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Antifa Turkeesian posted:I'm guessing the answer is no, because poor women have already been destroyed by decades of defacto bans on abortion and nothing has changed, while rich women will always have the means to find an abortion no matter the laws of their state. I'm inclined to agree. The problem with assuming ending abortion rights is a bridge too far and will rally voters to democrats is twofold. One, voter turnout was ridiculously high last election, is unlikely to be repeated, and also didn't benefit democrats anywhere near as much as expected. Two, the leader of the Democratic party for the foreseeable future is Joe Biden, a longtime opponent of abortion rights. You don't just need voters upset about abortion rights, you need them to believe Joe Biden cares about saving them.
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May 20, 2021 04:17
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Platystemon posted:Massachusetts repealed that in 2018 I missed this somehow. I stand corrected.
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May 20, 2021 04:34
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Some Guy TT posted:I'm inclined to agree. The problem with assuming ending abortion rights is a bridge too far and will rally voters to democrats is twofold. One, voter turnout was ridiculously high last election, is unlikely to be repeated, and also didn't benefit democrats anywhere near as much as expected. Two, the leader of the Democratic party for the foreseeable future is Joe Biden, a longtime opponent of abortion rights. You don't just need voters upset about abortion rights, you need them to believe Joe Biden cares about saving them. 1. There was just recently a Democratic primary with turnout that exceeded 2018. Democratic turnout post-Election in the Georgia runoffs was also high compared to historical turnout; Democratic turnout in 2018 was also high compared to historical; there is currently no evidence to support this claim. 2. The claim that Joe Biden is a long time opponent of abortion rights is incredibly disingenuous. Joe Biden in particular campaigned on reversing Trump era attacks on abortion rights, it's literally on his website. Joe Biden himself has said "Reproductive rights are a constitutional right. And, in fact, every woman should have that right." Dems largely believe Joe Biden supports women's rights, the idea he doesn't seems like the kind of misinfo pushed during the primaries by the usual suspects.
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May 20, 2021 06:17
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https://twitter.com/NBCNews/status/1395284433339568128
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May 20, 2021 09:11
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Raenir Salazar posted:1. There was just recently a Democratic primary with turnout that exceeded 2018. Democratic turnout post-Election in the Georgia runoffs was also high compared to historical turnout; Democratic turnout in 2018 was also high compared to historical; there is currently no evidence to support this claim. You're interpreting my argument completely backwards. If turnout is already high, that means making it even higher than it already is just becomes that much harder. I'm not going to argue with you about this otherwise because as the post I was replying to mentioned it's not really on-topic. Well, this seemed inevitable. quote:Probate judges are elected to six-year terms in Alabama, and nearly every county, including Talladega, doesn't require them to have law degrees or to be lawyers, unlike probate judges in most other states. Jinks is a former program director for the Alabama State Parks, and he had worked on the campaign of Alabama Gov. Bob Riley, who left office in 2011. Not requiring judges to actually be able to practice law has always seemed like a huge blind spot when it comes to holding them to ethical standards.
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May 20, 2021 09:20
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Raenir Salazar posted:1. There was just recently a Democratic primary with turnout that exceeded 2018. Democratic turnout post-Election in the Georgia runoffs was also high compared to historical turnout; Democratic turnout in 2018 was also high compared to historical; there is currently no evidence to support this claim. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/joe-biden-supports-hyde-amendment-splits-2020-dems/story?id=63506190
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May 20, 2021 10:23
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tom kite posted:https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/joe-biden-supports-hyde-amendment-splits-2020-dems/story?id=63506190 Care to elaborate?
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May 20, 2021 13:59
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tom kite posted:https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/joe-biden-supports-hyde-amendment-splits-2020-dems/story?id=63506190 It's a huge leap to suggest Biden's position on the Hyde amendment (which in the article you apparently didn't read says he's open to repealing it) has anything to do with what he'll do if the Supreme Court were to overturn Roe vs Wade.
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May 20, 2021 14:09
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What do you think Biden will do if the Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade?
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May 20, 2021 14:13
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Some Guy TT posted:What do you think Biden will do if the Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade? Use the bully pulpit to deride the decision as a travesty and to encourage congress to pass bills like HR1, to pass laws like the VAWA, to encourage voters to hand them a larger majority so they can have a mandate in which to pass an ambitious and expansive legislative agenda to help women, and to explore avenues to reform and expand the court. This is obvious what any Dem president would do at a minimum.
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May 20, 2021 14:18
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So you're not saying legislation would necessarily actually pass in this hypothetical situation, or even that executive orders would be signed. You just think Democrats would wage a public relations campaign to convince people they can solve the problem if they have more seats, and that this public relations campaign will be so effective it will cause the electorate to outperform current already historic turnout.
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May 20, 2021 14:29
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Some Guy TT posted:So you're not saying legislation would necessarily actually pass in this hypothetical situation, or even that executive orders would be signed. You just think Democrats would wage a public relations campaign to convince people they can solve the problem if they have more seats, and that this public relations campaign will be so effective it will cause the electorate to outperform current already historic turnout. The question was what Biden should do, not the entirety of the Democratic party. Also, what point are you trying to make? Blue Footed Booby fucked around with this message at 14:39 on May 20, 2021 |
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May 20, 2021 14:34
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The original post that started this discussion posited that talk of a Supreme Court ruling outlawing abortion would galvanize voters to Democrats was overblown. I agree with that position, and am framing the hypothetical in pessimistic terms to suggest that demoralization among Democratic voters is more likely than galvanization in this context.
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May 20, 2021 14:41
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Some Guy TT posted:The original post that started this discussion posited that talk of a Supreme Court ruling outlawing abortion would galvanize voters to Democrats was overblown. I agree with that position, and am framing the hypothetical in pessimistic terms to suggest that demoralization among Democratic voters is more likely than galvanization in this context. You claimed that it be because Biden was a "long time opponent of abortion rights" and that Democratic high turnout was "unlikely to be repeated"; on both these counts you made unsubstantiated claims that even a small amount of googling refutes; and more specifically that Dem voters won't/do not believe Biden will fight for the right to choose. That isn't pessimism, it's making stuff up. Raenir Salazar fucked around with this message at 14:56 on May 20, 2021 |
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May 20, 2021 14:54
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Well, yeah. Because hypothetical situations literally involve making things up and speculating about them. That's what the term means. You did it too.
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May 20, 2021 15:03
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Some Guy TT posted:I'm inclined to agree. The problem with assuming ending abortion rights is a bridge too far and will rally voters to democrats is twofold. One, voter turnout was ridiculously high last election, is unlikely to be repeated, and also didn't benefit democrats anywhere near as much as expected. Two, the leader of the Democratic party for the foreseeable future is Joe Biden, a longtime opponent of abortion rights. You don't just need voters upset about abortion rights, you need them to believe Joe Biden cares about saving them. Some Guy TT posted:Well, yeah. Because hypothetical situations literally involve making things up and speculating about them. That's what the term means. You did it too. So to confirm, everything about your post above you were just knowingly making things up? Additionally I don't think anything I said I was "making things up" I completely expect and believe in the things I said.
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May 20, 2021 15:28
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Again, it is logically impossible to discuss hypothetical situations without making things up. Making things up is literally the point of the exercise because neither one of us has any idea what would actually happen if the Supreme Court outlawed abortion I think your made up situation of Biden doing almost nothing useful and Democrats cynically panhandling on the promise of maybe doing something useful if they win more seats to be quite probable. Where we disagree is that you think this strategy will foment a landslide, whereas I think voters would more likely just give up on the Democrats in disgust. I think Biden's past actions and made up future ones in the context of this hypothetical support my reading better than yours, and am hard pressed to see how any disagreement on your part could be any more or less made up than mine given we are discussing events that haven't actually happened yet.
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May 20, 2021 16:14
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Some Guy TT posted:Again, it is logically impossible to discuss hypothetical situations without making things up. Making things up is literally the point of the exercise because neither one of us has any idea what would actually happen if the Supreme Court outlawed abortion sounds like a good reason to stop discussing potential future hypotheticals that amount to screaming into the wind at what people might or might not do politically several years in the future
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May 20, 2021 16:30
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 Opinions! Starting to get into the seriously ideological decisions now, as is traditional in mid-May. For now, just Edwards v. Vannoy, but more will come.CANIGLIA v. STROM ET AL. TLDR: The “community caretaking” search warrant exception for searching an impounded vehicle for a firearm does not justify a warrantless entry to a house to seize firearms after a psychiatric welfare check. Unanimous opinion. Holding / Majority Opinion (Thomas) Decades ago, this Court held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed that police officers who patrol the “public highways” are often called to discharge noncriminal “community caretaking functions,” such as responding to disabled vehicles or investigating accidents. The question today is whether Cady’s acknowledgment of these “caretaking” duties creates a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home. It does not. During an argument with his wife at their Rhode Island home, Edward Caniglia (petitioner) retrieved a handgun from the bedroom, put it on the dining room table, and asked his wife to “shoot [him] now and get it over with.” She declined, and instead left to spend the night at a hotel. The next morning, when petitioner’s wife discovered that she could not reach him by telephone, she called the police (respondents) to request a welfare check. Respondents accompanied petitioner’s wife to the home, where they encountered petitioner on the porch. Petitioner spoke with respondents and confirmed his wife’s account of the argument, but denied that he was suicidal. Respondents, however, thought that petitioner posed a risk to himself or others. They called an ambulance, and petitioner agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation— but only after respondents allegedly promised not to confiscate his firearms. Once the ambulance had taken petitioner away, however, respondents seized the weapons. Guided by petitioner’s wife—whom they allegedly misinformed about his wishes—respondents entered the home and took two handguns. Petitioner sued, claiming that respondents violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered his home and seized him and his firearms without a warrant. The District Court granted summary judgment to respondents, and the First Circuit affirmed solely on the ground that the decision to remove petitioner and his firearms from the premises fell within a “community caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement. Citing this Court’s statement in Cady that police officers often have noncriminal reasons to interact with motorists on “public highways,” the First Circuit extrapolated a freestanding community-caretaking exception that applies to both cars and homes. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The “‘very core’” of this guarantee is “‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” To be sure, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all unwelcome intrusions “on private property,”—only “unreasonable” ones. We have thus recognized a few permissible invasions of the home and its curtilage. Perhaps most familiar, for example, are searches and seizures pursuant to a valid warrant. We have also held that law enforcement officers may enter private property without a warrant when certain exigent circumstances exist, including the need to “‘render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.’” And, of course, officers may generally take actions that “‘any private citizen might do’” without fear of liability. E.g., Jardines, 569 U. S., at 8 (approaching a home and knocking on the front door). The First Circuit’s “community caretaking” rule, however, goes beyond anything this Court has recognized. The decision below assumed that respondents lacked a warrant or consent, and it expressly disclaimed the possibility that they were reacting to a crime. The court also declined to consider whether any recognized exigent circumstances were present because respondents had forfeited the point. … Neither the holding nor logic of Cady justified that approach. True, Cady also involved a warrantless search for a firearm. But the location of that search was an impounded vehicle—not a home—“‘a constitutional difference’” that the opinion repeatedly stressed. In fact, Cady expressly contrasted its treatment of a vehicle already under police control with a search of a car “parked adjacent to the dwelling place of the owner.” Cady’s unmistakable distinction between vehicles and homes also places into proper context its reference to “community caretaking.” This quote comes from a portion of the opinion explaining that the “frequency with which . . . vehicle[s] can become disabled or involved in . . . accident[s] on public highways” often requires police to perform noncriminal “community caretaking functions,” such as providing aid to motorists. What is reasonable for vehicles is different from what is reasonable for homes. Cady acknowledged as much, and this Court has repeatedly “declined to expand the scope of . . . exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home.” We thus vacate the judgment below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Lineup: Thomas, unanimous. Concurrence by Roberts, joined by Breyer. Concurrence by Alito. Concurrence by Kavanaugh. Concurrence (Roberts, joined by Breyer): Fifteen years ago, this Court unanimously recognized that “[t]he role of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties.” A warrant to enter a home is not required, we explained, when there is a “need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Nothing in today’s opinion is to the contrary, and I join it on that basis. Concurrence (Alito): I join the opinion of the Court but write separately to explain my understanding of the Court’s holding and to highlight some important questions that the Court does not decide. 1. The Court holds—and I entirely agree—that there is no special Fourth Amendment rule for a broad category of cases involving “community caretaking.” As I understand the term, it describes the many police tasks that go beyond criminal law enforcement. These tasks vary widely, and there is no clear limit on how far they might extend in the future. … 2. While there is no overarching “community caretaking” doctrine, it does not follow that all searches and seizures conducted for non-law-enforcement purposes must be analyzed under precisely the same Fourth Amendment rules developed in criminal cases. … 3. This case falls within one important category of cases that could be viewed as involving community caretaking: conducting a search or seizure for the purpose of preventing a person from committing suicide. Assuming that petitioner did not voluntarily consent to go with the officers for a psychological assessment, he was seized and thus subjected to a serious deprivation of liberty. But was this warrantless seizure “reasonable”? We have addressed the standards required by due process for involuntary commitment to a mental treatment facility, but we have not addressed Fourth Amendment restrictions on seizures like the one that we must assume occurred here, i.e., a short-term seizure conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether a person presents an imminent risk of suicide. … 4. This case also implicates another body of law that petitioner glossed over: the so-called “red flag” laws that some States are now enacting. These laws enable the police to seize guns pursuant to a court order to prevent their use for suicide or the infliction of harm on innocent persons....Provisions of red flag laws may be challenged under the Fourth Amendment, and those cases may come before us. Our decision today does not address those issues. … 5. One additional category of cases should be noted: those involving warrantless, nonconsensual searches of a home for the purpose of ascertaining whether a resident is in urgent need of medical attention and cannot summon help. At oral argument, THE CHIEF JUSTICE posed a question that highlighted this problem. He imagined a situation in which neighbors of an elderly woman call the police and express concern because the woman had agreed to come over for dinner at 6 p.m., but by 8 p.m., had not appeared or called even though she was never late for anything.....If the police entered the home without a warrant to see if she needed help, would that violate the Fourth Amendment?...This imaginary woman may have regarded her house as her castle, but it is doubtful that she would have wanted it to be the place where she died alone and in agony. Our current precedents do not address situations like this. We have held that the police may enter a home without a warrant when there are “exigent circumstances.” But circumstances are exigent only when there is not enough time to get a warrant, and warrants are not typically granted for the purpose of checking on a person’s medical condition. … 6. The three categories of cases discussed above are simply illustrative. Searches and seizures conducted for other non-law-enforcement purposes may arise and may present their own Fourth Amendment issues. Today’s decision does not settle those questions. Concurrence (Kavanaugh): I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to underscore and elaborate on THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s point that the Court’s decision does not prevent police officers from taking reasonable steps to assist those who are inside a home and in need of aid. For example, as I will explain, police officers may enter a home without a warrant in circumstances where they are reasonably trying to prevent a potential suicide or to help an elderly person who has been out of contact and may have fallen and suffered a serious injury. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-157_8mjp.pdf CIC SERVICES, LLC v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ET AL. TLDR: With limited exceptions, you have to pay the IRS your taxes before you can challenge the taxes as invalid. That doesn’t apply to failing to report certain information (in this case micro-captive transactions) even if the failure triggers a tax penalty, when your suit is to strike the whole requirement to report down (that is, not just to avoid a tax penalty). Holding / Majority Opinion (Kagan) The Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U. S. C. §7421(a), bars any “suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” The question here is whether the Act prohibits a suit seeking to set aside an information-reporting requirement that is backed by both civil tax penalties and criminal penalties. We hold that the Act does not preclude the suit. … Congress responded [to a flood of anti-tax lawsuits] by enacting the Anti-Injunction Act. In its current form (differing little from the original), the Act provides: “[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person.” The Act, we have stated, “protects the [Federal] Government’s ability to collect a consistent stream of revenue, by barring litigation to enjoin or otherwise obstruct the collection of taxes.” Because of the Act, a person can typically challenge a federal tax only after he pays it, by suing for a refund. In an ordinary Anti-Injunction Act case, that short primer on the statute would naturally bring us to a description of the tax under dispute. But describing the tax implicated here will have to wait. For that tax—the thing that raises the Anti-Injunction Act question—comes into play only at the back end of a complex information-reporting scheme. The reporting scheme itself is where we must begin. ... This case starts with requirements that taxpayers and material advisors provide detailed information about what the Internal Revenue Code calls “reportable transaction[s].” [or those that “have a potential for tax avoidance or evasion,” which the IRS has the power to identify.] Using that authority, the IRS determined that so-called micro-captive transactions must be reported because of their potential for tax evasion. A micro-captive transaction is typically an insurance agreement between a parent company and a “captive” insurer under its control. … Noncompliance with Notice 2016–66 [making these transactions reportable] subjects a taxpayer or material advisor to stiff penalties—at last bringing us to the tax involved in this case, as well as to non-tax criminal consequences. By statutory provision, all failures to supply required information on reportable transactions, including the micro-captive transactions specified in the Notice, are punishable by civil monetary penalties—$50,000 for advisors and up to that amount (depending on the amount of tax gain realized) for taxpayers. … This suit challenges the lawfulness of Notice 2016–66. The petitioner is CIC Services, a material advisor to taxpayers participating in micro-captive transactions. It brought this action before the Notice’s first reporting date, rather than after a reporting violation, let alone payment of penalty. (As far as we know, CIC has still not committed a violation, instead complying with the Notice while pressing this suit.) CIC’s complaint mainly asserts that the IRS violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing the Notice without notice-and-comment procedures. The complaint also alleges that the Notice is arbitrary and capricious under the APA because it imposes new reporting requirements without proven need. … The Government moved to dismiss the action based on the AntiInjunction Act, arguing that CIC’s “requested relief would prevent the IRS from assessing a tax penalty against material advisors” that disregard the Notice’s reporting requirements. In the Government’s view, the way for CIC to bring its claims is to disobey the Notice and then sue for a refund of any resulting tax penalty. The District Court agreed. [And so did the Sixth Circuit]. … Once again, the Anti-Injunction Act provides, with exceptions not relevant here, that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person.” If CIC’s suit is not for that purpose, it can go forward. If the suit is for that purpose, it must be dismissed. In that event, CIC could contest the legality of the reporting rules only by violating them and suing for a refund of a later tax penalty. If that downstream tax penalty did not exist, this case would be a cinch: The Anti-Injunction Act would not apply and the suit could proceed. A reporting requirement is not a tax; and a suit brought to set aside such a rule is not one to enjoin a tax’s assessment or collection. That is so even if the reporting rule will help the IRS bring in future tax revenue—here, by identifying sham insurance transactions. We said as much in Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 575 U. S. 1 (2015). In that case, out-of-state retailers wanted to invalidate a Colorado law requiring them to report to the State’s Department of Revenue any sale to a state resident on which they had not collected tax. We allowed the suit to proceed, explaining that a suit about reporting requirements is not about the “assessment” or “collection” of taxes. … The complication here is that Notice 2016–66’s reporting obligations (unlike those in Direct Marketing) are backed up by a statutory tax penalty. As earlier described, the Code provides that a taxpayer who violates a demand for information about a reportable transaction—including those specified in the Notice—is subject to civil monetary penalties. And the Code “deem[s]” those civil penalties to be “tax[es]” as the Anti-Injunction Act uses that term. The question thus becomes whether that added tax penalty changes the analysis. Does its presence—as a sanction for flouting the Notice—mean that CIC’s suit is, as the Anti-Injunction Act provides, “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax”? In considering a “suit[’s] purpose,” we inquire not into a taxpayer’s subjective motive, but into the action’s objective aim—essentially, the relief the suit requests. … It is in characterizing the purpose of CIC’s suit that the parties’ disagreement emerges. Recall that CIC’s complaint avers that Notice 2016–66 violates the APA. And the complaint describes the relief requested as “setting aside IRS Notice 2016–66,” “enjoin[ing] the enforcement of Notice 2016–66 as an unlawful IRS rule,” and “declaring that Notice 2016–66 is unlawful.” According to CIC, all of that reveals the suit’s aim as invalidating the Notice and thereby eliminating its onerous reporting requirements—not as blocking the downstream tax penalty that may sanction the Notice’s breach. By contrast, the Government contends that the suit’s purpose is to stop the collection of the tax itself. In making that claim, the Government picks up on the word “enforcement” in CIC’s request for relief: Because the Notice is enforced through tax penalties, the Government claims, “enjoin[ing] the [Notice’s] enforcement,” as CIC wants, means preventing the IRS from collecting taxes. And even putting aside that word, the Government insists that there is no real difference between a suit to invalidate the Notice and one to preclude the tax penalty. … To begin with, we agree with CIC’s reading of its complaint. The complaint contests the legality of Notice 2016– 66, not of the statutory tax penalty that serves as one way to enforce it. CIC alleges that the Notice is procedurally and substantively flawed; it brings no legal claim against the separate statutory tax. … And we reject the Government’s argument that an injunction against the Notice is the same as one against the tax penalty—just “two sides of the same coin.” If that view were right, of course, no amount of artful pleading would avail: CIC’s suit targeting the Notice would then in fact target the tax, and the AntiInjunction Act would apply. But the Government’s take is wrong. Three aspects of the regulatory scheme here, taken in combination, refute the idea that this is a tax action in disguise. … First, the Notice imposes affirmative reporting obligations, inflicting costs separate and apart from the statutory tax penalty. … Second and relatedly, the Notice’s reporting rule and the statutory tax penalty are several steps removed from each other. … Third, violation of the Notice is punishable not only by a tax, but by separate criminal penalties. ... The Government worries that a ruling for CIC will enfeeble the Anti-Injunction Act. If CIC can bring this suit now, the Government claims, a wave of pre-enforcement actions will follow. … The Government, however, much overstates the possible consequences of today’s ruling. As we have explained, this suit falls outside the Anti-Injunction Act because the injunction it requests does not run against a tax at all. The suit contests, and seeks relief from, a separate legal mandate; the tax appears on the scene—as criminal penalties do too—only to sanction that mandate’s violation. … CIC’s suit aims to enjoin a standalone reporting requirement, whose violation may result in both tax penalties and criminal punishment. That is not a suit “for the purpose of restraining the [IRS’s] assessment or collection” of a tax, and so does not trigger the Anti-Injunction Act. We reverse the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Lineup: Kagan, unanimous. Concurrence by Sotomayor. Concurrence by Kavanaugh. Concurrence (Sotomayor): I concur because I agree that CIC Services, a material advisor to taxpayers engaged in micro-captive transactions, does not bring this suit “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax,” but rather for the purpose of avoiding the regulatory burdens imposed by Notice 2016–66 (Notice). The three factors identified by the majority, taken in combination, show that this suit falls outside the ambit of the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA): The Notice imposes substantial compliance costs that are unconnected to (and possibly far greater than) CIC Services’ potential tax liability; the causal chain connecting the Notice’s reporting requirement to any tax is attenuated; and the Notice is enforced by criminal as well as tax penalties. I write separately to highlight that the answer might be different if CIC Services were a taxpayer instead of a tax advisor. Taxpayers who are subject to reporting requirements backed by tax penalties face a choice: (1) provide information about their own finances to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which may in turn use that information to calculate the taxpayers’ liability more accurately, or (2) refuse to provide such information and pay a noncompliance penalty, which Congress has deemed a tax. For a given taxpayer, then, a tax on noncompliance may operate as a rough substitute for the tax liability she has evaded by withholding required information. Concurrence (Kavanaugh): I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to underscore what remains (and does not remain) of Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U. S. 752 (1974), and Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725 (1974), in the wake of the Court’s decision today. In Americans United and Bob Jones, this Court adopted a straightforward and broad rule for determining whether a pre-enforcement suit is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. Under that rule, if a pre-enforcement suit would “necessarily preclude” the assessment or collection of a tax, that suit is barred by the Act and the taxpayer needs to bring a refund suit after paying the tax. Bob Jones, 416 U. S., at 732; see also Americans United, 416 U. S., at 760–761. In other words, Americans United and Bob Jones instruct courts to look to the effects of a suit. And if a pre-enforcement suit would have the effect of preventing the assessment or collection of a tax, then that suit is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. Many courts have taken Americans United and Bob Jones at their word. And the Sixth Circuit did so here. … The Court today holds, however, that CIC’s pre-enforcement suit is not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. In so holding, the Court in effect carves out a new exception to Americans United and Bob Jones for pre-enforcement suits challenging regulations backed by tax penalties. I agree with the Court’s decision to narrow Americans United and Bob Jones because the broad “effects” rule articulated in those decisions is hard to square with the text of the AntiInjunction Act, which bars only a pre-enforcement “suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” §7421(a). Contrary to some sweeping language in Americans United and Bob Jones, the Anti-Injunction Act is best read as directing courts to look at the stated object of a suit rather than the suit’s downstream effects. And for that reason, as the Court explains, the text of the Anti-Injunction Act is best read as distinguishing (i) pre-enforcement suits challenging the regulatory component of a regulatory tax, which remain prohibited because the requested relief necessarily runs against the assessment or collection of a tax, from (ii) pre-enforcement suits challenging a regulation backed by a tax penalty, which may proceed because the requested relief runs against an independent legal obligation. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-930_d1o3.pdf BP P. L. C. ET AL. v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE TLDR: Technical question: is a court of appeals, reviewing a district court order sending a case back from federal court to a state court, able to review all of that order (that is, every possible basis for federal court jurisdiction), or only part of that order (that is, only the federal officer and civil rights removal to federal court portions)? Answer: all of the order. Holding / Majority Opinion (Gorsuch) This case began when Baltimore’s mayor and city council sued various energy companies for promoting fossil fuels while allegedly concealing their environmental impacts. But the merits of that claim have nothing to do with this appeal. The only question before us is one of civil procedure: Does 28 U. S. C. §1447(d) permit a court of appeals to review any issue in a district court order remanding a case to state court where the defendant premised removal in part on the federal officer removal statute, §1442, or the civil rights removal statute, §1443? [Baltimore sued BP in Maryland state court. BP removed the case to federal court citing a number of provisions, including one providing a federal forum for any action against an officer of the US or any agency, or any person acting under that officer, because part of BP’s drilling was at the request or at least color of the federal government (§1442). BP also identified a number of federal statutes which might support removal anyway. Baltimore tried to remand back to state court. The district court wrote a long order ultimately agreeing with the city on all counts and sending back to state court.] Normally that would have ended the matter. Since at least 1949, federal appellate courts have generally lacked the power to review a district court order remanding a case to state court. SBut like most rules, this one has accrued exceptions with time. In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress created an exception allowing appellate review for cases “‘removed pursuant to’” 28 U. S. C. §1443, a provision that guarantees a federal forum for certain federal civil rights claims. So before a civil rights case is returned to state court, a federal court of appeals usually can intervene to test the soundness of the district court’s remand order. In 2011, Congress added a similar exception for suits against federal officers or agencies removed pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1442. Here, too, Congress has deemed it appropriate to allow appellate review before a district court may remand a case to state court. All told, then, the law as it stands today provides that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” After the district court ordered the City’s case remanded to state court, the defendants sought to appeal—and this much everyone seemed to agree they were free to do. After all, the defendants had relied on the federal officer removal statute found in §1442 when they removed the case to federal court—and the current version of §1447(d) permits an appeal in just these circumstances. The real trouble began only when it came to the scope of the defendants’ appeal. The Fourth Circuit read §1447(d) as authorizing it to review only the part of the district court’s remand order discussing §1442. As a result, the court of appeals refused to consider whether the district court may have erred when it rejected the defendants’ other grounds for removal. Finding (only) the district court’s §1442 analysis sound, the Fourth Circuit proceeded to affirm. [So here is SCOTUS to decide if you can appeal the whole order (agreeing with the 7th circuit) or only the 1442 / 1443 parts (agreeing with the 4th circuit).] When called on to interpret a statute, this Court generally seeks to discern and apply the ordinary meaning of its terms at the time of their adoption. Here, the relevant portion of §1447(d) provides that “an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal.” To our minds, the first telling clue lies in the statute’s use of the term “order.” Whether we look to the time of §1447(d)’s adoption or amendment, a judicial “order” meant then what it means today: a “written direction or command delivered by . . . a court or judge.” So an “order remanding a case” was (and is) a formal command from a district court returning the case to state court. In this case, the district court’s remand order rejected all of the defendants’ grounds for removal. For good reason too. Normally, federal jurisdiction is not optional; subject to exceptions not relevant here, “courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction” assigned to them. So the district court wasn’t at liberty to remove the City’s case from its docket until it determined that it lacked any authority to entertain the suit. From this it would seem to follow that, when a district court’s removal order rejects all of the defendants’ grounds for removal, §1447(d) authorizes a court of appeals to review each and every one of them. After all, the statute allows courts of appeals to examine the whole of a district court’s “order,” not just some of its parts or pieces. Of course, §1447(d) extends appellate review only to some orders—those remanding a “case . . . removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443.” But it’s hard to see how that qualification changes the calculus. … How does the City reply? It suggests that exceptions to statutory rules should be construed narrowly—and that our reading of §1447(d)’s exception to its general rule against appellate review is too permissive. We disagree. As a preliminary matter, the factual premise underlying the City’s argument is surely contestable. One might just as easily conceive of §1447(d)’s usual rule barring appellate review as itself an exception to the even more general rule that final district court orders are appealable under 28 U. S. C. §1291. More fundamentally, the City’s legal premise is also in error. This Court has “‘no license to give statutory exemptions anything but a fair reading.’ ” Exceptions and exemptions are no less part of Congress’s work than its rules and standards—and all are worthy of a court’s respect. … Alternatively, the City suggests that, if Congress had wanted appellate courts to review every issue in a remand order, it would have said as much. Sometimes, the City observes, Congress does exactly that, expressly directing courts to resolve “all” legal issues in certain cases. ut the defendants remind us that Congress also knows how to limit appellate review to particular “questions” rather than the whole of a district court’s “order”; sometimes it does just that too. n the end, all of the parties’ fencing about language Congress didn’t use persuades us of only one thing— that we are best served by focusing on the language it did employ. … To the extent any doubt remains about how best to read §1447(d), we believe our most analogous precedent resolves it. In Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516 U. S. 199, 204 (1996), this Court faced a dispute about the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §1292(b). That statute allows a district court to certify “an order” to the court of appeals if it “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and if “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” In Yamaha, the Court asked the parties to address whether §1292(b) authorizes appellate courts to review any question contained in the district court’s order—or whether it allows those courts to address only the “controlling question of law” the district court certified for further review. The answer there is telling here. The Court held that, “[a]s the text of §1292(b) indicates, appellate jurisdiction applies to the order certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court.” … The Fourth Circuit erred in holding that it was powerless to consider all of the defendants’ grounds for removal under §1447(d). In light of that error, the defendants ask us to consider some of those additional grounds ourselves. That task, however, does not implicate the circuit split that we took this case to resolve and we believe the wiser course is to leave these matters for the Fourth Circuit to resolve in the first instance. The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Lineup: Gorsuch, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Breyer, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Dissent by Sotomayor. Alito took no part. Dissent (Sotomayor): Civil defendants in state court may remove a case to federal district court by asserting one or more bases for federal jurisdiction. If the district court concludes that the case was improperly removed, it issues an order remanding the case back to state court. For more than a century, the rule has been that such remand orders are generally not subject to appellate review. This rule, codified at 28 U. S. C. §1447(d), “reflects Congress’s longstanding policy of not permitting interruption of the litigation of the merits of a removed case by prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction of the district court to which the cause is removed.” Originally, there were no exceptions to §1447(d)’s bar on appellate review. Then, as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress created appellate jurisdiction over “‘order[s] remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443,’” the civil rights removal statute. In 2011, Congress extended this exception to cases removed pursuant to §1442, the federal officer removal statute. The Court today holds that a defendant who invokes either §1442 or §1443 when removing a case to federal court is entitled to appellate review of not just those grounds, but also any other grounds for removal the defendant asserts. I disagree. That interpretation lets defendants sidestep §1447(d)’s bar on appellate review by shoehorning a §1442 or §1443 argument into their case for removal. In other words, it lets the exception swallow the rule. Furthermore, when Congress amended §1447(d) to permit appellate review of decisions under §1442, every Court of Appeals to have addressed the question interpreted §1447(d) to permit appellate review of arguments under §1443 only, not of other arguments for removal addressed in the same order. If Congress wanted to disturb that consensus, it would have said so. I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1189_p86b.pdf
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May 20, 2021 16:51
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And now Edwards, because I needed 2 posts for all of these opinions. EDWARDS v. VANNOY, WARDEN TLDR: Nonunanimous jury convictions like Louisiana used to have before Ramos found it unconstitutional are not reviewable after the fact. Can’t have any more nonunanimous jury convictions going forward, but none of the people convicted under an unconstitutional scheme can get relief. Also, no new procedural rules (like a unanimous jury) will ever be retroactive. Holding / Majority Opinion (Kavanaugh) Last Term in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___ (2020), this Court held that a state jury must be unanimous to convict a criminal defendant of a serious offense. Ramos repudiated this Court’s 1972 decision in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404, which had allowed non-unanimous juries in state criminal trials. The question in this case is whether the new rule of criminal procedure announced in Ramos applies retroactively to overturn final convictions on federal collateral review. Under this Court’s retroactivity precedents, the answer is no. This Court has repeatedly stated that a decision announcing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. Indeed, in the 32 years since Teague underscored that principle, this Court has announced many important new rules of criminal procedure. But the Court has not applied any of those new rules retroactively on federal collateral review. [Edwards did a home invasion + kidnapping + rape + armed robbery in Baton Rouge in 2006, confessed on video, was convicted 10-2 on 4 counts and 11-1 on 3 other counts] In 2015, Edwards filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. He argued that the non-unanimous jury verdict violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury. The District Court rejected that claim as foreclosed by this Court’s 1972 decision in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404. In Apodaca, this Court ruled that the Constitution does not require unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials. … While Edwards’s petition for certiorari was pending, this Court decided Ramos and rejected Justice Powell’s opinion in Apodaca. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___ (2020); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972). The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury against the States. Therefore, in state court as well as federal court, a jury must be unanimous to convict a defendant of a serious offense. The Court’s decision in Ramos directly affected Louisiana and Oregon, which were the only two States that still allowed non-unanimous juries. For those States, this Court’s decision in Ramos immediately triggered a pressing question: Does Ramos apply retroactively to overturn final convictions on federal collateral review? We granted certiorari in Edwards’s case to decide that question. We conclude that Ramos does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. A new rule of criminal procedure applies to cases on direct review [still pending on a first set of appeals and not final], even if the defendant’s trial has already concluded. But under the habeas corpus statute as interpreted by this Court, a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not apply retroactively to overturn final convictions on federal collateral review. … As the Court has explained, applying “constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Here, for example, applying Ramos retroactively would potentially overturn decades of convictions obtained in reliance on Apodaca. Moreover, conducting scores of retrials years after the crimes occurred would require significant state resources. And a State may not be able to retry some defendants at all because of “lost evidence, faulty memory, and missing witnesses.” When previously convicted perpetrators of violent crimes go free merely because the evidence needed to conduct a retrial has become stale or is no longer available, the public suffers, as do the victims. Even when the evidence can be reassembled, conducting retrials years later inflicts substantial pain on crime victims who must testify again and endure new trials. In this case, the victims of the robberies, kidnappings, and rapes would have to relive their trauma and testify again, 15 years after the crimes occurred. Put simply, the “costs imposed upon the States by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus thus generally far outweigh the benefits of this application.” … The Court has identified only one possible exception to that principle. The Court has stated that a new procedural rule will apply retroactively on federal collateral review only if it constitutes a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure. But the Teague Court stated that it was “unlikely” that such watershed “components of basic due process have yet to emerge.” And in the 32 years since Teague, as we will explain, the Court has never found that any new procedural rule actually satisfies that purported exception. To determine whether Ramos applies retroactively on federal collateral review, we must answer two questions. First, did Ramos announce a new rule of criminal procedure, as opposed to applying a settled rule? A new rule ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. Second, if Ramos announced a new rule, does it fall within an exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that apply retroactively on federal collateral review? Ramos held that a state jury must be unanimous to convict a defendant of a serious offense. In so holding, Ramos announced a new rule. A rule is new unless it was “dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” In other words, a rule is new unless, at the time the conviction became final, the rule was already “apparent to all reasonable jurists.” The starkest example of a decision announcing a new rule is a decision that overrules an earlier case. … By renouncing Apodaca and expressly requiring unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials, Ramos plainly announced a new rule for purposes of this Court’s retroactivity doctrine. And new rules of criminal procedure ordinarily do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. Having determined that Ramos announced a new rule requiring jury unanimity, we must consider whether that new rule falls within an exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that apply retroactively on federal collateral review. This Court has stated that the watershed exception is “extremely narrow” and applies only when, among other things, the new rule alters “our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” In the abstract, those various adjectives—watershed, narrow, bedrock, essential—do not tell us much about whether a particular decision of this Court qualifies for the watershed exception. In practice, the exception has been theoretical, not real. The Court has identified only one pre-Teague procedural rule as watershed: the right to counsel recognized in the Court’s landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344–345 (1963). The Court has never identified any other pre-Teague or post-Teague rule as watershed. None. Moreover, the Court has flatly proclaimed on multiple occasions that the watershed exception is unlikely to cover any more new rules. ... Edwards seeks to distinguish Ramos from the long line of cases where the Court has declined to retroactively apply new procedural rules. Edwards emphasizes three aspects of Ramos: (i) the significance of the jury-unanimity right; (ii) Ramos’s reliance on the original meaning of the Constitution; and (iii) the effect of Ramos in preventing racial discrimination in the jury process. But Edwards’s attempts to distinguish Ramos are unavailing because the Court has already considered and rejected those kinds of arguments in prior retroactivity cases. First, Edwards emphasizes the significance of the jury-unanimity right for criminal defendants. But that argument for retroactivity cannot be squared with the Court’s decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), and DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 (1968) (per curiam). In Duncan, the Court repudiated several precedents and ruled that a defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial in a state criminal case. Notwithstanding the extraordinary significance of Duncan in guaranteeing a jury trial and expanding the rights of criminal defendants, the Court in DeStefano declined to retroactively apply the jury right. … Second, Edwards stresses that Ramos relied on the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment. But that argument for retroactivity is inconsistent with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), and Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406 (2007). In Crawford, the Court relied on the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause to overrule precedent and restrict the use of hearsay evidence against criminal defendants. Notwithstanding Crawford’s reliance on the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment, the Court in Whorton declined to retroactively apply Crawford. Third, Edwards says that Ramos prevents racial discrimination by ensuring that the votes of all jurors, regardless of race, matter in the jury room. But that argument for retroactivity cannot prevail in light of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), and Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255 (1986) (per curiam). In Batson, the Court overruled precedent and revolutionized day-to-day jury selection by holding that state prosecutors may not discriminate on the basis of race when exercising individual peremptory challenges. Nonetheless, the Court in Allen declined to retroactively apply Batson. The Court’s decisions in Duncan, Crawford, and Batson were momentous and consequential. All three decisions fundamentally reshaped criminal procedure throughout the United States and significantly expanded the constitutional rights of criminal defendants...Yet the Court did not apply any of those decisions retroactively on federal collateral review...Consistent with the Court’s long line of retroactivity precedents, we hold that the Ramos jury-unanimity rule does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. In so concluding, we recognize that the Court’s many retroactivity precedents taken together raise a legitimate question: If landmark and historic criminal procedure decisions—including Mapp, Miranda, Duncan, Crawford, Batson, and now Ramos—do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review, how can any additional new rules of criminal procedure apply retroactively on federal collateral review? At this point, some 32 years after Teague, we think the only candid answer is that none can—that is, no new rules of criminal procedure can satisfy the watershed exception. We cannot responsibly continue to suggest otherwise to litigants and courts. ... We respectfully offer four responses to the dissent. First, in the dissent’s view, if a right is important enough to justify overruling or repudiating precedent (as in Ramos), then it often is important enough to apply retroactively as a watershed rule of criminal procedure. But the Court’s precedents say the opposite….TAlthough Ramos stopped short of expressly deciding this retroactivity question (because it was not squarely presented), Ramos discussed retroactivity and plainly foreshadowed today’s decision. The lead opinion in Ramos—which was joined in relevant part by two of today’s dissenters, JUSTICE BREYER and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR—explained that overruling or repudiating Apodaca was not likely to significantly affect Louisiana’s and Oregon’s reliance interests in preserving final convictions because Ramos was not likely to apply retroactively on federal collateral review. … Second, the dissent suggests that the Court knows that Ramos should apply retroactively under the watershed exception, but wants to avoid applying Ramos retroactively, and for that reason has decided to just eliminate the watershed exception altogether. That suggestion is unfounded. Ramos was a momentous decision, and those of us who joined it continue to agree with it. But as we have explained, Ramos itself analyzed the Court’s retroactivity precedents and foretold today’s decision on retroactivity. … Third, on that last point, the dissent responds that Teague nominally identified a retroactivity exception for watershed procedural rules and that we should do so as well. But the problem, as we see it, is that Teague simultaneously said that it was “unlikely” that new procedural rules would qualify as watershed. 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion). So Teague took with one hand what it seemingly gave with the other. And in the 32 years since Teague, this Court has never once held that a new procedural rule qualifies for the purported watershed exception. What is more, the Court has regularly repeated that Teague’s watershed exception would likely never be satisfied. The Court today need not and does not overrule any post-Teague cases that held the watershed exception satisfied because there are no post-Teague cases that held the watershed exception satisfied. Fourth, the dissent asserts that the Court is not living up to the promise of Ramos for criminal defendants. To begin with, the dissent cannot reasonably charge the Court with failing to live up to Ramos given that Ramos itself explicitly forecast today’s decision on retroactivity. Moreover, with respect, JUSTICE KAGAN dissented in Ramos. To be sure, the dissent’s position on the jury-unanimity rule in Ramos was perfectly legitimate, as is the dissent’s position on retroactivity in today’s case. And it is of course fair for a dissent to vigorously critique the Court’s analysis. But it is another thing altogether to dissent in Ramos and then to turn around and impugn today’s majority for supposedly shortchanging criminal defendants. … Ramos announced a new rule of criminal procedure. It does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. We affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It is so ordered. Lineup: Kavanaugh, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Concurrence by Thomas, joined by Gorsuch. Concurrence by Gorsuch, joined by Thomas. Dissent by Kagan, joined by Breyer and Sotomayor. Concurrence (Thomas, joined by Gorsuch): I join the majority in full because it correctly charts its way through precedent to hold expressly what we have long implied: “New procedural rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.” I write separately to highlight that we could also have resolved this case by applying the statutory text of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA directs federal courts to deny “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court” unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” In 2011, petitioner urged a Louisiana court to hold that the Federal Constitution requires jury unanimity, and the court rejected that claim on the merits. That conclusion was consistent with Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), in which this Court determined that the Constitution does not require unanimous jury verdicts for state criminal convictions. AEDPA thus leaves no room for this Court—or any federal court—to grant relief. [Under the AEDPA] First, a prisoner must exhaust his claims in state court before he can seek relief in federal court. If “any available [state-law] procedure” remains open, a federal “writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted.” §§2254(b)–(c). Second, once a state court has had the opportunity to decide that claim, AEDPA demands that federal courts respect that judgment. The law precludes relief “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim” either (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” ... Here, the system worked as designed. Edwards presented his unanimous jury claim to a Louisiana court. And the state court reasonably relied on Apodaca in rejecting that claim. AEDPA is clear about what happens next—relief “shall not be granted.” Our analysis could have begun and ended there—with §2254(d)(1)’s plain text. Concurrence (Gorsuch, joined by Thomas): Sometimes this Court leaves a door ajar and holds out the possibility that someone, someday might walk through it— though no one ever has or, in truth, ever will. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), the Court suggested that one day it might apply a new “watershed” rule of criminal procedure retroactively to undo a final state court conviction. But that day never came to pass. Instead, over the following three decades this Court denied “watershed” status to one rule after another. Rules guaranteeing individuals the right to confront their accusers. Rules ensuring that only a jury may decide a defendant’s fate in a death penalty case. Rules preventing racially motivated jury selection. All failed to win retroactive application. Today, the Court candidly admits what has been long apparent: Teague held out a “false hope” and the time has come to close its door. We take this step not because this Court’s criminal procedure rulings are somehow unimportant. Any decision seeking to enforce liberties enshrined in the Constitution has a claim to “watershed” importance. Instead, we abandon Teague’s test because it poses a question this Court has no business asking. … This Court’s (in)activity since Teague only begins to make sense when viewed against the backdrop of the traditional rule that old judgments are impervious to new challenges. Yes, this Court’s decisions should apply to all cases pending in trial courts and on direct appeal. But they should not apply retroactively in habeas. The reason has nothing to do with whether Members of this Court happen to think the rules they announce are “new” in some sense or insufficiently “fundamental” in another. It’s simpler than that: The writ of habeas corpus does not authorize federal courts to reopen a judgment issued by a court of competent jurisdiction once it has become final. It’s here, too, where today’s decision makes its real contribution. If Teague pointed us back in the direction of the traditional rule, each of the cases that has followed in its wake has edged us, step-by-step, closer still. Today’s decision advances the progress by making express what has long been barely implicit: The “watershed” exception for new rules of criminal procedure is no exception at all. Not only does this development do much to honor the traditional understanding of habeas review and the great weight of this Court’s precedents throughout its history. It also allows us to retire a test that was unknown in law until 1989 and whose contours remain unknowable decades later. Dissent (Kagan, joined by Breyer and Sotomayor): “A verdict, taken from eleven, [i]s no verdict at all,” this Court proclaimed just last Term. Citing centuries of history, the Court in Ramos termed the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury “vital,” “essential,” “indispensable,” and “fundamental” to the American legal system. The Court therefore saw fit to disregard stare decisis and overturn a 50-year-old precedent enabling States to convict criminal defendants based on non-unanimous verdicts. And in taking that weighty step, the Court also vindicated core principles of racial justice. For in the Court’s view, the state laws countenancing non-unanimous verdicts originated in white supremacism and continued in our own time to have racially discriminatory effects. Put all that together, and it is easy to see why the opinions in Ramos read as historic. Rarely does this Court make such a fundamental change in the rules thought necessary to ensure fair criminal process. If you were scanning a thesaurus for a single word to describe the decision, you would stop when you came to “watershed.” Yet the Court insists that Ramos’s holding does not count as a “watershed” procedural rule under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 311 (1989). The result of today’s ruling is easily stated. Ramos will not apply retroactively, meaning that a prisoner whose appeals ran out before the decision can receive no aid from the change in law it made. So Thedrick Edwards, unlike Evangelisto Ramos, will serve the rest of his life in prison based on a 10-to-2 jury verdict. Only the reasoning of today’s holding resists explanation. The majority cannot (and indeed does not) deny, given all Ramos said, that the jury unanimity requirement fits to a tee Teague’s description of a watershed procedural rule. Nor can the majority explain its result by relying on precedent. Although flaunting decisions since Teague that held rules non-retroactive, the majority comes up with none comparable to this case. Search high and low the settled law of retroactivity, and the majority still has no reason to deny Ramos watershed status. So everything rests on the majority’s last move—the overturning of Teague’s watershed exception. If there can never be any watershed rules—as the majority here asserts out of the blue—then, yes, jury unanimity cannot be one. The result follows trippingly from the premise. But adopting the premise requires departing from judicial practice and principle. In overruling a critical aspect of Teague, the majority follows none of the usual rules of stare decisis. It discards precedent without a party requesting that action. And it does so with barely a reason given, much less the “special justification” our law demands. ... Start with what Teague and its progeny repeatedly said about what makes a new rule of criminal procedure “watershed” (so that, before today, the rule applied retroactively).2 A watershed rule, we held, is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Such a rule addresses one of “the bedrock procedural elements” of the criminal process. Or similarly stated, it plays a “fundamental” and “central[ ]” role in a trial. More specifically, a new rule, to qualify as watershed, must be “essential to [the trial’s] fairness.” And it must go to the defendant’s guilt or innocence, “prevent[ing] an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction.” Those requirements set a high bar. But they capture—or anyway, were once meant to—a “small core of rules” needed to fairly adjudicate a defendant’s guilt. The first clue that the unanimity rule falls within Teague’s small core is that the Court thought its adoption justified overturning precedent. Ramos didn’t just announce a new rule. It reversed a prior, well-settled one...the Ramos majority described Apodaca as flouting the essential “meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right,” as revealed in both historical practice and judicial decisions. … Twice before, this Court retroactively applied rules that are similarly integral to jury verdicts. First, in Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U. S. 203, 204 (1972) (per curiam), we gave “complete retroactive effect” to the rule of In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), that a jury must find guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Like Ramos, Winship rested on an “ancient” legal tradition incorporated into the Constitution. As in Ramos, that tradition served to “safeguard men” from “unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures” of freedom. And as in Ramos, that protection plays a “vital” part in “the American scheme of criminal procedure.” With all that established, the Ivan V. Court needed just two pages to hold Winship retroactive, highlighting the reasonable-doubt standard’s “indispensable” role in “reducing the risk” of wrongful convictions. 407 U. S., at 204–205. Second, in Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S. 323 (1980), we retroactively applied the rule of Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130 (1979), that a six-person guilty verdict must be unanimous. Think about that for a moment: We held retroactive a unanimity requirement, no different from the one here save that it applied to a smaller jury. The reasoning should by now sound familiar. Allowing conviction by a non-unanimous jury “impair[s]” the “purpose and functioning of the jury,” undermining the Sixth Amendment’s very “essence.” It “raises serious doubts about the fairness of [a] trial.” And it fails to “assure the reliability of [a guilty] verdict.” So when a jury has divided, as when it has failed to apply the reasonable-doubt standard, “there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.” … The majority argues in reply that the jury unanimity rule is not so fundamental because . . . . Well, no, scratch that. Actually, the majority doesn’t contest anything I’ve said about the foundations and functions of the unanimity requirement. Nor could the majority reasonably do so. For everything I’ve said about the unanimity rule comes straight out of Ramos’s majority and concurring opinions. Just check the citations: I’ve added barely a word to what those opinions (often with soaring rhetoric) proclaim. Start with history. The ancient foundations of the unanimous jury rule? Check. The inclusion of that rule in the Sixth Amendment’s original meaning? Check. Now go to function. The fundamental (or bedrock or central) role of the unanimous jury in the American system of criminal justice? Check. The way unanimity figures in ensuring fairness in criminal trials and protecting against wrongful guilty verdicts? Check. The link between those purposes and safeguarding the jury system from (past and present) racial prejudice? Check. In sum: As to every feature of the unanimity rule conceivably relevant to watershed status, Ramos has already given the answer—check, check, check— and today’s majority can say nothing to the contrary. Instead, the majority relies on decisions holding non-retroactive various other—even though dissimilar—procedural rules. In making that argument from past practice, the majority adopts two discrete tactics. Call the first “throw everything against the wall.” Call the second “slice and dice.” Neither can avail to render the jury unanimity rule anything less than what Ramos thought it—as the majority concedes, “momentous.” As its first move, the majority lists as many decisions holding rules non-retroactive as it can muster. The premise here is that sheer volume matters: The majority presents the catalog as if every rule is as important as every other and as if comparing any to the unanimity requirement is beside the point. But that idea founders on this Court’s constant refrain that watershed rules are only a small subset of procedural rules. … Enter the majority’s second stratagem, which tries to conquer by dividing. Here, the majority picks out “three aspects of Ramos” pointing toward watershed status, and names one prior decision to match each of the three. So in addressing the unanimity rule’s “significance,” the majority notes that the Court once held the jury-trial right non-retroactive. In tackling Ramos’s return to “original meaning,” the majority points to our decision that an originalist rule about hearsay evidence should not apply backward. And in discussing Ramos’s role in “prevent[ing] racial discrimination,” the majority invokes our denial of retroactivity to a rule making it easier to prove race-based peremptory strikes. What the majority doesn’t find—or even pretend to—is any decision corresponding to Ramos on all of those dimensions. So the majority is left to overrule Teague’s holding on watershed rules. On the last page or so of its merits discussion (before it turns to pre-butting this dissent), the majority eliminates the watershed exception, declaring it “long past time” to do so. Teague had said there would not be “many” (retroactive) watershed rules. 489 U. S., at 313 (plurality opinion). The majority now says there will be none at all. If that is so, of course, jury unanimity cannot be watershed. Finally, the majority offers an intelligible reason for declining to apply Ramos retroactively. But in taking that road, the majority breaks a core judicial rule: respect for precedent. Stare decisis is a foundation stone of the rule of law, “promot[ing] the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Adherence to precedent is, of course, “not an inexorable command.” Ramos itself teaches that much. But Ramos also shows how high stare decisis sets the bar for overruling a prior decision. To reverse course, we insist on compelling reasons, thorough explanation, and careful attention to competing interests. But not here. The majority crawls under, rather than leaps over, the stare decisis bar. To begin with, no one here asked us to overrule Teague. This Court usually confines itself to the issues raised and briefed by the parties. … Equally striking, the majority gives only the sketchiest of reasons for reversing Teague’s watershed exception. In deciding whether to depart from precedent, the Court usually considers—and usually at length—a familiar set of factors capable of providing the needed special justification. The majority can’t be bothered with that customary, and disciplining, practice; it barely goes through the motions. Seldom has this Court so casually, so off-handedly, tossed aside precedent. In its page of analysis, the majority offers just one ground for its decision—that since Teague, the Court has not identified a new rule as watershed, and so “the purported exception has become an empty promise.” … I would not discard Teague’s watershed exception and so keep those unfairly convicted people from getting new trials. Instead, I would accept the consequences of last Term’s holding in Ramos. A decision like that comes with a promise, or at any rate should. If the right to a unanimous jury is so fundamental—if a verdict rendered by a divided jury is “no verdict at all”—then Thedrick Edwards should not spend his life behind bars over two jurors’ opposition. I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-5807_new_3e04.pdf
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May 20, 2021 16:52
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Why was there even a lawsuit in Caniglia v. Strom at all? Did the police just refuse to give Caniglia back his guns?
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May 20, 2021 17:07
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Some Guy TT posted:Why was there even a lawsuit in Caniglia v. Strom at all? Did the police just refuse to give Caniglia back his guns? More or less. https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/03/theres-no-place-like-home/ tldr: Cops intervened after a domestic dispute got scary and sent him for a psych evaluation. He claims he agreed to go quietly if the cops let him keep his guns. His wife turned over the guns anyway, and the cops wouldn't give them back.
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May 20, 2021 17:12
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Some Guy TT posted:Why was there even a lawsuit in Caniglia v. Strom at all? Did the police just refuse to give Caniglia back his guns? He sued just for the fourth amendment and related state constitutional and statutory claim violations of taking the guns sans warrant in the first place.
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May 20, 2021 17:14
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It looks like he did get the guns back but it took such a comically long time he decided to sue for damages because they stole his guns. Good grief. I wonder how much money the department wasted on this incredibly stupid case just because they really wanted to steal some guns.
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May 20, 2021 17:18
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Some Guy TT posted:It looks like he did get the guns back but it took such a comically long time he decided to sue for damages because they stole his guns. Good grief. I wonder how much money the department wasted on this incredibly stupid case just because they really wanted to steal some guns. Law enforcement agencies love to seize guns and will do just about anything to avoid giving them back, irrespective of the merits of the underlying seizure. See Wright v. Beck at the 9th Circuit in late 2020.
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May 21, 2021 02:15
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Some Guy TT posted:It looks like he did get the guns back but it took such a comically long time he decided to sue for damages because they stole his guns. Good grief. I wonder how much money the department wasted on this incredibly stupid case just because they really wanted to steal some guns. How much money has every level of law enforcement and judiciary wasted because they didn't want to follow the actual law and instead do whatever the gently caress they wanted? Hell, the whole of civil forfeiture is this. State and federal governments waste obscene amounts of tax payer dollars protecting bad actors.
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May 21, 2021 03:52
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I'm pretty sure "never give anyone their guns back, I don't care if it's legal" is actually what the majority of California / Rhode Island voters want.
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May 21, 2021 04:20
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Raenir Salazar posted:It's a huge leap to suggest Biden's position on the Hyde amendment (which in the article you apparently didn't read says he's open to repealing it) has anything to do with what he'll do if the Supreme Court were to overturn Roe vs Wade. Can you quote a Joe Biden who agrees with your version of him on abortion or women's rights before the last primary
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May 21, 2021 08:28
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tom kite posted:Can you quote a Joe Biden who agrees with your version of him on abortion or women's rights before the last primary NYTimes posted:By the time he left the vice president’s mansion in early 2017, he was a 74-year-old who argued a far different view: that government doesn’t have “a right to tell other people that women, they can’t control their body,” as he put it in 2012. source Recent reporting on his decades-earlier statements about thinking RvW went "too far" makes it hard to google for quotes that are more specific while also being from the desired timeframe. I don't think anyone would argue his position at the end of the Obama admin--let alone his claimed position now--isn't far removed from ones he took earlier in his career. But I don't see any way to dismiss the above as meaningless words that wouldn't also cover literally saying "if RvW is overturned I will fight to pass a law protecting abortion rights." Like, if he's willing to lie, the specifics of the lie don't really matter. Which I suppose is a coherent position to take, but as MPF pointed out it doesn't really leave much room for meaningful discussion.
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May 21, 2021 17:54
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Some Guy TT posted:
Why? The standard exists externally to the Judge. If anything that's the approach disgruntled petitioners should turn to if they received unfair treatment. I think there are many issues with having lay judges presiding over court, but ethics doesn't come to mind as near the top of the list Grip it and rip it fucked around with this message at 18:22 on May 21, 2021 |
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May 21, 2021 18:18
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Blue Footed Booby posted:source From the intercept article, the quote is actually "If they ruled it to be unconstitutional, I will send to the United States Congress, and it will pass I believe, a bill that legislates Roe v. Wade adjusted by Casey." Given how poo poo Casey is, that's not a great stance.
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May 21, 2021 18:20
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Stickman posted:From the intercept article, the quote is actually "If they ruled it to be unconstitutional, I will send to the United States Congress, and it will pass I believe, a bill that legislates Roe v. Wade adjusted by Casey." Given how poo poo Casey is, that's not a great stance. No but it's a drat sight better than shrugging off the question. I don't think it will come to this, because I think the narrow nature of the question taken up by SCOTUS will let them weasel out of writing the strongly-bad opinion (i.e. overturn everything).
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May 21, 2021 18:43
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mdemone posted:I don't think it will come to this, because I think the narrow nature of the question taken up by SCOTUS will let them weasel out of writing the strongly-bad opinion (i.e. overturn everything). Yeah that lets them keep abortion “legal” while never disapproving of a restriction making abortion “impossible to obtain in practice.”
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May 21, 2021 18:52
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mdemone posted:No but it's a drat sight better than shrugging off the question. Honestly, we're past the point where there should be national legislation anyway. Many states have already eroded abortion rights to basically nothing, and whatever the outcome of this case it's certainly not going to make it easier for women in those states to exercise their rights!
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May 21, 2021 18:53
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Grip it and rip it posted:Why? The standard exists externally to the Judge. If anything that's the approach disgruntled petitioners should turn to if they received unfair treatment. Did you read the article? It's about how this judge can't be effectively held to an ethical standard because the official enforcement mechanisms are almost never used. It's not said explicitly, but I got the impression this is because most judges are kept in line by the threat of losing their license to practice law, which isn't a disincentive for a person who never had a license to practice law in the first place.
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May 21, 2021 23:41
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https://twitter.com/washingtonpost/status/1395115565619073033
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May 22, 2021 06:02
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Makes sense. If Biden truly supports Douglass Commonwealth statehood he should be pushing to give them as much autonomy as possible within the current system, especially where it could decrease historical oppression.
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May 22, 2021 08:01
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Stickman posted:Douglass Commonwealth I dunno if you came up with it or not but I had never heard this before and it owns.
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May 22, 2021 16:30
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Proust Malone posted:I dunno if you came up with it or not but I had never heard this before and it owns. It's actually the name that was chosen by the DC city council and used in the admission act that was passed by the US House. Personally I find "State of Washington, Douglass Commonwealth" to be kind of a gimmicky mouthful, but some of the supporters love it and it's just a name.
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May 22, 2021 16:46
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| # ? May 17, 2024 19:11 |
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DC gun laws are pretty infamously lovely and, in the spirit of US gun control history, used to disproportionately target minorities/the poor. So that sounds pretty good to reverse Trump's work to make them even worse.
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May 22, 2021 17:22
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