|
Cessna posted:If that's our standard Braxton Bragg did more for the Union. The confederate generals in the west always get such a bad rap-were they really that awful or were they just getting whipped by Grant and Sherman for 2 years before Lee started getting beaten by them? Was Albert Sydney Johnston really that great and would he have done anything differently if he hadn’t died at Shiloh? The Confederacy’s geographic/strategic situation in the the west seems pretty unenviable, especially compared to the fairly favorable situation they had in Virginia. In a perfect world (for the south) they can hold New Orleans and Memphis with 40k men each, but then oh yeah, they need another 40k each for Nashville and Chattanooga, and welp, then the federals just decide to invade Alabama at Mobile instead. In reality they had 1 real army of 60k to defend all of that-was it just strategically impossible to defend the south west of the Appalachians with the resources they had, or was there a way it could have been done better/differently? Properly defending New Orleans instead of galavanting around in Kentucky doesn’t seem like a bad start.
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 21:34
|
|
|
|
| # ? Jun 3, 2024 14:24 |
|
|
Ice Fist posted:I think I see what's happening here. Without Hitler, European integration wouldn't have been possible. Or modern Israel.
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 21:41
|
|
|
Cyrano4747 posted:While that's not wrong, I wonder if a more competent Fuhrer would have never gotten to where the Germans were in the Winter of '41 just because he'd have been smart enough to not, you know, invade all his neighbors at once and never gotten the string of lucky wins that let Hitler look like a military genius for two years. It was explained to me once that you can treat German military successes 1939-1941 less because of brilliant strategic-level long-term decision making, and more because Hitler kept rolling a natural 20 and they (the German high command) just kept going with it. Problem is you eventually stop getting lucky with your dice rolls and oops suddenly you're in a war of total annihilation with the world's major powers that you have no hope of actually winning.
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 21:46
|
|
|
Cyrano4747 posted:While that's not wrong, I wonder if a more competent Fuhrer would have never gotten to where the Germans were in the Winter of '41 just because he'd have been smart enough to not, you know, invade all his neighbors at once and never gotten the string of lucky wins that let Hitler look like a military genius for two years. A more competent Fuhrer looks probably more like Franco or Mussolini, maybe more like Mussolini. Opportunistically picking on weaker neighbors, expanding some spheres of influence over traditionally "German" spaces, and supporting right-wingers around the world with direct military aid.
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 21:50
|
|
|
Cyrano4747 posted:While that's not wrong, I wonder if a more competent Fuhrer would have never gotten to where the Germans were in the Winter of '41 just because he'd have been smart enough to not, you know, invade all his neighbors at once and never gotten the string of lucky wins that let Hitler look like a military genius for two years. Yeah, I feel like "risk-assessing Hitler" doesn't get as far, because he'd give up the idea of becoming a dictator in another country as farfetched
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 22:03
|
|
|
KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:A more competent Fuhrer looks probably more like Franco or Mussolini, maybe more like Mussolini. Opportunistically picking on weaker neighbors, expanding some spheres of influence over traditionally "German" spaces, and supporting right-wingers around the world with direct military aid. Sounds a bit like what Putin is currently doing
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 22:09
|
|
|
I've always thought Germany presented particular challenges in terms of foreign policy because of its location smack dab in the middle of Europe - it has no rear or peripheral areas to retreat into, it borders on everyone, and you're extremely vulnerable to being ganged up on (it's a real tough nation to play in Diplomacy). So to be successful, German foreign policy has to make sure that the country doesn't get ganged up on, and that means playing neighbors off against one another, keeping them divided, extracting small concessions for yourself over time, and making yourself indispensable to whatever conferences or treaties or arrangements are being negotiated around you. Bismarck was very very good at doing that, and he (and Germany) prospered by dividing his neighbors, isolating them, making countries afraid that if they didn't join you that you'd go and form an alliance with their enemies, and all the other things he did to slowly build Germany's influence (and surface area) without triggering a grand alliance to roll Germany back to its bare core territories. Unfortunately for Germany, he was fired and replaced by Kaiser Wilhelm, who managed to piss off and alarm pretty much all of his neighbors, and drove most of them into an alliance against him (I mean, you know you've hosed up when you've gotten Britain and France to set aside 600 years of hostility and formally ally), with catastrophic results. Hitler's early war moves were very successful and very much in the Bismarckian mode - picking off countries and parts of countries one at a time (at the conference table as often as on the battlefield), being very minimal in his demands at any given time, and keeping the other great powers separated and unable to gang up on him (most notably, keeping the USSR from formally allying with the UK/France and cutting his own deal with them). But then he switched into Wilhelm mode and manged to pick a fight with all of his neighbors simultaneously, and that was his undoing. It was always going to come crashing down on him - he could not be satisfied with the slow, opportunistic acquisition of small neighboring territories, his ideology demanded a whole continent of freshly-cleansed Lebensraum as quickly as possible - but for the pre-war and the first part of the war, Hitler had a lot of success following the Bismarckian strategy.
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 22:21
|
|
|
Kaiser Schnitzel posted:The confederate generals in the west always get such a bad rap-were they really that awful or were they just getting whipped by Grant and Sherman for 2 years before Lee started getting beaten by them? Was Albert Sydney Johnston really that great and would he have done anything differently if he hadn’t died at Shiloh? The Confederacy’s geographic/strategic situation in the the west seems pretty unenviable, especially compared to the fairly favorable situation they had in Virginia. They weren't in a great spot, but I wouldn't say it was untenable. There were basically three ways into the deep south (we'll use Atlanta as our "deep south" target) from the western side: Nashville --> Chattanooga --> Atlanta (the way they went), Memphis -- Chattanooga -- > Atlanta, and Vicksburg --> Jackson --> Birmingham/Montgomery --> Atlanta. That is a lot of miles to cover, but two armies probably could have done it, especially if they developed interior LOCs. They also had a lot of favorable terrain to make use of, either the mountains and rivers along the TN/GA border, or all of the rough terrain and waterways between Birmingham and Atlanta. If they'd fought a defensive campaign focusing on inflicting casualties in battles and raiding the long and vulnerable Union supply lines, it would have been a serious challenge for the Union armies to get through before their political willpower ran dry. Johnston's approach was probably the closest to this, but...he got fired for having insufficient panache, and indirectly handed the election to Lincoln. It really wasn't possible or smart for the CSA to try and hold any of their coastal cities, lucrative as they were. More and better forts around NO might've helped it stay in Confederate hands a bit longer, but even then, it would've simply been blockaded more enthusiastically. It also wasn't really necessary or even militarily smart to try and hold the Mississippi but it probably wasn't politically feasible to just tell all of the far west they were on their own, and good luck. Although that's essentially what ended up happening in the end.
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 22:35
|
|
|
I think it's difficult to compare a pre-unification policy situation for Prussia with post-unification German policy situation in terms of aims, options, and perceived position and threat.
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 22:40
|
|
|
I read an argument that if France hadn’t fallen so quickly and it had instead taken months or a few years to beat them then Britain might have been more willing to surrender. I’m not that convinced since Britain was kind of open to a truce, but maybe a few years of continental bloodletting would have worn them out in a way that being forced off the continent didn’t. Wether Germany comes out ahead and in any condition to take on the USSR is purely speculative, but weren’t the Soviets in the middle of re-arming and re-organizing when Barbarossa happened?
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 23:02
|
|
|
Arban posted:Sounds a bit like what Putin is currently doing Reminder of the one and only rule: this is not a thread for current events.
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 23:02
|
|
|
White Coke posted:I read an argument that if France hadn’t fallen so quickly and it had instead taken months or a few years to beat them then Britain might have been more willing to surrender. I’m not that convinced since Britain was kind of open to a truce, but maybe a few years of continental bloodletting would have worn them out in a way that being forced off the continent didn’t. Wether Germany comes out ahead and in any condition to take on the USSR is purely speculative, but weren’t the Soviets in the middle of re-arming and re-organizing when Barbarossa happened? The army was being expanded and rearmed in 1941, a few years later Hitler would have faced a very different Red Army, particularly one with a lot more competent enlisted force. In 1941 the ratio of officers, NCOs, and even senior conscripts to first year conscripts was at an all time low.
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 23:06
|
|
|
White Coke posted:I read an argument that if France hadn’t fallen so quickly and it had instead taken months or a few years to beat them then Britain might have been more willing to surrender. I’m not that convinced since Britain was kind of open to a truce, but maybe a few years of continental bloodletting would have worn them out in a way that being forced off the continent didn’t. Wether Germany comes out ahead and in any condition to take on the USSR is purely speculative, but weren’t the Soviets in the middle of re-arming and re-organizing when Barbarossa happened? Honestly these chronologies are probably better assessed from the perspective of "Hitler dies or is incapacitated permanently at some point, what does Germany do from there," rather than trying to postulate a gayer, blacker Hitler.
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 23:12
|
|
|
Ensign Expendable posted:The army was being expanded and rearmed in 1941, a few years later Hitler would have faced a very different Red Army, particularly one with a lot more competent enlisted force. In 1941 the ratio of officers, NCOs, and even senior conscripts to first year conscripts was at an all time low. Weren’t they developing/distributing a bunch of new equipment like a semiautomatic rifle and an improved T-34?
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 23:27
|
|
|
White Coke posted:I read an argument that if France hadn’t fallen so quickly and it had instead taken months or a few years to beat them then Britain might have been more willing to surrender. I’m not that convinced since Britain was kind of open to a truce, but maybe a few years of continental bloodletting would have worn them out in a way that being forced off the continent didn’t. Wether Germany comes out ahead and in any condition to take on the USSR is purely speculative, but weren’t the Soviets in the middle of re-arming and re-organizing when Barbarossa happened? Germany taking a few years to beat France doesn't sound like something that would ever result in them coming out ahead but like, also not something that could realistically happen? Like Germany doesn't get lucky in the Ardennes and the war settles into a stalemate, you've still got the US slowly gearing up and with Japan probably still pulling Pearl Harbor and bringing them into the war you now have within a couple years a whole bunch of pissed off Americans with easy access to the continent to bolster France and Britain.
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 23:45
|
|
|
Would the german people be willing to suffer drawn out trench warfare with France again?
|
|
#
?
Feb 3, 2021 23:52
|
|
|
White Coke posted:Weren’t they developing/distributing a bunch of new equipment like a semiautomatic rifle and an improved T-34? Yes, SVT production was underway (but a lot of kinks needed to be worked out still), PPSh production was ramping up, the ageing Maxim, DT and DP were going to be replaced by superior belt fed machine guns, the KV-1 was being phased out in favour of the KV-3 in 1941 and then the KV-4 or KV-5 in 1942 (whichever would win in trials), the T-34 was going to be replaced with the T-34M, the T-26 was finally going to be replaced with the T-50, the ancient T-37A and T-38 would be replaced with the T-40. When the war started pretty much everything had to be rolled back. Rifle production went back to bolt actions, the KV-3 and T-34M died even though production of components had already started (at least some T-34M parts were worked into T-34 production), the T-50 turned out to be too expensive to build so a new light tank had to be cobbled together out of the T-40, etc.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 00:03
|
|
|
bewbies posted:It also wasn't really necessary or even militarily smart to try and hold the Mississippi I'd argue this is absolutely incorrect. The Mississippi was the single most important trade route on the entire North American continent, and control of the river had a massive impact on both the Confederate and Union economies. It wasn't for nothing that New Orleans was the third largest port in the United States and by far the largest city in the Confederacy (Population 170K in 1860, compared to only 40K in Richmond), and losing it so early in the war was an unfathomable blow.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 01:44
|
|
|
I'd imagine a stalemate on the Western front would be pretty catastrophic for Germany because that means losing a lot of equipment and manpower that they won't have if/when they do turn on the USSR who has more time to prepare and rearm. A lot of Germany's problems are because of the massive unprecedented casualties and loss of equipment in 41' (and especially Typhoon) that IIRC they basically never recovered from? So fighting for a year or two in France that's a real struggle I can't imagine helping Germany be prepared for a war in the east. If the war in France lasts until say, 41, that means no Barbarosa until summer of 42 at a minimum, possibly 43? That's a huge deal. With the US probably dragged into the war still.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 01:54
|
|
|
Mr Luxury Yacht posted:Germany taking a few years to beat France doesn't sound like something that would ever result in them coming out ahead but like, also not something that could realistically happen? Yeah I don't see how Germany beats France at all without beating them the way they did.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 01:54
|
|
Yes, it's like a lava lamp.
|
Fish of hemp posted:Would the german people be willing to suffer drawn out trench warfare with France again? the original plan the German high command came up with for France was for half a million casualties to push the French to the Somme. Stalemate. Then in two years a final big push to Paris From Wikipedia but not sure about the sourcing quote:
I have no idea if the German population would find this acceptable. Also from reading Wages of Destruction I don’t know if the German economy could support a WWI style stalemate + blockade.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 01:57
|
|
|
Solaris 2.0 posted:the original plan the German high command came up with for France was for half a million casualties to push the French to the Somme. Stalemate. Then in two years a final big push to Paris Having just finished that book I would further argue that Germany got insanely lucky that A: Stalin did not concentrate his attack on army group center during the winter counter offensive in 1942, B: that they were able to evacuate their troops from Sicily and bottle the allies in Italy after quickly occupying it and C: that the allies switched targets from the Ruhr to the Berlin area allowing them to stabilize and partially rebuild industry.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 02:12
|
|
|
Acebuckeye13 posted:I'd argue this is absolutely incorrect. The Mississippi was the single most important trade route on the entire North American continent, and control of the river had a massive impact on both the Confederate and Union economies. It wasn't for nothing that New Orleans was the third largest port in the United States and by far the largest city in the Confederacy (Population 170K in 1860, compared to only 40K in Richmond), and losing it so early in the war was an unfathomable blow. Yeah it occurred to me that Vicksburg was this huge disaster for the confederacy, but really only because New Orleans and Memphis had fallen a year earlier. Holding those two much more economically, industrially and geographically important cities would mean nobody would have ever heard of Vicksburg. The Union navy could certainly blockade the heck out of the Mississippi as far as international trade went, but for internal trade and movement holding the Mississippi from Memphis to New Orleans would have been huge for the South.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 02:13
|
|
|
Kaiser Schnitzel posted:Yeah it occurred to me that Vicksburg was this huge disaster for the confederacy, but really only because New Orleans and Memphis had fallen a year earlier. Holding those two much more economically, industrially and geographically important cities would mean nobody would have ever heard of Vicksburg. The Union navy could certainly blockade the heck out of the Mississippi as far as international trade went, but for internal trade and movement holding the Mississippi from Memphis to New Orleans would have been huge for the South. Keep in mind too that the Union benefited massively from the Mississippi being opened up—not only could troops and supplies be freely transported with gunboat support almost anywhere along the river and its tributaries (Which include the Illinois, Ohio, and Tennessee rivers), but it also meant that raw materials and supplies from the midwest could be more easily transported back east. Shipping things by boat is vastly more efficient than any other form of transport, and even today the Mississippi carries a full 60% of US grain shipments. It really cannot be overemphasized just how important taking the river was.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 02:39
|
|
|
Acebuckeye13 posted:I'd argue this is absolutely incorrect. The Mississippi was the single most important trade route on the entire North American continent, and control of the river had a massive impact on both the Confederate and Union economies. It wasn't for nothing that New Orleans was the third largest port in the United States and by far the largest city in the Confederacy (Population 170K in 1860, compared to only 40K in Richmond), and losing it so early in the war was an unfathomable blow. I'm not arguing that it had no value, just that holding it was militarily impossible and thus a huge waste of resources. It might not have been possible politically, but ceding the river and everything west of it would've been a very smart move strategically. Kaiser Schnitzel posted:Yeah it occurred to me that Vicksburg was this huge disaster for the confederacy, but really only because New Orleans and Memphis had fallen a year earlier. Holding those two much more economically, industrially and geographically important cities would mean nobody would have ever heard of Vicksburg. The Union navy could certainly blockade the heck out of the Mississippi as far as international trade went, but for internal trade and movement holding the Mississippi from Memphis to New Orleans would have been huge for the South. Moving stuff...where? If the port of New Orleans is closed off to international shipping, the only thing the river is really good for is moving stuff north and south along the western fringe of the Confederacy. The Confederacy couldn't have accessed the Ohio, and the Mississippi doesn't have a lot of west-running tributaries. It would've been nice to have, but it absolutely wasn't strategically decisive. bewbies fucked around with this message at 02:55 on Feb 4, 2021 |
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 02:51
|
|
|
I love German Wikipedia:quote:A lorry ( truck , truck ), short truck or lorry , in Switzerland also Camion , [1] commonly known vices or truck , is the commercial vehicles belonging vehicle with which goods are transported. A truck can also be operated with a trailer; this combination is called a truck , the truck in this combination is called a motor vehicle . If the tractor is short and the Trailer is placed on it , the trailer combination is called .
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 02:57
|
|
|
bewbies posted:I'm not arguing that it had no value, just that holding it was militarily impossible and thus a huge waste of resources. It might not have been possible politically, but ceding the river and everything west of it would've been a very smart move strategically. Once again you're ignoring the value of closing off the river to the Union. You're literally proposing that best move militarily would have been to improve the enemy logistic network and give up your largest city! Also the Mississippi does have a major west-running tributary, which was the focus of several campaigns between Union and Confederate forces in the far west. If you did a typo and meant east-running, then the river was still extremely important to hold thanks to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which was the only major east-west railroad in the Confederacy and the major focus of the campaign that lead to the Battle of Shiloh. These networks were some of the biggest trade links in the entire Confederacy, and severing them so early in the war did incalculable damage to the Confederate cause.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 03:12
|
|
|
Acebuckeye13 posted:Once again you're ignoring the value of closing off the river to the Union. You're literally proposing that best move militarily would have been to improve the enemy logistic network and give up your largest city! Once again, I said that holding the river was a military impossibility, not that doing so would've been a nice thing for the CSA. It should have been clear to all at an early stage that any position that Union gunboats could dominate was not tenable. Obviously, in doing so you concede the river's utility to the enemy, but that's probably a better outcome than losing multiple major battles and tens of thousands of irreplaceable soldiers in order to try and keep it! Also I didn't say the river had no west-running tributaries, just that it didn't have that many, which is a major reason why it wasn't more useful to the CSA. I didn't make a typo, the Arkansas river runs east. It is interesting you bring up the Memphis-Charleston railroad though...it is a great case study of why fighting to keep the river was a dumb idea. The CSA was, in part, fighting to keep the last 10% or so of that line open for business...and made the mistake of engaging an enemy in gunboat and river resupply range in order to do it. It is a perfect example of why fighting an enemy near a river they controlled was a terrible idea. Had that battle occurred somewhere other than the riverbank, Union advantages would have been far less pronounced. I'm curious what you think the real losses were to the CSA when they lost the river. The loss of New Orleans was enormous, but what is your assessment of the river's economic/strategic value once that port was closed off or lost?
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 03:24
|
|
|
Kaiser Schnitzel posted:The confederate generals in the west always get such a bad rap-were they really that awful or were they just getting whipped by Grant and Sherman for 2 years before Lee started getting beaten by them? Was Albert Sydney Johnston really that great and would he have done anything differently if he hadn’t died at Shiloh? Grant panned A. S. Johnson in his memoirs although part of that might be sour grapes at being surprised at Shiloh. I think people looked back on him more favorably since him being alive would mean that they wouldn't have had to deal with Bragg for the rest of the war. Who knows what he would have done differently though? quote:It is a perfect example of why fighting an enemy near a river they controlled was a terrible idea. Had that battle occurred somewhere other than the riverbank, Union advantages would have been far less pronounced. They had to fight the battle there since they were trying to hit Grant before Buell reinforced him. If they'd waited, they'd of had to deal with both Grant and Buell at the same time. sullat fucked around with this message at 03:29 on Feb 4, 2021 |
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 03:25
|
|
|
bewbies posted:I'm curious what you think the real losses were to the CSA when they lost the river.  Had the CSA won separation I would imagine they would be at war with Mexico within 20 years, potentially less.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 03:36
|
|
|
Nessus posted:Hope of continuing to expand their territory and the influence of their peculiar institution without a navy. From what I understand of confederate ideas their goal of they won would've been to secure cuba, the caribbean, and the gulf coast to create a bulwark against the abolitionist movement. I'm not sure if that means outright conquest or a more diplomatic approach. A Mexican war would've been almost certain I think.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 03:40
|
|
|
bewbies posted:Once again, I said that holding the river was a military impossibility, not that doing so would've been a nice thing for the CSA. It should have been clear to all at an early stage that any position that Union gunboats could dominate was not tenable. Obviously, in doing so you concede the river's utility to the enemy, but that's probably a better outcome than losing multiple major battles and tens of thousands of irreplaceable soldiers in order to try and keep it! New Orleans was the third largest port in the country, but was functionally useless to the Union so long as the Confederacy controlled at least some part of the river. The longer Vicksburg stands, the longer the Union has to rely on railroads and lesser-developed or navigable waterways to transport food, finished goods, raw materials, and manpower from the Midwest to the East or for export (or vice-versa). The cascading effects are probably incalculable, but they were well understood at the time—which was why the Union spent so much effort and manpower to capture Vicksburg, which involved some insanely risky maneuvers from Grant to succeed. Acebuckeye13 fucked around with this message at 03:52 on Feb 4, 2021 |
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 03:49
|
|
|
I'd hesitate to say the Mississippi was vital to the Union without seeing data on shipping between the fall of Port Hudson and the end of the war. To clarify, the river was absolutely huge in terms of shipping both before and after the war and I don't mean to diminish that importance. However, I'm extremely skeptical that commerce would have returned to its prewar level immediately in mid 1863. Confederate forces (albeit small ones) continued to cross the river despite Union control, and pretty much all of the histories I've read only mention cotton transport on the river, and not food or finished goods or manpower.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 04:01
|
|
|
Libluini posted:If you saw it somewhere in Wiki-pages, could you link it? I'm curious to see what they used as sources, as my own search attempts came up empty It was https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Tsar_Bomba. quote:Much of its high-yield destructiveness was inefficiently radiated upwards into space.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 04:14
|
|
|
I wish I too could be inefficiently radiated upwards into space sometimes.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 04:29
|
|
|
Ensign Expendable posted:Yes, SVT production was underway (but a lot of kinks needed to be worked out still), PPSh production was ramping up, the ageing Maxim, DT and DP were going to be replaced by superior belt fed machine guns, the KV-1 was being phased out in favour of the KV-3 in 1941 and then the KV-4 or KV-5 in 1942 (whichever would win in trials), the T-34 was going to be replaced with the T-34M, the T-26 was finally going to be replaced with the T-50, the ancient T-37A and T-38 would be replaced with the T-40. What were the machine gun models they were working on? Were they making a universal machine gun like the Germans? Raenir Salazar posted:I'd imagine a stalemate on the Western front would be pretty catastrophic for Germany because that means losing a lot of equipment and manpower that they won't have if/when they do turn on the USSR who has more time to prepare and rearm. A lot of Germany's problems are because of the massive unprecedented casualties and loss of equipment in 41' (and especially Typhoon) that IIRC they basically never recovered from? So fighting for a year or two in France that's a real struggle I can't imagine helping Germany be prepared for a war in the east. If the war in France lasts until say, 41, that means no Barbarosa until summer of 42 at a minimum, possibly 43? That's a huge deal. With the US probably dragged into the war still. After the Fall of France Germany demobilized a lot of their soldiers to send them back to the factories to build up for Barbarossa, then remobilized them for the invasion. Another problem the Germans had was that they kept switching what they prioritized building from their factories because they kept thinking they had the Soviets on the ropes and wanted to get a head start on defeating Britain by switching from tanks to planes & submarines only to realize they hadn't quite won yet.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 07:13
|
|
|
Nessus posted:I believe the Germans' policy for recuperations were to send the injured guy home or at least into the right area while he grew back the flesh the Bolsheviks shot off, so it would probably be straightforward to get a pragmatic estimation of how much of that was happening, even if they all kept mum. Which I doubt they would have. feedmegin posted:Also your average German citizen had a family member out on the Eastern front or knew a neighbour that did. Yes censorship existed of course but that's not watertight and anyway doesn't help when someone is home on leave. Before Stalingrad it's actually a bit more complex. Brutalization of the frontsoldats mindset on the eastern front was so extensive, that a lot of them thought they would win at some point. The nazi tropes of "weak soldiers fearing their jew commissars, rotten structure with a firm door" etc. were so well disseminated that a great deal thought they were having temporary setbacks instead of fighting a losing war. After Stalingrad, this changed completely, of course. Fish of hemp posted:Would the german people be willing to suffer drawn out trench warfare with France again? Yes. Tias fucked around with this message at 09:36 on Feb 4, 2021 |
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 09:33
|
|
|
PittTheElder posted:Yeah I don't see how Germany beats France at all without beating them the way they did. Taking the decisions of French leadership into account, it was only a matter of time until they made another strategic fuckup. The most comedic turn of events would be Mussolini backstabbing Hitler but getting owned in the Alps anyways
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 09:38
|
|
|
Slim Jim Pickens posted:Taking the decisions of French leadership into account, it was only a matter of time until they made another strategic fuckup.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 11:23
|
|
|
|
| # ? Jun 3, 2024 14:24 |
|
|
bewbies posted:There were basically three ways into the deep south (we'll use Atlanta as our "deep south" target) from the western side: Nashville --> Chattanooga --> Atlanta (the way they went), Memphis -- Chattanooga -- > Atlanta, and Vicksburg --> Jackson --> Birmingham/Montgomery --> Atlanta. That is a lot of miles to cover, but two armies probably could have done it, especially if they developed interior LOCs. They also had a lot of favorable terrain to make use of, either the mountains and rivers along the TN/GA border, or all of the rough terrain and waterways between Birmingham and Atlanta. If they'd fought a defensive campaign focusing on inflicting casualties in battles and raiding the long and vulnerable Union supply lines, it would have been a serious challenge for the Union armies to get through before their political willpower ran dry. Johnston's approach was probably the closest to this, but...he got fired for having insufficient panache, and indirectly handed the election to Lincoln. A lot of the problem with the CSA is that most effort had to be expended in the area where the two capitols were not far apart. This meant transfers of men and material from East to West was always going to be rare. This meant that in the area with the most strategic width, the Confederates were much more limited in their ability to operate in the field due to their lack of numbers. The dispersed geography combined with the rivers meant that Union numerical superiority counted for more, and Davis couldn't reinforce them. I actually think Davis was justified firing Johnston. Johnston's approach offered only a slow loss- he did a decent job delaying and inflicting casualties on Sherman but that was simply insufficient. Davis needed a general who was going to try to inflict a serious reversal, and as ill-fated as Hood was as a general, he was not insubordinate the way Johnston was. Davis's worst personnel decision by far was not firing Bragg when his subordinates petitioned for his removal. Either Buckner and all of the others had to go, or Bragg had to go, but Davis did neither, which directly resulted in disaster at the siege of Chattanooga. Oh, and abandoning the Mississippi was absolutely not in the cards- in particular, once the river was closed, percussion cap production would taper off, then nose dive as some of the materials needed were mined in Mexico.
|
|
#
?
Feb 4, 2021 11:30
|
|
