Eastern Europe: Olivier's sphere of influence

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Debate & Discussion > Eastern Europe: Olivier's sphere of influence

Mokotow: Apr 16, 2012

Serbia announced at the last minute it will not participate in the joint Russanian and Belarusian military exercises that were about to begin. This comes barely a week after Serbian and Kosovar representatives signed a number of agreements in Washington. The statement said Serbia will not participate in exercise with either �East or West�.

I wonder if this is Serbia trying to aim for Yugoslav-style neutrality, after failing to move towards the EU and seeing how risky an alliance with Russia can be (ei. Montenegro coup attempt).

# ? Sep 9, 2020 16:11

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# ? May 14, 2024 17:40

CheGayvara: Oct 30, 2010

Mokotow posted:

Serbia announced at the last minute it will not participate in the joint Russanian and Belarusian military exercises that were about to begin. This comes barely a week after Serbian and Kosovar representatives signed a number of agreements in Washington. The statement said Serbia will not participate in exercise with either �East or West�.

I wonder if this is Serbia trying to aim for Yugoslav-style neutrality, after failing to move towards the EU and seeing how risky an alliance with Russia can be (ei. Montenegro coup attempt).

They have the EU summit soon, so probably don�t want to do exercises as it will look bad in front of the Europeans in context of unrest in Belarus. They are putting in an across the board moratorium so it isn�t targeted at Russia.

Israeli media also have an anonymous Serb government source saying they will not move the embassy if Israel recognizes Kosovo. Makes me wonder if Vucic�s apparent surprise at Trump�s remarks after the signing indicates he did not see the Kosovo agreement that contained the mutual recognition between Israel and Kosovo, perhaps making the embassy move dependent on it being taken out of the agreement.

Maybe it was in Serbia�s agreement, removed from theirs in the final draft, but kept in the separate Kosovo agreement. The source claims that the Serb representatives fought with the Americans to have Israel-Kosovo mutual recognition removed, but doesn�t say at what point in the negotiations the argument took place. To my mind it is possible the Americans intentionally tried to hoodwink them, or inferred they were just being asked to remove it from the Serb agreement it was okay to keep it in the Kosovo one.

A big mess all around it seems, but suggests that the Serbs will require seeing any agreements Kosovo signs at future summits, and shutting them down if there is something in there they don�t like.

# ? Sep 9, 2020 21:26

HUGE PUBES A PLUS: Apr 30, 2005

https://twitter.com/2020Belarus/status/1304433281136496643

# ? Sep 11, 2020 15:57

WAR CRIME GIGOLO: Oct 3, 2012; The Hague
tryna get me
for these glutes

"Traitors will kick the bucket," Putin says in the video. "Trust me. These people betrayed their friends, their brothers in arms. Whatever they got in exchange for it, those thirty pieces silver they were given, they will choke on them.�

# ? Sep 11, 2020 19:46

Elukka: Feb 18, 2011; For All Mankind

I'm seeing nothing about this on Finnish media, which is weird because this seems like it would be big news. The article claims it was reported by "Finnish station Radio Liberty", but as best I can tell this is a US government funded station operating in Russia.

The source seems to be the guy himself, which I suppose does make it possible that the investigation has so far been kept under wraps and this is the first we hear of it.

# ? Sep 11, 2020 20:05

Discendo Vox: Mar 21, 2013; We don't need to have that dialogue because it's obvious, trivial, and has already been had a thousand times.

Elukka posted:

I'm seeing nothing about this on Finnish media, which is weird because this seems like it would be big news. The article claims it was reported by "Finnish station Radio Liberty", but as best I can tell this is a US government funded station operating in Russia.

The source seems to be the guy himself, which I suppose does make it possible that the investigation has so far been kept under wraps and this is the first we hear of it.

RFE/RadioLiberty's got people in Finland too; they operate outside Russia and broadcast into the country, and probably just have domestic reporting and research staff. They've gotten way worse under trump, which is pretty impressive because they were operating under the remarkably innocuous voice of america model for a long time.

# ? Sep 11, 2020 20:46

Sekenr: Dec 12, 2013

I honestly don't get wtf. People who are in parliament just say, no you have legal basis to stop me. I was mostly scared for the entirety of it but this makes me furious for some reasonb

# ? Sep 12, 2020 13:18

CommieGIR: Aug 22, 2006; The blue glow is a feature, not a bug; Pillbug

Warning, this video is LOUD

https://twitter.com/stealthygeek/status/1304967421334355968?s=20

# ? Sep 13, 2020 04:07

HUGE PUBES A PLUS: Apr 30, 2005

CommieGIR posted:

Warning, this video is LOUD

https://twitter.com/stealthygeek/status/1304967421334355968?s=20

Loud and beautiful

HUGE PUBES A PLUS fucked around with this message at 19:38 on Sep 13, 2020

# ? Sep 13, 2020 19:35

Trogdos!: Jul 11, 2009; A DRAGON POKEMAN
well technically a water/flying type

https://twitter.com/DiMagnaySky/status/1305497479744557056

# ? Sep 14, 2020 15:53

Somaen: Nov 19, 2007; by vyelkin

Strong second place

https://mobile.twitter.com/Neiswestnij/status/1305494935358058502

# ? Sep 14, 2020 16:38

Brown Moses: Feb 22, 2002

Navalny is on the mend
https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1305806873489289217

# ? Sep 15, 2020 10:57

Mokotow: Apr 16, 2012

Luka just announced he�s closing the Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian borders. Everybody�s confused though, because the borders are actually open and it might have been a figure of speech.

# ? Sep 17, 2020 20:03

Paladinus: Jan 11, 2014; heyHEYYYY!!!

Mokotow posted:

Luka just announced he�s closing the Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian borders. Everybody�s confused though, because the borders are actually open and it might have been a figure of speech.

He meant that he pulled the army from the streets (very normal already) to strengthen the border, i.e. close it to military threats. Even for Lukashenko it would have been weird to announce complete closure of borders at a random music concert that he wasn't even supposed to visit. This type of warmongering is still awful, but he's been going on about Poland's plan to annex Hrodna and moving the army back and forth, so my money is on empty sabre rattling.

# ? Sep 17, 2020 20:41

Mokotow: Apr 16, 2012

Paladinus posted:

he's been going on about Poland's plan to annex Hrodna

God loving drat it, our plans foiled - again!

# ? Sep 17, 2020 20:46

Doctor Malaver: May 23, 2007; Ce qui s'est pass� t'a rendu plus fort

A Croatian illustrator recreated coats of arms of Yugoslav republics. See if you can guess which is which and what all the symbols are about...

https://www.matrijarsija.com/product/former-republics-igor-hofbauer/

# ? Sep 17, 2020 23:27

Dwesa: Jul 19, 2016

Doctor Malaver posted:

A Croatian illustrator recreated coats of arms of Yugoslav republics. See if you can guess which is which and what all the symbols are about...

https://www.matrijarsija.com/product/former-republics-igor-hofbauer/

Hm, I think it's Montenegro (black mountain and their cigarette brand), Croatia (Usta�e), Serbia (orthodoxy and slivovitz), Slovenia ("Triglav"), Macedonia (because of their various pepper relishes?) and BiH (former heavy industry, I guess), but I admit I don't recognize many other references.

# ? Sep 18, 2020 08:36

Somaen: Nov 19, 2007; by vyelkin

Looks like there is overwhelming evidence that Russia continues to develop and use military grade nerve agents, so the European Parliament passed this:

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2020-0280_EN.html

quote:

A. whereas Alexei Navalny, a leading Russian opposition politician, lawyer, blogger and anti-corruption activist, has uncovered numerous corruption affairs involving business enterprises and Russian politicians, led several public protests all over Russia and become one of the few effective leaders of the Russian opposition; whereas he had been detained, arrested and sentenced previously, in attempts to stop his political and public activities; whereas the European Court of Human Rights has declared a number of those procedures abusive and contrary to the principle of a fair trial; whereas Alexei Navalny had been physically attacked in 2017 by a medical disinfectant which left him almost blind, and by means of an alleged poisoning during his detention in 2019; whereas in neither of these cases were the perpetrators brought to justice;

B. whereas Alexei Navalny is reported to have fallen into a coma on 20 August on board a domestic Russian flight, was transported to a hospital in the Russian city of Tomsk and, at the request of his family, has been receiving medical treatment at the Charit� hospital in Berlin since 22 August;

C. whereas the attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny took place in the run-up to Russia�s local and regional elections on 13 September 2020, where he and his team had been actively engaged in introducing a �smart voting� strategy to defeat the candidates of the Putin regime; whereas this casts a particularly worrying light on the state of democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights in the country;

D. whereas just before his attempted poisoning, Alexei Navalny was in Novosibirsk and Tomsk, where he was investigating cases of corruption among the local governors; whereas through his anti-corruption activities in the regions, Alexei Navalny increased the awareness of such cases among the local public and as a result increased turn-out in regional elections, mobilising the opposition vote; whereas Alexei Navalny has established a system of 40 regional offices around the country, which scrutinise the local authorities on a permanent basis, but are also subject to intimidation and persecution from the Russian authorities;

E. whereas Alexei Navalny expressed his strong support for the protesters in Khabarovsk and Belarus and regarded the changes in Belarus as inspiration for the people of Russia;

F. whereas political assassinations and poisonings in Russia are systemic instruments of the regime deliberately targeting the opposition; whereas this is further exacerbated by the unwillingness of the authorities to thoroughly investigate the politically motivated or attempted murders of Anna Politkovskaya, Boris Nemtsov, Sergei Protazanov, Vladimir Kara-Murza and others; whereas representatives of the opposition are systematically subjected to verbal attacks, ad hominem campaigns and dehumanisation by the government or pro-government media;

G. whereas this most recent assassination attempt is just the latest example of very serious backsliding on the protection of human rights and respect for commonly agreed democratic principles and the rule of law in the Russian Federation;

H. whereas the ongoing repression of social dissent is reinforced by the impunity of police and security forces as well as the unwillingness of the courts to prosecute the real perpetrators of those crimes, which not only go unpunished but are even rewarded by the Kremlin;

I. whereas according to the renowned Russian human rights society Memorial, there are over 300 political and religious prisoners in the Russian Federation; whereas the EU shows solidarity with all dissidents and the Russian people, who, despite the threat to their freedom and their lives and the pressure from the Kremlin and the Russian authorities, continue to fight for freedom, human rights and democracy;

J. whereas politically motivated murders and attempted murders by the Russian secret service have a direct impact on EU internal security;

K. whereas the Charit� � Universit�tsmedizin Berlin hospital has concluded that Alexei Navalny was poisoned with a nerve agent from the Novichok group, which is a military grade of nerve agents developed by the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation; whereas this finding has been confirmed by a specialised laboratory of the German armed forces and multiple laboratories working independently; whereas the Novichok nerve agent was recently used in March 2018 on the territory of the EU in an attack on the former Russian intelligence operative Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, United Kingdom, which also resulted in the accidental death of Amesbury resident Dawn Sturgess;

L. whereas Russian doctors were the first to treat Alexei Navalny for poisoning and later claimed that there were no traces of poison in his body and tried to prevent him from being transported out of the country, and whereas the Russian authorities deny any connection to the incident;

M. whereas the Novichok nerve agent is an instrument that is developed for and only available to military structures and secret services in Russia; whereas such substances are regulated by Russian law; whereas the Novichok nerve agent is a chemical weapon that can be developed only in state-owned military laboratories and cannot be acquired by private individuals; whereas should that however be the case, it is a breach of Russia�s international legal commitments;

N. whereas the Council has called on the Russian authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into the attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny, has called for a joint international response and has reserved its right to take appropriate actions, including restrictive measures;

O. whereas under the Chemical Weapons Convention, any poisoning of an individual through the use of a nerve agent is considered a use of chemical weapons and whereas the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances constitutes a serious breach of international law and international human rights standards; whereas following the unanimous adoption of two proposals to that effect, including one put forward by the Russian Federation, Novichok was added to the list of controlled substances of the Chemical Weapons Convention and is therefore subject to the most stringent control guidelines under the Convention;

P. whereas the rights to freedom of thought and speech, association, and peaceful assembly are enshrined in the constitution of the Russian Federation;

Q. whereas Russian state-controlled information outlets are attempting to negate the responsibility of the Russian authorities in the attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny by spreading disinformation and diverting the focus from the continuous violations of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights in the Russian Federation;

R. whereas the 13 September 2020 regional elections in Russia resulted in a record number of complaints about the falsification of results; whereas in cities where Alexei Navalny was present before his attempted poisoning (Novosibirsk and Tomsk), his smart voting system proved to be effective and helped to defeat Putin�s candidates;

S. whereas the European Parliament has officially come to the conclusion that Russia can no longer be considered a �strategic partner�, also in the light of its antagonistic foreign policy, including military interventions and illegal occupations in third countries;

1. Strongly condemns the attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny and expresses its utmost concern about the repeated use of chemical nerve agents against Russian citizens;

2. Recalls that the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances constitutes a reprehensible crime under international law, in particular under the Chemical Weapons Convention;

3. Underlines that the attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny was part of a systemic effort to silence him and other dissident voices, and to deter him and those voices from further exposing serious corruption in the regime and deter political opposition in the country in general, in particular with a view to influencing Russia�s local and regional by-elections of 11-13 September;

4. Reiterates that the case of Alexei Navalny is one element of a wider Russian policy focusing on oppressive internal policies and aggressive actions worldwide, spreading instability and chaos, restabilising its sphere of influence and dominance, and undermining the rules-based international order;

5. Asks for the immediate launch of an international investigation (with the involvement of the EU, the UN, the Council of Europe, their allies and the OPCW) and emphasises its resolve to contribute to such an investigation; calls on the OPCW to establish a detailed investigation into breaches of Russia�s international commitments in the area of chemical weapons; calls on the Russian authorities to fully cooperate with the OPCW to ensure an impartial international investigation and to hold to account those responsible for the crime committed against Alexei Navalny;

6. Calls on the Foreign Affairs Council to take an active stance on this matter at its meeting on 21 September; demands that the EU establishes as soon as possible a list of ambitious restrictive measures vis-�-vis Russia and strengthens its existing sanctions against Russia; urges the deployment of such sanctions mechanisms as would allow for the collection and freezing of the European assets of corrupt individuals in accordance with the findings of Alexei Navalny�s Anti-Corruption Foundation;

7. Calls on the Russian authorities to put an end to the harassment, intimidation, violence and repression of their political opponents by ending the prevailing climate of impunity, which has already led to the loss of lives of many journalists, human rights defenders and opposition politicians; underlines the need to ensure that such individuals are able to carry out their legitimate and useful activities without any interference and without fearing for their lives or for those of their family members and friends;

8. Calls for the EU to continuously demand that Russia repeal or amend all laws incompatible with international standards, including the illegally enacted recent changes to the Russian Constitution and its legal framework for elections and the legislation on foreign agents and undesirable organisations in order to facilitate pluralism and free and fair elections and create a level playing field for opposition candidates;

9. Expresses its solidarity with the democratic forces in Russia, which are committed to an open and free society, and its support for all individuals and organisations who are the targets of attacks and repression;

10. Underlines the duty of the Russian Federation, as a member of the UN Security Council, to respect international law and the relevant agreements and conventions, and to comply fully with its international commitments, including cooperation with the OPCW in investigating any breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention;

11. Urges the Russian Federation to address the questions raised by the international community urgently and to provide immediate, full and complete disclosure of its Novichok programme to the OPCW;

12. Stresses that the Russian Federation, as a member of the Council of Europe and the OSCE, has committed to respecting fundamental freedoms, human rights and the rule of law as enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

13. Calls on the VP/HR and the European External Action Service to ensure that the cases of all persons prosecuted for political reasons are raised in EU-Russia human rights consultations, when resumed, and to formally request that Russia�s representatives in these consultations respond in every case; calls on the Presidents of the Council and the Commission, and the VP/HR, to continue to follow such cases closely, to raise these issues in different formats and meetings with Russia, and to report back to Parliament on exchanges with the Russian authorities;

14. Calls on the Member States to coordinate their positions vis-�-vis Russia and to speak with one unified voice in bilateral and multilateral forums with Russian authorities;

15. Reiterates that it is of the utmost urgency to launch a thorough and strategic reassessment of the EU�s relations with Russia, which would include the following principles:

a. to call on the VP/HR to review EU policy vis-�-vis Russia and the five guiding principles for the EU�s relations with Russia and to develop a new comprehensive strategy, which will be conditional on further developments in the area of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights by the Russian leadership and authorities;

b. to call on the Member States to continue to isolate Russia in international forums (such as the G7 and other formats) and to critically review the EU�s cooperation with Russia through various foreign policy platforms;

c. to call on the Council to prioritise the approval of the EU Magnitsky-style human rights sanctions mechanism and its implementation in the near future, which will include a list of individuals and could also include sectoral sanctions aimed at the Russian regime;

d. in the light of the Navalny case reiterates its previous position to halt the Nord Stream 2 project;

e. to call on the Council to adopt an EU strategy to support Russian dissidents, non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations, and independent media/reporters, making full use of human rights defender mechanisms, creating additional opportunities for young Russians to study in the EU, and assisting with the launch of a Russian university in exile in one of the Member States;

f. to call on the Council to immediately start preparations and adopt an EU strategy for future relations with a democratic Russia, including a broad offer of incentives and conditions to strengthen domestic tendencies towards freedom and democracy;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.

I couldn't figure out where to see on the EP website who voted against this, would be interesting to see who is pretty much guaranteed to be receiving Russian money.

In the meantime, Russia still hasn't opened an investigation into the poisoning with diplomats making statements like "what are your proofs Germany, send us your methods" and "what's our benefit of killing him"

# ? Sep 18, 2020 10:49

Brown Moses: Feb 22, 2002

Navalny's team posted a video yesterday showing them bagging up items in his room after he was poisoned, including the free water bottles from the hotel that were found to have traces of Novichok on them:

https://twitter.com/christogrozev/status/1306534975202828290

So that's my enjoyment of hotel stays ruined.

# ? Sep 18, 2020 11:06

HUGE PUBES A PLUS: Apr 30, 2005

Lavrov's having a real one on the phone with Sputnik (don't click, you already know what he's saying).

https://twitter.com/A__Alimov/status/1306868896885100546

In other Eastern European news:

https://twitter.com/Independent/status/1306888389426380802

# ? Sep 18, 2020 11:11

Mokotow: Apr 16, 2012

Protester self immolated in Smolevichi outside Minsk. There�s a very nasty video. 90% burns so it�s not looking good.

# ? Sep 18, 2020 12:52

Doctor Malaver: May 23, 2007; Ce qui s'est pass� t'a rendu plus fort

Dwesa posted:

Hm, I think it's Montenegro (black mountain and their cigarette brand), Croatia (Usta�e), Serbia (orthodoxy and slivovitz), Slovenia ("Triglav"), Macedonia (because of their various pepper relishes?) and BiH (former heavy industry, I guess), but I admit I don't recognize many other references.

Montenegro - Milo Đukanović, who ruled Montenegro since the nineties until very recently, based his power on cigarette smuggling. Italian courts connected him with mafia. There are two Serbian flags because the country has a significant Serb minority and these last elections were in large part about the Serbian Orthodox Church.
Croatia - Ustashe. I don't know if stormy clouds have a meaning.
Serbia - Chetniks, slivovitz, opanci (traditional footwear).
Slovenia - barbed wire they were quick to put up while other Balkan states were accepting immigrants; fist with thumb sticking out - symbol of dishonesty and spite; lime leaf as a traditional symbol; traditional footwear
Macedonia - peppers as traditional food; orthodox cross over the Albanian eagle - they have a strong and growing Albanian minority; grenades are a reference to the 2001 armed conflict with them
Bosnia - various symbols of war and destruction - cannons, fire, mass graves

# ? Sep 18, 2020 22:13

Sekenr: Dec 12, 2013

I like that even the church who is notoriously pro-whoever is in power, distanced themselves from abbess Gavriila who condemned the protesters.

# ? Sep 19, 2020 09:09

Paladinus: Jan 11, 2014; heyHEYYYY!!!

Sekenr posted:

I like that even the church who is notoriously pro-whoever is in power, distanced themselves from abbess Gavriila who condemned the protesters.

I sort of know the press secretary of BOC, Fr. Sergiy Lepin. He usually has to put out fires like that once a month, but things were obviously much more hectic lately. He's already been in hot water for voicing solidarity with Belarusian Catholics over Archbishop Kondrusiewicz on his personal facebook page. He's not exactly a passionate supporter of the protests either, but I hope he doesn't get fired, because he is actually concerned about a peaceful resolution to the crisis, no matter who wins.

# ? Sep 19, 2020 14:17

Sekenr: Dec 12, 2013

I am not exactly an insider on the church affairs but my uncle was a priest and a fairly high ranking hierarch before he died but if anything it is pretty interesting that Paul was deposed and a belarusian Veniamin was installed who doesn;t seem keen on current methods very much. And technically it is his job to keep everyone in line. Including the abbess

Meaning it is within his power to come over and say Gavriila, what tha gently caress you doing?

E for readability

Apparenty they are now trying to take children from protesters for "being a bad family" or such. This will only get more people on the streets for being such pieces of poo poo

Sekenr fucked around with this message at 19:06 on Sep 19, 2020

# ? Sep 19, 2020 17:30

Qtotonibudinibudet: Nov 7, 2011; Omich poluyobok, skazhi ty narkoman? ya prosto tozhe gde to tam zhivu, mogli by vmeste uyobyvat' narkotiki

in lighter news, post-ambassadorship mcfaul is an internet treasure

https://twitter.com/McFaul/status/1308323305263251456

# ? Sep 22, 2020 18:59

Hizawk: Jun 18, 2004; High on the Lions.

Blink and you will miss Lukashenkos inauguration.

Some real Game of Thrones poo poo.

# ? Sep 23, 2020 10:29

Sekenr: Dec 12, 2013

There is already a joke about it - Natalia Eismont entered the office without knocking and caught Lukashenko inaugurating

# ? Sep 23, 2020 12:04

CommieGIR: Aug 22, 2006; The blue glow is a feature, not a bug; Pillbug

https://twitter.com/LithuaniaMFA/status/1308807289093197826?s=20

# ? Sep 23, 2020 19:05

Mokotow: Apr 16, 2012

Poland announced it�s not recognizing him as head of state.

Also, Minsk kicked off this evening. Lots of people and OMON running around.

# ? Sep 23, 2020 21:47

Nitrox: Jul 5, 2002

Meanwhile in Belarus https://i.imgur.com/b9fawI4.gifv

# ? Sep 24, 2020 02:51

a podcast for cats: Jun 22, 2005; Dogs reading from an artifact buried in the ruins of our civilization, "We were assholes- " and writing solemnly, "They were assholes."; Soiled Meat

Some more stuff from Belarus popped up in Latvian news. Won't lie, it gave me chills.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FAJIrnphTFg

# ? Sep 24, 2020 18:19

Sekenr: Dec 12, 2013

Because gently caress them, Lukashenko is monster. Leech who ate us for 26 years and now refusing to let go, claimed all our successes as his doing, all failures blamed on someone else. If him leaving aught to be over his dead body than he must die

# ? Sep 27, 2020 06:27

darthzeta88: May 31, 2013; by Pragmatica

Azerbaijan and Armenia war went hot hot. A few helicopters shot down and a few IFVs destroyed with a lot of UAVs. Full mobilization has occurred and Azerbaijan has blocked its own internet access.

# ? Sep 27, 2020 10:49

Somaen: Nov 19, 2007; by vyelkin

Sekenr posted:

Because gently caress them, Lukashenko is monster. Leech who ate us for 26 years and now refusing to let go, claimed all our successes as his doing, all failures blamed on someone else. If him leaving aught to be over his dead body than he must die

How is it looking on the ground? What is the mood on the streets?

I can't imagine people losing hope and getting back under the boot, but what ca breakn Luka if he has Russian money and police+military support?

# ? Sep 27, 2020 20:05

Paladinus: Jan 11, 2014; heyHEYYYY!!!

Somaen posted:

How is it looking on the ground? What is the mood on the streets?

I can't imagine people losing hope and getting back under the boot, but what ca breakn Luka if he has Russian money and police+military support?

It's hard to gauge the mood of the entire movement, but from reading local telegram chats, I can tell you that people are willing to continue the fight. There is no real demand for escalating the protests apart from empty bravado, and even that some admins prefer to remove to focus on other things, like local self-government. This has become a huge thing lately. People are taking over their neighbourhoods. It used to be very unusual for people living in the same flat block to even know each other by name, but now people are check on each other, organise parties in their communal gardens, push local authorities to do their work by writing complaints and meeting them face to face, and yes, organise for peaceful protests.

Russian doesn't appear to be interested in directly helping Lukashenko to stay in power either. In parallel to the ideological dimension of Russian foreign policy and the rhetoric that comes with it, there's a very pragmatic strain of thought. Russia understands that Ukraine was a disaster for them in the long run, and they're very unlikely to push their luck with Belarus, where there is no Crimea or Donbass-like region that would largely support them unconditionally. Not to mention that they don't see Lukashenko staying in power in any case. Putin and Lavrov keep reminding him that he promised a constitutional reform and new elections. Russian propaganda acknowledges violence against peaceful protesters (even if it comes with a dozen of asterisks and mentions of maidan), Russian pro-Kremlin comedians make fun of Lukashenko just as much as of the protesters, etc. Russia is tired of having Lukashenko as the only contact point for pursuing their interests in Belarus, and as soon as they have an explicitly pro-Russian party or a politician they can bet on, they'll start pushing Lukashenko to step down even more.

Paladinus fucked around with this message at 21:07 on Sep 27, 2020

# ? Sep 27, 2020 21:05

Somaen: Nov 19, 2007; by vyelkin

Paladinus posted:

It's hard to gauge the mood of the entire movement, but from reading local telegram chats, I can tell you that people are willing to continue the fight. There is no real demand for escalating the protests apart from empty bravado, and even that some admins prefer to remove to focus on other things, like local self-government. This has become a huge thing lately. People are taking over their neighbourhoods. It used to be very unusual for people living in the same flat block to even know each other by name, but now people are check on each other, organise parties in their communal gardens, push local authorities to do their work by writing complaints and meeting them face to face, and yes, organise for peaceful protests.

All good news! I hope Europe will overturn the Cyprus veto and sanction the leadership at least. I think Lithuania is doing a pretty decent job pushing the issue on the European level, with 50k people gathering to support Belarus with the Baltic way. And business is doing its usual gross thing of "we need to get their IT companies to move here"

Paladinus posted:

Russian doesn't appear to be interested in directly helping Lukashenko to stay in power either. In parallel to the ideological dimension of Russian foreign policy and the rhetoric that comes with it, there's a very pragmatic strain of thought. Russia understands that Ukraine was a disaster for them in the long run, and they're very unlikely to push their luck with Belarus, where there is no Crimea or Donbass-like region that would largely support them unconditionally. Not to mention that they don't see Lukashenko staying in power in any case. Putin and Lavrov keep reminding him that he promised a constitutional reform and new elections. Russian propaganda acknowledges violence against peaceful protesters (even if it comes with a dozen of asterisks and mentions of maidan), Russian pro-Kremlin comedians make fun of Lukashenko just as much as of the protesters, etc. Russia is tired of having Lukashenko as the only contact point for pursuing their interests in Belarus, and as soon as they have an explicitly pro-Russian party or a politician they can bet on, they'll start pushing Lukashenko to step down even more.

With all that it sounds like all scenarios are undesirable for Putin because if Luka is replaced by someone less stained and more agreeable it is still a signal to Russians that 1) violence against protesters is unacceptable 2) protests work against the evil grandpa that has been at the wheel for too long 3) change does not mean becoming a failed chaotic state

# ? Sep 27, 2020 22:46

Paladinus: Jan 11, 2014; heyHEYYYY!!!

Somaen posted:

With all that it sounds like all scenarios are undesirable for Putin because if Luka is replaced by someone less stained and more agreeable it is still a signal to Russians that 1) violence against protesters is unacceptable 2) protests work against the evil grandpa that has been at the wheel for too long 3) change does not mean becoming a failed chaotic state

According to some experts, there are already moves by the Central Election Commission in Russia to make elections more transparent and fair, because they don't want to see the same thing happen there. With ongoing local protests in Russia, I'm sure they'll try to make at least some token steps to signal that Putin is not like Lukashenko at all. Even with local protests, you can see that while Kremlin is reluctant to give protesters exactly what they want, there are attempts to compromise.

# ? Sep 27, 2020 23:15

WAR CRIME GIGOLO: Oct 3, 2012; The Hague
tryna get me
for these glutes

Either al jazeera or reuters is claiming that there are syrians in the conflict. Was there any uptick in russian jets flying into azerbaijan before the conflict?

WAR CRIME GIGOLO fucked around with this message at 23:46 on Sep 27, 2020

# ? Sep 27, 2020 23:39

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# ? May 14, 2024 17:40

Charliegrs: Aug 10, 2009

WAR CRIME GIGOLO posted:

Either al jazeera or reuters is claiming that there are syrians in the conflict. Was there any uptick in russian jets flying into azerbaijan before the conflict?

I don't think it's been confirmed that Syrians are fighting there. But if there was chances are it would be the Turks transporting them. They kind of have a habit of sending Syrians to fight in other countries (Libya)

# ? Sep 28, 2020 04:16

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Debate & Discussion > Eastern Europe: Olivier's sphere of influence

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