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"This accused rapist can't treat women poorly, he surrounds himself with women!"
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Feb 6, 2020 06:09
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It's not surprising. He has a type. https://twitter.com/Slate/status/1044109668401008640
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Feb 6, 2020 08:39
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It’s a shame RBG has decomposed so far they couldn’t Weekend at Bernie’s to the SOTU.
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Feb 6, 2020 15:05
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Something fun to think about, specifically the hypocrisy that will occur god forbid https://twitter.com/daveweigel/stat...agenumber%3D611
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Feb 8, 2020 23:07
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McConnell already spared us the suspense on that hypothetical:Turtle McFuckface posted:Oh, we’d fill it
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Feb 8, 2020 23:17
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lol if rbg dies on Jan 19 they’ll 100% replace her
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Feb 9, 2020 02:11
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Kazak_Hstan posted:lol if rbg dies on Jan 19 they’ll 100% replace her If she died during an inauguration of a next Democratic President all of the Repubs would flee to confirm someone ASAP
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Feb 9, 2020 04:32
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Yeah there isn't a single person capable of rational thought who believes McConnell would hold off on replacing SCOTUS vacancy, especially a liberal's seat. If the GOP lose the WH and/or Senate they're going to mass rubber-stamp any remaining judicial vacancies immediately.
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Feb 9, 2020 19:10
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If a Democrat wins the presidency but the GOP retains the senate, I'd say they’d be willing and able to fill any vacancy that occurs before 10:30 am on Inauguration Day.
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Feb 9, 2020 19:34
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The senate is such a lynchpin of minority rule forever that a) no new states will ever be made, b) democratic states will somehow be made into non-senate 'former-states' and c) Koch-backed Repubs are salivating at a constitutional crisis to help re-write stuff to make all Senators governor-appointed.
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Feb 9, 2020 20:17
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jeeves posted:and c) Koch-backed Repubs are salivating at a constitutional crisis to help re-write stuff to make all Senators governor-appointed. The GOP is like 5 state houses away from having a free hand to amend the constitution.
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Feb 9, 2020 21:17
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Ron Jeremy posted:The GOP is like 5 state houses away from having a free hand to amend the constitution. Pretty cool of the 2/3 republican majority in the House to let Pelosi be Speaker, but pretty dumb of her to impeach Trump when the Democrats only had fewer than half the votes needed for removal in the Senate.
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Feb 9, 2020 22:14
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Ron Jeremy posted:The GOP is like 5 state houses away from having a free hand to amend the constitution. Note that this is a step down from the high-water mark a few years ago
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Feb 9, 2020 22:24
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Apparatchik Magnet posted:Pretty cool of the 2/3 republican majority in the House to let Pelosi be Speaker, but pretty dumb of her to impeach Trump when the Democrats only had fewer than half the votes needed for removal in the Senate. You need 2/3 of the state legislatures to call an article V convention, not 2/3 of Congress.
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Feb 9, 2020 22:29
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Zoran posted:You need 2/3 of the state legislatures to call an article V convention, not 2/3 of Congress. Though you also need 3/4 of the state legislatures to ratify it, so kinda irrelevant if the Rs call a convention at 2/3.
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Feb 9, 2020 22:36
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Kalman posted:Though you also need 3/4 of the state legislatures to ratify it, so kinda irrelevant if the Rs call a convention at 2/3. There is precident for a constitutional convention changing the rules for its end products ratification.
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Feb 9, 2020 22:41
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Thranguy posted:There is precident for a constitutional convention changing the rules for its end products ratification. Precedent. Doing so wouldn’t be compliant with the amendment process, which specifies the condition for ratification, and would be equivalent to formation of a new government entirely. And while that’s what happened with the Articles, the initial non-ratifying states were effectively not treated as part of the Union until after they ratified, suggesting that a convention non-compliant with the 3/4 rule wouldn’t be binding on non-ratifiers.
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Feb 9, 2020 23:10
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Kalman posted:Though you also need 3/4 of the state legislatures to ratify it, so kinda irrelevant if the Rs call a convention at 2/3. Dems are so worthless they’d probably get enough to hit 3/4. Or have some party switches.
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Feb 10, 2020 00:25
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Thranguy posted:There is precident for a constitutional convention changing the rules for its end products ratification. And the new rules said the constitution would only operate in the states that ratified it. Essentially it was a way for states to secede from the Articles government and form their own without unanimous consent, not a way for a minority of the country's population to force a majority into a new government. That wouldn't have worked then and it certainly wouldn't now. There's no way Texas, Florida and an alliance of corn states is going to conquer the financial, industrial, and military power centers of the country. 12 out of 13 states ratified it pretty quickly, and the last one (Rhode Island iirc) did when the other 12 threatened to kick them out of the Union and treat them as a foreign country. So in the end the Constitution ended up being legally adopted under the terms of the Articles anyway.
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Feb 10, 2020 18:59
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VitalSigns posted:And the new rules said the constitution would only operate in the states that ratified it. Essentially it was a way for states to secede from the Articles government and form their own without unanimous consent, not a way for a minority of the country's population to force a majority into a new government. That wouldn't have worked then and it certainly wouldn't now. There's no way Texas, Florida and an alliance of corn states is going to conquer the financial, industrial, and military power centers of the country. Uh...
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Feb 10, 2020 20:11
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VitalSigns posted:And the new rules said the constitution would only operate in the states that ratified it. Essentially it was a way for states to secede from the Articles government and form their own without unanimous consent, not a way for a minority of the country's population to force a majority into a new government. That wouldn't have worked then and it certainly wouldn't now. There's no way Texas, Florida and an alliance of corn states is going to conquer the financial, industrial, and military power centers of the country. The nuclear silos are concentrated in big square states, just for the record.
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Feb 10, 2020 21:37
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Blue Footed Booby posted:The nuclear silos are concentrated in big square states, just for the record. And the current Army active divisions are located in Texas (2), Kentucky (1), North Carolina (1), Kansas (1), Georgia(1), New York (1), Hawaii (1), Washington (1), South Korea (1), and Colorado (1). If you want to figure out state loyalties of enlisted (keeping in mind that these come disproportionately from the more conservative rural areas in states with a big rural/urban divide like Virginia, New York, or Washington), this site is good: https://www.governing.com/gov-data/public-workforce-salaries/military-civilian-active-duty-employee-workforce-numbers-by-state.html
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Feb 10, 2020 21:58
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Blue Footed Booby posted:The nuclear silos are concentrated in big square states, just for the record. Not under the control of those state governments Apparatchik Magnet posted:And the current Army active divisions are located in Texas (2), Kentucky (1), North Carolina (1), Kansas (1), Georgia(1), New York (1), Hawaii (1), Washington (1), South Korea (1), and Colorado (1). Just because Texas has Ft Hood does not mean it could conquer states with many times its population after being cut off from the industrial and logistical support base modern warfare requires. Assuming that everyone on Ft Hood would join up with a secessionist movement that wrote its own white nationalist constitution and set out to conquer the rest of the country is p silly as well, given that the US military has a greater proportion of racial minorites than the population. This is the same martial wank that convinced the Confederacy that they were gonna whip a country with a much greater population and all the industry, and take Maryland, DC, Kentucky, etc from the Union. VitalSigns fucked around with this message at 06:09 on Feb 11, 2020 |
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Feb 11, 2020 06:06
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In the scenario that started this, it’s a minority of commie lib states that are breaking away from the new 3/4 states union. It’s not clear why they wouldn’t be happy to let them go and be left alone. I also have no idea how your projected suppressed yearnings for a racial basis to anything came into this, either. It’s pretty weird to suggest that Texas can’t make stuff you’d need for modern warfare with existing hardware like, uh, fuel and bullets. And  at the idea that some complete military industrial base and supply chain is sitting in some particular state that’s going to suddenly churn out more B2s for one side or the other or that any of this would be relevant to a US civil war with mass media, Internet, and widely distributed and plentiful automatic rifles among particular populace. This may be slightly off topic. Apparatchik Magnet fucked around with this message at 06:44 on Feb 11, 2020 |
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Feb 11, 2020 06:39
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Yayyy [/sarcasm] https://twitter.com/SCOTUSblog/status/1232322969583706113?s=20
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Feb 25, 2020 19:10
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Did they cite 1840s precedent regarding the number of fucks the US gives about Mexican territorial integrity? Did they get a judgement in Mexico at least? I know the agent is wanted for murder in Mexico and the US refused extradition.
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Feb 25, 2020 19:28
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 Opinions! My apologies for the delay; I plead Mardi Gras. I’ve either been drunk or hung over for the entirety of the last week.ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO v. YALI ACEVEDO FELICIANO, ET AL. Holding / Majority Opinion (Per Curiam): In 1979, the Office of the Superintendent of Catholic Schools of the Archdiocese of San Juan created a trust to administer a pension plan for employees of Catholic schools, aptly named the Pension Plan for Employees of Catholic Schools Trust (Trust). Among the participating schools were Perpetuo Socorro Academy, San Ignacio de Loyola Academy, and San Jose Academy. In 2016, active and retired employees of the academies filed complaints in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance alleging that the Trust had terminated the plan, eliminating the employees’ pension benefits. The employees named as a defendant the “Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church of Puerto Rico,” which the employees claimed was a legal entity with supervisory authority over all Catholic institutions in Puerto Rico. App. to Pet. for Cert. 58–59, 152–153 (emphasis deleted). ... Because “there was a dispute as to which defendants in the case had legal personalities,” the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of First Instance to “determine who would be responsible for continuing paying the pensions, pursuant to the preliminary injunction.” Ibid. The Court of First Instance determined that the “Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church in Puerto Rico” was the only defendant with separate legal personhood. Id., at 239–240. The Court held such personhood existed by virtue of the Treaty of Paris of 1898, through which Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States. … The Puerto Rico Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the “Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church in Puerto Rico” was a “legally nonexistent entity.” … The Puerto Rico Supreme Court again reversed, reinstating the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The Supreme Court first held that the “relationship between Spain, the Catholic Church, and Puerto Rico is sui generis, given the particularities of its development and historical context.” Id., at 5. The Court explained that the Treaty of Paris recognized the “legal personality” of “the Catholic Church” in Puerto Rico. … [W]e find that the Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction to issue the payment and seizure orders. On February 6, 2018, after the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico remanded the case to the Court of First Instance to determine the appropriate parties to the preliminary injunction, the Archdiocese removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. Notice of Removal in Acevedo-Feliciano v. Holy Catholic Church, No. 3:18–cv–01060. The Archdiocese argued that the Trust had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and that this litigation was sufficiently related to the bankruptcy to give rise to federal jurisdiction. … Once a notice of removal is filed, “the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” 28 U. S. C. §1446(d)...The Court of First Instance issued its payment and seizure orders after the proceeding was removed to federal district court, but before the federal court remanded the proceeding back to the Puerto Rico court. At that time, the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the proceeding. The orders are therefore void. Lineup: Per curiam. Concurrence by Alito, joined by Thomas. Concurrence (Alito, joined by Thomas): I join the opinion of the Court but write separately to note other important issues that may arise on remand. First, the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico is based on an erroneous interpretation of this Court’s old decision in Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in Porto Rico, 210 U. S. 296, 323–324 (1908). The main question decided by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico below was whether the Catholic Church in Puerto Rico is a single entity for civil law purposes or whether any subdivisions, such as dioceses or parishes, or affiliated entities, such as schools and trusts, are separate entities for those purposes. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that Ponce decided that in Puerto Rico the Catholic Church is a single entity for purposes of civil liability. That was incorrect….The assets that may be reached by civil plaintiffs based on claims regarding conduct by entities and individuals affiliated in some way with the Catholic Church (or any other religious body) is a difficult and important issue, but at least one thing is clear: This Court’s old decision in Ponce did not address that question. Second, as the Solicitor General notes, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment at a minimum demands that all jurisdictions use neutral rules in determining whether particular entities that are associated in some way with a religious body may be held responsible for debts incurred by other associated entities. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-938_l6gn.pdf MONASKY v. TAGLIERI Holding / Majority Opinion (Ginsburg): Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Convention or Convention), Oct. 25, 1980, T. I. A. S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11 (Treaty Doc.), a child wrongfully removed from her country of “habitual residence” ordinarily must be returned to that country. This case concerns the standard for determining a child’s “habitual residence” and the standard for reviewing that determination on appeal. The petitioner, Michelle Monasky, is a U. S. citizen who brought her infant daughter, A. M. T., to the United States from Italy after her Italian husband, Domenico Taglieri, became abusive to Monasky. Taglieri successfully petitioned the District Court for A. M. T.’s return to Italy under the Convention, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s order. Monasky assails the District Court’s determination that Italy was A. M. T.’s habitual residence. First of the questions presented: Could Italy qualify as A. M. T.’s “habitual residence” in the absence of an actual agreement by her parents to raise her there? The second question: Should the Court of Appeals have reviewed the District Court’s habitual residence determination independently rather than deferentially? In accord with decisions of the courts of other countries party to the Convention, we hold that a child’s habitual residence depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case. An actual agreement between the parents is not necessary to establish an infant’s habitual residence. We further hold that a first-instance habitual residence determination is subject to deferential appellate review for clear error. … In the United States, on May 15, 2015, Taglieri petitioned the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for the return of A. M. T. to Italy under the Hague Convention, pursuant to 22 U. S. C. §9003(b), on the ground that Italy was her habitual residence. The District Court granted Taglieri’s petition after a four-day bench trial. Sixth Circuit precedent at the time, the District Court observed, instructed courts that a child habitually resides where the child has become “acclimatiz[ed]” to her surroundings. An infant, however, is “too young” to acclimate to her surroundings. The District Court therefore proceeded on the assumption that “the shared intent of the [parents] is relevant in determining the habitual residence of an infant,” though “particular facts and circumstances . . . might necessitate the consideration [of] other factors.” Id., at 97a. The shared intention of A. M. T.’s parents, the District Court found, was for their daughter to live in Italy, where the parents had established a marital home “with no definitive plan to return to the United States.” Ibid. Even if Monasky could change A. M. T.’s habitual residence unilaterally by making plans to raise A. M. T. away from Italy, the District Court added, the evidence on that score indicated that, until the day she fled her husband, Monasky had “no definitive plans” to raise A. M. T. in the United States. Id., at 98a. In line with its findings, the District Court ordered A. M. T.’s prompt return to Italy. … We granted certiorari to clarify the standard for habitual residence, an important question of federal and international law, in view of differences in emphasis among the Courts of Appeals. … The first question presented concerns the standard for habitual residence: Is an actual agreement between the parents on where to raise their child categorically necessary to establish an infant’s habitual residence? We hold that the determination of habitual residence does not turn on the existence of an actual agreement. … The Hague Convention does not define the term “habitual residence.” A child “resides” where she lives. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1176 (5th ed. 1979). Her residence in a particular country can be deemed “habitual,” however, only when her residence there is more than transitory. “Habitual” implies “[c]ustomary, usual, of the nature of a habit.” Id., at 640. The Hague Convention’s text alone does not definitively tell us what makes a child’s residence sufficiently enduring to be deemed “habitual.” It surely does not say that habitual residence depends on an actual agreement between a child’s parents. But the term “habitual” does suggest a fact-sensitive inquiry, not a categorical one. … Common sense suggests that some cases will be straightforward: Where a child has lived in one place with her family indefinitely, that place is likely to be her habitual residence. But suppose, for instance, that an infant lived in a country only because a caregiving parent had been coerced into remaining there. Those circumstances should figure in the calculus. See Karkkainen, 445 F. 3d, at 291 (“The inquiry into a child’s habitual residence is a fact-intensive determination that cannot be reduced to a predetermined formula and necessarily varies with the circumstances of each case.”) … The bottom line: There are no categorical requirements for establishing a child’s habitual residence—least of all an actual-agreement requirement for infants...An actual-agreement requirement would enable a parent, by withholding agreement, unilaterally to block any finding of habitual residence for an infant. … Turning to the second question presented: What is the appropriate standard of appellate review of an initial adjudicator’s habitual-residence determination? Neither the Convention nor ICARA prescribes modes of appellate review, other than the directive to act “expeditiously.” ... Generally, questions of law are reviewed de novo and questions of fact, for clear error, while the appropriate standard of appellate review for a mixed question “depends . . . on whether answering it entails primarily legal or factual work.” … The habitual-residence determination[] presents a task for factfinding courts, not appellate courts, and should be judged on appeal by a clear-error review standard deferential to the factfinding court. Lineup: Ginsburg, unanimous. Concurrence by Thomas. Concurrence by Alito. Concurrence (Thomas): The Court correctly concludes that an actual agreement between parents is not necessary to establish the habitual residence of an infant who is too young to acclimatize.* I also agree with the Court’s conclusion that the habitualresidence inquiry is intensely fact driven, requiring courts to take account of the unique circumstances of each case. I write separately, however, because I would decide this case principally on the plain meaning of the treaty’s text. Concurrence (Alito): I agree with the Court on almost all the issues in this case. Specifically, I agree (1) that analysis of the question of “habitual residence” should be based on a range of factors and should be attentive to the particular facts of each case, (2) that a child may have a habitual residence in a country without a parental agreement to that effect, (3) that our interpretation of habitual residence should take into account the interpretations of other signatory nations, (4) that a district court’s decision on habitual residence is entitled to deference on appeal, and (5) that the judgment below should be affirmed. I also agree with JUSTICE THOMAS that we must independently interpret the meaning of “habitual residence.” … So interpreted, “habitual residence” is not a pure question of fact, at least as we understand that concept in our legal system. But it does involve a heavily factual inquiry. For these reasons, I would say that the standard of review on appeal is abuse of discretion, not clear error. As a practical matter, the difference may be no more than minimal. The important point is that great deference should be afforded to the District Court’s determination. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-935_3dq3.pdf HERNANDEZ ET AL. v. MESA Holding / Majority Opinion (Alito): We are asked in this case to extend Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), and create a damages remedy for a cross-border shooting. As we have made clear in many prior cases, however, the Constitution’s separation of powers requires us to exercise caution before extending Bivens to a new “context,” and a claim based on a cross-border shooting arises in a context that is markedly new. Unlike any previously recognized Bivens claim, a cross-border shooting claim has foreign relations and national security implications. In addition, Congress has been notably hesitant to create claims based on allegedly tortious conduct abroad. Because of the distinctive characteristics of cross-border shooting claims, we refuse to extend Bivens into this new field. … The facts of this tragic case are set forth in our earlier opinion in this matter, Hernández v. Mesa, 582 U. S. ___ (2017) (per curiam). Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a 15-year-old Mexican national, was with a group of friends in a concrete culvert that separates El Paso, Texas, from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. The border runs through the center of the culvert, which was designed to hold the waters of the Rio Grande River but is now largely dry. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr., detained one of Hernández’s friends who had run onto the United States’ side of the culvert. After Hernández, who was also on the United States’ side, ran back across the culvert onto Mexican soil, Agent Mesa fired two shots at Hernández; one struck and killed him on the other side of the border. … In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, the Court broke new ground by holding that a person claiming to be the victim of an unlawful arrest and search could bring a Fourth Amendment claim for damages against the responsible agents even though no federal statute authorized such a claim. The Court subsequently extended Bivens to cover two additional constitutional claims: in Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), a former congressional staffer’s Fifth Amendment claim of dismissal based on sex, and in Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980), a federal prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide adequate medical treatment. After those decisions, however, the Court changed course. ... When asked to extend Bivens, we engage in a two-step inquiry. We first inquire whether the request involves a claim that arises in a “new context” or involves a “new category of defendants.” Malesko, 534 U. S., at 68. And our understanding of a “new context” is broad….When we find that a claim arises in a new context, we proceed to the second step and ask whether there are any “‘“special factors [that] counse[l] hesitation”’” about granting the extension... We have not attempted to “create an exhaustive list” of factors that may provide a reason not to extend Bivens, but we have explained that “central to [this] analysis” are “separation-of-powers principles.” … The Bivens claims in this case assuredly arise in a new context. Petitioners contend that their Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims do not involve a new context because Bivens and Davis involved claims under those same two amendments, but that argument rests on a basic misunderstanding of what our cases mean by a new context. … Bivens concerned an allegedly unconstitutional arrest and search carried out in New York City, 403 U. S., at 389; Davis concerned alleged sex discrimination on Capitol Hill, 442 U. S., at 230. There is a world of difference between those claims and petitioners’ cross-border shooting claims, where “the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches” is significant. … Because petitioners assert claims that arise in a new context, we must proceed to the next step and ask whether there are factors that counsel hesitation. As we will explain, there are multiple, related factors that raise warning flags. The first is the potential effect on foreign relations. … We have declined to extend Bivens where doing so would interfere with the system of military discipline created by statute and regulation, see Chappell, 462 U. S. 296; Stanley, 483 U. S. 669, and a similar consideration is applicable here. Since regulating the conduct of agents at the border unquestionably has national security implications, the risk of undermining border security provides reason to hesitate before extending Bivens into this field. Our reluctance to take that step is reinforced by our survey of what Congress has done in statutes addressing related matters…[I]t is “telling,” that Congress has repeatedly declined to authorize the award of damages for injury inflicted outside our borders. … In sum, this case features multiple factors that counsel hesitation about extending Bivens, but they can all be condensed to one concern––respect for the separation of powers. “Foreign policy and national security decisions are ‘delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy’ for which ‘the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities[,] nor responsibility.’” … When evaluating whether to extend Bivens, the most important question “is ‘who should decide’ whether to provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the courts?” The correct “answer most often will be Congress.” That is undoubtedly the answer here. Lineup: Alito, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Concurrence by Thomas, joined by Gorsuch. Dissent by Ginsburg, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Concurrence (Thomas, joined by Gorsuch): The Court correctly applies our precedents to conclude that the implied cause of action created in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), should not be extended to cross-border shootings. I therefore join its opinion. I write separately because, in my view, the time has come to consider discarding the Bivens doctrine altogether. The foundation for Bivens—the practice of creating implied causes of action in the statutory context—has already been abandoned. And the Court has consistently refused to extend the Bivens doctrine for nearly 40 years, even going so far as to suggest that Bivens and its progeny were wrongly decided. Stare decisis provides no “veneer of respectability to our continued application of [these] demonstrably incorrect precedents.” Dissent (Ginsburg, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan): In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), this Court held that injured plaintiffs could pursue claims for damages against U. S. officers for conduct disregarding constitutional constraints. The instant suit, invoking Bivens, arose in tragic circumstances. In 2010, the complaint alleges, a Mexican teenager was playing with friends in a culvert along the United States-Mexico border. A U. S. Border Patrol agent, in violation of instructions controlling his office and situated on the U. S. side of the border, shot and killed the youth on the Mexican side. The boy’s parents sued the officer for damages in federal court, alleging that a rogue federal law enforcement officer’s unreasonable use of excessive force violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. At the time of the incident, it is uncontested, the officer did not know whether the boy he shot was a U. S. national or a citizen of another land. When the case first reached this Court, the Court remanded it, instructing the Court of Appeals to resolve a threshold question: Is a Bivens remedy available to noncitizens (here, the victim’s parents) when the U. S. officer acted stateside, but the impact of his alleged wrongdoing was suffered abroad? To that question, the sole issue now before this Court, I would answer “yes.” Rogue U. S. officer conduct falls within a familiar, not a “new,” Bivens setting. Even if the setting could be characterized as “new,” plaintiffs lack recourse to alternative remedies, and no “special factors” counsel against a Bivens remedy. Neither U. S. foreign policy nor national security is in fact endangered by the litigation. Moreover, concerns attending the application of our law to conduct occurring abroad are not involved, for plaintiffs seek the application of U. S. law to conduct occurring inside our borders. I would therefore hold that the plaintiffs’ complaint crosses the Bivens threshold. … Plaintiffs’ Bivens action arises in a setting kin to Bivens itself: Mesa, plaintiffs allege, acted in disregard of instructions governing his conduct and of Hernández’s constitutional rights. Abbasi acknowledged the “fixed principle” that plaintiffs may bring Bivens suits against federal law enforcement officers for “seizure[s]” that violate the Fourth Amendment. Using lethal force against a person who “poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others” surely qualifies as an unreasonable seizure. The complaint states that Mesa engaged in that very conduct; it alleged, specifically, that Hernández was unarmed and posed no threat to Mesa or others. For these reasons, as Mesa acknowledged at oral argument, Hernández’s parents could have maintained a Bivens action had the bullet hit Hernández while he was running up or down the United States side of the embankment. The only salient difference here: the fortuity that the bullet happened to strike Hernández on the Mexican side of the embankment. But Hernández’s location at the precise moment the bullet landed should not matter one whit. After all, “[t]he purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer.” … The special factors featured by the Court relate, in the main, to foreign policy and national security. But, as suggested earlier, see supra, at 7, no policies or policymakers are challenged in this case. Plaintiffs target the rogue actions of a rank-and-file law enforcement officer acting in violation of rules controlling his office. … Moreover, the Court, in this case, cannot escape a “potential effect on foreign relations,” ante, at 9, by declining to recognize a Bivens action. As the Mexican Government alerted the Court: “[R]efus[al] to consider [Hernández’s] parents’ claim on the merits . . . is what has the potential to negatively affect international relations.” https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/17-1678_m6io.pdf RODRIGUEZ, AS CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE FOR THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE OF UNITED WESTERN BANCORP, INC. v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, AS RECEIVER FOR UNITED WESTERN BANK Holding / Majority Opinion (Gorsuch): This case grows from a fight over a tax refund. But the question we face isn’t who gets the money, only how to decide the dispute. Should federal courts rely on state law, together with any applicable federal rules, or should they devise their own federal common law test? To ask the question is nearly to answer it. The cases in which federal courts may engage in common lawmaking are few and far between. This is one of the cases that lie between. The trouble here started when the United Western Bank hit hard times, entered receivership, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation took the reins. Not long after that, the bank’s parent, United Western Bancorp, Inc., faced its own problems and was forced into bankruptcy, led now by a trustee, Simon Rodriguez. When the Internal Revenue Service issued a $4 million tax refund, each of these newly assigned caretakers understandably sought to claim the money. Unable to resolve their differences, they took the matter to court. The case wound its way through a bankruptcy court and a federal district court before eventually landing in the Tenth Circuit. At the end of it all, the court of appeals ruled for the FDIC, as receiver for the subsidiary bank, rather than for Mr. Rodriguez, as trustee for the corporate parent. How could two separate corporate entities both claim entitlement to a single tax refund? For many years, the IRS has allowed an affiliated group of corporations to file a consolidated federal return. This serves as a convenience for the government and taxpayers alike. Unsurprisingly, though, a corporate group seeking to file a single return must comply with a host of regulations. These regulations are pretty punctilious about ensuring the government gets all the taxes due from corporate group members. But when it comes to the distribution of refunds, the regulations say considerably less. They describe how the IRS will pay the group’s designated agent a single refund. And they warn that the IRS’s payment discharges the government’s refund liability to all group members. Ibid. But how should the members distribute the money among themselves once the government sends it to their designated agent? On that, federal law says little. To fill the gap, many corporate groups have developed “tax allocation agreements.” These agreements usually specify what share of a group’s tax liability each member will pay, along with the share of any tax refund each member will receive. But what if there is no tax allocation agreement? Or what if the group members dispute the meaning of the terms found in their agreement? Normally, courts would turn to state law to resolve questions like these. State law is replete with rules readymade for such tasks—rules for interpreting contracts, creating equitable trusts, avoiding unjust enrichment, and much more. Some federal courts, however, have charted a different course. They have crafted their own federal common law rule—one known to those who practice in the area as the Bob Richards rule, so named for the Ninth Circuit case from which it grew: In re Bob Richards Chrysler-Plymouth Corp., 473 F. 2d 262 (1973). As initially conceived, the Bob Richards rule provided that, in the absence of a tax allocation agreement, a refund belongs to the group member responsible for the losses that led to it. With the passage of time, though, Bob Richards evolved. Now, in some jurisdictions, Bob Richards doesn’t just supply a stopgap rule for situations when group members lack an allocation agreement. It represents a general rule always to be followed unless the parties’ tax allocation agreement unambiguously specifies a different result. … The federal government may have an interest in regulating how it receives taxes from corporate groups. The government also may have an interest in regulating the delivery of any tax refund due a corporate group. For example and as we’ve seen, the government may wish to ensure that others in the group have no recourse against federal coffers once it pays the group’s designated agent. But what unique interest could the federal government have in determining how a consolidated corporate tax refund, once paid to a designated agent, is distributed among group members? ... [W]e did not take this case to decide how this case should be resolved under state law or to determine how IRS regulations might interact with state law. We took this case only to underscore the care federal courts should exercise before taking up an invitation to try their hand at common lawmaking. Bob Richards made the mistake of moving too quickly past important threshold questions at the heart of our separation of powers. It supplies no rule of decision, only a cautionary tale. Whether this case might yield the same or a different result without Bob Richards is a matter the court of appeals may consider on remand. Lineup: Gorsuch, unanimous. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-1269_h3dj.pdf McKINNEY v. ARIZONA Holding / Majority Opinion (Kavanaugh): In 1992, an Arizona jury convicted McKinney of two counts of first-degree murder. Under this Court’s precedents, a defendant convicted of murder is eligible for a death sentence if at least one aggravating circumstance is found. McKinney’s trial judge found aggravating circumstances for both murders. … Nearly 20 years later, on federal habeas corpus review, an en banc panel of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided by a 6 to 5 vote that, in sentencing McKinney, the Arizona courts had failed to properly consider McKinney’s posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and had thereby run afoul of this Court’s decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma. … McKinney’s case then returned to the Arizona Supreme Court. In that court, McKinney argued that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury. By contrast, the State asked that the Arizona Supreme Court itself conduct a reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as permitted by Clemons v. Mississippi. The Arizona Supreme Court agreed with the State. The court itself reviewed the evidence in the record and reweighed the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including McKinney’s PTSD. The court upheld both death sentences. McKinney petitioned for certiorari in this Court. Because of the importance of the case to capital sentencing in Arizona, we granted certiorari. The issue in this case is narrow. McKinney contends that after the Ninth Circuit identified an Eddings error, the Arizona Supreme Court could not itself reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Rather, according to McKinney, a jury must resentence him. McKinney’s argument does not square with this Court’s decision in Clemons. In Clemons, a Mississippi jury sentenced the defendant to death based in part on two aggravating circumstances. After the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that one of the aggravators was unconstitutionally vague, the defendant argued that he was entitled to resentencing before a jury so that the jury could properly weigh the permissible aggravating and mitigating evidence. This Court disagreed. The Court concluded that the Mississippi Supreme Court could itself reweigh the permissible aggravating and mitigating evidence. … This Court’s precedents establish that state appellate courts may conduct a Clemons reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and may do so in collateral proceedings as appropriate and provided under state law. We affirm the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court. Lineup: Kavanaugh, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch. Dissent by Ginsburg, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Dissent (Ginsburg, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan): Petitioner James Erin McKinney, convicted in Arizona of two counts of first-degree murder, was sentenced to death in 1993. At that time, Arizona assigned capital sentencing to trial judges. To impose a death sentence, the judge had to find at least one aggravating circumstance and “no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” In 2002, in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002), this Court held Arizona’s capital sentencing regime unconstitutional. The “aggravating factors” that render a defendant eligible for capital punishment in Arizona, the Court reasoned, “operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.’” Id., at 609 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 494, n. 19 (2000)). “[T]he Sixth Amendment [therefore] requires that [such aggravating factors] be found by a jury.” Ibid.; see Hurst v. Florida, 577 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 1) (“The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death.”). Here in dispute, does Ring apply to McKinney’s case? If it does, then McKinney’s death sentences—imposed based on aggravating factors found by a judge, not a jury—are unlawful. The Constitution, this Court has determined, requires the application of new rules of constitutional law to cases on direct review. Such rules, however, do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review unless they fall within one of two exceptions. This Court has already held that Ring does not fall within those exceptions. Thus, the pivotal question: Is McKinney’s case currently on direct review, in which case Ring applies, or on collateral review, in which case Ring does not apply? I would rank the Arizona Supreme Court’s proceeding now before this Court for review as direct in character. I would therefore hold McKinney’s death sentences unconstitutional under Ring, and reverse the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court. … Accepting “collateral” as a fit description of the 2018 Arizona Supreme Court review proceeding, the Court relies on Clemons v. Mississippi, a decision holding that appellate courts can reweigh aggravating and mitigating factors as a form of “harmless-error analysis” when the factfinder “relied in part on an invalid aggravating circumstance.” Here, however, the Ninth Circuit engaged in harmless-error review when that court evaluated McKinney’s federal habeas petition—and found the Arizona Supreme Court’s 1996 Eddings error harmful. The State accordingly asked the Arizona Supreme Court “to cure [that] error” by conducting a new independent review proceeding. App. 389 (emphasis added). In determining de novo in 2018 whether McKinney’s death sentences were “not only legally correct, but also appropriate,” the Arizona Supreme Court was not conducting garden-variety harmless-error review of a lower court decision; it was rerunning direct review to correct its own prior harmful error … Because Ring controls post 2002 direct review proceedings, I would apply that precedent here and reverse the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-1109_5i36.pdf SHULAR v. UNITED STATES Holding / Majority Opinion (Ginsburg): The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U. S. C. §924(e), mandates a 15-year minimum sentence of imprisonment for certain defendants with prior convictions for a “serious drug offense.” A state offense ranks as a “serious drug offense” only if it “involv[es] manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” §924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This case concerns the methodology courts use to apply that definition. While the parties agree that a court should look to the state offense’s elements, they disagree over what the court should measure those elements against. In the Government’s view, the court should ask whether those elements involve the conduct identified in §924(e)(2)(A)(ii)—namely, “manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” Petitioner Eddie Lee Shular, however, contends that the terms employed in the statute identify not conduct, but offenses. In his view, those terms are shorthand for the elements of the offenses as commonly understood. According to Shular, the court must first identify the elements of the “generic” offense, then ask whether the elements of the state offense match those of the generic crime. ... The question presented: Does §924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s “serious drug offense” definition call for a comparison to a generic offense? We hold it does not. The “serious drug offense” definition requires only that the state offense involve the conduct specified in the federal statute; it does not require that the state offense match certain generic offenses. … The parties here agree that §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires a categorical approach. A court must look only to the state offense’s elements, not the facts of the case or labels pinned to the state conviction. They differ, however, on what comparison §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) requires. Shular would require “a generic-offense matching exercise”: A court should define the elements of the generic offenses identified in §924(e)(2)(A)(ii), then compare those elements to the elements of the state offense. In the Government’s view, a court should apply “the Kawashima categorical approach”: It should ask whether the state offense’s elements “necessarily entail one of the types of conduct” identified in §924(e)(2)(A)(ii). … The Government’s reading, we are convinced, correctly interprets the statutory text and context. Two features of §924(e)(2)(A)(ii), compared against a neighboring provision referring to offenses, §924(e)(2)(B)(ii), show that §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) refers to conduct. First, the terms in §924(e)(2)(A)(ii)—“manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance”—are unlikely names for generic offenses. … Second, by speaking of activities a state-law drug offense “involv[es],” §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) suggests that the descriptive terms immediately following the word “involving” identify conduct. … Both parties’ interpretations of 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) achieve a measure of consistency. Resolving this case requires us to determine which form of consistency Congress intended: application of ACCA to all offenders who engaged in certain conduct or to all who committed certain generic offenses (in either reading, judging only by the elements of their prior convictions). For the reasons explained, we are persuaded that Congress chose the former. Lineup: Ginsburg, unanimous. Concurrence by Kavanaugh. Concurrence (Kavanaugh): I join the Court’s opinion in full. In Part III–E of the opinion, the Court rejects Shular’s argument for applying the rule of lenity. I write separately to elaborate on why the rule of lenity does not apply here. This Court’s longstanding precedents establish that the rule of lenity applies when two conditions are met. First, as the Court today says and as the Court has repeatedly held, a court may invoke the rule of lenity only “‘after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction.’” … Second, this Court has repeatedly explained that the rule of lenity applies only in cases of “‘grievous’” ambiguity— where the court, even after applying all of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, “ ‘can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.’” … Because the Court correctly concludes that the rule of lenity does not apply in this case, I join the Court’s opinion in full. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-6662_gfbi.pdf HOLGUIN-HERNANDEZ v. UNITED STATES Holding / Majority Opinion (Breyer): A criminal defendant who wishes a court of appeals to consider a claim that a ruling of a trial court was in error must first make his objection known to the trial-court judge. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide two ways of doing so. They say that “[a] party may preserve a claim of error by informing the court . . . of [1] the action the party wishes the court to take, or [2] the party’s objection to the court’s action and the grounds for that objection.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 51(b). Errors “not brought to the court’s attention” in one of these two ways are subject to review only insofar as they are “plain.” In this case, a criminal defendant argued in the District Court that the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U. S. C. §3553(a) did not support imposing any prison time for a supervised-release violation. At the very least, the defendant contended, any term of imprisonment should be less than 12 months long. The judge nevertheless imposed a sentence of 12 months. The question is whether the defendant’s district-court argument for a specific sentence (namely, nothing or less than 12 months) preserved his claim on appeal that the 12-month sentence was unreasonably long. We think that it did. … We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ suggestion that defendants are required to refer to the “reasonableness” of a sentence to preserve such claims for appeal….We hold only that the defendant here properly preserved the claim that his 12-month sentence was unreasonably long by advocating for a shorter sentence and thereby arguing, in effect, that this shorter sentence would have proved “sufficient,” while a sentence of 12 months or longer would be “greater than necessary” to “comply with” the statutory purposes of punishment. Lineup: Breyer, unanimous. Concurrence by Alito, joined by Gorsuch. Concurrence (Alito): I agree with the Court that a defendant who requests a specific sentence during a sentencing hearing need not object to the sentence after its pronouncement in order to preserve a challenge to its substantive reasonableness (i.e., length) on appeal. I write to emphasize what we are not deciding. First, we do not decide “what is sufficient to preserve a claim that a trial court used improper procedures in arriving at its chosen sentence.” … Second, we do not decide what is sufficient to preserve any “particular” substantive-reasonableness argument. … Third, we do not decide whether this petitioner properly preserved his particular substantive-reasonableness arguments, namely, that he did not pose a danger to the public and that a 12-month sentence would not serve deterrence purposes. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-7739_9q7h.pdf INTEL CORPORATION INVESTMENT POLICY COMMITTEE ET AL. v. SULYMA Holding / Majority Opinion (Alito): The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) requires plaintiffs with “actual knowledge” of an alleged fiduciary breach to file suit within three years of gaining that knowledge rather than within the 6-year period that would otherwise apply. The question here is whether a plaintiff necessarily has “actual knowledge” of the information contained in disclosures that he receives but does not read or cannot recall reading. We hold that he does not and therefore affirm. … Sulyma filed this suit on behalf of a putative class in October 2015, alleging primarily that the committee and other plan administrators (petitioners here) had breached their fiduciary duties by overinvesting in alternative assets. Petitioners countered that the suit was untimely under §1113(2). Although Sulyma filed it within six years of the alleged breaches, he filed it more than three years after petitioners had disclosed their investment decisions to him. … Petitioners submitted records showing that Sulyma visited the NetBenefits site repeatedly during his employment. But he testified in his deposition that he did not “remember reviewing” the above disclosures during his tenure. He also stated in a declaration that he was “unaware” while working at Intel “that the monies that [he] had invested through the Intel retirement plans had been invested in hedge funds or private equity.” He recalled reviewing only account statements sent to him by mail, which directed him to the NetBenefits site and noted that his plans were invested in “short-term/other” assets but did not specify which. … We granted certiorari, 587 U. S. ___ (2019), to resolve whether the phrase “actual knowledge” does in fact mean “what it says,” 909 F. 3d, at 1076, and hold that it does. … Petitioners may well be correct that heeding the plain meaning of §1113(2) substantially diminishes the protection that it provides for ERISA fiduciaries, but by the same token, petitioners’ interpretation would greatly reduce §1113(1)’s value for beneficiaries, given the disclosure regime that petitioners themselves emphasize. Choosing between these alternatives is a task for Congress, and we must assume that the language of §1113(2) reflects Congress’s choice. If policy considerations suggest that the current scheme should be altered, Congress must be the one to do it. … Nothing in this opinion forecloses any of the “usual ways” to prove actual knowledge at any stage in the litigation. Plaintiffs who recall reading particular disclosures will of course be bound by oath to say so in their depositions. On top of that, actual knowledge can be proved through “inference from circumstantial evidence.” … Today’s opinion also does not preclude defendants from contending that evidence of “willful blindness” supports a finding of “actual knowledge.” In the case before us, however, petitioners do not argue that “actual knowledge” is established in any of these ways, only that they need not offer any such proof. And that is incorrect. Lineup: Alito, unanimous. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-1116_h3cj.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout]
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Feb 26, 2020 18:52
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hobbesmaster posted:Did they cite 1840s precedent regarding the number of fucks the US gives about Mexican territorial integrity? The problem is that ever since Bivens and like one other case SCOTUS has realized that providing a new federal common-law tort is something that should be left to Congress. Then Congress doesn't do anything, so now we have two problems. No comment on any proceedings ongoing in Mexico itself.
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Feb 26, 2020 18:53
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OK, can somebody translate Gorsuch's opinion into the actual decision? I know he can't write to save his life (and this was a niche enough case the Court probably decided they could afford to let him write it), but I'm reading this and realizing I really can't tell WHAT the Supreme Court determined here based on his opinion.
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Feb 27, 2020 00:08
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MadDogMike posted:OK, can somebody translate Gorsuch's opinion into the actual decision? I know he can't write to save his life (and this was a niche enough case the Court probably decided they could afford to let him write it), but I'm reading this and realizing I really can't tell WHAT the Supreme Court determined here based on his opinion. Let state law determine who gets the money / this isnt a problem that demands federal common law.
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Feb 27, 2020 00:13
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Are people living in another country generally allowed to sue a US citizen in US courts? Honest question Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents is a great defendant name as well
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Feb 27, 2020 00:25
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Nissin Cup Nudist posted:Are people living in another country generally allowed to sue a US citizen in US courts? Honest question Sure. The issue becomes that federal employees doing their jobs, particularly law enforcement of some sort, have hella protections.
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Feb 27, 2020 00:33
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Also theres a lot of legal precedent behind "oh god we're not touching foreign policy"
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Feb 27, 2020 01:26
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So under this ruling a CBP officer could murder someone in cold blood and have absolute immunity if it happens within the 100 mile border zone? Because that's basically what happened here only it was right on the border instead of a few (dozen) miles in land. And the conservatives are so loving giddy to make the Feds have absolute immunity that they really aren't even trying to hide their fascism at any level, are they?
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Feb 27, 2020 01:45
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Cops already can commit murder and get away with it, no Federal protections needed. It just makes it even harder than normal
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Feb 27, 2020 01:49
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Evil Fluffy posted:So under this ruling a CBP officer could murder someone in cold blood and have absolute immunity if it happens within the 100 mile border zone? No. That’s Tennessee v Gardner. The border zone was not relevant; crossing the border was.
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Feb 27, 2020 01:54
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Evil Fluffy posted:So under this ruling a CBP officer could murder someone in cold blood and have absolute immunity if it happens within the 100 mile border zone? Because that's basically what happened here only it was right on the border instead of a few (dozen) miles in land. Federal cops can shoot mexican citizens if and when the cop is in the US and the Mexican Citizen is in Mexico and have more or less absolute immunity from the family, or victim. My guess is that this is because "what if we are at war with Mexico?" Ron Jeremy posted:The GOP is like 5 state houses away from having a free hand to amend the constitution. While they can propose amendments, like for example an abortion ban, getting 3/4ths of the states to agree would be nearly impossible in the short run. However they may be playing the 100 year game, and put no time limit as to when the ratification needs to take place, so if enough states get Republican control in the next 100 years you could pass a nationwide abortion ban. This is not an impossible situation and we've seen republicans play games with 30 and 40 year payoffs in the past. Republicans would never allow the formation of a new federal government. If they attempted such an act they would be openly inviting several regional economies to band together and form new governments of their own. The West Coast would for example never want to be part of the same government as the bible belt. Texas may become its own country, and the New England area owns most of the capital markets. At best this would result in the EU 2.0. There is a very good reason such a convention has never been called, every time it gets close congress does its job and fixes whatever was causing the commotion. Congress Critters are correct in that calling a convention is a wild card that could upend the entire political system. About the only thing today that could get this called is if Trump outright steals the 2020 presidential race to the point of mass hacking, or paying off delegates with pardons and bribes if they vote for him, or something as awful as this, and even then It would at least be attempted to be restricted to the Trump situation in the call for a convention. Note that Trump could actully do all the above, at least with republican controlled states who could then refuse to bring state charges to presidental delegates who violate the delegate voting rules.
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Feb 27, 2020 02:52
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ulmont posted:No. That’s Tennessee v Gardner. The border zone was not relevant; crossing the border was. Ginsburg's dissent is clear that the border part is, in the view of the minority, irrelevant. The CBP officer was in the US for all of his actions, he acted recklessly and didn't follow guidance or procedures and since Blevin is rooted in discussing federal officers from behaving badly, the fact that the consequences of his actions occurred outside the US shouldn't be relevant. This would have no precedential impact on prosecuting misbehaviour of US officers or citizens abroad since the CBP officer and his misconduct all occurred in the US. Of course the conservative majority would never want to stop CBP from creating as hostile an environment as possible. They probably envisage a scenario where the us Mexico border has a 1 Mile no go area on the Mexican side and any beaners in there are fair game for the good, upstanding men of the border patrol.
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Feb 27, 2020 08:35
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Evil Fluffy posted:So under this ruling a CBP officer could murder someone in cold blood and have absolute immunity if it happens within the 100 mile border zone? Because that's basically what happened here only it was right on the border instead of a few (dozen) miles in land. Seeing as the DoJ is opening a denaturalization unit...
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Feb 27, 2020 15:17
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Congress: Excuse me federal court, what should we do about this constitutional situation? Courts: *Shrug* https://twitter.com/ToddRuger/status/1233507494682660864?s=20
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Mar 2, 2020 01:47
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