised RNVR. Men from the Free French, Netherlands, Polish and Norwegian navies were also trained there. After two weeks at Mowden (and assuming attaining the required standard), Cadets moved to King Alfred (L), in the stately neo-Gothic surroundings of the requisitioned Lancing College public school. This was the longest phase of the training at six weeks. Direct Entrant officers started the training process here, joining their own divisions at Lancing and having to pick up and learn the basics of naval life that the others were taught at Mowden as they went. Cadets were accommodated on-site in large, sparse communal dormitories. The routing of Morning Divisions was continued but they were held on the school’s central courtyard which quickly became overcrowded as between six and 10 divisions could be passing through at any one time, so they were held in shifts. The major element of training at Lancing was in advanced seamanship – navigation, metrology and ship-handling. As well as extensive classroom instruction, cadets were able to practice the latter in the College’s sports hall, where miniature ships would be manoeuvred around the floor which was chalked-out with depth contours, headlands, and docksides as well as being strewn with marker buoys, lighthouses and other navigational marks. At least, that was the theory – in the early days of the war the equipment didn’t exist and so cadets had to ‘sail’ around the hall on commandeered ice-cream seller’s tricycles. By the end of 1941 these had been replaced by more sophisticated ride-on ships powered by electric motors and fitted with compasses, running lights, signal lamps and flag halyards.  Direct Entrants being instructed on ship-handling using one of the electric miniature ships at Lancing. Cadets were taught how to lay, handle, retrieve and stow various sorts of anchors in a variety of weather conditions, how to ‘work their tides’ (calculating tidal heights for any point and time from the published Admiralty almanacs), how to set a course by compass (accounting for compass error, magnetic deviation, ship leeway, tidal flow and current set) , how to read, mark and update nautical charts, how to calculate position from astronomical sightings, the meanings of the various buoys, markers, ship lights and day symbols plus a crash-course on navigational maths (spherical and triangular geometry). The course also taught gunnery drill, plus the crucial knowledge for a future officer such as the intricacies of naval routine, the Divisional System, flag etiquette and how to command men on parade and drill. Finally, cadets passed to King Alfred (H), the main former-lido complex in Hove. This four-week stage was partly to teach more advanced forms of the lessons learnt at Lancing but also to impart (and check up on…) those crucial OLQs. On transferring to Hove the cadets were measured for their officer’s uniforms – unsurprisingly this led to the tailors of West Sussex doing roaring trade and half a dozen tailor’s shops were set up in the streets around the training establishment. These would be checked and then hung up in the quartermaster’s stores, to be issued on passing-out – if that happened. If it didn’t, at least the cadet didn’t have to pay for the uniform. The course at Hove included elements such as rough-weather ship handling (using remote-controlled models in tanks fitted with wave- and wind-generators) and storm procedure, damage control instruction and firefighting, more instruction on gunnery (majoring more on ballistic theory and the uses of various types of gun and shell than practical drill) as well as other weapons and system such as depth-charges, torpedoes and Asdic. There were also tests of the cadets’ skills at leading parade, divisional inspections and other officer duties. The final hurdle, as had been the case in the Royal Navy for over two centuries, was Final Board – a day-long barrage of written and oral examinations to squeeze out all that the cadets had learnt in the past three months. Failure of the Final Board usually meant going to sea as a rating, although at the commanding officer’s discretion a cadet could be held back for further training and a second attempt. On passing Final Board the successful cadets were paraded for inspection by a senior officer and handed their commissions. These had to be presented in order to receive their uniforms, which were donned straight away. After Alfred The course at King Alfred was really intended only to produce seamen with the potential to be naval officers – only a small part of the course was given over to warfare training. Having left King Alfred, the newly-minted officers were then to go to the Royal Naval College at Greenwich for a short course to teach them how to ‘fight the ship’ and the basics of naval tactics, fleet manoeuvres and other skills. However even as the system at King Alfred reached maturity the demand for new officers was such that this element was often skipped. New officers were frequently sent to new-build or re-commissioning ships, so that the ship’s working-up exercises would also serve as the officer’s warfare training – a system which proved remarkably effective. RNVR officers could be sent to the course at Greenwich by their commanding officer’s request and passing the course was made a pre-requisite for being an executive officer. Only from mid-1943 did the demand slacken enough for men to routinely go from King Alfred to Greenwich.  Able Seaman Jack Boulton was one of thousands of ratings promoted from the lower deck to the wardroom by the CW Scheme. Here, as a newly-trained Sub-Lieutenant, RNVR, he's mixing with regular RN officers in the wardroom of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, 'the university of the navy.' The pre-war attitudes of the RN to its reserves quickly mellowed, both by necessity and by clear demonstration of their abilities. At the outbreak of war even the staunchest advocate of the RNVR would have been sceptical of the notion that an RNVR officer could command even a minor warship. The RNVR would be to provide junior officers to ‘fill the gaps’, the RNR would provide specialist skills and experience and the RN would provide the commanders. This notion was quickly dismantled. From the very start of the war the hurredly-built convoy escort ships such as naval trawlers and corvettes were, in nearly all cases, commanded by RNR officers with RNVR juniors, plus a lower deck consisting mostly of RNR seniors and freshly-trained ‘Hostilties Only’ RN ratings. The Admiralty made sure that RNVR officers who demonstrated real potential could be promoted quickly - much more quickly than either their regular counterparts or their peacetime predecessors. A newly-commissioned Sub-Lieutenant who was aged 28 or over could, if approved by their commander, be promoted to Lieutenant after just three months of active service. Those aged 21-28 would have to wait six months and those aged 19.5-21 would need a year. In all cases this was hugely accelerated over the pace of promotions in the peacetime navy where a new 'one-ringer' would usually have to wait two years or more to get his second stripe - something which initially caused some friction and derision amongst the regulars, but that quickly dissolved as the RNVR men proved themselves. Many fresh RNVR officers, entirely new to the sea and naval life in 1939, reached Lieutenant-Commander rank within three years. A few (around 100) ended the war as Captain, RNVR, although the Admiralty could never quite bring itself to put a 'Wave Navy' Captain on the bridge of a cruiser, carrier or battleship and those making it to the rank were deployed on staff and instructional roles. The RNVR ranks only went up as far as Commodore, and this was only given out to previously retired RN officers brought back into service but unable, on account of age or health, from serving at sea and instead given Temporary RNVR commissions and posted to important operational roles such as running dockyards, ports, convoy anchorages or training bases.  Francis Curzon, 5th Earl Howe, Commodore RNVR, meets his son, Lieutenant Edward Curzon, RNVR, aboard the battleship HMS Howe , named after their ancestor, Richard Howe, 1st Earl Howe, who commanded the British fleet at 'the Glorious First' in 1794. The Earl was senior naval officer of the dockyards at Leith, while his son was serving aboard the battleship. The Wonderful Wavy Navy The abilities of the new RNVR officers impressed even the most sceptical professionals and the demand for officers to man and command minor vessels was unceasing. By 1940 RNVR officers were being placed in command of small ships such as HDMLs, MTBs, MGBs, MMSs and SGBs. They then graduated to trawlers, minesweepers, and corvettes, and then to frigates and sloops and finally to destroyers. The Royal Naval Patrol Service, which carried out coastal patrol, harbour defence, minesweeping, boom-laying, convoy management and escort, was almost entirely manned by Temporary officers and Hostilities-Only ratings – about 70,000 men in over 1600 vessels. Before 1940 the Submarine Service had been closed to reservists in any capacity but in 1940 Admiral Max Horton took over as commander of the service. He had been C-in-C of the Reserve Fleet during its 1939 mobilisation and had been deeply impressed by the efficiency and skill of the reservists. He opened the Submarine Service to RNR and RNVR officers, although it was expected that it would take between five and seven years of training and service for a new-intake RNVR officer to reach command. In fact the first RNVR officer to command a RN submarine was appointed in early 1942 and many more passed the ‘Perisher’ command course to qualify as both executive and commanding officers.  Edward Young, a graphic designer until September 1939, became the first RNVR officer to command a submarine when he was still Lieutenant, not being promoted to Lieutenant-Commander until the spring of 1944. By 1942 the number of RNVR officers in the service equalled the number of their RN regular counterparts. By 1945 the RNVR outnumbered the RN four-to-one, with a total of 43,805 RNVR officers on the Navy List. The fact that the huge majority of these new officers had joined the service as ratings, if only for the 12 weeks of training, lead to a significant change in the culture of the RN - a greater sense of, and dedication to, meritocracy and a very different form of leadership from its officers - less dictative, more collaborative and delegative. This shift in culture, which was noted during wartime by the Admiralty, was generally welcomed. Active efforts were made to preserve it in the post-war years and that formed the basis of the modern recruitment, training and leadership doctrines which are still in place in the RN today. The dominance of the ‘Wavy Navy’ in the wartime service, and the successful and even distinguished record of many of its members, was a source of great pride to the ‘amateurs’ within it. A Punch cartoon of June, 1943 (which was undoubtedly pinned up in many a corvette or trawler’s wardroom…) captured the spirit very well. Walking down a London street, the girlfriend of a Sub-Lieutenant, RNVR, spies a Commander, RN. The caption provides his answer to her unwritten question:  “Straight stripes? Oh, those are the fellows who run the Navy in peacetime.” Of course, as intended, virtually all these RNVR officers were demobbed with the return of peace. HMS King Alfred paid-off in September 1945. Of the near-44,000 RNVR officers of 1945, only 100 joined the RN permanently and 500 accepted a four-year extension to their Temporary commissions. In recognition of the reserves’ wartime service, King George VI decreed that both the RNR and the RNVR would lose their distinctive rank stripes (the intertwined lace for the RNR, the zig-zag stripe for the RNVR) and instead wear the same straight stripes with the ‘Elliott’s Eye’ executive curl as the RN, but with the addition of an ‘R’ within the curl. The change was brought into effect in 1951. The RNR and the RNVR ratings seemed largely unconcerned with the change, but the RNVR officers were proud of their specific ‘Wavy Navy’ stripes and the wartime achievement it represented. One RNVR division collected all their old ‘wavy’ gold lace, sold it and purchased a wardroom snuffbox. One melted their lace down and turned it into a commemorative plaque. Another, obviously feeling the loss more keenly, had a set of Lieutenant, RNVR stripes placed in a miniature coffin which was paraded at every mess dinner thereafter until well into the 1970s. The esteem with which the ‘Wave Navy’ heritage was held can be judged by the relative lack of a furore that was caused in 1958 when the RNVR was abolished altogether. The changing needs of the RN during the Cold War and the decline in manning numbers of the Merchant Navy made it no longer practical or necessary to maintain two separate reserve elements. From November 1959 there would be only one Royal Naval Reserve. While this retained the name of the former ‘professional’ reserve, and was still open to professional sailors, the large majority of the new RNR’s members were civilian ‘landsmen’ and their training and duties reflected that – in name it may be the RNR, but in spirit it is very much the RNVR.  The very image of the RNVR during the Second World War - a young duffle-coated Sub-Lieutenant, RNVR, peering out from the bridge of a naval trawler. [NOTE: I apologise for the lack of decent/truely relevant pictures. While there are plenty of excellent pictures of RNVR officer training in the IWM archive, including some brilliant scans from some cadet notebooks from King Alfred and the RNVR's internal magazine, 'The Wave', I don't have free-to-use access to them and I'm not paying  again for a second batch of licenses. So these are just mostly pinched from Wikimedia...]
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Mar 9, 2019 20:49
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The German helmet you have oXDemosthenesXo is certainly one issued during or perhaps after the 1st World War, you can always tell between it and it's 2nd World War spin off with the bolts on the crown which for the 1st World War was part of an experimental visor that didn't really take off.
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Mar 9, 2019 21:07
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Speaking of the Italians in WWII, how were their uniforms?
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Mar 9, 2019 21:49
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I would have thought the admiralty would be eager to get access to a larger reserve of British seamen?  E: Maybe they were concerned it would be too old and salty rather than young and fresh? Schadenboner fucked around with this message at 23:32 on Mar 9, 2019 |
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Mar 9, 2019 23:30
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Schadenboner posted:I would have thought the admiralty would be eager to get access to a larger reserve of British seamen? I think the Admiralty was very concerned about the quality of British seamen before WW2, hence why it was so dismissive of its reserves. Only the finest Dartmouth-educated seamen would do. The RNVR taught the Admiralty that, with proper training and the use of a municipal swimming pool, it could create top-quality seamen from almost anywhere. Dammit, that's basically a smutty-but-perfect two-line summation of that previous 4000-word megapost. Thanks goons!!!
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Mar 9, 2019 23:52
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So were the standard German uniforms in WWI less ridiculously over engineered crap?
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Mar 10, 2019 02:18
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look out historians, the english department thinks we're stupid for caring about whether something's true or not
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Mar 10, 2019 02:34
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i love write-ups like the one about the royal navy above (thank you, thank you, thank you) not so much because i care about military fashion but because of the light people shine on contemporary society when they describe the full story behind some intricate piece of military history, as was done so well above. people in this thread are very good about providing context i love the context. i live for the context. it's why i love history, and geography. these disciplines are the essence of context
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Mar 10, 2019 02:50
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If you collected all this stuff and covered training for every service of the major belligerents you could probably sell it as a book or something. This goes for most of the other effortposts/effortposters here, too.
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Mar 10, 2019 03:19
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An article about the development of the US Army's Class A green uniform. The Army Green Uniform for semidress wear by all male personnel was adopted in 1954 as a result of a post-World War II, long-range uniform improvement program. The new uniform provided the foundation for a stable service uniform system upon which the Army could build the uniform tradition it historically lacked. This report presents the Army uniform problems which led to the uniform program, the selection of a color and design for the new service uniform and accessories, and the development of the Army Green Uniform into a complete system for all-year wear. THE ARMY GREEN UNIFORM 1. Introduction The U.S. Army is building a uniform tradition with the Army Green Uniform it adopted in 1954. Throughout its history the American Army has lacked any strong tradition in dress, unlike the U.S. Navy whose uniforms reflect the color, design and spirit of British naval uniforms worn 200 years ago. The importance of uniform tradition and appeal was stated by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, then Chief of Staff, to a Senate subcommittee hearing on appropriations for the Green Uniform in 1955: “The American soldier requires and deserves a uniform which he can wear with pride. In our never-ending search for men of high caliber and firm determination, we must offer a uniform that is military, distinctive and dignified.” For the first time Army officers and enlisted men share a general duty uniform that is attractively distinct in color from other military uniform and is designed according to sound principles of style and use. The Army Green Uniform is the result of a long-range uniform improvement program established after World War II when widespread dissatisfaction with the Army uniform reached a climax. 2. Tradition in Uniforms a. Growth and Importance of Tradition The importance of a uniform’s appearance dates back to the original purpose of special military attire. Medieval princes and rulers initially clothed their followers in the same colors to set them apart from the enemy and from other classes of society (1). Uniforms in the modern sense of identical clothing for an army were introduced during the second half of the 17th Century. The growth of commerce and the consolidation of finances and authority enabled rulers of emerging nation-state to maintain standing armies and to clothe them in uniforms. With time, uniforms became a source of patriotism and soldiery pride as well as simple identification. A historian notes, “The esprit de corps of standing armies on the Continent owed much to the jealously preserved traditions linked with their uniforms”(1). The color of national uniforms became traditional. Generally, the French and Austrian armies wore white, the Prussian armies blue, and the Russians green (2). The famous redcoats of the British were first adopted by Cromwell’s Parliamentary Army in 1645, and red continued as the general British uniform color for more than 250 years until changes in warfare required camouflage clothing. The British still preserve their traditional red in the scarlet tunics and cloaks worn by the Foot Guards and Life Guards at state occasions. Individual regiments within armies were identified by the different colors of their facings, cuffs and trousers and even by differences in their coat buttons. The five regiments of the British Foot Guards are distinguished even today by the traditional grouping of their tunic buttons, from the evenly spaced buttons of the Grenadiers to the 5-button grouping of the Welsh Guards(3). In America, the new U.S. Navy built its uniform tradition upon the dark blue of the British Royal Naval uniform. The present U.S. Navy uniform of blue and gold and the Marine Corps dress uniform of two-tone blue date back to early 19th Century Navy and Marine Corps uniforms. Naval seamen regard their traditional white and blue uniform of blouse, scarf and bell-shaped trousers with such pride that they turned town post-World War II proposals for design modernization. b. Lack of Army Uniform Tradition In contrast to these strong uniform traditions, the American Army uniform has changed continually. The H. A. Ogden illustrations of Army uniforms and similar studies show the Army enlisted man and officer wearing a different uniform in every major American campaign and war since the Revolution (6, 7). The first Army uniform policy was promulgated by Gen. George Washington in October 1779 after Congress delegated the prescription of uniforms to the Commander-in-Chief. Although a blue, open waistcoat was prescribed as the basic Army coat, the troops were divided by states into regional groups and distinguished by different colored coat facings. The color of the Army coat was finally established in 1821 when dark blue was proclaimed the national uniform color. The design of the uniform changed frequently, however, as it followed British and Prussian models and was influenced by civilian fashions. By the Civil War, the regulation uniform was a semidress type with a dark blue, heavy frock coat and light blue trousers. In a postwar study of the Union uniform, the assistant Surgeon General sharply criticized the heavy, tight-fitting coat as being, too restrictive and too warm for year-round wear, especially in the South (8). Instead of boldly designing its own practical uniform, the U.S. Army moved closer to European models and in the late 70’s adopted the spiked helmet popularized by the Prussian Army (7). The Army’s one stable uniform feature the blue color of the tunic – was discarded for field uniforms during the Spanish-American War (1898). The blue coats of U.S. troops fighting in Cuba presented such visible targets to snipers that the men smeared mud on their uniforms to be less conspicuous. By the end of the war the Army had changed its summer uniform color to Khaki (Hindustani for “dust-colored”), a tan shade worn by British troops in India. The Army also adopted a camouflage color for its winter service uniform – a dull, greenish-brown color designated as “olive-drab.” The Blue Uniform was retained for dress wear, thus beginning the separation of dress and camouflage colored service or field uniforms. The World War I Army uniform was patterned after the British Army uniform with a stiff, high “military” collar which was perhaps stylish but uncomfortable, and spiral-wound puttees which restricted circulation in the legs when worn too tight. Between the World Wars, the Army’s lack of uniform tradition and firm uniform policy became even more apparent. Army officers began wearing a semidress winter uniform which they referred to as their “pinks and greens” – a combination of either a dark yellow-green coat and “pink” (light taupe) trousers, or less often, the same coat and matching green trousers. Military tailors and uniform houses competing for uniform sales catered to the desire of local commanders and individual officers to have a uniform that was slightly different, and the color of the green coat became progressively darker. By World War II Army officers appeared in an unpleasing diversity of shades and combinations of the “pinks” and greens. The outbreak or World War II found the Army literally undressed for wartime duty. Lt. Gen. Edmond B. Gregory, Quartermaster General during the War, has vividly described the Army’s uniform plight in 1940: “After World War I, for reasons of economy, it was decided to discard the dress uniform and make the so-called ‘service uniform’ of olive drab woolen cloth do for both field and garrison wear. Officers and enlisted men, in an endeavor to make a military dress appearance, wore their uniforms rather tight, and as someone has expressed it, the Army was prepared for fighting in Maine in summer and Florida in winter. Furthermore, military planning in the United States, in the years preceding 1940, was based on a defensive concept. Operations had been visualized as taking place mainly near or within the borders of the continental United States, or in similar climatic areas. Consequently, when World War II came upon us, the Army was ill-equipped, having a ‘service uniform’ which was neither a field uniform nor a dress uniform – neither attractive in appearance nor usable in the field or in combat.”(5) Under the aggressive leadership of Col. Georges F. Doriot (later Brigadier General), Chief of the newly-formed Research and Development staff of the Office of the Quartermaster General, a program was begun in 1942 to develop functional uniforms which would be suitable for fighting in any part of the world. A significant accomplishment was the development of the M-1943 cold weather clothing ensemble to be worn by U.S. troops in the invasion of France. To give this combat uniform a semidress appearance for garrison wear, the Army adopted a hip-length jacket styled after the British battle dress jacket. This was the World War II “Eisenhower” or “Ike” jacket, so named because Gen. Dwight Eisenhower first admired and wore the British model when he was Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces. In the field, the Eisenhower jacket served as an insulating layer in the M-l943 ensemble, not as an outer field garment like the British jacket. It was to be worn underneath a water-repellent, wind-resistant outer jacket and, when the temperature required, over a sweater, a flannel shirt and wool/cotton underwear. To accommodate these insulating underlayers, the “Ike” jacket was designed with a bloused action back and roomy sleeves. As a result it was somewhat too large when worn without the extra undergarments. Unfortunately, many soldiers regarded the “Ike” jacket as a dress item because they had no service coat and the men often had it fitted so snugly that they could not wear it in the field as intended (9). The deep-seated dissatisfaction of the Army with its uniform, which stimulated these continual modifications, reached a peak after World War II. When the troops returned home, the men who were making the Army their career wanted a garrison uniform that was more flattering and attractive in civilian eyes. The olive-drab, short “Ike” jacket was not a satisfactory semidress item in a peacetime society which considered coats and ties the proper attire for many occasions. The baggy fit of the jacket further detracted from its suitability for wear as a service uniform. The image of the jacket suffered further from its indiscriminate use as a working jacket by soldiers returning to civilian life. Upon discharge, soldiers had been allowed to retain their uniforms because of the shortage of civilian clothes, and the jackets, which were functional as work clothing, were frequently seen on construction crews, filling station attendants and other civilian workers. The greatest source of dissatisfaction, however, was not with the appearance of the Eisenhower jacket but the olive-drab color of the uniform. Because the color was a camouflage shade, not normally worn in men’s clothing, the uniform was almost instinctively rejected. The acceptance of a uniform is known to be based primarily on the viewer’s psychological reaction to its appearance. If the color of a uniform and thus its appearance is displeasing, the reaction will not be favorable even though this dislike may be attributed to other factors. Experts from the clothing industry advised the Army that the olive-drab color lacked consumer acceptability and that the Army should find a more attractive color if it wished to obtain, a satisfactory uniform upon which a tradition could be built (5). 3. Separation of the Field and General Duty Uniform The Army Command was as displeased as its soldiers with the uniform situation. Clothing the Army had been a serious production and supply problem during World War II. A multitude of uniform items had been authorized and numerous out-of-date items continued in use on an optional basis because of wartime fabric shortages and because no long-range uniform policy existed. The first postwar action taken to meet the uniform problem was initiated by Gen. Eisenhower, then Army Chief of Staff, in March 1946 under War Department Circular 88. To reduce the multiplicity of uniforms, Circular 88 prescribed the olive drab winter uniform as the field and garrison uniform for all male Army personnel. In keeping with the recommendation of the Doolittle Commission, officers would appear in formation wearing the same uniform as troops. The officer’s pinks and greens would become obsolete after July 1948. For semidress and dress needs, a blue uniform similar to the blue dress uniform of 1938 would be authorized for all male personnel. The Eisenhower jacket would remain a dual-purpose item, serving as the jacket of the garrison uniform and as an insulating layer in the field ensemble. Since the men would wear the Eisenhower jacket as their uniform “coat” at semidress occasions until a blue uniform was developed, the Quartermaster Corps began a program to improve its appearance. The patterns for the World War II jacket were modified twice with some fullness being eliminated each time. Unfortunately, the supply of World War II “Ike” jackets in stock was so large that few of the better fitting jackets were ever produced. Officers and enlisted men had their jackets tailored to fit snugly in a wide range of effects which compromised the desired uniformity of appearance. Also, officers were authorized to wear their pinks and greens except when in formation with the troops. By 1947 it was apparent that no one was satisfied with the Eisenhower jacket as a dual-purpose item. Pressure developed to drop the Circular 88 requirement that this jacket form part of the field ensemble so it could be redesigned solely as a garrison item. The Quartermaster Corps objected that this would leave soldiers without an adequate combat uniform and the Army would be as unprepared for emergency as it was in World War II (10). The final jacket design in 1950 had a straight, unbloused front, narrower sleeves and a fitted waist. Some blousing was retained in the back to give an “action back” and to avoid the jacket rising above the belt when the wearer bent over. This modified version was later adopted as a flight jacket by the Air Force for its general wear uniform, in addition to a coat which was its basic uniform item. During this period there was a widespread feeling that any clothing needs beyond a functional field uniform should be met with a completely separate uniform which might serve for both dress and semidress purposes. The blue uniform prescribed in Circular 88 for semidress and dress wear seemed to offer this solution and the development of the blue uniform was initiated in 1947. The reactions of Army men and women to the proposed blue uniform were obtained in a study conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, for the Quartermaster Corps between December 1946 and April 1947 (11). Demonstration teams showed eight different blue uniform combinations to U.S. troops in the United States, Germany, Austria and the Pacific area. More than 30,450 persons filled out group questionnaires and 1213 were interviewed in detail as to their preferences. Army personnel almost unanimously approved the idea of a dress uniform. They indicated greatest preference for the light blue uniform or a combination of medium blue jacket and light blue trousers. Significantly, color was cited most often as the reason for both liking and disliking the various blue uniforms. Unfortunately, the cost of the proposed blue uniform appeared to be beyond reasonable expectations of what could be funded at that time. Even if the new items were held to the minimum of coat, trousers and service cap, it was estimated the cost for initial issue would amount to $5l,400,000 (12). Since action on such a uniform did not then appear possible, the idea of issuing a blue dress uniform was dropped in 1948. In April 1948, a change in uniform policy was announced by the new Chief of Staff, Gen. Omar N. Bradley, under Department of the Army Circular 89. Recognizing that the Eisenhower jacket was not a satisfactory dress item and that a blue dress uniform was not feasible, the Circular authorized wool serge coats to replace the Eisenhower jacket for garrison wear. Officers were to retain the pinks and greens which they had never really relinquished, and enlisted men were to receive a new coat designed like the officer’s coat but in olive-drab color to match their trousers. The Eisenhower jacket would be worn by all male personnel only for the winter field uniform. The blue dress uniform would be optional winter dress wear for officers. Circular 89, like Circular 88, was never implemented. The olive-drab coat appeared to be only another attempt to alter a uniform which no one found really acceptable. The Army was reluctant to spend $21 million for olive-drab coats, that would not satisfy the need for an attractive semidress uniform (13). The need for a uniform change, particularly in color, was increased by the Air Force’s introduction of their gray-blue uniform in 1949-50. The Army was clearly at a disadvantage in competing for desirable recruits with its olive-drab uniform against the more attractive uniform colors of the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. At this point Lt. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration, requested that a long-range program be initiated to find a lasting solution to the uniform problem. A Uniform Board was appointed in early February 1949 to review the problem, to make recommendations and to oversee the improvement of uniforms for Army men and women. It was from the recommendations of this Uniform Board that the present Army Green Uniform ultimately came. The primary recommendation of the Board was to develop a uniform for general duty or semidress wear which was completely independent of the field uniform in style, design and color. The Army’s history of uniform instability had demonstrated that a dual purpose or compromise uniform would never really be satisfactory. Second, the Uniform Board urged that a new basic color be found for the general duty uniform. The olive-drab color was no longer required since the general duty uniform would be separate from field clothing. Th fact, olive-drab had been declared unsatisfactory even for camouflage purposes by the Corps of Engineers and a new green camouflage color was specified for field garments. 4. Search for a New Color The most important task facing the developers of the general duty uniform was the selection of a new basic color. It was obvious that the Army uniform could be stabilized only if a pleasing color were found. The Research and Development staff of the Office of Quartermaster General began the search for a new color early in 1949. It considered many shades, evaluating each on the basis of consumer appeal and attractiveness; potential for integration of summer and winter uniforms with a minimum of separate items, and with accessories of existing uniforms; practicality for general wear; relation to past Army uniforms; and distinctiveness when compared with the uniforms of other U.S. military services and foreign armies. It was recognized that blue unquestionably would be a popular color for a new uniform because of its basic acceptance in men’s clothing. However, it would have been difficult for the Army to find a distinctive, practical blue shade for a uniform since the blue field had been preempted by the Air Force and Navy service uniforms and the Marine Corps and Navy dress uniforms. The green and “pink” combination of the officers’ uniform was tentatively rejected because the light trousers would be impractical for general duty wear by enlisted men. The dark yellow-green coat was attractive only when worn in combination with the contrasting pink trousers. Various grays, including the gray of the West Point uniform, and taupe colors in the family of the officers’ “pink” trousers were also considered. The field of greens appeared to offer the best opportunity for a shade which would be basically attractive and also distinctive and militarily acceptable. Various shades of green had been worn in the past by the Army, and accessories for a green uniform might be integrated where necessary with the camouflage green field uniform. Color experts and clothing designers of the Advisory Committee on Military Uniforms (appointed by the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council) advised the Quartermaster Corps that gray-green shades of a neutral cast would be attractive and the most flattering to the greatest range of people. Yellow-greens were unpleasantly close to olive-drab, and blue greens would be harder to wear. Sixteen shades of neutral green close to the gray axis were developed by the Quartermaster Corps Research and Development Textile Dyeing Laboratory, then located at the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot. Early in 1950, dyed samples of the 16 shades were shown in all possible coat and trouser combinations to 222 enlisted men at the Quartermaster Board, Camp Lee, Virginia, to 30 officers at the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot, and to 14 civilian consultants on color (14). The predominant preference of each group was for a dark green coat and light trousers. Interviews of the soldiers indicated they were swayed toward the contrasting combination of greens by their desire to look like officers, who wore dark coats and light trousers. The design of the coat was worked out during this period by the Uniform Board and the National Research Council Advisory Committee. The committee recommended a modified, beltled, semifitted style coat similar to that designed for the olive-drab uniform in l948 and later adopted by the Air Force. The proposed Army coat was distinguished from the Air Force coat by its use of conventional Army pleated top pockets and inside hanging lower pockets. The Army officers’ belted coat then in use with its flared cavalry skirt and tight fitting torso was considered out of style. On 7 April 1950, the Uniform Board presented its first uniform display to the General Staff. In order to provide a wide range of color choices, the QMC dressed mannequins in 31 uniforms of different color combinations but of similar design. Among the colors were the 16 shades of gray-green, three shades of gray, five of blue, and one of taupe. For comparison, the uniform line-up included the existing olive-drab and green and pink Army uniforms, and the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and U.S. Military Academy uniforms. After the showing, the Chief of Staff asked the Uniform Board to screen the colors further and to make a selection of four colors for further review. The Board consulted its Advisory Committee of color experts and designers, which settled on a single color — the dark gray-green shade ultimately designated Army Green shade 44. The Uniform Board presented its recommendation for the general duty uniform to the Chief of Staff and his officers on 8 February 1951 (15). The proposed coat, trousers and service cap were in the gray-green shade 44, ornamented with gold-colored braids and insignia. The coat was semifitted and single breasted with conventional Army pockets at the top and bottom, four buttons and no belt. The Board also displayed three uniforms in other gray-green and blue-green shades as alternatives. All the General Staff officers except one preferred the Army Green shade 44. A final decision on the uniform’s color and design was withheld until Army personnel were surveyed and the proposed uniform was given a wear test. The Army knew from experience that a new uniform must be attractive and serviceable to ensure its proper use and optimal appearance. If a soldier disliked the uniform’s look, he would have his garments altered, often distorted; if the uniform was comfortable, the soldier would wear his coat open or in the wrong size; if the material needed frequent cleaning and pressing or the ornamentation required replacement, the soldier would not spend the money to maintain his uniform properly. To obtain a representative sampling of reaction to the proposed gray-green uniform, the QMC sent demonstration teams to Army groups in the United States and to troops in the European Theater. In February 195l the uniform was modeled for 218 enlisted men at Fort Meade, Washington, D.C.., and for 23 Officers’ wives at nearby Ft. McNair (16). To allow for any influence which length of service might have on their reaction to the uniform, the men were identified as “recruits” (82) with six months service or less, and as “veterans” (136) with three years service or more. During March and April, a QMC team toured Germany and Austria, showing the proposed gray-green uniform and other new Army uniforms to approximately 14,300 U.S. troops in 24 cities. Questionnaires were filled out by 978 enlisted men and 289 officers – roughly 10 percent of the audience in each area. The reactions of these diverse groups were markedly similar on the basic, questions of uniform color and design, as Table 1 indicates (16, 17). The wives’ lower enthusiasm for a change, it was admitted, was due to their general resistance to new uniform expenses and their past experience as Army wives with the cost of uniform changes. The proposed uniform was also shown to a group of nine retired General Officers who unanimously approved it. To test serviceability, the Ceremonial Troop companies of the Third Infantry Regiment in the Washington, D. C., area wore the proposed uniform daily during the winter of 1951-52. Some of the 3000 gray-green uniforms were still being worn two years later. The Third Regiment was surveyed in September 1952. The test subjects strongly endorsed the replacement of the olive-drab uniform with the proposed gray-green uniform for daily wear, and the majority felt that officers and enlisted men should wear the same uniform (l3). Despite the overwhelming acceptance of the gray-green uniform by Army personnel, the plan to adopt it was temporarily dropped from consideration in 1952. The Uniform Board recommended instead that the officers’ pinks and greens be adopted with the modernized coat design as the general duty uniform for all male personnel. It was thought that the pinks and greens could be introduced at less cost than the gray-green uniform since there would be no problem of residual stocks of accessories. The cost of issuing a new uniform to enlisted men would be the same with either color, but if the pinks and greens were adopted, the officers could wear their uniforms in the older style coat until the stocks were exhausted. (18) Also, a procurement study submitted in July 1951 by the General Staff indicated it would cost $91 million to begin integrating the gray-green uniform into the system by September 1953 (19). By 1954, however, the General Staff and Uniform Board realized the adoption of the pinks and greens would be false economy. The original objective of the Army uniform program was to develop a service uniform that was popular enough to establish a uniform tradition. Troop surveys had shown that Army personnel clearly preferred the gray-green uniform. Also, the light “pink” trousers were not really practical for general wear by enlisted men and would require more frequent dry cleaning than the gray-green uniform. In reassessing the initial costs of introducing a uniform, the General Staff concluded the gray-green uniform would not be much more expensive than the pinks and greens if it were phased in while stocks of the existing olive-drab and pinks and greens were being depleted. 5. Adoption of the Army Green Uniform On 2 September 1954, the adoption of the Army Green Uniform in shade 44 was announced in Circular 102 – nearly 10 years after the first postwar efforts to find a solution to the semidress uniform problem. Uniforms were made up for sizing and fitting tests to check the accuracy of the new patterns and to establish the quality level desired (20). These uniforms were also used in an orientation program to acquaint Army troops throughout the world and the National Guard with the new Army Green Uniform. The uniform became available at Quartermaster Supply outlets in September 1956 and was initially issued to inductees a year later. After a transition period to allow wear-out of existing uniforms, the Green Uniform became mandatory semidress attire in September 1961. a. Black Trim and Accessories Between the adoption and actual procurement of the Army Green Uniform, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor became the Chief of Staff and ordered several changes in the uniform’s appearance. The uniform as originally proposed carried out a green and gold color scheme with gold buttons, grade insignia of gold on a green back-ground for enlisted men, and a gold-colored sleeve band for officers. It was to be worn with a light tan shirt, a dark green tie, green socks, and russet-colored cap visor and low-quarter shoes. The gold trim and russet leather were selected as a pleasing contrast to the gray-green coat, trousers and cap. The russet shoes and visor also were considered economical since similar items were then worn with existing uniforms. Late in 1955 the officers’ gold sleeve band was replaced with a black mohair braid. At the same time a black mohair braid was added to the officers’ trousers – two vertical narrow stripes for general officers and one wide stripe for other officers. The black trim reduced the contrasting color effect, leaving only the gold buttons on the coat as a color contrast with the green of the uniform fabric. The Army Green Uniform was now primarily green and black since the shoes, cap visor, tie and socks had already been changed to black from the shades originally proposed. The black accessories had been adopted in the interest of a Department of Defense Standardization Program established by Congress in l954 (21). The first change was from russet to black shoes identical with those worn by the Navy and the Air Force. The cap visor was similarly changed to match the leather of the shoes. Black socks and neckties were adopted next to reduce the number of items in the military supply system and to harmonize with the other accessories. The black accessories proved quite practical since they could also be worn with the Blue Dress Uniform, which was authorized for optional purchase by enlisted men as well as officers in August 1953 and later became mandatory for officers in 1959. By utilizing the same accessories and basic coat and trouser designs for the Green, Dress Blue and Summer Tropical Worsted and white uniforms, the Army saved money and simplified uniform production and supply. This uniform coordination was another step toward establishing a distinctive “Army look.” b. Service Cap A cap is clearly the most distinctive feature of a military uniform and its style has a great, though often subtle, influence on the total effect of a uniform. Recognizing this, the Uniform Board appointed a special subcommittee on caps in 1950 to recommended a cap design for the proposed general duty uniform. The service cap at that time was of a two-piece construction consisting of a frame and four cap covers. The Army adopted this cap in 1946 for reasons of economy and supply when Circular 88 prescribed the issue of three different uniforms to be worn with service caps. Cap covers to match the olive drab wool, cotton khaki and tropical worsted uniforms were supplied with the frame and were interchanged as required. A white cap cover was worn by Military Police. In place of this system, the Uniform Board subcommittee recommended a solid construction cap in one shade, similar in design to the cap developed by the Quartermaster Corps for the Air Force in l947-48 (22). The Army adopted a modified version of this cap with a straight, high front and relaxed crown. The Quartermaster Corps lightened the cap from 13 1/2 ounces for the frame and serge cover to 11 ounces by using lighter weight materials and an improved construction. The present service cap features a gold chin strap for all officers and warrant officers, and a black strap for enlisted men. The black visor is embroidered with gold bullion leaves for general and field grade officers. The shade 44 cap is worn with the summer khaki uniforms as well as the Army Green. The same design is also used for the blue service cap of the Dress Blues. c. Raincoat A new semidress raincoat for both enlisted men and officers was introduced for wear with the Army Green Uniform. The need for a satisfactory raincoat was long recognized but its development was postponed until work on the general duty uniform was well underway. At the beginning of World War II, the Army supplied a camouflage green, coated fabric raincoat for wear with both field and service uniforms. Because the raincoat was hot, uncomfortable and physically restrictive, it was replaced in 1944 with a poncho for field rain protection. In addition, the development in 1943 of a water-repellent, wind-resistant field uniform for cold weather eliminated the need for a field raincoat in that climate. Concurrent with these uniform efforts, the Army developed a multi-purpose field overcoat for officers in a trench coat style — loose fitting, double breasted with a belt and shoulder loops. This trench coat had a water-repellent, wind-resistant outer cotton shell and a removable wool liner. The coat proved so popular that Circular 88 authorized the issue of a similar coat to enlisted men in 1946. Unfortunately, to introduce the coat into the uniform system, it was necessary to utilize surplus stocks of wartime fabric. In place of the lightweight materials used for the officers’ trench coat, the enlisted men’s field coat was made with a 9-ounce cotton sateen outer shell and heavy wool liner. The result was a bulky coat which weighed about 5 1/4 pounds and was less comfortable than the officers’ lighter trench coat. Circular 88 also prescribed that the outer shell of this overcoat serve as the Army’s raincoat. At that time water-repellent treatments did not withstand laundering and it was necessary to re-treat rain garments for water repellency after every dry-cleaning or washing. The Army’s need for a raincoat to wear with the new Army Green Uniform led to the adoption in 1955 of a coated fabric raincoat for both officers and enlisted men. This raincoat was taupe-colored and made of a 1.6 ounce nylon twill, coated on the inside with polyvinyl butyral for complete waterproofness. The coat’s design was similar to the officers’ taupe wool trench coat (23). Although the new raincoat incorporated the best rainwear technology at that time, it had several serious disadvantages. Like all coated fabric raincoats, it was impermeable to perspiration vapor and thus subjected the wearer to the discomfort of moisture condensation inside the coat. When the coat became soiled it could not be cleaned readily, and the coat seams at first proved vulnerable to leaks. Further, the general appearance of the raincoat was unsatisfactory: the untreated outside discolored when it became wet; the soft, lightweight fabric clung to the wearer’s legs when he walked, and the coat puckered at the seams. In 1959, a breakthrough in rainwear treatments by technologists at the Quartermaster Research and Development Laboratories (now U.S. Army Natick Laboratories), made a satisfactory and attractive military raincoat possible at last. Chemists at these Laboratories combined two commercially available water repellents to synergistically produce a highly durable water-repellent and oil-resistant treatment for textiles. This treatment, named “Quarpel” as a Quartermaster-developed repellent, freed Army clothing designers from the necessity of using coated fabrics for rainwear. The Quarpel treatment could withstand up to 15 launderings without re-treatment and still retain greater water repellency than the best vapor permeable raincoats then on the market. Fabrics treated with the compound remained vapor permeable and free from uncomfortable moisture condensation (24). The Quartermaster Corps had applied Quarpel to field and combat clothing and the results confirmed their hopes that the treatment could provide a rain garment which was efficiently water-repellent, washable and comfortable. Accordingly, in 1964 the Army adopted a semidress raincoat utilizing the Quarpel treatment to replace the coated fabric taupe raincoat for all male personnel. The new raincoat was a lighter but harmonizing shade of green for wear with the Army Green uniform and was made of a single layer of 5 ounce, cotton polyester fabric with an inside shoulder yoke. Because of its washability and better drape, the new raincoat provided an improved appearance and promised a longer service life than the current standard. 6. An Army Green Uniform for All-Year Wear The adoption of the Army Green Uniform in 1954 stabilized the winter service uniform and settled the question of color. It did not, however, complete the long-term objective to provide officers and enlisted men with attractive, similar attire for semidress wear throughout the year. In the summer of 1964, the Army adopted a new lightweight Green Uniform and a green wool overcoat which completed the development of this uniform system. a. Lightweight Green Uniform (1) Summer Uniform Needs. The Army Uniform Board temporarily laid aside consideration of other uniform problems until the most pressing need for a satisfactory winter service uniform was met. In 1959, when a new five-year uniform program was initiated, top priority was given to the development of a summer service uniform for enlisted men(25). Them adequacy of the soldier’s summer attire for semidress and off-duty wear had been recognized as far back as 1946 when Circular 88 was issued. This service uniform consisted of cotton khaki shirt and trousers which wrinkled easily and quickly became rumpled. During the summer the soldier was the most poorly dressed enlisted man in the military services, particularly at coat-and-tie occasions or on travel. The Marine Corps issued its enlisted men a coat in the summer, and the Air Force provided a summer bush jacket which at least looked more formal than shirtsleeves. To meet the soldier’s need for a coat-type summer uniform, the Quartermaster General proposed developing a lightweight version of the Army Green winter uniform (25). This was a break from the earlier intents of Circulars 88 and 89 to provide a coat by authorizing the officers’ tropical worsted tan uniform for enlisted men. It was felt that a tan uniform was not practical for summer wear by enlisted men. Because of its light color it would be harder to keep clean than Army Green and the soldier would need two tan uniforms to maintain them properly. An Army Green summer uniform should be less expensive, both to the soldier in dry-cleaning costs and to the Army in initial issue. The proposed lightweight green uniform would fulfill a second major need to increase the flexibility of the Army uniform, The existing system of seasonal changeovers between winter Army Green and summer tan uniforms had several disadvantages. First, the two-color system was becoming more inconvenient with the increased travel of Army officers through transfers and temporary duty to posts in the United States and abroad. Army personnel often had to carry extra uniforms to be “in uniform” upon arrival at a new post since the changeover dates varied for different; climatic areas. In addition, the Army Green winter uniform was often too warm during the transitional seasons of spring and fall, and officers already had requested a lighter weight fabric for the Green Uniform. It appeared a lightweight uniform would be adequate all year many personnel working in heated buildings or warm climates (26). A summer uniform in Army Green promised the further benefit of reinforcing the new Army Green identification by enabling personnel to appear in the same uniform color all year. (2) Development of Summer Fabric. The fabric which the Quartermaster Corps recommended for the lightweight Green Uniform was a 9-ounce blend of a polyester fiber and wool. This blend was selected by the QM Research and Engineering Command as the most suitable for summer semidress uniforms after two extensive studies of tropical weight fabrics. The summer fabric studies were part of a larger Wool Conservation Program undertaken by the Army at the time of the Korean War to find a low cost alternate for all-wool fabrics. The domestic supply of wool had never been adequate to meet military and civilian needs, and the Army wished to limit its dependence on imports of foreign wool in times of emergency. The first Quartermaster Corps studies of wools and wool/synthetic blends was carried out in l95l (27). Textile manufacturers submitted 27 lightweight fabrics as the best summer suit material available on the market. These fabrics were evaluated in laboratory tests for appearance, comfort and wear, and six were selected for field testing along with the standard all-wool material. The candidates included blends of acetate and viscose; wool and rayon; wool and nylon; mohair, viscose, acetate and nylon, and two all-wool fabrics of different construction from each other and the all-wool standard. The seven fabrics were made into 21 nonduplicating uniforms. Each uniform was worn by officers at Ft. Bliss, Texas, which is hot and dry, and at Ft. Lee, Va., which is hot and humid, on a controlled wear and dry-cleaning schedule from June through September of 1951. A total of 168 test subjects rated the uniforms for appearance, comfort, resistance to soiling and overall acceptability. A panel of nonparticipating field grade officers judged the appearance of the uniforms at the end of the tests. Fabric wear- resistance was determined by trained Quartermaster Corps observers who examined the garments during and after the tests. The combined results of these thorough laboratory and field tests indicated the all-wool standard was the most suitable fabric then available for summer semidress uniforms. Within a few years, however, the introduction of new synthetic fibers — particularly polyester and acrylic — encouraged the Quartermaster Corps to undertake a second search for an alternate to the all-wool standard (28). The textile industry again submitted summer blends with proved consumer acceptability. Nine fabrics were chosen for study and evaluated during 1955-56 in a battery of laboratory and field tests similar to those of the 1951 study. The tested fabrics were 100 percent polyester fibers; polyester fibers blended with wool, with rayon, with both rayon and wool; two different blends of acrylic fibers and wool, a blend of acrylic fiber and rayon; a blend of modacrylic fiber and wool, a blend of rayon and wool, and the all-wool standard. In contrast to the 1951 study, several of the blended fabrics showed durability and acceptability equal to or better than the all-wool standard. The best results were obtained with a lightweight blend of 40 percent wool and 60 percent polyester fiber. This blend appeared neater initially and after wear because of its greater wrinkle-resistance and crease retention; it was more durable and resistant to tear arid abrasion than all-wool, and it felt more comfort-able in warm weather. The blend of wool and polyester was classified in specifications as a Type III fabric for summer uniforms for procurement in lieu of the Type I all-wool fabric. New materials with similar characteristics were developed for the service cap and tan shirt so they could be worn with the proposed lightweight Green Uniform in warm weather. The shirt fabric was changed from cotton poplin to a polyester/cotton blend which had superior wrinkle resistance and easier maintenance characteristics. The weight of the service cap was reduced by 2 1/2 ounces with lightweight materials and new ventilation features were added. The Department of Defense approved the adoption of the lightweight Green Uniform on 13 July 1964. The new uniform not only improved the appearance of soldiers during the summer and provided a flexible Army Green service uniform all year, but it also substantially reduced the number of uniform items. The lightweight uniform replaced the officers’ tans and reduced the number of summer khaki items needed by officers and enlisted men for general duty. The long-sleeve khaki shirt which was worn with a tie was discontinued once the lightweight Green Uniform was available for semidress occasions. However the open-neck, short-sleeve khaki shirt was retained with the khaki trousers as a comfortable working uniform for warm weather. b. Overcoat A primary target of the 1959 uniform proposals was the development of a dressier overcoat for enlisted men. The soldier’s cotton, camouflage green overcoat (with removable wool liner) was not a satisfactory dress item and was no longer required as a field garment. The Army needed a new overcoat suitable for wear with the Green Uniform and comparable to the coats of the other military services. As was explained previously, the soldier’s water-repellent, wind-resistant cotton trench coat was developed initially for Army officers during World War II as a practical field item. The Army had entered the War with a melton wool field overcoat which weighed 7 pounds when dry and could absorb an additional 9 pounds of water during a moderately heavy rainfall. By 1944 a new Army field ensemble was provided which did not include an overcoat and the officers’ trench coat was retained for wear only with the service uniform. After World War II the appearance of the cotton trench coat was considered unsatisfactory for semidress wear by officers, and in 1950 the Army adopted a wool gabardine, taupe-colored overcoat for officers. The design of the coat retained the still popular trench coat style inherited from the British in World War I – loose fitting, double-breasted with a belt and shoulder loops. This well-accepted officers’ trench coat became the model in 1959 when the Quartermaster Corps proposed a semidress overcoat for enlisted men to replace the cotton shell overcoat with removable liner. By 1964 when the new overcoat was approved, it was decided to make it green to match the Army Green uniform and to also adopt it for officers in place of their taupe, wool overcoat With the initial issue of the green wool overcoat in 1967, the Army finished separating the field and service uniforms and provided all male personnel with a complete, attractive and distinctive Army Green uniform system
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