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NaanViolence posted:There is an insane amount of 20/20 hindsight being applied here. Nah people wanted her to retire at the time, it doesn't take hindsight to count to 9 or to know that you can't just assume unbroken Democratic majorities forever E: especially after the wake up call of the 2010 midterms, banking on permanent Democratic Senate control after that is inexcusable
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May 14, 2020 23:16
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galenanorth posted:-- April 2014, back when Democrats still controlled the chamber 55-45. I'd go further back, but the OP is from 2013. At this point I'm not sure if noted war criminal Allen West would be better or worse than whomever Trump would pick for another SCOTUS vacancy considering his last pick.
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May 14, 2020 23:35
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Evil Fluffy posted:I'm wondering how much longer it's going to be until there's a SCOTUS ruling where the conservative majority's reasoning just flat out states "because we say so, gently caress you" instead of just implying it like they usually do. Masterpiece Cake Shop
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May 15, 2020 07:25
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FronzelNeekburm posted:Masterpiece Cake Shop That and Trump v Hawaii within weeks? One finding discriminatory animus and one being totes ok.
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May 15, 2020 18:40
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 Opinion! LUCKY BRAND DUNGAREES, INC., ET AL. v. MARCEL FASHIONS GROUP, INC. Holding / Majority Opinion (Sotomayor): This case arises from protracted litigation between petitioners Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc., and others (collectively Lucky Brand) and respondent Marcel Fashions Group, Inc. (Marcel). In the latest lawsuit between the two, Lucky Brand asserted a defense against Marcel that it had not pressed fully in a preceding suit between the parties. This Court is asked to determine whether Lucky Brand’s failure to litigate the defense in the earlier suit barred Lucky Brand from invoking it in the later suit. Because the parties agree that, at a minimum, the preclusion of such a defense in this context requires that the two suits share the same claim to relief—and because we find that the two suits here did not—Lucky Brand was not barred from raising its defense in the later action. Marcel and Lucky Brand both sell jeans and other apparel. Both entities also use the word “Lucky” as part of their marks on clothing. In 1986, Marcel received a federal trademark registration for “Get Lucky”; a few years later, in 1990, Lucky Brand began selling apparel using the registered trademark “Lucky Brand” and other marks that include the word “Lucky.” Three categories of marks are at issue in this case: Marcel’s “Get Lucky” mark; Lucky Brand’s “Lucky Brand” mark; and various other marks owned by Lucky Brand that contain the word “Lucky.” These trademarks have led to nearly 20 years of litigation between the two companies, proceeding in three rounds. … In April 2011, the third round of litigation began: Marcel filed an action against Lucky Brand (2011 Action), maintaining that Lucky Brand continued to infringe Marcel’s “Get Lucky” mark and, in so doing, contravened the judgment issued in the 2005 Action. This complaint did not reprise Marcel’s earlier allegation (in the 2005 Action) that Lucky Brand continued to use the “Get Lucky” phrase. Marcel argued only that Lucky Brand’s continued, post-2010 use of Lucky Brand’s own marks—some of which used the word “Lucky”—infringed Marcel’s “Get Lucky” mark in a manner that (according to Marcel) was previously found infringing. Marcel requested that the District Court enjoin Lucky Brand from using any of Lucky Brand’s marks containing the word “Lucky.” … On remand to the District Court, Lucky Brand moved to dismiss, arguing—for the first time since its motion to dismiss and answer in the 2005 Action—that Marcel had released its claims by entering the settlement agreement [in 2003, in the first case]. Marcel countered that Lucky Brand was precluded from invoking the release defense, because it could have pursued the defense fully in the 2005 Action but had neglected to do so. The District Court granted Lucky Brand’s motion to dismiss, holding that it could assert its release defense and that the settlement agreement indeed barred Marcel’s claims. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that a doctrine it termed “defense preclusion” prohibited Lucky Brand from raising the release defense in the 2011 Action. Noting that a different category of preclusion—issue preclusion—may be wielded against a defendant, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322 (1979), the court reasoned that the same should be true of claim preclusion: A defendant should be precluded from raising an unlitigated defense that it should have raised earlier. The panel then held that “defense preclusion” bars a party from raising a defense where: “(i) a previous action involved an adjudication on the merits”; “(ii) the previous action involved the same parties”; “(iii) the defense was either asserted or could have been asserted, in the prior action”; and “(iv) the district court, in its discretion, concludes that preclusion of the defense is appropriate.” 898 F. 3d, at 241. Finding each factor satisfied in this case, the panel vacated the District Court’s judgment. We granted certiorari, 588 U. S. ___ (2019), to resolve differences among the Circuits regarding when, if ever, claim preclusion applies to defenses raised in a later suit. This case asks whether so-called “defense preclusion” is a valid application of res judicata: a term that now comprises two distinct doctrines regarding the preclusive effect of prior litigation. The first is issue preclusion (sometimes called collateral estoppel), which precludes a party from relitigating an issue actually decided in a prior case and necessary to the judgment. The second doctrine is claim preclusion (sometimes itself called res judicata). Unlike issue preclusion, claim preclusion prevents parties from raising issues that could have been raised and decided in a prior action—even if they were not actually litigated. If a later suit advances the same claim as an earlier suit between the same parties, the earlier suit’s judgment “prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.” Suits involve the same claim (or “cause of action”) when they “‘aris[e] from the same transaction,’” or involve a “common nucleus of operative facts”. … This Court has never explicitly recognized “defense preclusion” as a standalone category of res judicata, unmoored from the two guideposts of issue preclusion and claim preclusion. Instead, our case law indicates that any such preclusion of defenses must, at a minimum, satisfy the strictures of issue preclusion or claim preclusion. The parties thus agree that where, as here, issue preclusion does not apply, a defense can be barred only if the “causes of action are the same” in the two suits—that is, where they share a “‘common nucleus of operative fact[s].’” Put simply, the two suits here were grounded on different conduct, involving different marks, occurring at different times. They thus did not share a “common nucleus of operative facts.” To start, claims to relief may be the same for the purposes of claim preclusion if, among other things, “‘a different judgment in the second action would impair or destroy rights or interests established by the judgment entered in the first action.’” Here, however, the 2011 Action did not imperil the judgment of the 2005 Action because the lawsuits involved both different conduct and different trademarks. … Resisting this conclusion, Marcel points to treatises and this Court’s cases, arguing that they support a version of “defense preclusion” doctrine that extends to the facts of this case. But these authorities do no such thing. As an initial matter, regardless of what those authorities might imply about “defense preclusion,” none of them describe scenarios applicable here. Moreover, we doubt that these authorities stand for anything more than that traditional claim- or issue-preclusion principles may bar defenses raised in a subsequent suit— principles that, as explained above, do not bar Lucky Brand’s release defense here. … At bottom, Marcel’s 2011 Action challenged different conduct—and raised different claims—from the 2005 Action. Under those circumstances, Marcel cannot preclude Lucky Brand from raising new defenses. The judgment of the Second Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Sotomayor, unanimous. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-1086_5ie6.pdf
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May 15, 2020 18:59
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Opinion! OPATI, IN HER OWN RIGHT AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF OPATI, DECEASED, ET AL. v. REPUBLIC OF SUDAN ET AL. Holding / Majority Opinion (Gorsuch): In 1998, al Qaeda operatives simultaneously detonated truck bombs outside the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Hundreds died, thousands were injured. In time, victims and their family members sued the Republic of Sudan in federal court, alleging that it had assisted al Qaeda in perpetrating the attacks. After more than a decade of motions practice, intervening legislative amendments, and a trial, the plaintiffs proved Sudan’s role in the attacks and established their entitlement to compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, however, Sudan argued, and the court agreed, that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act barred the punitive damages award. It is that decision we now review and, ultimately, vacate. The starting point for nearly any dispute touching on foreign sovereign immunity lies in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812). There, Chief Justice Marshall explained that foreign sovereigns do not enjoy an inherent right to be held immune from suit in American courts: “The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.” Still, Chief Justice Marshall continued, many countries had declined to exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in cases involving foreign ministers and militaries. IAnd, accepting a suggestion from the Executive Branch, the Court agreed as a matter of comity to extend that same immunity to a foreign sovereign in the case at hand. … [After 150 years of inconsistent sovereign immunity cases] In 1976, Congress sought to remedy the problem and address foreign sovereign immunity on a more comprehensive basis. The result was the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). As a baseline rule, the FSIA holds foreign states and their instrumentalities immune from the jurisdiction of federal and state courts. But the law also includes a number of exceptions. Of particular relevance today is the terrorism exception Congress added to the law in 1996. That exception permits certain plaintiffs to bring suits against countries who have committed or supported specified acts of terrorism and who are designated by the State Department as state sponsors of terror. Still, as originally enacted, the exception shielded even these countries from the possibility of punitive damages. Two years after Congress amended the FSIA, al Qaeda attacked the U. S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. … Congress amended the FSIA again in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), 122 Stat. 338. Four changes, all found in a single section, bear mention here. First, in §1083(a) of the NDAA, Congress moved the statesponsored terrorism exception from its original home in §1605(a)(7) to a new section of the U. S. Code, 28 U. S. C. §1605A. This had the effect of freeing claims brought under the terrorism exception from the FSIA’s usual bar on punitive damages. Second, also in §1083(a), Congress created an express federal cause of action for acts of terror. This new cause of action, codified at 28 U. S. C. §1605A(c), is open to plaintiffs who are U. S. nationals, members of the Armed Forces, U. S. government employees or contractors, and their legal representatives, and it expressly authorizes punitive damages. Third, in §1083(c)(2) of the NDAA, a provision titled “Prior Actions,” Congress addressed existing lawsuits that had been “adversely affected on the groun[d] that” prior law “fail[ed] to create a cause of action against the state.” Actions like these, Congress instructed, were to be given effect “as if ” they had been originally filed under §1605A(c)’s new federal cause of action. Finally, in §1083(c)(3) of the NDAA, a provision titled “Related Actions,” Congress provided a time-limited opportunity for plaintiffs to file new actions “arising out of the same act or incident” as an earlier action and claim the benefits of 28 U. S. C. §1605A. Following these amendments, the Owens plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the new federal cause of action, and hundreds of additional victims and family members filed new claims against Sudan similar to those in Owens. … [Sudan eventually claims the amendments can’t apply to older actions and] The petitioners responded by asking this Court to review the first of these rulings and decide whether the 2008 NDAA amendments permit plaintiffs proceeding under the federal cause of action in §1605A(c) to seek and win punitive damages for past conduct. … The principle that legislation usually applies only prospectively “is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.” … Sudan points to Landgraf. There, the Court observed that, “in decisions spanning two centuries,” we have approached debates about statutory meaning with an assumption that Congress means its legislation to respect the principle of prospectivity and apply only to future conduct—and that, if and when Congress wishes to test its power to legislate retrospectively, it must say so “clear[ly].”All this is important, Sudan tells us, because when we look to the NDAA we will find no clear statement allowing courts to award punitive damages for past conduct. But if Sudan focuses on the rule, the petitioners highlight an exception suggested by Altmann. Because foreign sovereign immunity is a gesture of grace and comity, Altmann reasoned, it is also something that may be withdrawn retroactively without the same risk to due process and equal protection principles that other forms of backward-looking legislation can pose. Foreign sovereign immunity’s “principal purpose,” after all, “has never been to permit foreign states . . . to shape their conduct in reliance on the promise of future immunity from suit in United States courts.” ... As we see it, however, there is no need to resolve the parties’ debate over interpretive presumptions. Even if we assume (without granting) that Sudan may claim the benefit of Landgraf ’s presumption of prospectivity, Congress was as clear as it could have been when it authorized plaintiffs to seek and win punitive damages for past conduct using §1065A(c)’s new federal cause of action. After all, in §1083(a), Congress created a federal cause of action that expressly allows suits for damages that “may include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” This new cause of action was housed in a new provision of the U. S. Code, 28 U. S. C. §1605A, to which the FSIA’s usual prohibition on punitive damages does not apply. Then, in §§1083(c)(2) and (c)(3) of the very same statute, Congress allowed certain plaintiffs in “Prior Actions” and “Related Actions” to invoke the new federal cause of action in §1605A. Both provisions specifically authorized new claims for preenactment conduct. Put another way, Congress proceeded in two equally evident steps: (1) It expressly authorized punitive damages under a new cause of action; and (2) it explicitly made that new cause of action available to remedy certain past acts of terrorism. Neither step presents any ambiguity, nor is the NDAA fairly susceptible to any competing interpretation. … The judgment of the court of appeals with respect to punitive damages is vacated. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Lineup: Gorsuch, unanimous; Kavanaugh not participating. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/17-1268_c07d.pdf
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May 18, 2020 15:26
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So can we sue the Saudis for 9/11 now
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May 18, 2020 15:52
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FlamingLiberal posted:So can we sue the Saudis for 9/11 now No you have to sue George W Bush
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May 18, 2020 15:55
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FlamingLiberal posted:So can we sue the Saudis for 9/11 now No. You have to prove that the country supported the act of terrorism (difficult), and they also had to have been designated by the US State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism (nope).
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May 18, 2020 16:09
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So Biden made an interesting comment (shocking) on potential judges https://twitter.com/sahilkapur/status/1266214652075290625 The 9th amendment in full is "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people" which is pretty vague. This is interesting I cant recall any recent 9th cases lately, or any historical cases under fire. Would would be the result of a broader 9th?
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May 29, 2020 06:15
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Maybe a broader 9th would mean all of those ALEC-lead lawsuits to slowly push "gently caress you white conservatives can do anything and it's legal" religious freedom arguments go right in the trash where they belong because while the 1st says you have the religious freedom to belive in your lovely bigotry, the 9th prohibits you from inflicting it on others? I suspect it's something along those lines.
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May 29, 2020 08:20
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Nissin Cup Nudist posted:So Biden made an interesting comment (shocking) on potential judges the 9th is fairly proximate to Roe v Wade, for one
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May 29, 2020 09:30
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Roe v Wade is built on privacy theory though
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May 29, 2020 11:07
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Is the 9th relevant to rule-making authority by federal agencies? A major thrust of the Federalist Society recently has been to force regulations to be passed by congress instead of delegated to rule-making bodies, then undo Chevron deference so they can shitcan any of those laws that don't match conservative policy preferences.
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May 29, 2020 13:42
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Potato Salad posted:Roe v Wade is built on privacy theory though Privacy at least in part as a 9th Amendment unenumerated right, though.
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May 29, 2020 21:25
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Forever_Peace posted:Is the 9th relevant to rule-making authority by federal agencies? A major thrust of the Federalist Society recently has been to force regulations to be passed by congress instead of delegated to rule-making bodies, then undo Chevron deference so they can shitcan any of those laws that don't match conservative policy preferences. No
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May 30, 2020 00:28
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It's going to be a Roe signal more than anything.
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May 30, 2020 00:36
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Discendo Vox posted:It's going to be a Roe signal more than anything. I think that and a broader signal that he wants to appoint explicit living constitutionalists as a counter to the originalist trend in Republican appointments.
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May 30, 2020 01:38
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https://twitter.com/adamliptak/status/1266581076136398849?s=21 From the decision: quote:Similar or more severe restrictions apply to comparable secular gatherings, including lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator sports, and theatrical performances, where large groups of people gather in close proximity for extended periods of time. And the Order exempts or treats more leniently only dissimilar activities, such as operating grocery stores, banks, and laundromats, in which people neither congregate in large groups nor remain in close proximity for extended periods. From Kavanaugh's dissent: quote:I would grant the Church’s requested temporary injunction because California’s latest safety guidelines discriminate against places of worship and in favor of comparable secular businesses. Why can't California just impose restrictions similar to comparable private businesses where people sit together in proximity for hours, like movie theaters? Oh wait, they did? Well uh er um hm  (Also, hurr durr, Kavanaugh citing Trinity Lutheran to rail against religious discrimination. Thanks, Kagan and Breyer, so very much for giving conservatives this gift.)
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May 30, 2020 06:14
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I'm not sure who has the better argument here. If it is true that churches are being treated differently (and hair salons and offices do have people present in large groups and close proximity for extended periods), that does seem to be a violation. On the other hand, if these are the same restrictions as given to movie theatres and lectures, that seems evenhanded. Considering the emergency posture, a tie probably should go to California. Order! SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH, ET AL. v. GAVIN NEWSOM, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL. Order: The application for injunctive relief presented to JUSTICE KAGAN and by her referred to the Court is denied. Concurrence (Roberts): The Governor of California’s Executive Order aims to limit the spread of COVID–19, a novel severe acute respiratory illness that has killed thousands of people in California and more than 100,000 nationwide. At this time, there is no known cure, no effective treatment, and no vaccine. Because people may be infected but asymptomatic, they may unwittingly infect others. The Order places temporary numerical restrictions on public gatherings to address this extraordinary health emergency. State guidelines currently limit attendance at places of worship to 25% of building capacity or a maximum of 100 attendees. Applicants seek to enjoin enforcement of the Order. “Such a request demands a significantly higher justification than a request for a stay because, unlike a stay, an injunction does not simply suspend judicial alteration of the status quo but grants judicial intervention that has been withheld by lower courts.” This power is used where “the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear” and, even then, “sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances.” Although California’s guidelines place restrictions on places of worship, those restrictions appear consistent with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Similar or more severe restrictions apply to comparable secular gatherings, including lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator sports, and theatrical performances, where large groups of people gather in close proximity for extended periods of time. And the Order exempts or treats more leniently only dissimilar activities, such as operating grocery stores, banks, and laundromats, in which people neither congregate in large groups nor remain in close proximity for extended periods. The precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement. Our Constitution principally entrusts “[t]he safety and the health of the people” to the politically accountable officials of the States “to guard and protect.” When those officials “undertake[ ] to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,” their latitude “must be especially broad.” Where those broad limits are not exceeded, they should not be subject to second-guessing by an “unelected federal judiciary,” which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the people. That is especially true where, as here, a party seeks emergency relief in an interlocutory posture, while local officials are actively shaping their response to changing facts on the ground. The notion that it is “indisputably clear” that the Government’s limitations are unconstitutional seems quite improbable. Dissent (Kavanaugh, joined by Thomas and Gorsuch): I would grant the Church’s requested temporary injunction because California’s latest safety guidelines discriminate against places of worship and in favor of comparable secular businesses. Such discrimination violates the First Amendment. In response to the COVID–19 health crisis, California has now limited attendance at religious worship services to 25% of building capacity or 100 attendees, whichever is lower. The basic constitutional problem is that comparable secular businesses are not subject to a 25% occupancy cap, including factories, offices, supermarkets, restaurants, retail stores, pharmacies, shopping malls, pet grooming shops, bookstores, florists, hair salons, and cannabis dispensaries. South Bay United Pentecostal Church has applied for temporary injunctive relief from California’s 25% occupancy cap on religious worship services. Importantly, the Church is willing to abide by the State’s rules that apply to comparable secular businesses, including the rules regarding social distancing and hygiene. But the Church objects to a 25% occupancy cap that is imposed on religious worship services but not imposed on those comparable secular businesses. In my view, California’s discrimination against religious worship services contravenes the Constitution. As a general matter, the “government may not use religion as a basis of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits.” This Court has stated that discrimination against religion is “odious to our Constitution.” To justify its discriminatory treatment of religious worship services, California must show that its rules are “justified by a compelling governmental interest” and “narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” California undoubtedly has a compelling interest in combating the spread of COVID–19 and protecting the health of its citizens. But “restrictions inexplicably applied to one group and exempted from another do little to further these goals and do much to burden religious freedom.” What California needs is a compelling justification for distinguishing between (i) religious worship services and (ii) the litany of other secular businesses that are not subject to an occupancy cap. California has not shown such a justification. The Church has agreed to abide by the State’s rules that apply to comparable secular businesses. That raises important questions: “Assuming all of the same precautions are taken, why can someone safely walk down a grocery store aisle but not a pew? And why can someone safely interact with a brave deliverywoman but not with a stoic minister?” The Church and its congregants simply want to be treated equally to comparable secular businesses. California already trusts its residents and any number of businesses to adhere to proper social distancing and hygiene practices. The State cannot “assume the worst when people go to worship but assume the best when people go to work or go about the rest of their daily lives in permitted social settings.” California has ample options that would allow it to combat the spread of COVID–19 without discriminating against religion. The State could “insist that the congregants adhere to social-distancing and other health requirements and leave it at that—just as the Governor has done for comparable secular activities.” Or alternatively, the State could impose reasonable occupancy caps across the board. But absent a compelling justification (which the State has not offered), the State may not take a looser approach with, say, supermarkets, restaurants, factories, and offices while imposing stricter requirements on places of worship. The State also has substantial room to draw lines, especially in an emergency. But as relevant here, the Constitution imposes one key restriction on that line-drawing: The State may not discriminate against religion. In sum, California’s 25% occupancy cap on religious worship services indisputably discriminates against religion, and such discrimination violates the First Amendment. The Church would suffer irreparable harm from not being able to hold services on Pentecost Sunday in a way that comparable secular businesses and persons can conduct their activities. I would therefore grant the Church’s request for a temporary injunction. I respectfully dissent. Lineup: Roberts, joined by GInsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. Concurrence by Roberts. Dissent by Kavanaugh, joined by Thomas and Gorsuch. https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/19A1044-Order.pdf
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May 30, 2020 17:56
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It's probably the correct ruling on free exercise clause, and yet completely against the assembly clause.
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May 30, 2020 18:10
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ulmont posted:I'm not sure who has the better argument here. If it is true that churches are being treated differently (and hair salons and offices do have people present in large groups and close proximity for extended periods), that does seem to be a violation. On the other hand, if these are the same restrictions as given to movie theatres and lectures, that seems evenhanded. Considering the emergency posture, a tie probably should go to California. Where was Alito in all this?
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May 30, 2020 18:15
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Nissin Cup Nudist posted:Where was Alito in all this? Voted with Kavanaugh / Thomas / Gorsuch but didn’t write or join the dissent.
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May 30, 2020 18:16
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ulmont posted:Voted with Kavanaugh / Thomas / Gorsuch but didn’t write or join the dissent. So Judges can vote, but don't have to write an opinion about it? Was Alito in a rush to get to his golf game or something?
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May 30, 2020 18:25
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Nissin Cup Nudist posted:So Judges can vote, but don't have to write an opinion about it? Was Alito in a rush to get to his golf game or something? I mean it’s more efficient. The opinion is just whatever they can throw together to justify how they were always going to vote anyway. Might as well just cut out the make work part.
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May 30, 2020 18:31
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Nissin Cup Nudist posted:So Judges can vote, but don't have to write an opinion about it? Was Alito in a rush to get to his golf game or something? Yes, particularly with an emergency request situation. This order came out after midnight last night. For motions to stay like this, you often don't see any opinions at all.
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May 30, 2020 18:42
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Nissin Cup Nudist posted:So Judges can vote, but don't have to write an opinion about it? Was Alito in a rush to get to his golf game or something? This isn't an opinion. It's an opinion relating to an order. They're denying review/injunction. Most of the time these actions get no opinion at all. This is also why Roberts is just a concurrence, because no one signed onto it. The official opinion for this is: "The application for injunctive relief presented to JUSTICE KAGAN and by her referred to the Court is denied. JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE ALITO, JUSTICE GORSUCH, and JUSTICE KAVANAUGH would grant the application." That's all you'll see on a denial for review most of the time.
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May 30, 2020 18:52
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It’s pretty uncommon for cases to have more than three or four opinions. I’m not sure I’ve ever seen a case where literally every justice felt the need to separately write. It’s not like there are usually nine substantially different ways to think about a single legal issue. The cases where you get a ton of different opinions are usually either particularly complex (and maybe the court should’ve granted a narrower review) or particularly nationally prominent (and then the justices’ ego gets the better of them).
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May 30, 2020 19:23
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rjmccall posted:It’s pretty uncommon for cases to have more than three or four opinions. I’m not sure I’ve ever seen a case where literally every justice felt the need to separately write. Even Bush v. Gore had a per curiam, then a concurrence, then 4 dissents (one from each of the liberal justices), so only 6 opinions.
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May 30, 2020 20:20
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ulmont posted:I'm not sure who has the better argument here. If it is true that churches are being treated differently (and hair salons and offices do have people present in large groups and close proximity for extended periods), that does seem to be a violation. What hair salons do you visit that have hundreds of people close together for hours at a time? Larger places might have a dozen or so stalls (usually several feet apart) and site another 10-20 people who are waiting. They are not anywhere close to the same as churches that seat hundreds (sometimes thousands) closely together for an hour or more at a time. Kavabeer claiming they're the same is either being willfully obtuse or he's just an idiot blinded by his religious fervor. The idea that religion is being unfairly targeted is absurd and this would've been 9-0 if the court didn't have a bunch of right wing ideologues on it.
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May 30, 2020 20:29
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Seriously, there's a glimmer of an argument with movie theaters and indoor concert venues (which are currently shut down) but comparing them to hair salons is Stickman fucked around with this message at 21:22 on May 30, 2020 |
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May 30, 2020 21:10
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Is the DACA decision expected next week? I keep hearing that it's coming but still nothing has actually come down.
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May 30, 2020 21:22
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FlamingLiberal posted:Is the DACA decision expected next week? I keep hearing that it's coming but still nothing has actually come down. All argued cases will almost certainly (typically they only hold them if like a justice dies and they want to reargue with the new justice) have opinions come down by the end of June. When in June is a wildcard. Next chance is Monday.
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May 30, 2020 21:37
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Opinions! NASRALLAH v. BARR Holding / Majority Opinion (Kavanaugh): Under federal immigration law, noncitizens who commit certain crimes are removable from the United States. During removal proceedings, a noncitizen may raise claims under the international Convention Against Torture, known as CAT. If the noncitizen demonstrates that he likely would be tortured if removed to the designated country of removal, then he is entitled to CAT relief and may not be removed to that country (although he still may be removed to other countries). If the immigration judge orders removal and denies CAT relief, the noncitizen may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. If the Board of Immigration Appeals orders removal and denies CAT relief, the noncitizen may obtain judicial review in a federal court of appeals of both the final order of removal and the CAT order. In the court of appeals, for cases involving noncitizens who have committed any crime specified in 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(2)(C), federal law limits the scope of judicial review. Those noncitizens may obtain judicial review of constitutional and legal challenges to the final order of removal, but not of factual challenges to the final order of removal. Everyone agrees on all of the above. The dispute here concerns the scope of judicial review of CAT orders for those noncitizens who have committed crimes specified in §1252(a)(2)(C). The Government argues that judicial review of a CAT order is analogous to judicial review of a final order of removal. The Government contends, in other words, that the court of appeals may review the noncitizen’s constitutional and legal challenges to a CAT order, but not the noncitizen’s factual challenges to the CAT order. Nasrallah responds that the court of appeals may review the noncitizen’s constitutional, legal, and factual challenges to the CAT order, although Nasrallah acknowledges that judicial review of factual challenges to CAT orders must be highly deferential. So the narrow question before the Court is whether, in a case involving a noncitizen who committed a crime specified in §1252(a)(2)(C), the court of appeals should review the noncitizen’s factual challenges to the CAT order (i) not at all or (ii) deferentially. Based on the text of the statute, we conclude that the court of appeals should review factual challenges to the CAT order deferentially. We therefore reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. … In 2013, Nasrallah pled guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property. The U. S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina sentenced Nasrallah to 364 days in prison. Based on Nasrallah’s conviction, the Government initiated deportation proceedings. In those proceedings, Nasrallah applied for CAT relief to prevent his removal to Lebanon. Nasrallah alleged that he was a member of the Druze religion, and that he had been tortured by Hezbollah before he came to the United States. Nasrallah argued that he would be tortured again if returned to Lebanon. The Immigration Judge determined that Nasrallah was removable. As to the CAT claim, the Immigration Judge found that Nasrallah had previously suffered torture at the hands of Hezbollah. Based on Nasrallah’s past experience and the current political conditions in Lebanon, the Immigration Judge concluded that Nasrallah likely would be tortured again if returned to Lebanon. The Immigration Judge ordered Nasrallah removed, but also granted CAT relief and thereby blocked Nasrallah’s removal to Lebanon. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals disagreed that Nasrallah likely would be tortured in Lebanon. The Board therefore vacated the order granting CAT relief and ordered Nasrallah removed to Lebanon. Nasrallah filed a petition for review in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, claiming (among other things) that the Board of Immigration Appeals erred in finding that he would not likely be tortured in Lebanon. Nasrallah raised factual challenges to the Board’s CAT order. Applying Circuit precedent, the Eleventh Circuit declined to review Nasrallah’s factual challenges. Nasrallah contends that the Eleventh Circuit should have reviewed his factual challenges to the CAT order because the statute bars review only of factual challenges to a “final order of removal.” According to Nasrallah, a CAT order is not a “final order of removal” and does not affect the validity of a final order of removal. Therefore, Nasrallah argues, the statute by its terms does not bar judicial review of factual challenges to a CAT order. The Courts of Appeals are divided over whether §§1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) preclude judicial review of factual challenges to a CAT order. … When a noncitizen is removable because he committed a crime specified in §1252(a)(2)(C), immigration law bars judicial review of the noncitizen’s factual challenges to his final order of removal. In the Government’s view, the law also bars judicial review of the noncitizen’s factual challenges to a CAT order. Nasrallah disagrees. We conclude that Nasrallah has the better of the statutory argument. The first relevant statute is the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. That Act authorizes noncitizens to obtain direct “review of a final order of removal” in a court of appeals. As the parties agree, in the deportation context, a “final order of removal” is a final order “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.” The Act also states that judicial review “of all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” In other words, a noncitizen’s various challenges arising from the removal proceeding must be “consolidated in a petition for review and considered by the courts of appeals.” By consolidating the issues arising from a final order of removal, eliminating review in the district courts, and supplying direct review in the courts of appeals, the Act expedites judicial review of final orders of removal. The second relevant statute is the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, known as FARRA. FARRA implements Article 3 of the international Convention Against Torture, known as CAT. As relevant here, CAT prohibits removal of a noncitizen to a country where the noncitizen likely would be tortured. Importantly for present purposes, §2242(d) of FARRA provides for judicial review of CAT claims “as part of the review of a final order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U. S. C. 1252).” The third relevant statute is the REAL ID Act of 2005. As relevant here, that Act responded to this Court’s 2001 decision in St. Cyr. In St. Cyr, this Court ruled that the 1996 Act, although purporting to eliminate district court review of final orders of removal, did not eliminate district court review via habeas corpus of constitutional or legal challenges to final orders of removal. The REAL ID Act clarified that final orders of removal may not be reviewed in district courts, even via habeas corpus, and may be reviewed only in the courts of appeals. The REAL ID Act also provided that CAT orders likewise may not be reviewed in district courts, even via habeas corpus, and may be reviewed only in the courts of appeals. Those three Acts establish that CAT orders may be reviewed together with final orders of removal in a court of appeals. But judicial review of final orders of removal is somewhat limited in cases (such as Nasrallah’s) involving noncitizens convicted of crimes specified in §1252(a)(2)(C). In those cases, a court of appeals may review constitutional or legal challenges to a final order of removal, but the court of appeals may not review factual challenges to a final order of removal. The question in this case is the following: By precluding judicial review of factual challenges to final orders of removal, does the law also preclude judicial review of factual challenges to CAT orders? We conclude that it does not. The relevant statutory text precludes judicial review of factual challenges to final orders of removal—and only to final orders of removal. In the deportation context, a final “order of removal” is a final order “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.” A CAT order is not itself a final order of removal because it is not an order “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.” … Even though CAT orders are not the same as final orders of removal, a question remains: Do CAT orders merge into final orders of removal in the same way as, say, an immigration judge’s evidentiary rulings merge into final orders of removal? The answer is no. For purposes of this statute, final orders of removal encompass only the rulings made by the immigration judge or Board of Immigration Appeals that affect the validity of the final order of removal. ... To be sure, as noted above, FARRA provides that a CAT order is reviewable “as part of the review of a final order of removal” under 8 U. S. C. §1252. Likewise, §1252(b)(9) provides that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” But FARRA and §1252(b)(9) simply establish that a CAT order may be reviewed together with the final order of removal, not that a CAT order is the same as, or affects the validity of, a final order of removal. ... Although a noncitizen may obtain judicial review of factual challenges to CAT orders, that review is highly deferential, as Nasrallah acknowledges. The standard of review is the substantial-evidence standard: The agency’s “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” ... But the Government still insists that the statute supplies no judicial review of factual challenges to CAT orders. The Government advances a slew of arguments, but none persuades us. First, the Government raises an argument based on precedent....But Foti’s interpretation of the INA as it existed as of 1963 no longer applies. Second, the Government puts forward a structural argument. As the Government sees it, if a CAT order is not merged into a final order of removal, then no statute would authorize a court of appeals to review a CAT order in the first place....The premise of that argument is incorrect....our decision does not affect the authority of the courts of appeals to review CAT orders. Third, the Government asserts a congressional intent argument: Why would Congress bar review of factual challenges to a removal order, but allow factual challenges to a CAT order? To begin with, we must adhere to the statutory text, which differentiates between the two kinds of orders for those purposes. In any event, Congress had good reason to distinguish the two....Because the factual components of CAT orders will not previously have been litigated in court and because those factual issues may be critical to determining whether the noncitizen is likely to be tortured if returned, it makes some sense that Congress would provide an opportunity for judicial review, albeit deferential judicial review, of the factual components of a CAT order. Fourth, the Government advances a policy argument— that judicial review of the factual components of a CAT order would unduly delay removal proceedings. But today’s decision does not affect whether the noncitizen is entitled to judicial review of a CAT order and does not add a new layer of judicial review. Fifth, what about the slippery slope? If factual challenges to CAT orders may be reviewed, what other orders will now be subject to factual challenges in the courts of appeals? Importantly, another jurisdiction-stripping provision, §1252(a)(2)(B), states that a noncitizen may not bring a factual challenge to orders denying discretionary relief. ... In cases where a noncitizen has committed a crime specified in 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(2)(C), §§1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) preclude judicial review of the noncitizen’s factual challenges to a final order of removal. A CAT order is distinct from a final order of removal and does not affect the validity of a final order of removal. Therefore, §§1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) do not preclude judicial review of a noncitizen’s factual challenges to a CAT order. We reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. It is so ordered. Lineup: Kavanaugh, joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Dissent by Thomas, joined by Alito. Dissent (Thomas, joined by Alito): The majority holds that the federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review factual challenges to orders resolving claims brought under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Because I disagree with this interpretation of the relevant immigration laws, I respectfully dissent. ... This case concerns whether CAT claims brought during a criminal alien’s removal proceeding are covered by the criminal-alien bar in §1252(a)(2)(C). The most important provision for determining whether these CAT orders are subject to §1252(a)(2)(C) is the zipper clause. If orders deeming a criminal alien ineligible for CAT relief fall within that clause, then the bar in §1252(a)(2)(C) prevents review; if they do not, then the courts have jurisdiction to review factual challenges related to these orders. I would conclude that CAT orders fall within the zipper clause. The zipper clause states that “all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” ... The plain text clearly covers CAT claims such as the one petitioner raised. The Government initiated removal proceedings, alleging that petitioner had been convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude.” As a direct result, petitioner applied for CAT relief to prevent his removal. He was denied CAT withholding because the Immigration Judge, during the removal proceeding, determined that petitioner had been convicted of a “particularly serious crime.” On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals likewise denied CAT deferral in that selfsame removal proceeding. It is beyond dispute that petitioner’s eligibility for CAT relief involved “questions of law and fact” that directly “ar[ose] from” the Government’s initiation of removal proceedings against him. The very forms of relief for which petitioner applied—withholding of removal and deferral of removal—confirm that this relief arose directly from the Government-initiated removal proceeding. Because the CAT claim falls within the zipper clause, all of §1252’s other limitations and procedural requirements imposed on final orders of removal, including §1252(a)(2)(C)’s criminal-alien bar, also apply. Accordingly, courts have no jurisdiction to review factual challenges to CAT claims brought in the course of a criminal alien’s removal proceeding. ... What Congress has done is enact §1252(a)(2)(C), which strips jurisdiction over certain claims of criminal aliens. That is what is before us, not the broader policy considerations. As has been the case for decades now, the decisions of this Court continue to systematically chip away at this statute and other jurisdictional limitations on immigration claims, thus thwarting Congress’ intent. Because today’s erroneous result further weakens a duly enacted statute, I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-1432_e2pg.pdf THOLE ET AL. v. U. S. BANK N. A. ET AL. Holding / Majority Opinion (Kavanaugh): To establish standing under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he or she suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) that the injury was caused by the defendant, and (3) that the injury would likely be redressed by the requested judicial relief. Plaintiffs James Thole and Sherry Smith are two retired participants in U. S. Bank’s retirement plan. Of decisive importance to this case, the plaintiffs’ retirement plan is a defined-benefit plan, not a defined-contribution plan. In a defined-benefit plan, retirees receive a fixed payment each month, and the payments do not fluctuate with the value of the plan or because of the plan fiduciaries’ good or bad investment decisions. By contrast, in a defined-contribution plan, such as a 401(k) plan, the retirees’ benefits are typically tied to the value of their accounts, and the benefits can turn on the plan fiduciaries’ particular investment decisions. ... Even though the plaintiffs have not sustained any monetary injury, they filed a putative class-action suit against U. S. Bank and others (collectively, U. S. Bank) for alleged mismanagement of the defined-benefit plan. The alleged mismanagement occurred more than a decade ago, from 2007 to 2010. ... We affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit [dismissing the case] on the ground that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing. Thole and Smith have received all of their monthly benefit payments so far, and the outcome of this suit would not affect their future benefit payments. If Thole and Smith were to lose this lawsuit, they would still receive the exact same monthly benefits that they are already slated to receive, not a penny less. If Thole and Smith were to win this lawsuit, they would still receive the exact same monthly benefits that they are already slated to receive, not a penny more. The plaintiffs therefore have no concrete stake in this lawsuit. ... To nonetheless try to demonstrate their standing to challenge alleged plan mismanagement, the plaintiffs have advanced four alternative arguments. First, analogizing to trust law, Thole and Smith contend that an ERISA defined-benefit plan participant possesses an equitable or property interest in the plan...As this Court has stated before, plan participants possess no equitable or property interest in the plan. The trust-law analogy therefore does not fit this case and does not support Article III standing for plaintiffs who allege mismanagement of a defined-benefit plan. Second, Thole and Smith assert standing as representatives of the plan itself. But in order to claim “the interests of others, the litigants themselves still must have suffered an injury in fact, thus giving” them “a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute.” ... Third, in arguing for standing, Thole and Smith stress that ERISA affords the Secretary of Labor, fiduciaries, beneficiaries, and participants—including participants in a defined-benefit plan—a general cause of action to sue for restoration of plan losses and other equitable relief. But the cause of action does not affect the Article III standing analysis. ... Fourth, Thole and Smith contend that if defined-benefit plan participants may not sue to target perceived fiduciary misconduct, no one will meaningfully regulate plan fiduciaries. For that reason, the plaintiffs suggest that defined-benefit plan participants must have standing to sue. But this Court has long rejected that kind of argument for Article III standing....In any event, the argument rests on a faulty premise in this case because defined-benefit plans are regulated and monitored in multiple ways. To begin with, employers and their shareholders often possess strong incentives to root out fiduciary misconduct because the employers are entitled to the plan surplus and are often on the hook for plan shortfalls. ... Winning or losing this suit would not change the plaintiffs’ monthly pension benefits. The plaintiffs have no concrete stake in this dispute and therefore lack Article III standing. We affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. It is so ordered. Lineup: Kavanaugh, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Concurrence by Thomas, joined by Gorsuch. Dissent by Sotomayor, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. Concurrence (Thomas, joined by Gorsuch): I agree with the Court’s opinion, which correctly applies our precedents and concludes that petitioners lack standing. I also agree that “[c]ourts sometimes make standing law more complicated than it needs to be.”. I write separately to observe that by requiring us to engage with petitioners’ analogies to trust law, our precedents unnecessarily complicate this case. The historical restrictions on standing provide a simpler framework. Article III vests “[t]he judicial Power of the United States” in the federal courts and specifies that it shall extend to enumerated categories of “Cases” and “Controversies.” “To understand the limits that standing imposes on ‘the judicial Power,’ . . . we must ‘refer directly to the traditional, fundamental limitations upon the powers of common-law courts.’” ... Petitioners claim violations of private rights under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). “In a suit for the violation of a private right, courts historically presumed that the plaintiff suffered a de facto injury [if] his personal, legal rights [were] invaded.” In this case, however, none of the rights identified by petitioners belong to them. The fiduciary duties created by ERISA are owed to the plan, not petitioners. As participants in a defined benefit plan, petitioners have no legal or equitable ownership interest in the plan assets. There has been no assignment of the plan’s rights by ERISA or any contract. And petitioners cannot rely on ERISA §502(a). Although it establishes certain causes of action, it creates no private right. There is thus no need to analogize petitioners’ complaint to trust law actions, derivative actions, qui tam actions, or anything else. We need only recognize that the private rights that were allegedly violated do not belong to petitioners under ERISA or any contract. Dissent (Sotomayor, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan): The Court holds that the Constitution prevents millions of pensioners from enforcing their rights to prudent and loyal management of their retirement trusts. Indeed, the Court determines that pensioners may not bring a federal lawsuit to stop or cure retirement-plan mismanagement until their pensions are on the verge of default. This conclusion conflicts with common sense and longstanding precedent. ERISA protects “the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries.” Chief among these safeguards is that “all assets of an employee benefit plan” must “be held in trust by one or more trustees” for “the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries.” A retirement plan’s assets “shall never inure to the benefit of any employer.” Because ERISA requires that retirement-plan assets be held in trust, it imposes on the trustees and other plan managers “‘strict standards’” of conduct “‘derived from the common law of trusts.’” These “fiduciary duties” obligate the trustees and managers to act prudently and loyally, looking out solely for the best interest of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries—typically, the employees who sacrifice wages today to secure their retirements tomorrow. ... If a fiduciary flouts these stringent standards, ERISA provides a cause of action and makes the fiduciary personally liable. ... Petitioners allege that, as of 2007, respondents breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by investing pension-plan assets in respondents’ own mutual funds and by paying themselves excessive management fees. (Petitioners further contend that this self-dealing persists today.) ... In the Court’s words, the question here is whether petitioners have alleged a “concrete” injury to support their constitutional standing to sue. They have for at least three independent reasons. First, petitioners have an interest in their retirement plan’s financial integrity, exactly like private trust beneficiaries have in protecting their trust. By alleging a $750 million injury to that interest, petitioners have established their standing. ... the Court acknowledges that “private trust” beneficiaries have standing to protect the assets in which they have an “equitable” interest. The critical question, then, is whether petitioners have an equitable interest in their retirement plan’s assets even though their pension payments are fixed. They do. ERISA expressly required the creation of a trust in which petitioners are the beneficiaries: “[A]ll assets” of the plan “shall be held in trust” for petitioners’ “exclusive” benefit. ... Because respondents’ alleged mismanagement lost the pension fund hundreds of millions of dollars, petitioners have stated an injury to their equitable property interest in that trust. The Court, by contrast, holds that participants and beneficiaries in a defined-benefit plan have no stake in their plan’s assets. In other words, the Court treats beneficiaries as mere bystanders to their own pensions. That is wrong on several scores. For starters, it creates a paradox: In one breath, the Court determines that petitioners have “no equitable or property interest” in their plan’s assets, ante, at 4; in another, the Court concedes that petitioners have an enforceable interest in receiving their “monthly pension benefits,” Benefits paid from where? The plan’s assets, obviously. Precisely because petitioners have an interest in payments from their trust fund, they have an interest in the integrity of the assets from which those payments come. ... Second, petitioners have standing because a breach of fiduciary duty is a cognizable injury, regardless whether that breach caused financial harm or increased a risk of nonpayment. A beneficiary has a concrete interest in a fiduciary’s loyalty and prudence. For over a century, trust law has provided that breach of “a fiduciary or trust relation” makes the trustee “suable in equity.” That is because beneficiaries have an enforceable “right that the trustee shall perform the trust in accordance with the directions of the trust instrument and the rules of equity.” That interest is concrete regardless whether the beneficiary suffers personal financial loss. A beneficiary may sue a trustee for restitution or disgorgement, remedies that recognize the relevant harm as the trustee’s wrongful gain. ... Last, petitioners have standing to sue on their retirement plan’s behalf. Even if petitioners had no suable interest in their plan’s financial integrity or its competent supervision, the plan itself would. There is no disputing at this stage that respondents’ “mismanagement” caused the plan “approximately $750 million in losses” still not fully reimbursed. And even under the concurrence’s view, respondents’ fiduciary duties “are owed to the plan.” The plan thus would have standing to sue under either theory discussed above. The problem is that the plan is a legal fiction: Although ERISA provides that a retirement plan “may sue . . . as an entity,” 29 U. S. C. §1132(d)(1), someone must still do so on the plan’s behalf. Typically that is the fiduciary’s job. But imagine a case like this one, where the fiduciaries refuse to sue because they would be the defendants. Does the Constitution compel a pension plan to let a fox guard the henhouse? Of course not. This Court’s representational standing doctrine permits petitioners to sue on their plan’s behalf. ... It is hard to overstate the harmful consequences of the Court’s conclusion. With ERISA, “the crucible of congressional concern was misuse and mismanagement of plan assets by plan administrators.” In imposing fiduciary duties and providing a private right of action, Congress “designed” the statute “to prevent these abuses in the future.” Yet today’s outcome encourages the very mischief ERISA meant to end. After today’s decision, about 35 million people with defined-benefit plans will be vulnerable to fiduciary misconduct. The Court’s reasoning allows fiduciaries to misuse pension funds so long as the employer has a strong enough balance sheet during (or, as alleged here, because of ) the misbehavior. ... The Constitution, the common law, and the Court’s cases confirm what common sense tells us: People may protect their pensions. “Courts,” the majority surmises, “sometimes make standing law more complicated than it needs to be.” Indeed. Only by overruling, ignoring, or misstating centuries of law could the Court hold that the Constitution requires beneficiaries to watch idly as their supposed fiduciaries misappropriate their pension funds. I respectfully dissent https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/17-1712_0971.pdf
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BANISTER v. DAVIS Holding / Majority Opinion (Kagan): A state prisoner is entitled to one fair opportunity to seek federal habeas relief from his conviction. But he may not usually make a “second or successive habeas corpus application.” The question here is whether a motion brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend a habeas court’s judgment qualifies as such a successive petition. We hold it does not. A Rule 59(e) motion is instead part and parcel of the first habeas proceeding. This case is about two procedural rules. First, Rule 59(e) applies in federal civil litigation generally. The Rule enables a party to request that a district court reconsider a justissued judgment. Second, the so-called gatekeeping provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), codified at 28 U. S. C. §2244(b), governs federal habeas proceedings. It sets stringent limits on second or successive habeas applications. We say a few words about each before describing how the courts below applied them here. Rule 59(e) allows a litigant to file a “motion to alter or amend a judgment.” The time for doing so is short—28 days from entry of the judgment, with no possibility of an extension. The Rule gives a district court the chance “to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following” its decision. ... The filing of a Rule 59(e) motion within the 28-day period “suspends the finality of the original judgment” for purposes of an appeal. Without such a motion, a litigant must take an appeal no later than 30 days from the district court’s entry of judgment. But if he timely submits a Rule 59(e) motion, there is no longer a final judgment to appeal from. Only the disposition of that motion “restores th[e] finality” of the original judgment, thus starting the 30-day appeal clock. ... Now turn to §2244(b)’s restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions. Under AEDPA, a state prisoner always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction. But after that, the road gets rockier. To file a second or successive application in a district court, a prisoner must first obtain leave from the court of appeals based on a “prima facie showing” that his petition satisfies the statute’s gatekeeping requirements. Under those provisions, which bind the district court even when leave is given, a prisoner may not reassert any claims “presented in a prior application.” And he may bring a new claim only if it falls within one of two narrow categories—roughly speaking, if it relies on a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law or if it alleges previously undiscoverable facts that would establish his innocence. Still more: Those restrictions, like all statutes and rules pertaining to habeas, trump any “inconsistent” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure otherwise applicable to habeas proceedings. This case began when, nearly two decades ago, petitioner Gregory Banister struck and killed a bicyclist while driving a car. Texas charged him with the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to 30 years in prison. State courts upheld the conviction on direct appeal and in collateral proceedings. Banister then turned to federal district court for habeas relief. Although raising many claims, his petition mainly argued that his trial and appellate counsel provided him with constitutionally ineffective assistance. The District Court disagreed and entered judgment denying the application. At that point, Banister timely filed a Rule 59(e) motion asking the District Court to alter its judgment. Consistent with the Rule’s corrective purpose, Banister urged the court to fix what he saw as “manifest errors of law and fact.” Five days later and without requiring a response from the State, the court issued a one-paragraph order explaining that it had reviewed all relevant materials and stood by its decision. In accordance with the timeline for appealing a judgment after the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion, see supra, at 3, Banister then filed a notice of appeal (along with a request for a certificate of appealability) to challenge the District Court’s rejection of his habeas application. Yet the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as untimely. That ruling rested on the view that Banister’s Rule 59(e) motion, although captioned as such, was not really a Rule 59(e) motion at all. Because it “attack[ed] the federal court’s previous resolution of [his] claim on the merits,” the Fifth Circuit held that the motion must be “construed as a successive habeas petition.” ... We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split about whether a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a habeas court’s judgment counts as a second or successive habeas application. We hold it does not, and reverse. This case requires us to choose between two rules—more specifically, to decide whether AEDPA’s §2244(b) displaces Rule 59(e) in federal habeas litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally govern habeas proceedings. They give way, however, if and to the extent “inconsistent with any statutory provisions or [habeas-specific] rules.” Here, the Fifth Circuit concluded and Texas now contends that AEDPA’s limitation of repetitive habeas applications conflicts with Rule 59(e)’s ordinary operation. That argument in turn hinges on viewing a Rule 59(e) motion in a habeas case as a “second or successive application.”If such a motion constitutes a second or successive petition, then all of §2244(b)’s restrictions kick in—limiting the filings Rule 59(e) would allow. But if a Rule 59(e) motion is not so understood—if it is instead part of resolving a prisoner’s first habeas application—then §2244(b)’s requirements never come into the picture. ... This Court has already held that history supports a habeas court’s consideration of a Rule 59(e) motion. In Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257 (1978), we addressed prior to AEDPA “the applicability of Federal Rule [59(e)] in habeas corpus proceedings.” In deciding that the Rule applied in habeas—that “a prompt motion for reconsideration” was “thoroughly consistent” with habeas law and “well suited to the special problems and character of [habeas] proceedings”—we mainly looked to historical practice. Rule 59(e), we recounted, derived from a court’s common-law power “to alter or amend its own judgments during[] the term of court in which [they were] rendered,” prior to any appeal. ... Congress passed AEDPA against this legal backdrop, and did nothing to change it. AEDPA of course made the limits on entertaining second or successive habeas applications more stringent than before. See supra, at 3. But the statute did not redefine what qualifies as a successive petition, much less place Rule 59(e) motions in that category. ... Nor do AEDPA’s purposes demand a change in that tradition. As explained earlier, AEDPA aimed to prevent serial challenges to a judgment of conviction, in the interest of reducing delay, conserving judicial resources, and promoting finality. Nothing in Rule 59(e)—a rule Browder described as itself “based on an interest in speedy disposition and finality,” —conflicts with those goals. ... Texas (along with the dissent) resists this conclusion on one main ground: this Court’s prior decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524 (2005). The question there was whether a Rule 60(b) motion for “relie[f] from a final judgment” denying habeas relief counts as a second or successive habeas application. We said that it does, so long as the motion “attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits.” Texas thinks the “Gonzalez principle applies with equal force to Rule 59(e) motions.” After all, the State argues, both Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) provide “vehicles for asserting habeas claims” after a district court has entered judgment denying relief. And if Gonzalez does apply, Texas concludes, Banister must lose because (as everyone agrees) his Rule 59(e) motion pressed only merits-based claims. But Rule 60(b) differs from Rule 59(e) in just about every way that matters to the inquiry here. (Contra the dissent’s refrain, see post, at 1, 3, 5, 6, 10, 14, the variance goes far beyond their “labels.”) Begin, again, with history. Recall that Rule 59(e) derives from a common-law court’s plenary power to revise its judgment during a single term of court, before anyone could appeal. By contrast, Rule 60(b) codifies various writs used to seek relief from a judgment at any time after the term’s expiration—even after an appeal had (long since) concluded. Those mechanisms did not (as the term rule did) aid the trial court to get its decision right in the first instance; rather, they served to collaterally attack its already completed judgment. And that distinction was not lost on pre-AEDPA habeas courts applying the two rules. As discussed earlier, it is practically impossible to find a case dismissing a Rule 59(e) motion for raising repetitive claims. But decisions abound dismissing Rule 60(b) motions for that reason. That is because those courts recognized Rule 60(b)—as contrasted to Rule 59(e)—as threatening an already final judgment with successive litigation. The modern-day operation of the two Rules also diverge, with only Rule 60(b) undermining AEDPA’s scheme to prevent delay and protect finality. Unlike Rule 59(e) motions with their fixed 28-day window, Rule 60(b) motions can arise long after the denial of a prisoner’s initial petition— depending on the reason given for relief, within either a year or a more open-ended “reasonable time.” In short, a Rule 60(b) motion differs from a Rule 59(e) motion in its remove from the initial habeas proceeding. A Rule 60(b) motion—often distant in time and scope and always giving rise to a separate appeal—attacks an already completed judgment. Its availability threatens serial habeas litigation; indeed, without rules suppressing abuse, a prisoner could bring such a motion endlessly. By contrast, a Rule 59(e) motion is a one-time effort to bring alleged errors in a just-issued decision to a habeas court’s attention, before taking a single appeal. It is a limited continuation of the original proceeding—indeed, a part of producing the final judgment granting or denying habeas relief. For those reasons, Gonzalez does not govern here. A Rule 59(e) motion, unlike a Rule 60(b) motion, does not count as a second or successive habeas application. ... The Fifth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion because it thought that Banister’s motion was really a second or successive habeas application, and so did not reset the appeals clock. For all the reasons we have given, that understanding of a Rule 59(e) motion is wrong. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Lineup: Kagan, joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Dissent by Alito, joined by Thomas. Dissent (Alito, joined by Thomas): Gregory Banister, a state prisoner, filed a federal habeas petition arguing that his conviction was invalid for 53 reasons. His arguments spanned almost 300 pages and featured an imagined retelling of the jury deliberations in the form of stage dialogue. After the District Court determined that all his claims lacked merit, he filed a motion rearguing many of them. If Banister had labeled this motion what it was in substance—another habeas petition—it would have been summarily dismissed under 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(1). If he had labeled it a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), it would also have been subject to dismissal under our decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524 (2005). Instead, he gave it a different label, styling it as a motion to alter the judgment under Rule 59(e), and the Court now holds this label makes all the difference. The question in this case is whether a state prisoner can evade the federal habeas statute’s restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions by affixing a Rule 59(e) label. The answer follows from our decision in Gonzalez, and the answer is no. If a Rule 59(e) motion asserts a habeas claim, the motion functions as a second or successive habeas petition and should be treated as such. ... In Gonzalez, we considered how §2244(b) applies to a filing that is in essence a second or successive habeas petition but bears a different label. The filing there was a motion under Rule 60(b), which allows a court to relieve a party of an earlier judgment. Every Member of the Gonzalez Court, including those in dissent, recognized that whether a Rule 60(b) motion should be treated as a habeas petition depends on the nature of the relief the motion seeks, not the label slapped onto it. And in considering whether a Rule 60(b) motion asserts the type of relief that requires it to be treated as a habeas petition, the critical question is whether the motion in essence asserts a habeas claim, that is, a claim that propounds a “federal basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction.”If the motion “seeks to add a new ground for” that relief, it “will of course qualify” as a second or successive habeas petition. It will also qualify “if it attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a [habeas] claim on the merits.” ... Although Gonzalez concerned a motion under Rule 60(b), nothing in its reasoning was tied to any specific characteristics of such a motion, and accordingly, there is no good reason why a Rule 59(e) motion should not be subject to the same rules. Indeed, the application of Gonzalez’s reasoning is even more clear-cut when a habeas petitioner files a Rule 59(e) motion. Like its neighbor, Rule 59(e) provides a way for a civil litigant to get relief after the entry of judgment, but a Rule 59(e) motion can seek only “reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.” And a claim that “attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits” is exactly the type of claim that, under Gonzalez, is subject to §2244(b)(1) and must therefore be dismissed. ... I would hold that a Rule 59(e) motion that constitutes a second or successive habeas petition is subject to §2244(b) and that such a motion does not toll the time to appeal. I therefore conclude that the Fifth Circuit was correct to dismiss Banister’s untimely appeal. Because the Court holds to the contrary, I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-6943_k5fm.pdf FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL. Holding / Majority Opinion (Breyer): In 2016, Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). 130 Stat. 549, 48 U. S. C. §2101 et seq. That Act created a Financial Oversight and Management Board, and it provided, as relevant here, that the President could appoint its seven members without “the advice and consent of the Senate,” i.e., without Senate confirmation. The question before us is whether this method of appointment violates the Constitution’s Senate confirmation requirement. In our view, the Appointments Clause governs the appointments of all officers of the United States, including those located in Puerto Rico. Yet two provisions of the Constitution empower Congress to create local offices for the District of Columbia and for Puerto Rico and the Territories. And the Clause’s term “Officers of the United States” has never been understood to cover those whose powers and duties are primarily local in nature and derive from these two constitutional provisions. The Board’s statutory responsibilities consist of primarily local duties, namely, representing Puerto Rico in bankruptcy proceedings and supervising aspects of Puerto Rico’s fiscal and budgetary policies. We therefore find that the Board members are not “Officers of the United States.” For that reason, the Appointments Clause does not dictate how the Board’s members must be selected. ... The Federal Bankruptcy Code’s municipality-related Chapter 9 did not apply to Puerto Rico (or to the District of Columbia). But at the same time, federal bankruptcy law invalidated Puerto Rico’s own local “debt-restructuring” statutes. In 2016, in response to Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis, Congress enacted PROMESA. 130 Stat. 549, 48 U. S. C. §2101 et seq. PROMESA allows Puerto Rico and its entities to file for federal bankruptcy protection.The filing and subsequent proceedings are to take place in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, before a federal judge selected by the Chief Justice of the United States. PROMESA also created the Financial Oversight and Management Board—with seven members appointed by the President and with the Governor serving as an ex officio member. ... After both court and Board had decided a number of matters, several creditors moved to dismiss all proceedings on the ground that the Board members’ selection violated the Appointments Clause. The court denied the motions. ... Congress created the Board pursuant to its power under Article IV of the Constitution to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory . . . belonging to the United States.” §Some have argued in these cases that the Appointments Clause simply does not apply in the context of Puerto Rico. But, like the Court of Appeals, we believe the Appointments Clause restricts the appointment of all officers of the United States, including those who carry out their powers and duties in or in relation to Puerto Rico. The Constitution’s structure provides strong reason to believe that is so....The Appointments Clause reflects a similar [to making law] allocation of responsibility, between President and Senate, in cases involving appointment to high federal office....The objectives advanced by the Appointments Clause counsel strongly in favor of that Clause applying to the appointment of all “Officers of the United States.” Why should it be different when such an officer’s duties relate to Puerto Rico or other Article IV entities? ... The more difficult question before us is whether the Board members are officers of the United States such that the Appointments Clause requires Senate confirmation. If they are not officers of the United States, but instead are some other type of officer, the Appointments Clause says nothing about them. (No one suggests that they are “Ambassadors,” “other public Ministers and Consuls,” or “Judges of the supreme Court.”) And as we shall see, the answer to this question turns on whether the Board members have primarily local powers and duties. The language at issue does not offer us much guidance for understanding the key term “of the United States.” The text suggests a distinction between federal officers—officers exercising power of the National Government—and nonfederal officers—officers exercising power of some other government....the Constitution recognizes that for certain localities, there will be no state government capable of exercising local power. Thus, two provisions of the Constitution, Article I, §8, cl. 17, and Article IV, §3, cl. 2, give Congress the power to legislate for those localities in ways “that would exceed its powers, or at least would be very unusual” in other contexts...This structure suggests that when Congress creates local offices using these two unique powers, the officers exercise power of the local government, not the Federal Government. ... The practice of creating by federal law local offices for the Territories and District of Columbia that are filled through election or local executive appointment has continued unabated for more than two centuries. Like JUSTICE THOMAS, post, at 6 (opinion concurring in judgment), we think the practice of the First Congress is strong evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution. We find this subsequent history similarly illuminates the text’s meaning. Puerto Rico’s history is no different. It reveals a longstanding practice of selecting public officials with important local responsibilities in ways that the Appointments Clause does not describe....Indeed, to read Appointments Clause constraints as binding Puerto Rican officials with primarily local duties would work havoc with Puerto Rico’s (federally ratified) democratic methods for selecting many of its officials. We thus conclude that while the Appointments Clause does restrict the appointment of “Officers of the United States” with duties in or related to the District of Columbia or an Article IV entity, it does not restrict the appointment of local officers that Congress vests with primarily local duties under Article IV, §3, or Article I, §8, cl. 17. The question remains whether the Board members have primarily local powers and duties. We note that the Clause qualifies the phrase “Officers of the United States” with the words “whose Appointments . . . shall be established by Law.” And we also note that PROMESA says that the Board is “an entity within the territorial government” and “shall not be considered a department, agency, establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government.” But the most these words show is that Congress did not intend to make the Board members “Officers of the United States.” It does not prove that, insofar as the Constitution is concerned, they succeeded. But we think they have. Congress did not simply state that the Board is part of the local Puerto Rican government. Rather, Congress also gave the Board a structure, a set of duties, and related powers all of which are consistent with this statement. ... the Board possesses considerable power—including the authority to substitute its own judgment for the considered judgment of the Governor and other elected officials. But this power primarily concerns local matters. Congress’ law thus substitutes a different process for determining certain local policies (related to local fiscal responsibility) in respect to local matters. And that is the critical point for current purposes. The local nature of the legislation’s expressed purposes, the representation of local interests in bankruptcy proceedings, the focus of the Board’s powers upon local expenditures, the local logistical support, the reliance on local laws in aid of the Board’s procedural powers—all these features when taken together and judged in the light of Puerto Rico’s history (and that of the Territories and the District of Columbia)—make clear that the Board’s members have primarily local duties, such that their selection is not subject to the constraints of the Appointments Clause. ... The Court of Appeals, pointing to three of this Court’s cases, reached the opposite conclusion....We do not believe these three cases set forth the critical legal test relevant here, however, and we do not apply any test they might enunciate. Each of the cases considered an Appointments Clause problem concerning the importance or significance of duties that were indisputably federal or national in nature. ... Here, PROMESA, a federal law, creates the Board and its duties, and no one doubts their significance. But we cannot stop there. To do so would ignore the history we have discussed—history stretching back to the founding. And failing to take account of the nature of an appointee’s federally created duties, i.e., whether they are primarily local versus primarily federal, would threaten interference with democratic (or local appointment) selection methods in numerous Article IV Territories and perhaps the District of Columbia as well. ... We conclude, for the reasons stated, that the Constitution’s Appointments Clause applies to the appointment of officers of the United States with powers and duties in and in relation to Puerto Rico, but that the congressionally mandated process for selecting members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico does not violate that Clause. Given this conclusion, we need not consider the request by some of the parties that we overrule the much-criticized “Insular Cases” and their progeny. ... For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Lineup: Breyer, joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Concurrence by Thomas. Concurrence by Sotomayor. Concurrence (Thomas): The Court reaches the right conclusion: The appointment process for members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (Board) does not violate the Appointments Clause. I cannot agree, however, with the ill-defined path that the Court takes to reach this result. I would resolve these cases based on the original public meaning of the phrase “Officers of the United States” in the Appointments Clause. ... As I have previously explained, the original public meaning of the phrase “Officers of the United States” includes “all federal civil officials who perform an ongoing, statutory duty.” At the founding, the term “officer” referred to “anyone who performed a continuous public duty.” And the phrase “of the United States” limited the Appointments Clause to “federal” officers. ... Territorial officials performing duties created under Article IV of the Constitution are not federal officers within the original meaning of the phrase “Officers of the United States.” Since the founding, this Court has recognized a distinction between Article IV power and the powers of the National Government in Articles I, II, and III. The founding generation understood the phrase “Officers of the United States” to refer to officers exercising the powers of the National Government, not officers solely exercising Article IV territorial power. Because the Board’s members perform duties pursuant to Article IV, they do not qualify as “Officers of the United States.” ... Today’s decision reaches the right outcome, but it does so in a roundabout way that departs from the original meaning of the Appointments Clause. I would hold that the Board’s members are not “Officers of the United States” because they perform ongoing statutory duties under only Article IV. I therefore cannot join the Court’s opinion and concur only in the judgment. Concurrence (Sotomayor): Nearly 60 years ago, the people of Puerto Rico “embark[ed] on [a] project of constitutional self-governance” after entering into a compact with the Federal Government. At the conclusion of that endeavor, the people of Puerto Rico established, and the United States Congress recognized, a “republican form of government” “pursuant to a constitution of [the Puerto Rican population’s] own adoption.” One would think the Puerto Rican home rule that resulted from that mutual enterprise might affect whether officers later installed by the Federal Government are properly considered officers of Puerto Rico rather than “Officers of the United States” subject to the Appointments Clause. Yet the parties do not address that weighty issue or any attendant questions it raises. I thus do not resolve those matters here and instead concur in the judgment. I nevertheless write to explain why these unexplored issues may well call into doubt the Court’s conclusion that the members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico are territorial officers not subject to the “significant structural safeguards” embodied in the Appointments Clause. Puerto Rico’s compact with the Federal Government and its republican form of government may not alter its status as a Territory. But territorial status should not be wielded as a talismanic opt out of prior congressional commitments or constitutional constraints ... By 1950, however, international and local “pressures for greater autonomy,” prompted Congress to pass Public Law 600, 64 Stat. 319, a measure “enabl[ing] Puerto Rico to embark on the project of constitutional self-governance,” “‘[R]ecognizing’” and “affirm[ing] the ‘principle of government by consent,’” Public Law 600 “offered the Puerto Rican public a ‘compact,’ under which they could ‘organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption.’” Under the terms of the compact, Public Law 600 itself was submitted to the people of Puerto Rico, who voted to approve the law through a popular referendum. Delegates were then elected to a constitutional convention to draft a constitution, and in a special referendum, the draft constitution was submitted to the people of Puerto Rico for approval. In 1952, “both Puerto Rico and the United States ratified Puerto Rico’s Constitution.” ... With the passage of Public Law 600 and the adoption and recognition of the Puerto Rico Constitution, “the United States and Puerto Rico . . . forged a unique political relationship, built on the island’s evolution into a constitutional democracy exercising local self-rule.” Of critical import here, the Federal Government “relinquished its control over [Puerto Rico’s] local affairs[,] grant[ing] Puerto Rico a measure of autonomy comparable to that possessed by the States.” Indeed, the very “purpose of Congress in the 1950 and 1952 legislation was to accord Puerto Rico the degree of autonomy and independence normally associated with States of the Union.” ... Despite the Board’s wide-ranging, veto-free authority over Puerto Rico, the solitary role PROMESA contemplates for Puerto Rican-selected officials is this: The Governor of Puerto Rico sits as an ex officio Board member without any voting rights. No individual within Puerto Rico’s government plays any part in determining which seven members now decide matters critical to the island’s financial fate. ... In concluding that the Board members are territorial officers not subject to the strictures of the Appointment Clause, the Court does not meaningfully address Puerto Rico’s history or status. Nor need it, as the parties do not discuss the potential consequences that Congress’ recognition of complete self-government decades ago may have on the Appointments Clause analysis. But in my view, however one distinguishes territorial officers from federal officers (whether under the Court’s “primarily local” test, ante, at 14, or some other standard), the longstanding compact between the Federal Government and Puerto Rico raises grave doubts as to whether the Board members are territorial officers not subject to the Appointments Clause. When Puerto Rico and Congress entered into a compact and ratified a constitution of Puerto Rico’s adoption, Congress explicitly left the authority to choose Puerto Rico’s governmental officers to the people of Puerto Rico. That turn of events seems to give to Puerto Rico, through a voluntary concession by the Federal Government, the exclusive right to establish Puerto Rico’s own territorial officers. ... These cases [noting that Congress’ authority under the Territories Clause lasts only until given away] raise serious questions about when, if ever, the Federal Government may constitutionally exercise authority to establish territorial officers in a Territory like Puerto Rico, where Congress seemingly ceded that authority long ago to Puerto Rico itself. The 1950s compact between the Federal Government and Puerto Rico undoubtedly carried ramifications for Puerto Rico’s status under federal and international law; the same may be true of the Appointments Clause analysis here. After all, the longawaited promise of Public Law 600’s compact between Puerto Rico and the Federal Government seemed to be that the people of Puerto Rico may choose their own territorial officers, rather than have such officers foisted on the Territory by the Federal Government. Viewed against that backdrop, the result of these cases seems anomalous. The Board members, tasked with determining the financial fate of a self-governing Territory, exist in a twilight zone of accountability, neither selected by Puerto Rico itself nor subject to the strictures of the Appointments Clause. I am skeptical that the Constitution countenances this freewheeling exercise of control over a population that the Federal Government has explicitly agreed to recognize as operating under a government of their own choosing, pursuant to a constitution of their own choosing. Surely our Founders, having labored to attain such recognition of self-determination, would not view that same recognition with respect to Puerto Rico as a mere act of grace. Nevertheless, because these issues are not properly presented in these cases, I reluctantly concur in the judgment. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-1334_8m58.pdf GE ENERGY POWER CONVERSION FRANCE SAS, CORP., FKA CONVERTEAM SAS v. OUTOKUMPU STAINLESS USA, LLC, ET AL. Holding / Majority Opinion (Thomas): The question in this case is whether the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997, conflicts with domestic equitable estoppel doctrines that permit the enforcement of arbitration agreements by nonsignatories. We hold that it does not. In 2007, ThyssenKrupp Stainless USA, LLC, entered into three contracts with F. L. Industries, Inc., for the construction of cold rolling mills at ThyssenKrupp’s steel manufacturing plant in Alabama. Each of the contracts contained an identical arbitration clause. The clause provided that “[a]ll disputes arising between both parties in connection with or in the performances of the Contract . . . shall be submitted to arbitration for settlement.” After executing these agreements, F. L. Industries, Inc., entered into a subcontractor agreement with petitioner GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. (GE Energy), then known as Converteam SAS. Under that agreement, GE Energy agreed to design, manufacture, and supply motors for the cold rolling mills. Between 2011 and 2012, GE Energy delivered nine motors to the Alabama plant for installation. Soon thereafter, respondent Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, acquired ownership of the plant from ThyssenKrupp. According to Outokumpu, GE Energy’s motors failed by the summer of 2015, resulting in substantial damages. In 2016, Outokumpu and its insurers filed suit against GE Energy in Alabama state court. GE Energy removed the case to federal court under 9 U. S. C. §205, which authorizes the removal of an action from state to federal court if the action “relates to an arbitration agreement . . . falling under the Convention [on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards].” GE Energy then moved to dismiss and compel arbitration, relying on the arbitration clauses in the contracts between F. L. Industries, Inc., and ThyssenKrupp. The District Court granted GE Energy’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration with Outokumpu and Sompo Japan Insurance Company of America. The court held that GE Energy qualified as a party under the arbitration clauses because the contracts defined the terms “Seller” and “Parties” to include subcontractors. Because the court concluded that both Outokumpu and GE Energy were parties to the agreements, it declined to address GE Energy’s argument that the agreement was enforceable under equitable estoppel. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court’s order compelling arbitration. The court interpreted the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention or Convention) to include a “requirement that the parties actually sign an agreement to arbitrate their disputes in order to compel arbitration.”The court concluded that this requirement was not satisfied because “GE Energy is undeniably not a signatory to the Contracts.” It then held that GE Energy could not rely on state-law equitable estoppel doctrines to enforce the arbitration agreement as a nonsignatory because, in the court’s view, equitable estoppel conflicts with the Convention’s signatory requirement. Given a conflict between the Courts of Appeals on this question, we granted certiorari. Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) permits courts to apply state-law doctrines related to the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Section 2 of that chapter provides that an arbitration agreement in writing “shall be . . . enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” As we have explained, this provision requires federal courts to “place [arbitration] agreements ‘“upon the same footing as other contracts.”’” But it does not “alter background principles of state contract law regarding the scope of agreements (including the question of who is bound by them).” The “traditional principles of state law” that apply under Chapter 1 include doctrines that authorize the enforcement of a contract by a nonsignatory. ... The New York Convention is a multilateral treaty that addresses international arbitration....Only one article of the Convention addresses arbitration agreements—Article II. That article contains only three provisions, each one sentence long. Article II(1) requires “[e]ach Contracting State [to] recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.” Article II(2) provides that “[t]he term ‘agreement in writing’ shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.” Finally, Article II(3) states that “[t]he court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” In 1970, the United States acceded to the New York Convention, and Congress enacted implementing legislation in Chapter 2 of the FAA. Chapter 2 grants federal courts jurisdiction over actions governed by the Convention, §203; establishes venue for such actions, §204; authorizes removal from state court, §205; and empowers courts to compel arbitration, §206. Chapter 2 also states that “Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that [Chapter 1] is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention.” We must determine whether the equitable estoppel doctrines permitted under Chapter 1 of the FAA, see supra, at 3–4, “conflict with . . . the Convention.”. Applying familiar tools of treaty interpretation, we conclude that they do not conflict. “The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.” The text of the New York Convention does not address whether nonsignatories may enforce arbitration agreements under domestic doctrines such as equitable estoppel. The Convention is simply silent on the issue of nonsignatory enforcement, and in general, “a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered”—a principle “so obvious that it seems absurd to recite it,” This silence is dispositive here because nothing in the text of the Convention could be read to otherwise prohibit the application of domestic equitable estoppel doctrines. ... Nothing in the drafting history suggests that the Convention sought to prevent contracting states from applying domestic law that permits nonsignatories to enforce arbitration agreements in additional circumstances. ... the weight of authority from contracting states indicates that the New York Convention does not prohibit the application of domestic law addressing the enforcement of arbitration agreements. The courts of numerous contracting states permit enforcement of arbitration agreements by entities who did not sign an agreement. ... We have never provided a full explanation of the basis for our practice of giving weight to the Executive’s interpretation of a treaty. Nor have we delineated the limitations of this practice, if any. But we need not resolve these issues today. Our textual analysis aligns with the Executive’s interpretation so there is no need to determine whether the Executive’s understanding is entitled to “weight” or “deference.” ... We hold only that the New York Convention does not conflict with the enforcement of arbitration agreements by nonsignatories under domestic-law equitable estoppel doctrines. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Lineup: Thomas, unanimous. Concurrence by Sotomayor. Concurrence (Sotomayor): I agree with the Court that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997 (New York Convention), does not categorically prohibit the application of domestic doctrines, such as equitable estoppel, that may permit nonsignatories to enforce arbitration agreements. I note, however, that the application of such domestic doctrines is subject to an important limitation: Any applicable domestic doctrines must be rooted in the principle of consent to arbitrate. This limitation is part and parcel of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) itself. It is a “basic precept,” that “[a]rbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion,” “We have emphasized th[is] ‘foundational FAA principle’ many times,” and even the parties find common ground on the point. Because this consent principle governs the FAA on the whole, it constrains any domestic doctrines under Chapter 1 of the FAA that might “appl[y]” to Convention proceedings (to the extent they do not “conflict with” the Convention). Parties seeking to enforce arbitration agreements under Article II of the Convention thus may not rely on domestic nonsignatory doctrines that fail to reflect consent to arbitrate. ... Article II of the Convention leaves much to the contracting states to resolve on their own, and the FAA imposes few restrictions. Nevertheless, courts applying domestic nonsignatory doctrines to enforce arbitration agreements under the Convention must strictly adhere to “the foundational FAA principle that arbitration is a matter of consent.” Because the Court’s opinion is consistent with this limitation, I join it in full. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-1048_8ok0.pdf
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Jun 1, 2020 20:07
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That ERISA ruling is a son of a bitch. Retirees can't sue their retirement plan's trustee for bad faith dealing unless the malfeasance has already jeopardized future payments. Good thing Wall Street is so scrupulous about its duties of care
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Jun 2, 2020 07:34
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Yep. And the federal agency that is supposed to act as an insurance agency for failing pension plans? It's running out of money, fast, and you know Republicans won't vote to save it because that'd be helping unions and spending money
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Jun 2, 2020 13:55
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Devor posted:That ERISA ruling is a son of a bitch. Retirees can't sue their retirement plan's trustee for bad faith dealing unless the malfeasance has already jeopardized future payments. I find it odd the plaintiffs just couldn't find someone with a defined contribution plan to add onto the lawsuit.
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Jun 2, 2020 15:31
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Opinion! LOMAX v. ORTIZ-MARQUEZ ET AL. Holding / Majority Opinion (Kagan): To help staunch a “flood of nonmeritorious” prisoner litigation, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) established what has become known as the three-strikes rule. That rule generally prevents a prisoner from bringing suit in forma pauperis (IFP)—that is, without first paying the filing fee—if he has had three or more prior suits “dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Today we address whether a suit dismissed for failure to state a claim counts as a strike when the dismissal was without prejudice. We conclude that it does: The text of Section 1915(g)’s three-strikes provision refers to any dismissal for failure to state a claim, whether with prejudice or without. … The Courts of Appeals have long divided over whether a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim qualifies as a strike under Section 1915(g).3 In line with our duty to call balls and strikes, we granted certiorari to resolve the split, 589 U. S. ___ (2019), and we now affirm. This case begins, and pretty much ends, with the text of Section 1915(g). Under that provision, a prisoner accrues a strike for any action “dismissed on the ground[] that it . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” That broad language covers all such dismissals: It applies to those issued both with and without prejudice to a plaintiff ’s ability to reassert his claim in a later action. A strike-call under Section 1915(g) thus hinges exclusively on the basis for the dismissal, regardless of the decision’s prejudicial effect. To reach the opposite result—counting prejudicial orders alone as strikes—we would have to read the simple word “dismissed” in Section 1915(g) as “dismissed with prejudice.” But this Court may not narrow a provision’s reach by inserting words Congress chose to omit. … Lomax maintains that the phrase “dismissed [for] fail[ure] to state a claim” in Section 1915(g) is a “legal term of art” referring only to dismissals with prejudice. To support that view, he relies on a procedural rule used to answer a different question. When a court dismisses a case for failure to state a claim, but neglects to specify whether the order is with or without prejudice, how should a later court determine its preclusive effect? Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), codifying an old equitable principle, supplies the answer: It tells courts to treat the dismissal “as an adjudication on the merits”—meaning a dismissal with prejudice. … Rule 41(b) is necessary because that phrase means only what it says: “dismissed for failure to state a claim”—whether or not with prejudice. In other words, the phrase’s indifference to prejudicial effect is what creates the need for a default rule to determine the import of a dismissal when a court fails to make that clear. Rule 41(b), then, actually undercuts Lomax’s position: Its very existence is a form of proof that the language used in Section 1915(g) covers dismissals both with and without prejudice. … The text of the PLRA’s three-strikes provision makes this case an easy call. A dismissal of a suit for failure to state a claim counts as a strike, whether or not with prejudice. We therefore affirm the judgment below. It is so ordered. Lineup: Kagan, joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotmayor, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, and by Thomas except for footnote 4 (so unanimous except that Thomas disagrees that a dismissal with leave to amend the complaint is different than actually dismissing the action). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-8369_3dq3.pdf
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Jun 8, 2020 16:18
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| # ? May 17, 2024 01:26 |
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Glad to know that loving over prisoners still has bipartisan support
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Jun 8, 2020 17:13
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