|
That Alito opinion gave me a headache, even by his indecipherable standards.
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 17:01
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 31, 2024 06:10 |
|
|
Discendo Vox posted:I posted here. It's worth remembering teacher goons deal with writing and people much worse than most of us can dream of. Yeah, I followed your little experiment with not a little amusement. I'm a teacher as well, and just today I've seen sentence structure and vocabulary usage that would blow your face right off your skull in the worst way imaginable.
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 17:04
|
|
|
Mr. Nice! posted:
Gorsuch 5th vote in a 5-4, joined by Ginsburg, no less. It does read like an issue that answers the question "what would it take to ever get Gorsuch as the 5th vote". Simple opinion saying this is what you negotiated, and a deal's a deal. and lol, Robert's dissent is basically "aww come on, the treaty isn't violated by a gas tax! Cars are a new luxery item, they can loving walk like their ancestors!"
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 17:10
|
|
i never expected this.
|
Yeah, unfortunately in the immigration case I think the majority is correctly interpreting the (really bad) law and the minority is grasping at straws to justify chiseling away at the edges of the (really bad) law.
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 17:17
|
|
|
Rigel posted:Gorsuch 5th vote in a 5-4, joined by Ginsburg, no less. It does read like an issue that answers the question "what would it take to ever get Gorsuch as the 5th vote". Simple opinion saying this is what you negotiated, and a deal's a deal. Don't forget Roberts crying because this decision might limit the state's ability to prosecute natives for traveling on Washington roads with "contraband."
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 17:17
|
|
|
Rigel posted:and lol, Robert's dissent is basically "aww come on, the treaty isn't violated by a gas tax! Cars are a new luxery item, they can loving walk like their ancestors!" The contraband question is an interesting one, I thought.
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 17:22
|
|
|
ulmont posted:The contraband question is an interesting one, I thought. That's just Roberts trying to criminalize peyote.
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 17:29
|
|
|
ulmont posted:tri-tri-tri-triple post! Rebutting the majority's reliance on strict grammarian textualism Edit: Future Alito: the dissent's reading of the statute would require us to end a sentence with a preposition. This reading obviously cannot stand. The opinion is reversed and remanded for consideration to remove all rights from poor people.
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 17:38
|
|
|
Weird that the four liberal justices thought the 9th circuit was right about something that the other four circuits to consider the issue decided the other way. Conservatives ignoring the Constitution is probably the reason.
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 18:27
|
|
|
quote:To some modern ears, quote:Really, this case just tells an old and familiar story. The State of Washington includes millions of acres that the Yakamas ceded to the United States under significant pressure. In return, the government supplied a handful of modest promises. The State is now dissatisfied with the consequences of one of those promises. It is a new day, and now it wants more. But today and to its credit, the Court holds the parties to the terms of their deal. It is the least we can do. kinda downplaying the whole "give us your land or we'll kill you" part
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 18:38
|
|
|
EwokEntourage posted:kinda downplaying the whole "give us your land or we'll kill you" part They go into a little more detail in the opinion: Gorsuch Concurrence at 5 posted:“obtaining Indian lands east of the Cascades became a central objective” for the government’s own needs. Id., at 1241. The Yakamas knew all this and could see the writing on the wall: One way or another, their land would be taken. If they managed to extract from the negotiations the simple right to take their goods freely to and from market on the public highways, it was a price the United States was more than willing to pay. By any fair measure, it was a bargain-basement deal.
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 19:07
|
|
|
Even Gorsuch is like "shut up and give them the pittance you offered them for a quarter of your state, dickholes", I love it
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 20:07
|
|
|
Gorsuch posted:Decades ago, many of the defendants before us sold “bare metal” products to the Navy. Things like the turbines used to propel its ships.
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 20:15
|
|
|
COUGAR DEN and loving maritime tort law. Those cases were nuts I like how the one person is being sued both individually and as an administrator
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 20:35
|
|
|
Devor posted:You know Alito's argument is well-founded when he goes STRAIGHT to parsing adverbs and nouns. ulmont posted:tri-tri-tri-triple post! On its face, to me at least, the decision looks like a correct interpretation of a bad law. Or rather, I think the majority has a correct interpretation of a law which they should have then declared invalid, and I don't think Breyer's attempt to say "we have to interpret the law like I say or else it's unconstitutional" is particularly convincing. I am especially unconvinced by Breyer's "if Congress didn't think 'when' meant immediately, why did they give the AG at the time discretion to delay implementation by 1-2 years?" Congress did think "when" meant immediately, but they didn't think they needed to add in a "here's how to interpret 'when' if the officials in question don't enforce the rules as we wrote them" section. I think indefinite detention without possibility of a bail hearing is unconstitutional, period. Even if it's for a deportable alien who was released three seconds ago for the crime of ultra murder (which is a very serious crime despite the fact that somehow the sentence isn't life), a bail hearing should happen (which, in such a case, should consist of the government saying "gently caress off with your bail request" and the immigration "judge" saying "sounds good."). Additionally, maybe some sort of "statute of limitations" for immigration actions needs to exist, and maybe it can be "due process"ed into existence, but Breyer playing around with the definitions of when and describes isn't it. Granted, the majority claimed that the people facing deportation didn't actually raise any constitutional claims (except those needed for the "don't pick the unconstitutional interpretation if you don't have to" doctrine), but since when has the court let that stop them? Their bit about "someone else can challenge the constitutionality of the law as applied" rings pretty hollow. Heck, I bet they put that in there just because they want to have someone challenge that so they can shut that down in a separate case.
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 21:04
|
|
|
EwokEntourage posted:kinda downplaying the whole "give us your land or we'll kill you" part It says right there, "significant pressure"
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 22:02
|
|
|
Doc Hawkins posted:It says right there, "significant pressure" just like the Turks significantly pressured the Armenians to leave
|
|
#
?
Mar 19, 2019 22:15
|
|
|
In a terrible timeline that righted itself, next year we'd elect a militant liberal who uses the recent SCOTUS ruling to round up and indefinitely detain Republicans, especially jurists and politicians.rjmccall posted:Yeah, unfortunately in the immigration case I think the majority is correctly interpreting the (really bad) law and the minority is grasping at straws to justify chiseling away at the edges of the (really bad) law. Indefinite detention is a direct violation of some pretty core parts of the Constitution (as pointed out in the dissent). Saying you can indefinitely detain someone without legal recourse is a huge loving problem for a nation that has a history of rounding up people for being the wrong (ie: not white) kind of person.
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 01:32
|
|
|
I'd be ok with giving him the nickname Neil "significant pressure" Gorsuch
|
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 02:53
|
|
|
im an immeasurable dolt and a layman but i did balk at the cougar den dissent's mink coat argument, on the basis that the treaty shouldn't apply because the implications don't "make sense". the treaty says something, then that's what you get. if the logical outcome of what it says is absurd, what does that matter? was making sense ever the point? oh yeah we made this binding agreement with you guys but we decided not to follow it because hey, when you really think about it, sheesh, its a pretty silly thing, really. i read some of this stuff and even the bits i don't agree with i tend to just shrug and go "yeah sure i guess its pedantic logic based on banal absurdities and requires being intentionally dense to reach a desired conclusion but hey thats law" but that bit leap out as me as actually maybe being just more straightforwardly stupid.
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 03:21
|
|
|
Tiler Kiwi posted:im an immeasurable dolt and a layman but i did balk at the cougar den dissent's mink coat argument, on the basis that the treaty shouldn't apply because the implications don't "make sense". the treaty says something, then that's what you get. if the logical outcome of what it says is absurd, what does that matter? was making sense ever the point? oh yeah we made this binding agreement with you guys but we decided not to follow it because hey, when you really think about it, sheesh, its a pretty silly thing, really. It actually is a part of how a judge is supposed to interpret a contract or a law. To extremely oversimplify, it's a two-step process: 1. Is the answer clearly X, or is it "maybe X, maybe Y?" 2. If it is "maybe X, maybe Y", which way makes more sense (for contracts, this is "what would the parties have wanted?" for laws, it's more like "what did Congress really want?")? Then there's another "even if it's clearly X, is X insane?" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plain_meaning_rule#Doctrine_of_absurdity ulmont fucked around with this message at 03:50 on Mar 20, 2019 |
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 03:43
|
|
|
Dang, how straightforwardly reasonable of an explanation. It still kind of bothers me more than anything else I've read, maybe because the implication for it is that "it doesn't make sense (because it limits what I want to do)" kind of thing, rather than being based on what the parties at the time were actually agreeing to. And I've kind of developed a distrust of the more "reasonable person" style approaches to interpretation since it leaves a lot of room open for unconscious bias, and very conscious bias as well. Like my hunch is that they wouldn't pull this sort of attempt to I wouldn't be surprised to be wrong about that too, tho.
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 04:05
|
|
|
Tiler Kiwi posted:Dang, how straightforwardly reasonable of an explanation. It still kind of bothers me more than anything else I've read, maybe because the implication for it is that "it doesn't make sense (because it limits what I want to do)" kind of thing, rather than being based on what the parties at the time were actually agreeing to. The gap between 1855 and 2019 is doing a lot of that work here. However, I just want to point out now that "what the parties at the time were actually agreeing to [should be what is enforced]" is not very different from "what the people who ratified the Constitution in 1787-1790 thought the constitution meant then is how it should be enforced in 2019." If you like the latter, check out Justice Thomas's opinions. Tiler Kiwi posted:And I've kind of developed a distrust of the more "reasonable person" style approaches to interpretation since it leaves a lot of room open for unconscious bias, and very conscious bias as well. While you are correct that this sort of approach interpretation leaves room open for unconscious and conscious bias, I would like to point out that the alternative - endorse and enforce clearly unreasonable interpretations, even where there are more reasonable alternate approaches - also has its own obvious flaws. Tiler Kiwi posted:Like my hunch is that they wouldn't pull this sort of attempt to Two points on this: 1. With extremely limited exceptions, any case that reaches the Supreme Court does not have an obvious answer. Generally speaking, someone could* argue either side in good faith. And the majority and dissenting opinions tend to reflect this. 2. It is literally zero effort for a US Supreme Court Justice to rule either way. They get paid the same and they have life tenure either way. Their votes are going** to reflect this as well. *Lawyer ethical rules require that there be a good faith argument, in fact. **The exceptions tend to be how a Justice thinks a vote would reflect on the institutional power and legitimacy of the Court generally. Think Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, and possibly Robert's opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. As an example where the Justices should have thought longer, Bush v. Gore.
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 04:22
|
|
|
That's all true and good, of course. I do have to add that I also put little credence in the power of ethical rules, particularly when dealing with powerful groups and/or "respected institutions"; if I had a jurisprudence it would probably be "excessively cynical and ignorant". And I also think it's pretty established that people can be influenced even outside of personal gain: I think it was doctors that were proven to be influenced substantially by a "bribe" as petty as a free sandwich. The point is more they'd find themselves sufficiently influenced by knowing that a ruling on a binding treaty against a sovereign nation that went too far with creative liberties would likely cause tumult, which may influence them to think that a more textual interpretation is more "sensible". Or maybe their respect for the institution of the court extends to a nationalistic pride that results in them feeling like its unjustifiable for the US to have to deal fairly with someone as petty and powerless as a native tribe. But at this point it's just me hemming and hawing hypotheticals about age old problems that have been elucidated on more effectively, trying to use "makes sense" as a barometer, so I guess I'm not really much better than the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court; a concession that pains me. In terms of weighing the lesser of two evils, I guess I'd personally feel far less affronted by a textual absurdity than an "common sense" absurdity where I'm left in the lurch because a more powerful person felt their gut instinct was better than mine. Its one thing I guess for it to be done when the judge is a more de facto neutral arbitrator, but in this case it comes across as a government weaseling its way out of an obligation; the laws limiting the actions of the powerful ought to be the least open to interpretation. Otoh I do programming tho so that kind of ultra literal / logical mindset required in it has clearly resulted in a great deal of brain poisoning. e: Like with Thomas' supposed jurisprudence; I sure as hell don't like the ramifications of it, but if something dumb and stupid is actually the logical outcome of what the constitution were meant to do, and is written to do, well..., I'd kind of feel obliged to say, here's what the rules are, can you please make better ones now e2: also im probably some variety of lovely absurdist: nearly everything people think is normal is based on countless absurdities we've just become deadened to, law included. Tiler Kiwi fucked around with this message at 16:01 on Mar 20, 2019 |
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 04:53
|
|
|
The solution is to pester your legislators to write better laws, rather than attempt to short circuit the legislative process by heading to court.
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 07:26
|
|
|
AGGGGH BEES posted:The solution is to pester your legislators to write better laws, rather than attempt to short circuit the legislative process by heading to court. Just like the solution for same-sex marriage was to beg bigoted straight people to stop legislating away your rights? Take your “benevolent democracy” fallacies and shove ‘em. Stickman fucked around with this message at 07:55 on Mar 20, 2019 |
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 07:53
|
|
|
AGGGGH BEES posted:The solution is to pester your legislators to write better laws, rather than attempt to short circuit the legislative process by heading to court. That doesn’t really work for a treaty signed in 1855. And, of course, it is emphatically the job of the judicial branch to adjudicate any disputes over the meaning of a law.
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 14:51
|
|
|
Stickman posted:Just like the solution for same-sex marriage was to beg bigoted straight people to stop legislating away your rights? What if the Supreme Court had ruled gay marriage unconstitutional? It's easy to cheer on the Supreme Court expanding its own power when it's making rulings you agree with. But that can leave us in deep trouble when it's making rulings we disagree with. The Court hasn't always been a progressive force in America, and with the growing conservative majority on it, it's time to recognize that the Court's ability to overturn democracy isn't always a good thing.
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 14:57
|
|
|
https://twitter.com/washingtonpost/status/1108374116850192389quote:Contreras concluded that Interior’s Bureau of Land Management “did not sufficiently consider climate change” when making decisions to auction off federal land in Wyoming to oil and gas drilling. The judge temporarily blocked drilling on roughly 300,000 acres of land in the state. Is this considered a finding of fact? Did the judge determine they had a duty to evaluate the impact on climate change, or that they should have had a duty to consider the impact?
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 15:30
|
|
|
 Opinions! One unanimous and one per curiam; noncontroversial day.OBDUSKEY v. MCCARTHY & HOLTHUS LLP Holding / Majority Opinion: The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act regulates “‘debt collector[s].’” A “‘debt collector,’” the Act says, is “any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts.” This definition, however, goes on to say that “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6)” (a separate provision of the Act), “[the] term [debt collector] also includes any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” The question before us concerns this last sentence. Does it mean that one principally involved in “the enforcement of security interests” is not a debt collector (except “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6)”)? If so, numerous other provisions of the Act do not apply. Or does it simply reinforce the fact that those principally involved in the enforcement of security interests are subject to §1692f(6) in addition to the Act’s other provisions? In our view, the last sentence does (with its §1692f(6) exception) place those whose “principal purpose . . . is the enforcement of security interests” outside the scope of the primary “debt collector” definition, §1692a(6), where the business is engaged in no more than the kind of securityinterest enforcement at issue here—nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Every State provides some form of judicial foreclosure: a legal action initiated by a creditor in which a court supervises sale of the property and distribution of the proceeds….About half the States also provide for what is known as nonjudicial foreclosure, where notice to the parties and sale of the property occur outside court supervision. … In 2007, petitioner Dennis Obduskey bought a home in Colorado with a $329,940 loan secured by the property. About two years later, Obduskey defaulted. In 2014, Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., hired a law firm, McCarthy & Holthus LLP, the respondent here, to act as its agent in carrying out a nonjudicial foreclosure. According to the complaint, McCarthy first mailed Obduskey a letter that said it had been “instructed to commence foreclosure” against the property, disclosed the amount outstanding on the loan, and identified the creditor, Wells Fargo...Obduskey responded with a letter invoking §1692g(b) of the FDCPA, which provides that if a consumer disputes the amount of a debt, a “debt collector” must “cease collection” until it “obtains verification of the debt” and mails a copy to the debtor. Yet, Obduskey alleges, McCarthy neither ceased collecting on the debt nor provided verification. Instead, the firm initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure action by filing a notice of election and demand with the county public trustee...Obduskey then filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that the firm had violated the FDCPA by, among other things, failing to comply with the verification procedure. In light of different views among the Circuits about application of the FDCPA to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, we granted the petition. … Three considerations lead us to conclude that McCarthy is not subject to the main coverage of the Act. First, and most decisive, is the text of the Act itself. As a preliminary matter, we concede that if the FDCPA contained only the primary definition, a business engaged in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings would qualify as a debt collector for all purposes....The Act does not, however, contain only the primary definition. And the limited-purpose definition poses a serious, indeed an insurmountable, obstacle to subjecting McCarthy to the main coverage of the Act. It says that “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6)” a debt collector “also includes” a business, like McCarthy, “the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” §1692a(6) (emphasis added). This phrase, particularly the word “also,” strongly suggests that one who does no more than enforce security interests does not fall within the scope of the general definition. Otherwise why add this sentence at all? … Second, we think Congress may well have chosen to treat security-interest enforcement differently from ordinary debt collection in order to avoid conflicts with state nonjudicial foreclosure schemes. As Colorado’s law makes clear, supra, at 3–4, state nonjudicial foreclosure laws provide various protections designed to prevent sharp collection practices and to protect homeowners, see 2 Dunaway §17:1. And some features of these laws are in tension with aspects of the Act. For example, the FDCPA broadly limits debt collectors from communicating with third parties “in connection with the collection of any debt.” If this rule were applied to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, then advertising a foreclosure sale—an essential element of such schemes—might run afoul of the FDCPA. … Third, for those of us who use legislative history to help interpret statutes, the history of the FDCPA supports our reading. When drafting the bill, Congress considered a version that would have subjected security-interest enforcers to the full coverage of the Act...A different version of the bill, however, would have totally excluded from the Act’s coverage “any person who enforces or attempts to enforce a security interest in real or personal property.”Given these conflicting proposals, the Act’s present language has all the earmarks of a compromise: The prohibitions contained in §1692f(6) will cover security-interest enforcers, while the other “debt collector” provisions of the Act will not. These considerations convince us that, but for §1692f(6), those who engage in only nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings are not debt collectors within the meaning of the Act. Lineup: Breyer, unanimous. Concurrence by Sotomayor. Other Opinions: Concurrence (Sotomayor): I join the Court’s opinion, which makes a coherent whole of a thorny section of statutory text. I write separately to make two observations: First, this is a close case, and today’s opinion does not prevent Congress from clarifying this statute if we have gotten it wrong. Second, as the Court makes clear, “enforcing a security interest does not grant an actor blanket immunity from the” mandates of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U. S. C. §1692 et seq. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1307_7lho.pdf THEODORE H. FRANK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. PALOMA GAOS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ET AL. Holding / Majority Opinion: Three named plaintiffs brought class action claims against Google for alleged violations of the Stored Communications Act. The parties negotiated a settlement agreement that would require Google to include certain disclosures on some of its webpages and would distribute more than $5 million to cy pres recipients, more than $2 million to class counsel, and no money to absent class members. We granted certiorari to review whether such cy pres settlements satisfy the requirement that class settlements be “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e)(2). Because there remain substantial questions about whether any of the named plaintiffs has standing to sue in light of our decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___ (2016), we vacate the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand for further proceedings. ... After briefing before the Ninth Circuit was complete, but prior to decision by that court, we issued our opinion in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___ (2016). In Spokeo, we held that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” We rejected the premise, relied on in the decision then under review and in Edwards, that “a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Google notified the Ninth Circuit of our opinion. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, without addressing Spokeo. … In briefing on the merits before this Court, the Solicitor General filed a brief as amicus curiae supporting neither party. He urged us to vacate and remand the case for the lower courts to address standing. … When the District Court ruled on Google’s second motion to dismiss, it relied on Edwards to hold that Gaos had standing to assert a claim under the SCA. Our decision in Spokeo abrogated the ruling in Edwards that the violation of a statutory right automatically satisfies the injury-infact requirement whenever a statute authorizes a person to sue to vindicate that right. Since that time, no court in this case has analyzed whether any named plaintiff has alleged SCA violations that are sufficiently concrete and particularized to support standing. After oral argument, we ordered supplemental briefing from the parties and Solicitor General to address that question. After reviewing the supplemental briefs, we conclude that the case should be remanded for the courts below to address the plaintiffs’ standing in light of Spokeo. The supplemental briefs filed in response to our order raise a wide variety of legal and factual issues not addressed in the merits briefing before us or at oral argument. … The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Per curiam. Dissent by Thomas. Other Opinions: Dissent (Thomas): Respectfully, I would reach the merits and reverse. As I have previously explained, a plaintiff seeking to vindicate a private right need only allege an invasion of that right to establish standing. Here, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Stored Communications Act, which creates a private right: It prohibits certain electronic service providers from “knowingly divulg[ing] . . . the contents of a communication” sent by a “‘user,’” “subscriber,” or “customer” of the service, except as provided in the Act. They also asserted violations of private rights under state law. By alleging the violation of “private dut[ies] owed personally” to them “‘as individuals,’” the plaintiffs established standing. Whether their allegations state a plausible claim for relief under the Act or state law is a separate question on which I express no opinion. … As to the class-certification and class-settlement orders, I would reverse. The named plaintiffs here sought to simultaneously certify and settle a class action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and (e). Yet the settlement agreement provided members of the class no damages and no other form of meaningful relief.* Most of the settlement fund was devoted to cy pres payments to nonprofit organizations that are not parties to the litigation; the rest, to plaintiffs’ lawyers, administrative costs, and incentive payments for the named plaintiffs. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-961_j42k.pdf
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 15:34
|
|
|
Jealous Cow posted:Is this considered a finding of fact? Did the judge determine they had a duty to evaluate the impact on climate change, or that they should have had a duty to consider the impact? With the understanding that I haven't seen the court's order and opinion yet, had a duty. That's more of a legal conclusion than a finding of fact, though. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires agencies to conduct an Environmental Impact Statement before actions "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." The issue in this case is whether or not BLM was required to consider climate change as part of that EIS.
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 15:41
|
|
|
ulmont posted:That doesn’t really work for a treaty signed in 1855. And, of course, it is emphatically the job of the judicial branch to adjudicate any disputes over the meaning of a law. I was talking about the illegal immigrant case, actually, though it's certainly possible the treaty could be renegotiated (not that the tribe seems to have much incentive to).
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 15:59
|
|
|
Thomas taking a plaintiff friendly approach to standing shows that standing after spokeo is just a clusterfuck
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 16:11
|
|
|
ulmont posted:With the understanding that I haven't seen the court's order and opinion yet, had a duty. That's more of a legal conclusion than a finding of fact, though. I found the order and opinion with a better news article: https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2016cv1724-99 quote:The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is that (1) BLM [Bureau of Land Management] failed to take a “hard look” at GHG [GreenHouse Gases] emissions from potential oil and gas drilling on the leased parcels; and (2) its FONSIs [Findings of No Significant environmental Impact] were deficient. As explained below, the Court concludes that BLM did not take a hard look at drilling-related and downstream GHG emissions from the leased parcels, and it failed to sufficiently compare those emissions to regional and national emissions. These shortcomings also rendered the challenged FONSIs deficient, because the FONSIs could not convincingly state that BLM’s leasing decisions would not significantly affect the quality of the environment.
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 17:44
|
|
|
EwokEntourage posted:Thomas taking a plaintiff friendly approach to standing shows that standing after spokeo is just a clusterfuck I'm not sure if that had much bearing. Thomas doesn't care about prior decisions at all, he will always reverse a 3 year old decision that he didn't vote for the first time around.
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 18:01
|
|
|
What is the best case outcome for Curtis Flowers' case at the supreme court? I've been following it since listening to In the Dark and I'm very invested in seeing justice for him, but I'm having trouble understanding what exactly will come of finding MORE prosecutorial misconduct other than another trial.
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 18:34
|
|
|
Martian Manfucker posted:What is the best case outcome for Curtis Flowers' case at the supreme court? I've been following it since listening to In the Dark and I'm very invested in seeing justice for him, but I'm having trouble understanding what exactly will come of finding MORE prosecutorial misconduct other than another trial. If his Batson challenge is successful, then he will go to trial, even though it will be his 7th trial. They have always been able to convict or come close to convicting, and I can't imagine them giving up and saying "ok, we're done with you" for 4 alleged murders. The prosecution needs to quit loving up.
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 18:44
|
|
|
Main Paineframe posted:What if the Supreme Court had ruled gay marriage unconstitutional? On what grounds? I know the constitution is pretty bad, but justices being unwilling to protect minority’s constitutional rights from malicious legislation is because of fear of “judicial activism” is a bigger problem than the reverse? There’s definitely a critical point where all of our institutions are terrible because they’re comprised of terrible people, but at least with some baseline equality protections sane people down the line can say “hey we’ve been violating our own rules for years” rather than depending on piecemeal legislation which is easier to overturn at the drop of a hat. E: And honestly, Lawrence was far more important than Obergefell. Stickman fucked around with this message at 19:03 on Mar 20, 2019 |
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 18:55
|
|
|
Rigel posted:I'm not sure if that had much bearing. Thomas doesn't care about prior decisions at all, he will always reverse a 3 year old decision that he didn't vote for the first time around. His dissent in this case is the same as what he said in his concurrence in spokeo. quote:As I have previously explained, a plaintiff seeking to vindicate a private right need only allege an invasion of that right to establish standing. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (concurring opinion)
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 19:20
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 31, 2024 06:10 |
|
|
Stickman posted:On what grounds? I know the constitution is pretty bad, but justices being unwilling to protect minority’s constitutional rights from malicious legislation is because of fear of “judicial activism” is a bigger problem than the reverse? Whatever grounds they want. The Court hasn't always looked at the law the same way it does now, and even now there's plenty of cases where the Court's reasoning is some thinly veiled bullshit. For example, the Court at the beginning of the 20th century was also a fan of judicial activism, but in the conservative direction. Most notoriously, it declared that the Due Process clause said that regulating working conditions was unconstitutional, and used that legal grounds to overrule minimum wage laws, child labor laws, working hour limitation laws, and more. With legal arguments that would be considered radical libertarian by today's standards, they insisted that the Constitution heavily restricted both state and federal governments' ability to regulate, and that worker protections of almost any kind necessarily infringed upon a Constitutional "right to labor" and "freedom of contract" unless they were based on a serious threat to workers' health. Judicial activism hasn't always been good for social rights or protecting minorities, either. Let's not forget cases like Dred Scott or Korematsu.
|
|
#
?
Mar 20, 2019 21:48
|
|