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 Opinions! A per curiam "just whack this guy" before the Court leaves town for the summer. JEFFERSON S. DUNN, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. MATTHEW REEVES TLDR: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 really does mean that federal courts can’t second-guess state courts on death penalty convictions. Even if you try to make an ineffective assistance of counsel claim but don’t call your prior counsel to testify. Holding / Majority Opinion (Per Curiam) Willie Johnson towed Matthew Reeves’ broken-down car back to the city after finding Reeves stranded on an Alabama dirt road. In payment for this act of kindness, Reeves murdered Johnson, stole his money, and mocked his dying spasms. Years after being convicted of murder and sentenced to death, Reeves sought state postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel should have hired an expert to develop sentencing-phase mitigation evidence of intellectual disability. But despite having the burden to rebut the strong presumption that his attorneys made a legitimate strategic choice, Reeves did not call any of them to testify. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief, stressing that lack of evidence about counsel’s decisions impeded Reeves’ efforts to prove that they acted unreasonably. On federal habeas review, the Eleventh Circuit held that this analysis was not only wrong, but indefensible. In an unpublished, per curiam opinion that drew heavily on a dissent from denial of certiorari, the Eleventh Circuit reinterpreted the Alabama court’s lengthy opinion as imposing a simple per se prohibition on relief in all cases where a prisoner fails to question his counsel. It was the Eleventh Circuit, however, that went astray in its “readiness to attribute error.” Federal habeas courts must defer to reasonable state-court decisions, 28 U. S. C. §2254(d), and the Alabama court’s treatment of the spotty record in this case was consistent with this Court’s recognition that “the absence of evidence cannot overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” … Alabama charged Reeves with murder and appointed counsel for him. His attorneys took several steps to develop mitigating evidence, including exploring the possibility that Reeves was intellectually disabled. For example, they obtained extensive records of Reeves’ educational, medical, and correctional history. Counsel also requested funding to hire a neuropsychologist, Dr. John Goff, to evaluate Reeves and prepare mitigation evidence. And when the trial court initially rejected that request, counsel successfully sought reconsideration. After the court granted funding, Reeves’ attorneys managed to acquire additional mental-health records from the State, including documents related to a pretrial competency evaluation that featured a partial administration of an IQ test. The totality of the evidence reflected that Reeves had a troubled childhood, suffered from numerous behavioral difficulties, and was within the “borderline” range of intelligence. While in school—before being expelled for violence and misbehavior—he had been referred to special services for emotional conflict and behavioral issues. But Reeves’ records also showed that he had previously been denied special educational services for intellectual disability. Counsel also learned that Reeves had attended classes and earned certificates in welding, masonry, and automotive mechanics. And the psychologist who initially evaluated Reeves later opined that he was not intellectually disabled. At some point before trial, Reeves’ attorneys apparently elected to pursue other mitigation strategies instead of hiring Dr. Goff. The record does not reveal the exact reason for this decision—likely because Reeves did not ask them to testify. The record does show, however, that counsel presented a holistic mitigation case. … [Reeves was sentenced to death and] later sought post-conviction relief in state court, alleging almost 20 theories of error. Relevant here, he asserted that he was categorically exempt from execution by reason of intellectual disability, or at the very least that counsel should have hired Dr. Goff to develop mitigation along those lines for use at sentencing. At a 2-day hearing in state court, Reeves called two experts, including Dr. Goff. The doctor concluded that Reeves was intellectually disabled, explaining that the so-called Flynn Effect—a controversial theory involving the inflation of IQ scores over time—required adjusting Reeves’ score downward into the 60s. Dr. Goff also cited a number of behavioral assessments that supposedly showed Reeves’ shortcomings in adaptive functioning. For its part, the State offered the expert testimony of Dr. King, who administered his own evaluation and concluded that Reeves was not intellectually disabled. In fact, Dr. King pointed out that Reeves had a leadership role in a drug-dealing group and earned as much as $2,000 a week. Despite Reeves’ focus on his attorney’s performance, he did not give them the opportunity to explain their actions. Although all three of his lawyers apparently were alive and available, Reeves did not call them to testify. The trial court denied relief, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. First, it agreed that Reeves had failed to prove that he was actually intellectually disabled and thus exempt from execution. The court specifically addressed Dr. Goff ’s reliance on the Flynn Effect, reiterating that this approach “has not been accepted as scientifically valid by all courts” and was “not settled in the psychological community.” In fact, even Dr. Goff had “admitted that he did not use the ‘Flynn Effect’ for over 20 years after it was first discovered.” Second, the court rejected Reeves’ claim that counsel should have hired an expert to develop mitigating evidence of intellectual disability. Stressing that an attorney’s decision not to hire an expert is “typically [a] strategic decisio[n]” that will “not constitute per se deficient performance,” the court looked to the record to assess the “reasoning behind counsel’s actions.” In this case, the court observed, “the record [was] silent as to th[ose] reasons” “because Reeves failed to call his counsel to testify.” Hence, he could not overcome the “presumption of effectiveness” that courts must afford to trial counsel. … Like every court before it, the Eleventh Circuit first rejected Reeves’ claim that he was intellectually disabled. But, it held that his lawyers were constitutionally deficient for not developing more evidence of intellectual disability and that this failure might have changed the outcome of the trial. In reaching that result, the Eleventh Circuit explained that it owed no deference to the “unreasonable” decision of the Alabama court. Quoting at length from the earlier dissent from denial of certiorari, the panel reasoned that “a per se rule that the petitioner must present counsel’s testimony” was clearly contrary to federal law. … This case presents a simple question: Did the Alabama court violate clearly established federal law when it rejected Reeves’ claim that his attorneys should have hired an expert? In answering this question, we owe deference to both Reeves’ counsel and the state court. As to counsel, we have often explained that strategic decisions—including whether to hire an expert—are entitled to a “strong presumption” of reasonableness. Defense lawyers have “limited” time and resources, and so must choose from among “‘countless’” strategic options. Such decisions are particularly difficult because certain tactics carry the risk of “harm[ing] the defense” by undermining credibility with the jury or distracting from more important issues. The burden of rebutting this presumption “rests squarely on the defendant,” and “[i]t should go without saying that the absence of evidence cannot overcome [it].” In fact, even if there is reason to think that counsel’s conduct “was far from exemplary,” a court still may not grant relief if “[t]he record does not reveal” that counsel took an approach that no competent lawyer would have chosen. This analysis is “doubly deferential” when, as here, a state court has decided that counsel performed adequately. A federal court may grant habeas relief only if a state court violated “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” This “wide latitude” means that federal courts can correct only “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice syste[m].” And in reviewing the work of their peers, federal judges must begin with the “presumption that state courts know and follow the law.” Or, in more concrete terms, a federal court may grant relief only if every “‘fair-minded juris[t]’” would agree that every reasonable lawyer would have made a different decision. A straightforward application of these principles reveals the extent of the Eleventh Circuit’s error. We start, as we must, with the case as it came to the Alabama court. Reeves had filed a 100-plus-page brief alleging manifold errors, including several theories of ineffective assistance of counsel. Many of these attacked basic strategic choices, including his current argument that counsel should have hired Dr. Goff to develop additional evidence of intellectual disability. Yet, despite Reeves’ determination to find fault with his lawyers, he offered no testimony or other evidence from them. That omission was particularly significant given the “range of possible reasons [Reeves’] counsel may have had for proceeding as they did.” This is not a case in which a lawyer “failed to uncover and present any evidence of [Reeves’] mental health or mental impairment, [or] his family background.” Counsel’s initial enthusiasm to collect Reeves’ records and obtain funding hardly indicates professional neglect and disinterest. Rather, we simply do not know what information and considerations emerged as counsel reviewed the case and refined their strategy. … We think it clear from context that the Alabama court did not apply a blanket rule, but rather determined that the facts of this case did not merit relief. As an initial matter, the Alabama court twice recognized that there can be instances of “per se deficient performance.” It simply concluded that here, counsel’s choice regarding experts involved a strategic decision entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. … Even more important, the actual analysis of the claim at issue here reflects a case-specific approach. The court did not merely say, as the Eleventh Circuit wrongly suggested, that Reeves’ “‘failure to call his attorneys to testify was fatal to his claims.’” Rather, the opinion prefaced this quote with an important qualifier—“In this case.” And sure enough, the court proceeded to explain why Reeves could not prevail “in this case”—because “the record [was] silent as to the reasoning behind counsel’s actions.” To be sure, the record in this particular case happened to be deficient “because Reeves failed to call his counsel to testify.” But, this unremarkable observation of cause and effect in light of the facts before the court was hardly an absolute bar in every case where other record evidence might fill in the details. And, it certainly was not contrary to clearly established law given that this Court and the Eleventh Circuit have made the same observation that a silent record cannot discharge a prisoner’s burden. For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Lineup: Unknown, but Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor dissent. Dissent by Sotomayor, joined by Kagan. Dissent (Sotomayor, joined by Kagan) Under Strickland v. Washington, courts must assess a defendant’s claim that his attorney failed to provide constitutionally effective assistance “in light of all the circumstances.” No single type of evidence is a prerequisite to relief. Therefore, as the majority implicitly acknowledges, a per se rule that a habeas petitioner’s claim fails if his attorney did not testify at an evidentiary hearing is flatly incompatible with Strickland. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama applied precisely such a rule in this case. When respondent Matthew Reeves raised several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claims in state postconviction proceedings, the court stated, in no uncertain terms (and underlined for emphasis), that “to overcome the strong presumption of effectiveness, a Rule 32 petitioner must, at his evidentiary hearing, question trial counsel regarding his or her actions and reasoning.” Applying that rule “[i]n this case,” the court held that “Reeves’s failure to call his attorneys to testify is fatal to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Reeves then sought habeas relief in federal court. Based on the state court’s clear holding, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit properly determined that the state court’s use of the per se rule was an unreasonable application of Strickland. Through linguistic contortion, the Court today rescues the state court’s decision by construing it not to apply a per se rule at all. Based on that implausible reading, the Court summarily reverses the Eleventh Circuit’s grant of relief. The lengths to which this Court goes to ensure that Reeves remains on death row are extraordinary. I respectfully dissent. … The Eleventh Circuit... read the state appellate court’s decision to “trea[t] Mr. Reeves’ failure to call his counsel to testify as a per se bar to relief—despite ample evidence in the record to overcome the presumption of adequate representation.” In so doing, the state court “unreasonably applied Strickland.” The Eleventh Circuit accordingly reviewed Reeves’ claim de novo and found that Reeves had proved ineffective assistance of counsel. The Eleventh Circuit was not alone in interpreting the state court’s decision to apply a “categorical rule.” Less than a month earlier, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama (the same court that had issued the decision in question) denied another defendant’s IAC claim. Once again, the court stated its per se rule: “[T]o overcome the strong presumption of effectiveness, a Rule 32 petitioner must, at his evidentiary hearing, question trial counsel regarding his or her actions and reasoning.”In support, the court cited its prior decision in Reeves, which it summarized as “holding that [a] Rule 32 petitioner had failed to prove his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel because he did not call his trial or appellate counsel to testify at the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing.” As in Reeves’ case, the court in M.D.D. held that “the failure to have trial counsel testify is fatal to M.D.D.’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” The State petitioned this Court to review the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Reeves. Despite the Alabama court’s plain embrace of a per se rule, the State accused the Eleventh Circuit of too “readily attributing error to the state court” by interpreting its decision to “purportedly creat[e] and us[e] this per se rule.” On that basis, the State asked this Court to reverse summarily the Eleventh Circuit. The sole question presented in this case is whether the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama applied a categorical rule that Reeves’ failure to call his attorneys to testify was fatal to his IAC claim as a matter of law. No one disputes that such a rule would be an “unreasonable application” of Strickland and its progeny. Under those decisions, no single type of evidence, such as counsel’s testimony, is a prerequisite to relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals improperly applied such a per se rule here. It began by invoking Reeves’ burden “to present evidence” sufficient to overcome the “strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably.” It then ignored all of the evidence that Reeves’ counsel had acted unreasonably, including Dr. Goff’s description of the evaluation he would have conducted, Dr. Ronan’s warning that her testimony was no substitute for an actual intellectual disability assessment, and trial counsel’s repeated representations about the necessity of hiring Dr. Goff to conduct such an evaluation. The court held that none of this evidence mattered because trial counsel did not testify: “[B]ecause Reeves failed to call his counsel to testify, the record is silent as to the reasons trial counsel . . . chose not to hire Dr. Goff or another neuropsychologist.” Ibid. The court treated that fact as “fatal” to Reeves’ claim. … The Court declares that it is “clear from context that the Alabama court did not apply a blanket rule, but rather determined that the facts of this case did not merit relief.” The problem is that the “facts of this case” make no appearance in the state court’s discussion. This Court thus searches for some sign (any sign) that the state court implicitly assessed the facts of the case. … Finally, the Court latches on to three words, “[i]n this case,” insisting that they prove that the state court merely concluded that trial counsel’s testimony was critical to Reeves’ IAC claim “[i]n this case.” But in using the phrase “[i]n this case,” the state court was not addressing the evidentiary record. It was analogizing Reeves’ case to the many cases it had just cited for the proposition that “‘a Rule 32 petitioner must, at his evidentiary hearing, question trial counsel regarding his or her actions and reasoning.’” It then concluded that “Reeves’s failure to call his attorneys to testify” in this case was similarly “fatal to his claims.” If the state court had meant to weigh the evidence in the record, it would have. It did not. This Court is putting words in the state court’s mouth that the state court never uttered, and which are flatly inconsistent with what the state court did say. Finding no relevant factual analysis in the state court’s decision, this Court attempts its own, speculating as to what Reeves’ counsel might have said had they been called to testify. For instance, the Court imagines that “counsel may have uncovered additional evidence confirming their concerns about an intellectual-disability strategy.” The Court also insinuates that Reeves may have strategically declined to call his trial counsel to avoid harmful testimony. But if counsel’s testimony would have been damaging to Reeves’ claim, one would have expected the State to call counsel to testify. Yet the State expressly declined to do so, despite having counsel available to testify. The Court’s eagerness to invent scenarios harmful to Reeves’ claim stems from its apparent belief that “the Alabama court was entitled to reject Reeves’ claim if trial counsel had any ‘possible reaso[n] . . . for proceeding as they did.’” That view has no basis in this Court’s precedent. Cullen did not hold that an IAC claim fails if a court can imagine any possible reason for counsel’s actions. No claim could ever survive such a standard. One can always imagine some unsubstantiated reason for what trial counsel did. Cullen instead stated that, to assess whether counsel’s conduct was reasonable, courts must “entertain the range of possible reasons” for counsel’s actions in light of the events and evidence actually established in the record. The Court’s speculations about what may have occurred after Dr. Goff ’s appointment are pure conjecture. In any case, the Court’s guesswork is beside the point because it was not the basis for the state court’s decision. When a state court gives a reasoned explanation for its decision, federal habeas courts must review that decision on its own terms. Here, the state court relied solely on the mere fact that Reeves’ counsel did not testify. That is the only reason subject to our review, and it plainly contravenes Strickland. … In Reeves’ case, this Court stops the lower court from granting Reeves’ petition by adopting an utterly implausible reading of the state court’s decision. In essence, the Court turns “deference,” into a rule that federal habeas relief is never available to those facing execution. I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/070221zor_4gc5.pdf (start at page 4)
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Jul 2, 2021 16:16
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Has anyone broken down the stats on this court's use of per curiam rulings as compared to previous courts? It feels like a departure to me to see 6-3 conservative rulings consistently presented in unsigned per curiam format.
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Jul 2, 2021 16:26
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https://twitter.com/SCOTUSblog/status/1410958901760118789 Huh. So the evangelical Supreme Court pick didn't want to pick a fight over gay weddings. Interesting.
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Jul 2, 2021 16:49
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Can't wait to see them overturn Sullivan and then follow it up with a statement that anti-SLAPP laws are also unconstitutional just as an added gently caress You to people who dare step out of line against their wealthy overlords. 
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Jul 2, 2021 17:47
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Some Guy TT posted:https://twitter.com/SCOTUSblog/status/1410958901760118789
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Jul 2, 2021 18:07
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https://mobile.twitter.com/GregStohr/status/1411025687486533637
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Jul 3, 2021 00:16
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And thus Joe Biden becomes the first president since Jimmy Carter to have zero Supreme Court appointments for his entire term in office.
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Jul 3, 2021 08:14
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It's really incredible how Democrats learned nothing from RBG Or maybe they just don't care, it's not like they don't welcome the pro-child-slavery or union-busting decisions the Roberts court is churning out
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Jul 3, 2021 13:41
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What would you like Democrats to do exactly to the lifetime appointed Supreme Court justice? Poison him? Threaten his family? Promise him he can pick his successor? Justice Breyer is not ‘the Democrats.’ He’s one old man in a powerful position who has no desire to give it up and there is no legal way to make him.
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Jul 3, 2021 13:46
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Oracle posted:Promise him he can pick his successor? Remind me again why this is off limits. That's basically what happened with Kavanaugh and it was such a non scandal no one even brought it up at the confirmation hearings.
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Jul 3, 2021 13:52
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Oracle posted:What would you like Democrats to do exactly to the lifetime appointed Supreme Court justice? Poison him? Threaten his family? Promise him he can pick his successor? They aren't even doing the bare minimum: calling on him to retire
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Jul 3, 2021 14:01
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Some Guy TT posted:Remind me again why this is off limits. That's basically what happened with Kavanaugh and it was such a non scandal no one even brought it up at the confirmation hearings. Politically it would be tricky, considering Biden has publicly and repeatedly said that his first nominee will be a black woman. Quorum posted:Has anyone broken down the stats on this court's use of per curiam rulings as compared to previous courts? It feels like a departure to me to see 6-3 conservative rulings consistently presented in unsigned per curiam format. I don't have the stats, but I believe it takes six votes to skip oral argument and issue a per curiam decision, which would be why with a 6-3 conservative majority you see it more often than in the past-- and on cases with a lot more heft.
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Jul 3, 2021 14:03
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VitalSigns posted:It's really incredible how Democrats learned nothing from RBG People like pelosi barely care if at all. They’re old and rich and don’t have to worry about the country collapsing into a theocratic state in the near future because most of them will be dead. As for Breyer I don’t care what has to be done, make him retire. Refusing to do so just means ap that in the end he’s as much a selfish rear end in a top hat as RBG was.
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Jul 3, 2021 14:25
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Breyer can still retire after next term and the Democrats will be able to fill the seat (unless some D retires or dies which is a possibility). We saw how fast Barrett was nominated and approved, the end of the next term gives plenty of time. Ds would probably screw it up still but hey, at least there is hope.
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Jul 3, 2021 14:41
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Bizarro Kanyon posted:Breyer can still retire after next term and the Democrats will be able to fill the seat (unless some D retires or dies which is a possibility). We saw how fast Barrett was nominated and approved, the end of the next term gives plenty of time. Given the average age of the Democratic Senate caucus that possibility is very much not a non zero one
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Jul 3, 2021 15:04
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That would be more reassuring if the senate weren't 50-50 One Democratic senator dies and is replaced by a Republican governor or the Dems screw the special election like they did with Ted Kennedy and the majority is gone.
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Jul 3, 2021 15:06
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Oracle posted:What would you like Democrats to do exactly to the lifetime appointed Supreme Court justice? Poison him? look ive been playing crusader kings and this isn't /entirely/ out of the question
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Jul 3, 2021 15:17
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VitalSigns posted:That would be more reassuring if the senate weren't 50-50 I mean, this argument also applies if Breyer steps down tomorrow.
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Jul 3, 2021 15:18
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I'ver never really understood the attitude that if you don't have the power to command or force something to happen unilaterally, then you don't need to try or even give a poo poo at all. In the American system, Democrats also don't have the power to force voters to vote for them, but nobody says "well since we can't threaten their families to get votes, no need to campaign or advertise or try to convince anyone, if you can't unilaterally order someone to do a thing at gunpoint there's no point in doing anything except sitting back and hoping things go your way" Hieronymous Alloy posted:I mean, this argument also applies if Breyer steps down tomorrow. Yeah but due to how the arrow of time works in our physical universe, a year of taking a horrible risk is more likely to gently caress you over than a week of taking a horrible risk
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Jul 3, 2021 15:27
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VitalSigns posted:I'ver never really understood the attitude that if you don't have the power to command or force something to happen unilaterally, then you don't need to try or even give a poo poo at all. It's very fatalistic, like it assumes no one can ever be persuaded about anything and the only way to win is to triangulate until you appeal to enough people's preexisting fixed preferences. I do think the Democrats could do more if they wanted to. Breyer gets pushback from the left wing of the Democratic Party, but seemingly not from the centre. Of course it's possible that pressure on him just makes him want to stay longer out of spite, but I also feel like somebody must be able to get through to him, and it's unlikely to be a bunch of 30-something two-term congresspeople.
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Jul 3, 2021 15:42
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Just lmao at everyone who thinks Manchin and/or Sinema wouldn't just outright refuse to let a Biden SCOTUS nominee get a hearing months before midterms.
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Jul 3, 2021 16:01
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vyelkin posted:Of course it's possible that pressure on him just makes him want to stay longer out of spite, Anything's possible but seems unlikely. It seems like at worst publicly calling on him to retire to stem the bleeding of voting rights etc would do nothing, not make a guy who was ready to retire stay longer out of butthurt. Especially since Breyer seems to have convinced himself that the court is apolitical so postponing a retirement to get back at Biden politically wouldn't be something he'd consciously do. I think Democrats just don't really care, they're rich, court decisions don't affect them. Maybe they're playing 1000-D chess behind the scenes cajoling him to retire because a political supercomputer calculated that doing it discreetly out of the public eye was the optimal strategy but I doubt it.
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Jul 3, 2021 16:16
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Evil Fluffy posted:Just lmao at everyone who thinks Manchin and/or Sinema wouldn't just outright refuse to let a Biden SCOTUS nominee get a hearing months before midterms. This is just delusional. There is zero evidence that either of them would block a nomination.
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Jul 3, 2021 16:44
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True, but only because Biden is almost guaranteed to nominate someone they'd like. Which is to say, someone clearly to the right of Breyer. I'd bet on Stacey Abram's sister personally.
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Jul 3, 2021 17:14
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Some Guy TT posted:True, but only because Biden is almost guaranteed to nominate someone they'd like. Which is to say, someone clearly to the right of Breyer. I'd bet on Stacey Abram's sister personally. It’ll probably be Ketanji Brown Jackson. Who (maybe relevantly) was a Breyer clerk.
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Jul 3, 2021 17:19
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VitalSigns posted:They aren't even doing the bare minimum: calling on him to retire Do you think that publicly calling for him to retire would convince him to do so? I'm pretty sure Breyer already knows the arguments for their retirement and has already made their decision one way or another.
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Jul 3, 2021 18:00
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AVeryLargeRadish posted:Do you think that publicly calling for him to retire would convince him to do so? I'm pretty sure Breyer already knows the arguments for their retirement and has already made their decision one way or another. Maybe it would work, maybe it wouldn't. I do think that trying to convince, cajole, or pressure someone to do the right thing is more likely to work than nothing. It's an unelected superlegislature controlled 6-3 by the party that hasn't even won half the presidential elections in my lifetime, and the conservatives on the court are committed to ending democracy. You'd think there'd be a public discussion among the Democratic leadership over how loving badly RBG hosed up by hubristically refusing the step down when progressives were begging her to, years after Sandra Day O'Connor explicitly said she wanted George W Bush to be president so she could retire under a Republican. I mean, why do anything then, why tell people over and over to get out and vote, I'm pretty sure everyone already knows voting exists, and we can't say for sure that telling people to vote one more time will convince any specific person to do so.
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Jul 3, 2021 21:44
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VitalSigns posted:I mean, why do anything then, why tell people over and over to get out and vote, I'm pretty sure everyone already knows voting exists, and we can't say for sure that telling people to vote one more time will convince any specific person to do so. the corporatist octogenarian dems and their sycophantic supporters that control the party don't actually care about any issues that you do. they want to protect the status quo with as little effort as possible. they tell you to vote because they want to keep their powerful prestigious positions, not because they have some ideology that they are enthusiastic about.
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Jul 3, 2021 22:10
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Thinking about it more, the most likely path to changing a liberal supremee court justice's mind would be to get DC liberal high society mad at him. If a bunch of LGBT people and poor women are calling on him to step down to keep Republicans from revoking their civil rights they can be dismissed as a bunch of uppity whiners who need to stop presuming on their betters. But if he stopped getting fêted and gladhanded because the wealthy cocktail set are pissed that he's gambling with letting McConnell block another seat, well now that's a serious matter. And if Biden and Pelosi and the Washington Post have influence over anyone's opinions, it's Washington high society. Or just loving bribe him. Legally of course, like how Scalia got fancy vacations and poo poo from donors who wanted to buy influence with him. Obviously I'm not suggesting anyone commit any crimes here, but luckily thanks to the Roberts court it's next to impossible to actually manage to commit a crime in the act of paying perfectly legal bribes.
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Jul 3, 2021 23:31
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Rust Martialis posted:This is just delusional. There is zero evidence that either of them would block a nomination. Manchin probably wouldn't, but Sinema has proven to have some big Crazy Harry from The Muppet Show mad bomber energy to her and will gleefully blow poo poo up for likes and high fives on Instagram or whatever because she was feeling kinda cute that day. So who knows.
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Jul 4, 2021 00:21
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Some Guy TT posted:True, but only because Biden is almost guaranteed to nominate someone they'd like. Which is to say, someone clearly to the right of Breyer. I'd bet on Stacey Abram's sister personally. While this is definitely based a bit on gossip anecdotes, apparently Biden liked Sotomayor (the best justice in a while) pretty well and was one of Kagan's biggest backers (the second best justice in a while). In the absence of firmer evidence I'd expect him to pick someone more like Kagan and less like Kennedy. Kalman posted:It’ll probably be Ketanji Brown Jackson. Who (maybe relevantly) was a Breyer clerk. That name had definitely been noised around though, and I could buy a Kennedy-style trade a la Kavanaugh where Biden promises to let Breyer basically handpick his replacement. Anything interesting we should know about Jackson"s jurisprudence?
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Jul 4, 2021 00:30
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GreyjoyBastard posted:Sotomayor (the best justice in a while) pretty well and was one of Kagan's biggest backers (the second best justice in a while)
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Jul 4, 2021 00:48
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Hieronymous Alloy posted:I mean, this argument also applies if Breyer steps down tomorrow. But the longer he puts it off the more likely it is to have happened. We're much less likely to lose the senate majority in the next two months than we are in the next 16. And I'm not willing to put positive odds on Senate retention after that considering that Republicans are going full steam ahead on voter suppression while Democrats have jack poo poo. Stickman fucked around with this message at 01:19 on Jul 4, 2021 |
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Jul 4, 2021 01:17
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Fuschia tude posted:I mean, when the other candidates from the last quarter-century are Barrett, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, Alito, and Roberts... actually looks like Thurgood Marshall served more recently than i thought, so it's good i used fuzzy language  and it wouldn't surprise me if Sotomayor ultimately compares to him
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Jul 4, 2021 01:22
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GreyjoyBastard posted:That name had definitely been noised around though, and I could buy a Kennedy-style trade a la Kavanaugh where Biden promises to let Breyer basically handpick his replacement. Anything interesting we should know about Jackson"s jurisprudence? She was a public defender once upon a time. Not going to claim I’ve studied her opinions in detail but I’d bet on her being more on the Sotomayor side of things in general and especially in criminal law. (Also she’s 51, so would hopefully have a long tenure in service.)
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Jul 4, 2021 01:24
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With the Brnovich v. DNC decision, does this mean that the DOJ's ability to sue states for questionable voter laws (and restrictions) has been effectively neutered? I've heard that's now the case with DOJ v. Georgia.
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Jul 7, 2021 18:38
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https://twitter.com/RonColeman/status/1413557208734908418
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Jul 10, 2021 07:35
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This guy seems like a huge loving baby.
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Jul 10, 2021 07:44
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Platystemon posted:This guy seems like a huge loving baby. He was sued for something really stupid. I think you're allowed to be saucy when someone sues you for something really stupid. Especially when the New York Supreme Court straight up said the people suing him were full of poo poo.
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Jul 10, 2021 10:06
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He has it exactly backwards, though. Civil rights violation: nah Copyright violation: yeah
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Jul 10, 2021 10:46
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