Ukraine: The Aristoblyats

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Internet VFW > Ukraine: The Aristoblyats

Oxygenpoisoning: Feb 21, 2006

ChubbyChecker posted:

nah

the taliban were wiling to give bin laden to the us to stop the bombing, but the us government wanted to have more war

That�s a big stretch of what they said. They said if they deemed the evidence enough that they�d turn him over. It was a stall to buy time.

That said we epically hosed it up and up just as bad murderous warlords in place of the Taliban. The Iraq was completely unjust, but the Taliban were never giving over Bin Laden, they knew he was a terrorist and were okay with protecting him for years at that point.

# ? May 27, 2022 14:57

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# ? Jun 5, 2024 07:32

bulletsponge13: Apr 28, 2010

There exact complaint was they wanted Bin Ladin to face international criminal proceedings.

But Bush wanted war. Even though ever President had been told since 1990 what a terrible idea getting involved with AFG was, ans we had been sending aid and support to the Taliban for years pre-9/11.

9/11 was just a convenient excuse for war. Bush and Co were going to have one anyway.

# ? May 27, 2022 15:10

CRUSTY MINGE: Mar 30, 2011; Peggy Hill
Foot Connoisseur

We were definitely going back to Iraq under Bush, Afghanistan/9-11 just gave him an excuse that looked valid enough on the surface while being bullshit underneath.

# ? May 27, 2022 15:18

in a well actually: Jan 26, 2011; dude, you gotta end it on the rhyme

golden bubble posted:

W's motivation was always to finish the job that daddy didn't and prove that the Neoconservative theories of the early 90s, which he was a true believer in, worked in the real world. This is why they began planning an invasion of Iraq within weeks of 9/11.

Always seemed to be driven by Cheney and Rumsfeld, W was happily along for the ride.

# ? May 27, 2022 15:27

psydude: Apr 1, 2008

CRUSTY MINGE posted:

We were definitely going back to Iraq under Bush, Afghanistan/9-11 just gave him an excuse that looked valid enough on the surface while being bullshit underneath.

My point was it probably would have dampened "But Al Qaeda!" if we'd actually succeeded in capturing/killing their leadership within the first 6 months.

# ? May 27, 2022 15:34

ChubbyChecker: Mar 25, 2018

psydude posted:

My point was it probably would have dampened "But Al Qaeda!" if we'd actually succeeded in capturing/killing their leadership within the first 6 months.

wouldn't have defeated al qaeda, and bush & co would have still invaded iraq

# ? May 27, 2022 15:38

Murgos: Oct 21, 2010

in a well actually posted:

Always seemed to be driven by Cheney and Rumsfeld, W was happily along for the ride.

You don't have to cover for him. He was a complicit in all of it.

# ? May 27, 2022 15:54

zoux: Apr 28, 2006

in a well actually posted:

Always seemed to be driven by Cheney and Rumsfeld, W was happily along for the ride.

Largely, you had those guys and Paul Wolfowitz pushing for a war in Iraq from day one of the Bush presidency (all three contributed to a PNAC whitepaper arguing for a US invasion and permanent presence of Iraq in September of 2000) and Condoleeza Rice and Colin Powell resisting that. Then 9/11 happened. Former Rumsfeld aides say he was asking if the attack was enough to go after Iraq on the day of. By November he was circulating memos laying out a case of war in Iraq because of 9/11.

# ? May 27, 2022 16:02

PookBear: Nov 1, 2008

Stravag posted:

As i was told on discord this is actually a good thing like the uk's ww2 home guard because it lets you free up people who are 22 year old clerks to go fight

I didn't say it was good, I just meant that out of all the weird poo poo having people in the reserves over 40 isn't that odd.

# ? May 27, 2022 16:58

bulletsponge13: Apr 28, 2010

The only reason we didn't get Iran too was noted moral coward and piece of poo poo Colin Powell wasn't willing to lie and bank fabricated evidence.
For Iran.
No problem with doing it to Iraq

# ? May 27, 2022 17:19

highme: May 25, 2001; I posted my food for USPOL Thanksgiving!

zoux posted:

...PNAC...

Really not liking this New American Century, can we start over?

# ? May 27, 2022 18:00

zoux: Apr 28, 2006

It wasn't a project for a Good American Century, just a new one, and you cannot argue that this one isn't new.

# ? May 27, 2022 18:16

in a well actually: Jan 26, 2011; dude, you gotta end it on the rhyme

Murgos posted:

You don't have to cover for him. He was a complicit in all of it.

Oh I�m not at all, he�s more than complicit, but that incurious, overconfident legacy admission failson is a big picture guy. Put a replacement-level turn of the century Republican in as vp/secdef and they airstrike some Iraqi palaces and call it good.

# ? May 27, 2022 19:12

Vengarr: Jun 17, 2010; Smashed before noon

bulletsponge13 posted:

There exact complaint was they wanted Bin Ladin to face international criminal proceedings.

But Bush wanted war. Even though ever President had been told since 1990 what a terrible idea getting involved with AFG was, ans we had been sending aid and support to the Taliban for years pre-9/11.

9/11 was just a convenient excuse for war. Bush and Co were going to have one anyway.

There�s a reason the SA 9/11 thread immediately began with �Watch Bush start a loving war�

# ? May 27, 2022 19:22

Voyager I: Jun 29, 2012; This is how your posting feels.
🐥🐥🐥🐥🐥

bulletsponge13 posted:

The only reason we didn't get Iran too was noted moral coward and piece of poo poo Colin Powell wasn't willing to lie and bank fabricated evidence.
For Iran.
No problem with doing it to Iraq

Christ, imagine the mess that would have been.

# ? May 28, 2022 03:41

Xakura: Jan 10, 2019; A safety-conscious little mouse!

Voyager I posted:

Christ, imagine the mess that would have been.

As if you're out of the woods yet

# ? May 28, 2022 07:44

Hannibal Rex: Feb 13, 2010

I only started paying close attention to the Russia-Ukraine situation at the end of 2021, and didn't have much of an opinion on the preceding Donbas conflict except the general notion that Putin was following a tried and true 'frozen conflict' playbook to keep Ukraine permanently out of NATO and the EU; obviously, things were a bit more differentiated than that. One impression I've gradually developed is that the whole Donbas secession never was some kind of Russian master plan, but genuinely started as a homegrown protest movement in the East, which was economically much closer tied to Russia, and people there were legitimately worried about the far-right influence in the new Kiev government. However, the successful annexation of Crimea inspired a bunch of Russian extremists like Girkin to try the same thing in the Donbas, and they at least had some tacit approval from Moscow, even if the real military support only happened later.

This is just as a general precursor to a very long scholarly article on the Donbas since 2014, that I thought was insightful enough to share, in case anybody else wants to get up to speed on the background for the war. It's definitely sympathetic to the Donbas secessionists, and downplays the, to my mind, key factor that after the Little Green Men in Crimea, no one in Ukraine or the West could view the secessionists as anything other than Russian pawns for a long-term salami slice strategy, even if they may have started out as legitimate. Hence, no one was in a rush to enforce the implementation of Minsk 2, and give Putin another success that way. But it's a well documented recap of the developments that lead up to Putin starting this war.

As this has gone on, I've completely lost the simplistic view of Putin as some kind of mastermind spook. That went out a couple of days after the invasion, as it became clear how much of a gently caress-up the entire operation was. But it also extends back in time, to all his previous operations and so-called successes. More and more, Crimea and Donbass seem like a case of the dog catching the car to me, and Russia's situation has become more and more untenable ever since.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23745118.2022.2074398

quote:

Russia found itself faced with a diminishing ability to influence events in Ukrainian political space, lost much of the cultural and identity terrain, and was left with no agents of influence. People with a pro-Russia identity were too afraid to express their political positions openly. The situation with regard to free speech and expression was so grave that the UN OHCHR issued a special report on �Civic Space and Fundamental Freedoms in Ukraine, 2021� (OHCHR, 2021b).

At the same time, dialogue did not completely come to a halt after bilateral negotiations failed. Moscow continued to deal with Zelensky�s team through the auspices of certain Ukrainian oligarchs, and Andriy Yermak continued to be engaged in behind-the-scenes negotiations.95 The Russian leadership stressed the many incentives for cooperation and the benefits that would follow for neighbourly relations, should ties be restored. This dialogue did not bear fruit. It did however provoke a deeper reflection on Moscow�s part on what to do with Ukraine. Four schools of thought were identified by this research. The fifth option of a �status transition� modelled on the Kosovo process legitimised by the UN and deployment of international peacekeepers had been discussed, but was later abandoned.96

The first was continuation of �strategic patience� � waiting for a different political leadership to come to power in Ukraine and for Western financial support to scale down. Such leadership, it was hoped, would regard the Donbas conflict as a tragedy of a divided nation, would work together with Moscow and be a more reliable partner than Volodymyr Zelensky.97 This school of thought believed that positive change could be driven by financial � industrial elites and the military � political circles, � policy elites who were not satisfied with the course the country had adopted and wished for more independence from the West.98 Eventually, the Ukrainian society would rebel against the Euromaidan order, and this would be the moment for Russia to enter the scene. In the interim, active policy initiatives towards Ukraine should be abandoned while a conundrum in Donbas helped to maintain the necessary degree of tension. Russia should respond only if the next move came from Kyiv, but be prudent in committing to serious talks. Preservation of the status quo could include working-level contacts with the Ukrainian counterparts, gas concessions, low-key economic ties and imports of labour force. The policy thrust would be to preserve a �pro-Russian Ukraine� identity and facilitate transformation of political order in the country.99

The criticism of �strategic patience� option was that Russia might wait forever for a change that never comes. The expectation that Ukraine would implode under the burden of internal contradictions that might trigger an upheaval appeared implausible. Ukraine�s geopolitical significance was too great for the West in its contestation with Russia to be derailed. �Strategic patience� amounted to no policy that allowed moving out of the impasse. The hope that Donbas, having returned to the Ukrainian state, would reformat along less anti-Russian lines, was entirely misplaced.

As �strategic patience� was not leading to obvious results, the second school of talking to the master emerged, according to which the West alone could make the Ukrainian leadership compromise. This line was articulated by the deputy head of the Russian Security Council Dmitrii Medvedev in his October 2021 Kommersant article: �Ukrainian leaders of the current generation are absolutely dependent people. The country is under direct foreign control. It is pointless for us to deal with them. Business should only be conducted with a suzerain.�100 The criticism of Medvedev�s approach was that deploring the opponent was not a strategy, and talking was better than no talking, though policy adjustments were certainly needed. However, the article had an effect as it gave boost to hawkish attitudes and laid the grounds for the subsequent attempts on the part of the Russian leadership to talk to the West over Ukraine in December 2021, with an expectation that they would put pressure on Kyiv.

The third policy option can be badged as Paradigm shift: according to which, Russia should recognise the new realities and part with a myth of a �triune people� (Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians). It should abandon the sentiment of historical and cultural closeness, and acknowledge that Ukraine was a foreign country with an anti-Russian regime that did not mean it any good. It could potentially inflict harm, so Russia needed to deal with Ukraine as a hostile country on its borders and prepare accordingly, reinforce defence and intelligence-gathering capabilities, and enhance expertise. The existing Russia-oriented constituency was not politically relevant in Ukraine. It could be supported on an individual basis but not as a part of a pan-Russian World; immigration to Russia could be facilitated. Dmitry Trenin articulated this line of argument:

The premise of unification of the Russian people, allegedly split by the Russian � Ukrainian border, is a trap. Ukraine is a neighbour, who will never again become a �brotherly republic�. The idea of integration should be confined to history and replaced by thinking on how to maintain neighbourhood relations. Russia does not need Ukraine, and the significance of Ukraine for Russia is vastly exaggerated. However, the ability of Kyiv to carry out hostile actions against Moscow should not be underestimated. (Trenin, 2021)

The paradigm shift implied a �Russia first� approach to Ukraine that would make Russia more prepared for dealing with potential threats instead of regarding the neighbour as a prodigal son longing to return to the family. It did not envision a military occupation or any offensive operations, but rather parting with the notions based on the past.
Strategy shift constitutes the fourth policy option. From this perspective, the Russian goals in Ukraine were valid, but existing methods of achieving results were wrong. The strategy shift acknowledged that any unitary notion of the �Ukrainian people� was flawed. Different groups carried distinct views and socio-cultural characteristics. This mistake of the past was to pursue a Ukraine policy through big business and key politicians; a class that carried significant weight in Ukraine. This method had allowed deals to be done quickly, but working with Ukrainian society had been overlooked, and this weakness backfired. Russia failed to apply soft power effectively and did not reach out to a Russia-oriented constituency in the right way.101 The conclusion that followed was that �we should speak directly to the Ukrainian people, but not its leadership.� The new strategy should be about offering the forces in society that were friendly towards Russia an attractive forward-looking alternative.

All of these options were progressively running into dead ends. Talking to the master did not bear fruit, and on 15 February, the State Duma voted for a Communist proposal to formally recognise the �DNR� and �LNR� despite opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Russia and domestic policy figures. On 21 February, President Putin signed decrees recognising the sovereignty of the �people�s republics.� The important outcome for them were Russian security guarantees, which made the population feel protected.102 On 24 February, a Russian invasion of Ukraine began.

# ? May 28, 2022 18:00

aphid_licker: Jan 7, 2009

There's some frankly bizarre poo poo in there dude. Like the idea that girkin was acting on his own, or that there were meaningful hostile actions Russia had to fear from Ukraine at any point.

# ? May 28, 2022 18:54

A.o.D.: Jan 15, 2006

Words alone cannot express how much I hate the tone of that write up.

Perhaps the author did not intend this, but it reads as if Putin's mafia style government has reasonable goals that should be accommodated, and that Ukraine should have been more accommodating to a nation that had in recent history stolen repeatedly from them. It also seems to accept Russia's oligarchy as perfectly legitimate and something that shouldn't be opposed for it's inherent corruption, iniquity, and murderous policies.

Maybe theres a caveat that this is written from a supposed Russian perspective that didn't make it into the quote. If it's from the author's point of view, then gently caress that guy.

# ? May 28, 2022 19:18

The X-man cometh: Nov 1, 2009

A.o.D. posted:

It also seems to accept Russia's oligarchy as perfectly legitimate and something that shouldn't be opposed for it's inherent corruption, iniquity, and murderous policies.

Don't forget the racism, sexism and homophobia.

# ? May 28, 2022 19:37

GD_American: Jul 21, 2004; LISTEN TO WHAT I HAVE TO SAY AS IT'S INCREDIBLY IMPORTANT!

quote:

Dr. Matveeva joined the Department in 2012 where she is a member of the Russia and Eurasia Security Research Group. She worked both as an academic and a practitioner, specialising in conflict studies and developmental aspects of international peacebuilding. The geographical remit of her interests covers conflicts in the Ukraine, the North and South Caucasus, and in Central Asia, where she lived in 2003 � 2004 working as the UNDP Regional Adviser on Peace and Development, while her initial research background is in Afghanistan. In 2010 Dr. Matveeva headed the Research Secretariat of the international Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission. She presently acts as a consultant to international organisations, such as the UN, the EU and OSCE, and for international non-governmental organisations. Previously she was a Research Fellow at Chatham House, worked at the London School of Economics and headed programmes at International Alert and Saferworld. She is also an Honorary University Fellow at the Department of Politics, University of Exeter and writes as a senior analyst for Wikistrat on Russsia in international relations.

Yeah if you guys thought she was anti-Ukraine in that piece

https://genevasolutions.news/global-news/how-ukraine-missed-the-opportunity-to-get-its-people-back-in-the-donbass

# ? May 28, 2022 19:47

A.o.D.: Jan 15, 2006

Wait, it's Ukraine's fault that separatists engaged in a shooting war weren't allowed to vote in an election? Nah, gently caress that.

# ? May 28, 2022 20:24

Hannibal Rex: Feb 13, 2010

aphid_licker posted:

There's some frankly bizarre poo poo in there dude. Like the idea that girkin was acting on his own, or that there were meaningful hostile actions Russia had to fear from Ukraine at any point.

Girkin, with his weirdo monarchist nationalist views, sure he has ties to Russian intelligence, but compared to Crimea, Donbas was a very half-assed operation. He might have gotten orders to support people there and stir up trouble, but that might just as well have been some lower level initiative rather than a Kremlin masterplan. And no, I don't fully discount that Girkin and his crew decided on their own that after Crimea, Donbas would be next. Maybe it's far-fetched, and I'm not convinced of it, but I do entertain the notion. I haven't read much on that period yet. But the early weeks of the Donbas conflict were pretty chaotic. Maybe Girkin was on a leash, but it was a very loose one. Sending in fifty guys with guns isn't a very effective way to do an annexation, but it's certainly deniable.

Threats from Ukraine to Russia, that's a quote from this guy.

https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/85314

quote:

� Right now, Ukraine is more hostile to Russia than any other country in the world. The degree to which Kyiv is willing�and able�to take combative action against Moscow should not under any circumstances be understated. The contemptuous, sneering attitude to the modern Ukrainian state that has formed under the influence of Russian state propaganda can only result in unpleasant surprises.

� In reining in Kyiv�s impulses to use force to resolve the problem of the Donbas, Russia must avoid a large-scale war with Ukraine: that would be a catastrophe and a tragedy for millions of people that nothing could possibly justify.

IIRC, he's gone full Kremlin stooge since the war. It's telling that to him, a threat to Donbas equals a threat to Moscow, even back then.

A.o.D. posted:

Words alone cannot express how much I hate the tone of that write up.

Perhaps the author did not intend this, but it reads as if Putin's mafia style government has reasonable goals that should be accommodated, and that Ukraine should have been more accommodating to a nation that had in recent history stolen repeatedly from them. It also seems to accept Russia's oligarchy as perfectly legitimate and something that shouldn't be opposed for it's inherent corruption, iniquity, and murderous policies.

Maybe theres a caveat that this is written from a supposed Russian perspective that didn't make it into the quote. If it's from the author's point of view, then gently caress that guy.

Sure, those paragraphs are from the point of view of political circles in Moscow; what she fails to mention that by Fall 2021, from which most of the footnotes date, Putin very likely already had decided on the invasion.

# ? May 28, 2022 20:39

aphid_licker: Jan 7, 2009

^^^^ The fact that the NRs were immediately propped up by Russian troops when it turned out that Ukraine had the military means to crush them after all maybe is a clue? :thunk:

GD_American posted:

Yeah if you guys thought she was anti-Ukraine in that piece

https://genevasolutions.news/global-news/how-ukraine-missed-the-opportunity-to-get-its-people-back-in-the-donbass

That publishing date lol

aphid_licker fucked around with this message at 21:06 on May 28, 2022

# ? May 28, 2022 21:00

Herstory Begins Now: Aug 5, 2003; SOME REALLY TEDIOUS DUMB SHIT THAT SUCKS ASS TO READ ->>

I am unclear how she hypothesizes re-integration actually happening because it doesn't seem like that was ever even remotely in the cards, but perhaps I am completely missing some important point.

# ? May 28, 2022 21:30

Hannibal Rex: Feb 13, 2010

aphid_licker posted:

^^^^ The fact that the NRs were immediately propped up by Russian troops when it turned out that Ukraine had the military means to crush them after all maybe is a clue?

Sure, by around July, Moscow very definitely threw their weight behind them. Before that, it's fuzzier, and Ukraine had already retaken a bunch of cities earlier.

# ? May 28, 2022 21:56

aphid_licker: Jan 7, 2009

Hannibal Rex posted:

Sure, by around July, Moscow very definitely threw their weight behind them. Before that, it's fuzzier, and Ukraine had already retaken a bunch of cities earlier.

I seriously can't tell if you're joking.

# ? May 28, 2022 22:42

Hannibal Rex: Feb 13, 2010

aphid_licker posted:

I seriously can't tell if you're joking.

https://brill.com/view/journals/spsr/48/2/article-p135_2.xml

quote:

5.7 Juncture 6: Intervention of Regular Russian Forces, Late August

The Ukrainian armed forces first voiced allegations of cross-border shelling from Russian territory in mid-July after an attack on Ukrainian positions near the village of Zelenopillia.66 This attack and subsequent incidents of cross-border shelling may have slowed the advance of the Ukrainian forces, but they were insufficient to turn the tide of the conflict. When the Ukrainian advance was reversed in late August and the separatists regained control over the areas south of Luhansk, southeast of Donetsk, and east of Mariupol, Kyiv claimed that a major Russian invasion force was responsible for this sudden defeat.67 Moscow denies all of these claims, but there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary.68 At the same time, it is clear that Russia�s actions during this phase were a necessary condition for the continuation of the armed conflict over the years that followed because they prevented Ukrainian forces from regaining control over the conflict zone. Hence, it is clear that Russia played the determining role in the last critical juncture of the war�s formative stage. What remains open, however, is the question whether Russia�s role as the primary conflict driver was limited to this final episode of the war�s escalation sequence.

I'm not cherry-picking Putin apologists (at least not knowingly so), and Jakob Hauter doesn't sound like one. Mid-July was when the Russian military actively started supporting the war and its involvement became undeniable. I'm not saying Russia didn't have its fingers in the pie earlier.

# ? May 29, 2022 02:33

my kinda ape: Sep 15, 2008; Everything's gonna be A-OK; Oven Wrangler

So how big is Russia's stockpile of artillery ammunition? I've read that they've supposedly nearly exhausted their supply of missiles but what about shells? I realize shells are a lot easier to make than missiles and vehicles but considering the state of their military and industry it seems doubtful they could keep up with demand with production alone. Do they have enough shells to do live fire WWI reenactments for the rest of the century or is there a chance they might exhaust their stockpile of shells?

my kinda ape fucked around with this message at 17:55 on May 29, 2022

# ? May 29, 2022 04:11

GD_American: Jul 21, 2004; LISTEN TO WHAT I HAVE TO SAY AS IT'S INCREDIBLY IMPORTANT!

I'd be equally unshocked if they advanced 100km over terrain that's been shelled every square foot over the next three months, or if all of a sudden next week their guns fell silent and they realized "oh poo poo, we're out of ammo".

# ? May 29, 2022 04:18

Alan Smithee: Jan 4, 2005; A man becomes preeminent, he's expected to have enthusiasms.

Enthusiasms, enthusiasms...

Lmao if you don�t think they sold half the shells for cheese from France

# ? May 29, 2022 05:36

Steezo: Jun 16, 2003; Now go away, or I shall taunt you a second time!

Alan Smithee posted:

Lmao if you don�t think they sold half the shells for cheese from France

and replaced them with wooden ones painted metallic.

# ? May 29, 2022 10:42

Xakura: Jan 10, 2019; A safety-conscious little mouse!

Steezo posted:

and replaced them with wooden ones painted metallic.

I regret to inform you all the wood has been sold.

# ? May 29, 2022 10:43

orange juche: Mar 14, 2012

Xakura posted:

I regret to inform you all the wood has been sold.

I regret to inform you the money has been spent on caviar.

# ? May 29, 2022 11:11

steinrokkan: Apr 2, 2011; Soiled Meat

Xakura posted:

I regret to inform you all the wood has been sold.

Dying for Shoigu's interesting wood interest

# ? May 29, 2022 11:23

Murgos: Oct 21, 2010

Alan Smithee posted:

Lmao if you don�t think they sold half the shells for cheese from France

And most of the rest have been sitting in warehouses for 80 years and no one�s really certain how long ago the roof came off.

# ? May 29, 2022 15:51

aphid_licker: Jan 7, 2009

I mean it's an observable fact that they have been and are expending an absolute fuckton of shells with no sign of letting up so far

# ? May 29, 2022 17:35

Jasper Tin Neck: Nov 14, 2008; "Scientifically proven, rich and creamy."

aphid_licker posted:

I mean it's an observable fact that they have been and are expending an absolute fuckton of shells with no sign of letting up so far

It does seem the Russian offensive has slowed down, which might imply a supply bottleneck.

https://mobile.twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1530077228725313537

# ? May 29, 2022 20:44

bulletsponge13: Apr 28, 2010

UKR holdout in a trench singlehandedly delays Russian trench assault. From drone.

CW- war, death
https://www.instagram.com/tv/CeI3wFTAAwd/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=

# ? May 29, 2022 21:02

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# ? Jun 5, 2024 07:32

FrozenVent: May 1, 2009; The Boeing 737-200QC is the undisputed workhorse of the skies.

Russian advance will only be limited by logistics / supply.

# ? May 29, 2022 21:03

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