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Teriyaki Hairpiece
Dec 29, 2006

I'm nae the voice o' the darkened thistle, but th' darkened thistle cannae bear the sight o' our Bonnie Prince Bernie nae mair.
https://www.amazon.com/Complete-Aubrey-Maturin-Novels-volumes/dp/039306011X

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gradenko_2000
Oct 5, 2010

HELL SERPENT
Lipstick Apathy

Palladium posted:

how do you manage to read so many books

1. I set aside a chapter a day for any one book that I'm reading at the moment, or if chapters are too long, a set number of pages, like 20 pages a day for a 300-page book. I only don't do these on the weekends.

2. if it's a particularly light work-day I might read two sections, or one section each from two different books

3. and then I also have an audiobook that I play every time I'm driving, or doing chores

4. and then I also have a book on my phone that I read when I'm waiting around on something, although this one has been very slow lately since nowadays I'm usually posting or playing on my Switch if I'm just otherwise idle AND away from my computer

I don't know if it's a particularly novel trick, but simply having a point where you can stop reading, but committing to doing that one section every day, adds up to a lot of books over time. Last year's total was 34, and I'm up to 19 so far this 2022.

Punkin Spunkin
Jan 1, 2010
For me I just rely on reading as the purest sort of distraction/bringer of joy/destroyer of bad thoughts, esp now that I'm staying mostly sober. I'm basically reading at all possible times I could be reading. In the jacuzzi. In between laps in the pool. While I'm walking anywhere, waiting anywhere. Been a rough year for me, lotta loss, so I basically have to read. Helps that I have a Kindle with my thousands of books on it and it's waterproof and sturdy as gently caress, and that I'm an insane book pirate. Feel like I'm reading 6-7 books at anytime, I've had an unhealthy book juggling habit since I was a kid but it's just how I do things. Think I've finished like ~25, so far in 2022, mostly history, lotta Daniel Kehlmann and Alfred Duggan's historical fiction (underrated dude imo, Knight With Armour is hilarious) but I don't really keep track of the numbers.

Just added some interesting new adds off of this list, unfortunately a lot of it is military history n I cant say most of them are modern history
https://acoup.blog/book-recommendation-list/

in terms of modern history rn I'm reading Iran: A Modern History and Set the Night on Fire: L.A. in the Sixties. Majorly recommend the latter, should be required reading especially if you're Californian. Just a great history from like, 1960-1973 on the history of leftist/resistance movements in Southern California, from the sit ins to Corita Kent to Ron Karenga to the Sunset strip curfew riots and on and on.

Punkin Spunkin has issued a correction as of 17:41 on Jul 31, 2022

Trabisnikof
Dec 24, 2005

Anyone have any resources about the Bandung Conference?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandung_Conference

I'd like to learn more about it.

mawarannahr
May 21, 2019

Trabisnikof posted:

Anyone have any resources about the Bandung Conference?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandung_Conference

I'd like to learn more about it.

The Jakarta Method mentions it 41 times. there’s a lively discussion thread for the book here.

meefistopheles
Nov 11, 2013

Trabisnikof posted:

Anyone have any resources about the Bandung Conference?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandung_Conference

I'd like to learn more about it.

The Darker Nations is about the history of third world collectivism. Only one chapter on Bandung itself, but a lot of background on the history leading up to it and the fallout. The author is Vijay Prashad, and he's written a few books on connected topics as well.

MikeCrotch
Nov 5, 2011

I AM UNJUSTIFIABLY PROUD OF MY SPAGHETTI BOLOGNESE RECIPE

YES, IT IS AN INCREDIBLY SIMPLE DISH

NO, IT IS NOT NORMAL TO USE A PEPPERAMI INSTEAD OF MINCED MEAT

YES, THERE IS TOO MUCH SALT IN MY RECIPE

NO, I WON'T STOP SHARING IT

more like BOLLOCKnese

Dameius posted:

Has anyone invaded Russia from the east and won?

The Germans in WWI

Some Guy TT
Aug 30, 2011

https://mobile.twitter.com/martyrmade/status/1552109866201731072

HashtagGirlboss
Jan 4, 2005

Punkin Spunkin posted:

For me I just rely on reading as the purest sort of distraction/bringer of joy/destroyer of bad thoughts, esp now that I'm staying mostly sober. I'm basically reading at all possible times I could be reading. In the jacuzzi. In between laps in the pool. While I'm walking anywhere, waiting anywhere. Been a rough year for me, lotta loss, so I basically have to read. Helps that I have a Kindle with my thousands of books on it and it's waterproof and sturdy as gently caress, and that I'm an insane book pirate. Feel like I'm reading 6-7 books at anytime, I've had an unhealthy book juggling habit since I was a kid but it's just how I do things. Think I've finished like ~25, so far in 2022, mostly history, lotta Daniel Kehlmann and Alfred Duggan's historical fiction (underrated dude imo, Knight With Armour is hilarious) but I don't really keep track of the numbers.

Just added some interesting new adds off of this list, unfortunately a lot of it is military history n I cant say most of them are modern history
https://acoup.blog/book-recommendation-list/

in terms of modern history rn I'm reading Iran: A Modern History and Set the Night on Fire: L.A. in the Sixties. Majorly recommend the latter, should be required reading especially if you're Californian. Just a great history from like, 1960-1973 on the history of leftist/resistance movements in Southern California, from the sit ins to Corita Kent to Ron Karenga to the Sunset strip curfew riots and on and on.

I advise against reading and walking. Last time I did that I smacked my forehead on a gas station price sign

Slavvy
Dec 11, 2012

Is there a good go to book about the 1813 battle of Leipzig/battle of the nations?

Calico Heart
Mar 22, 2012

"wich the worst part was what troll face did to sonic's corpse after words wich was rape it. at that point i looked away"



hey goons, I am working on a project and need some help. What is, for your money, the worst thing McDonald’s has ever done? business practise or knowingly endangering customers/workers?

gimme the GOD DAMN candy
Jul 1, 2007
the mcrib

HootTheOwl
May 13, 2012

Hootin and shootin

Calico Heart posted:

hey goons, I am working on a project and need some help. What is, for your money, the worst thing McDonald’s has ever done? business practise or knowingly endangering customers/workers?

Sold to Ray Crock

i say swears online
Mar 4, 2005

Calico Heart posted:

hey goons, I am working on a project and need some help. What is, for your money, the worst thing McDonald’s has ever done? business practise or knowingly endangering customers/workers?

obviously it's the milkshake repair scam

also slash and burn the amazon but I actually don't know if the clown or Burger King is worse here

Orange Devil
Oct 1, 2010

Wullie's reign cannae smother the flames o' equality!

So uhhh, did this actually happen or nah?

John Charity Spring
Nov 4, 2009

SCREEEEE

Orange Devil posted:

So uhhh, did this actually happen or nah?

no

Agean90
Jun 28, 2008


what actually did happen was America's own atom bomb tests where they put African Americans closer to the bomb than whites

vyelkin
Jan 2, 2011

Orange Devil posted:

So uhhh, did this actually happen or nah?

Seems like it didn't, but don't let this sensational but fake story distract you from the actual environmental devastation and health damage done by France's nuclear testing in Algeria.

vyelkin
Jan 2, 2011

Agean90 posted:

what actually did happen was America's own atom bomb tests where they put African Americans closer to the bomb than whites

the US also forced Pacific island communities out of their homes so that they could be turned into bomb test sites, then dumped them on nearby islands that didn't have any food sources and left them to starve to death

(this is only a slight exaggeration because they only became severely malnourished and were eventually evacuated to yet another uninhabited island with insufficient food sources, rather than all dying. The US also knowingly irradiated populated islands with further bomb tests and then secretly used their inhabitants to study the effects of radiation poisoning. You can read some details here)

vyelkin has issued a correction as of 15:31 on Aug 2, 2022

mawarannahr
May 21, 2019

god bless America :patriot:

Orange Devil
Oct 1, 2010

Wullie's reign cannae smother the flames o' equality!
Yeah but that I all knew, the French stuff would've been new info to me.

R. Mute
Jul 27, 2011

Orange Devil posted:

So uhhh, did this actually happen or nah?
do you think the french could've contained themselves that long to capture an algerian (alive), tie them up, drag them all the way to the testing grounds, tie them up to a pole, put a sack over their head and then blast them with a nuke rather than just letting the national spirit of racism take the wheel and beat that algerian to death the second they saw them?

Pryor on Fire
May 14, 2013

they don't know all alien abduction experiences can be explained by people thinking saving private ryan was a documentary

vyelkin posted:

the US also forced Pacific island communities out of their homes so that they could be turned into bomb test sites, then dumped them on nearby islands that didn't have any food sources and left them to starve to death

(this is only a slight exaggeration because they only became severely malnourished and were eventually evacuated to yet another uninhabited island with insufficient food sources, rather than all dying. The US also knowingly irradiated populated islands with further bomb tests and then secretly used their inhabitants to study the effects of radiation poisoning. You can read some details here)

Yeah the Castle Bravo stuff was on par with the worst poo poo Nazi scientists ever did:

quote:

The damage done by Alvin Graves and the bomb under his command
was unprecedented. Within moments, everyone who was watching the blast
column, and who knew the geography of the islands, realized that the
islanders on Rongelap would probably be contaminated. A ship was ordered
to speed across, and by midafternoon had landed a number of sailors in
protective clothing to take Geiger counter readings from two of the village
wells. They saw islanders who were clearly ill: staggering, vomiting, lying
listlessly on the sand. But they said nothing to them, asked no questions,
and left in a matter of minutes.

They were consequently unaware that the islanders had been startled that
morning by what appeared to be a great sunrise in the western skies; and
had then felt a sudden, jolting warm wind like a stuttering typhoon,
followed by an unimaginably loud, thundering roar. They were also
unaware that a fine mist had enveloped the island, that showers of grit and
great gray flakes had fallen from the sky. Nor did they know that once the
roaring had stopped, the islanders had immediately tried to resume their
morning routines (breakfast, baking, fishing) and started to live a normal
island day until, hours later, they began to show symptoms of some
mysterious ailment.

The Geiger counters knew what had happened. The 236 people of
Rongelap had received doses of radiation every bit as great as those
suffered by the Japanese in Hiroshima, who had been just two miles from
ground zero. But on Rongelap, no alarm had sounded. Instead, the bomb
managers’ first reaction was to think of employing the Rongelapese as case
studies, as human guinea pigs. Radiation scientists at federal laboratories
such as Brookhaven on Long Island expressed a kind of distant delight:
“The habitation of these people on the island will afford most valuable
ecological radiation data on human beings.”

So, for the next fifty hours, the Rongelap islanders were left to their own
devices, to suffer in isolation until it became clear that the radiation was so
powerful it might actually kill them all, whereupon official panic ensued,
boats and planes arrived, and the islanders were told to get out, quickly.
They were hosed down with water, ordered to wash, checked with Geiger
counters, and washed again, a routine repeated three times. They were told
to take nothing, to leave with only the clothes on their backs. Those who
looked fit enough were taken by ship down to the airbase on Kwajalein.
The old and frail went by seaplane. “We were like animals,” said an
islander named Rokko Langinbelik, who was twelve at the time. “It was no
different from herding pigs into a gate.”

By now most were complaining of pain, burning, itching, hair falling
out, and skin lesions forming. But there was still no official concern for
their condition—only an academic interest. They might as well have been
in cages. They were scared out of their wits, having no idea what was
happening to them, why they were suddenly so ill, whether they were
suffering from a fast-spreading contagion. The doctors at the air base did
little for them, other than to advise them to wash and to subject them to
constant monitoring with the ever-chattering radiation counters.
Six days later a secret investigation, to be known by the anodyne name
Project 4.1, was initiated: “A Study of Response of Human Beings Exposed
to Significant Beta and Gamma Radiation Due to Fallout from High Yield
Weapons.”

No matter that these “human beings” had been the victims of a
monstrous and entirely avoidable accident, the consequence of a decision
made with casual, almost cynically calculated negligence. The subsequent
racism of their treatment at the hands of the authorities was obvious, or at
least is amply recognizable at this remove: had the islanders been
Caucasians, then official inquiries would have been instantly convened,
congressional committees would have been revved into high gear,
presidential apologies offered, compensation packages showered like rain.
But these were not Caucasians—they were mere Marshallese people,
colored natives, members of a subject citizenry, a population now to be
firmly contained and kept simply fed, watered, and, above all, docile. So
there was never to be any inquiry of substance or value. The victims had
worth not as members of any society, but as specimens—of importance
principally to science. They might as well have been cadavers handed over
to anatomists. They might as well have been branded with the term used by
Japanese in their notorious human vivisection experiments—their human
victims they called maruta, “logs of wood,” a deliberately dehumanizing
description, given to lessen the crime. These innocents from Rongelap were
America’s maruta, people rendered up as logs of wood. They were to
become no more than the accidental subjects, serendipitously offered up to
a group of faraway radiation scientists, of a detached, unemotional, and top-
secret clinical study, a project of supposed significance for all in the ever
more radioactive postnuclear world

Orange Devil
Oct 1, 2010

Wullie's reign cannae smother the flames o' equality!

R. Mute posted:

do you think the french could've contained themselves that long to capture an algerian (alive), tie them up, drag them all the way to the testing grounds, tie them up to a pole, put a sack over their head and then blast them with a nuke rather than just letting the national spirit of racism take the wheel and beat that algerian to death the second they saw them?

Maybe?

Dameius
Apr 3, 2006

Calico Heart posted:

hey goons, I am working on a project and need some help. What is, for your money, the worst thing McDonald’s has ever done? business practise or knowingly endangering customers/workers?

All the other things are worse and operate on bigger scales and budgets. On a more personal/limited scope scale the hot coffee lawsuit was supremely hosed up.

Chamale
Jul 11, 2010

I'm helping!



Calico Heart posted:

hey goons, I am working on a project and need some help. What is, for your money, the worst thing McDonald’s has ever done? business practise or knowingly endangering customers/workers?

Hiring loggers with chainsaws to kill everyone from a small Indigenous people that was blocking attempts to build beef farms in the Amazon.

Either that, or cancelling the McPizza.

War and Pieces
Apr 24, 2022

DID NOT VOTE FOR FETTERMAN
If never seen a better example of chickens coming home to roost than the coup and subsequent unpersoning of Mayor McCheese

Teriyaki Hairpiece
Dec 29, 2006

I'm nae the voice o' the darkened thistle, but th' darkened thistle cannae bear the sight o' our Bonnie Prince Bernie nae mair.
Birdie was the first to go, thrown in a cold river with a broken milkshake machine chained to her talons. The Fry Kids starved to death in front of a railway station, "PLEASE HELP" written on a cardboard sign in crayon that sat on the concrete in front of their emaciated bodies. Mayor McCheese disappeared into a Playplace ringed with a fence topped by barbed wire. The Hamburglar was dragged from his bed at night and shot in front of his children. Grimace's signature on his confession was written in a hand so shaky that it was almost illegible. His quavering, high-pitched testimony at the Trial was what doomed everyone else. I saw it on McDonald's state TV. All these bodies, all these lives, all merely speed bumps on the road to ultimate power for our Leader. His curly hair is stained red with the blood of the innocent. His gloves are dyed the sickly yellow of corruption. If I could McCry, I would, but my tears have run out. Soon I will join the others at the great McCafé in the sky.

Some Guy TT
Aug 30, 2011

can anyone give me a rundown of just what the deal was with soviet defectors ive gotten the impression through cultural osmosis over the years that basically everyone wanted to defect to the west from russia because communism was just so terrible and capitalism was so awesome but im not sure how much of this impression is based on actual history rather than propaganda

Calico Heart
Mar 22, 2012

"wich the worst part was what troll face did to sonic's corpse after words wich was rape it. at that point i looked away"



Chamale posted:

Hiring loggers with chainsaws to kill everyone from a small Indigenous people that was blocking attempts to build beef farms in the Amazon.

Either that, or cancelling the McPizza.

Any more info/link on this?

vyelkin
Jan 2, 2011

Some Guy TT posted:

can anyone give me a rundown of just what the deal was with soviet defectors ive gotten the impression through cultural osmosis over the years that basically everyone wanted to defect to the west from russia because communism was just so terrible and capitalism was so awesome but im not sure how much of this impression is based on actual history rather than propaganda

Some people did legitimately defect because they thought life would be better under capitalism. Igor Gouzenko, for example, supposedly defected because he had spent several years living outside the Soviet embassy compound in Ottawa and enjoyed his life in Canada, so when he was told he and his family were to return to the USSR they defected instead. For a lot of other defectors it was based not on firsthand experience but on dissatisfaction with their lives in the USSR and the high reputation of life under capitalism even if the reality didn't always live up to their expectations.

There's a recent article about this focusing on defectors to the US in the 1950s: Benjamin Tromly, "Ambivalent heroes: Russian defectors and American power in the early Cold War," Intelligence & National Security 33.5 (2018), 642-658. The author summarizes staple views of defectors' motivations and his new revision as follows:

quote:

The fates of Pirogov and Borzov encapsulate the difficult position of defectors in the Cold War. In the Cold War geography, moving from one bloc to the other was seen as an ideological act, one that signified either righteous protest (in the West) or betrayal (in the East). Accordingly, defectors such as Pirogov and Borzov were depicted in Western media as heroic figures whose flight represented a rejection of totalitarianism in the name of freedom. To some extent, scholarly work of defection has borne the imprint of this ideology-centric and normative view of defection. Vladislav Krasnov, himself a defector from the 1960s, states in a detailed study that anti-Soviet ideology was the major motivation guiding Cold War defectors of the previous decade.[ 15]

While anti-communism surely spurred some defections, it remains a limiting perspective from which to understand defection itself, let alone how the defectors acted once abroad. For instance, a richly documented work on the celebrated 1944 defector Viktor Kravchenko praises his ‘heroic and ringing defense of freedom’, even while acknowledging his opportunism and ideological ambivalence.[ 16] Indeed, recent analyses of defectors by Susan Carruthers, Boris Volodarsky, and Amy Knight provide unvarnished accounts of defection, giving full treatment to the diverse motives of the defectors and their handlers.[ 17] While these contributions complicate the construct of the ideological defector from different directions, much still remains unclear about the place of defectors in the Cold War, and in particular about the secretive US programs to court, receive, and utilize Soviet defectors.[ 18]

This article attempts to fill this lacunae by offering a portrait of Soviet defectors of the 1950s - or, more specifically, of Soviet citizens who crossed over to US custody in Germany. It analyzes motives for defection as well as defectors’ subsequent involvement in the Cold War, particularly in US-organized psychological warfare projects aimed at destabilizing the Soviet bloc.[ 19] Most defectors, it will be argued, were ambivalent Cold Warriors.[ 20] With regard to motives for exit, interrogation records of defectors in the American zone of Germany rarely reveal individuals following coherent ideological-political agendas. And in part because of the complex motives driving border-crossing, defectors had difficulty functioning in the Cold War West. As suggested by the trajectories of Borzov and Pirogov, defectors’ troubled pasts, varied reasons for flight, and subsequent marginalization in the West prevented them from becoming effective instruments of US power.

Basically, the Cold War context meant that defectors were seen in ideological terms, as striking a blow for freedom or as traitors to socialism, but most of them were just opportunists who saw a chance for self-preservation or self-advancement and took it, and often ended up disappointed and disillusioned if their lives didn't actually improve in the way they had hoped after defection. Of the two guys mentioned in the introduction, for example, Borzov and Pirogov, for instance, Borzov returned to the USSR six months after defecting because he got homesick and missed his wife, and Pirogov was denied US citizenship in 1955 because he had been a member of the Komsomol and then fired from his $300/month job with the CIA in 1956 because he only showed up to collect a paycheque and had no interest in actually running the anti-soviet emigre organization they had put him in charge of.

Tromly does some analysis of records from interrogations conducted when defectors first defected to try and get at their motives, and has this to say about it:

quote:

The interrogation records provide relatively unvarnished information on the defectors, but they are nonetheless complex sources that must be read against the grain. For a host of reasons - the fact that defectors usually arrived without personal documents, the closed nature of the USSR, and Soviet propaganda designed to discredit defectors as traitors - powerholders in the West often had virtually no verifiable information on the defectors’ backgrounds or their flight from the Soviet bloc. Indeed, existing US intelligence on the Soviet Union was so patchy that interrogators could rarely compare testimonies to a body of known facts - that is, except when defectors made egregious factual errors such as claiming to have served in a military unit that had never been stationed in Germany.[ 32] Not surprisingly, the interrogators sometimes made serious mistakes, such as when an Armenian resident of France convinced the Peripheral Reporting Unit that he was a Soviet defector.[ 33] The problem here is that the limits to interrogators’ knowledge apply to that of later historians as well. If interrogators on the ground frequently were unable to verify defectors’ accounts, why should historians revisiting the exchange decades later take the latter on faith?

Adding to the interrogators’ difficulties was the Soviet intelligence agencies’ practice of moving agents to the West posing as defectors. In 1955, the Commanding Officer of the 7925 Personnel Survey Detachment wrote to intelligence agencies explaining that an unnamed defector had been released from further interrogation because it was ‘believed, but it could not be proved’ that the defector’s story was ‘essentially a legend’ and that he was ‘a low level Soviet agent’.[ 34] Given such uncertainty on the part of the interrogators, the historian has no means of quantifying the phenomenon of fake defectors planted by the Soviet intelligence services. Nevertheless, it is logical to assume that the interrogation records under-reported the phenomenon of Soviet pseudo-defections.

Soviet espionage was only one factor that led defectors to offer biased information to interrogators. Even genuine defectors distorted their narratives for self-serving reasons. In order to grasp why defectors would doctor their life stories, one must reconstruct the context in which they acted. The defectors had risked their lives to cross the border, and now found themselves ‘incarcerated under needlessly unpleasant conditions for long periods’.[ 35] As already suggested in the discussion of the pilot Borzov, defectors feared that US or British authorities might return them to the Soviets, as indeed had often happened in the immediate postwar years.[ 36] And even after the threat of extradition subsided, defectors remained in legal limbo, uncertain of their futures in the West and their employment prospects. They also were well aware of the ‘shadow of retribution’ hanging over their heads, as Soviet intelligence networks in the West sought out and intimidated defectors, sometimes with the goal of recruiting them as spies.

Mired in a dangerous and unpredictable situation, the defectors had every reason to provide testimony that would ingratiate themselves with American interrogators. And the means to do so were obvious: to produce information that would hold interest to the Americans and to stress their hostility to the Soviet regime. An interviewer for the State Department External Research Staff explained the dynamic well. Due to ‘a certain pressure to present testimony which will be pleasing to the interviewer’, his respondents tended to ‘slant their statements’ by stressing that they, as well as the Soviet people as a whole, were ‘strongly opposed to the regime’.[ 37] Indeed, on some occasions, American interrogators were actually complicit in the efforts of defectors to depict themselves as anti-Soviet rebels, in part because the former were under pressure to produce defectors who would be put to ‘operational use’ by the CIA or other government agencies.[ 38] Krasnov’s claim that all of the interviewees were ‘ideological defectors’ is clearly untenable, as it ignores the play of power and expectations between recently departed Soviet citizens and their American handlers.[ 39]

Interrogation records, then, are skewed in the direction of emphasizing defectors’ ideological convictions as motivation for flight. All the more remarkable, then, is the fact that the records offer extensive evidence that non-ideological factors were often at work in spurring defections. Quantifying certain repeating themes in the 57 available interrogation files, drawn from the sources mentioned above, drives this point home (see Table 1). The data show that specific life situations often explained an individual’s motive to defect. Examples are many: the high-ranking civilian in Austria who defected in 1954 after getting into a fight in a bar in Vienna and being picked up by Soviet military police; the army private in Germany who, feeling he was ‘picked on’ by his superiors, ‘slugged’ his platoon leader; and an army sergeant who defected in the late 1940s to marry a German girl, convinced that there could be no ‘happy future’ for either him or his bride-to-be in the Soviet bloc.[ 40] In all three scenarios, defection was an escape from expected punishment in the USSR rather than an act of political protest or voting with one’s feet. It is also worthwhile to point out that the seemingly more ideological ‘victimization’ category, in which I grouped interviews that mentioned persecution of the defector or family members, sometimes involved flight from imminent arrest.[ 41] Whether they were fleeing political repression, the criminal system, military discipline, or an impending separation from a German lover, the defectors often left in desperation, convinced that they had nothing to lose.



None of this means that political discontent was irrelevant to defection. Most defectors - including those who pointed to non-ideological factors to explain their flight - criticized the Soviet regime, often denouncing ‘Stalin and the other Soviet leaders in terms of unmeasured abuse’.[ 42] Yet, in light of the incentive structure discussed above, the historian cannot be sure that defectors actually held the anti-communist sentiments they articulated, let alone that they had thought this way at the time of defection. In a 1954 review of defection cases, a CIA officer argued that individuals often ‘rationalize[d] their defections as stemming from ideological convictions’ post-facto, or after arriving in the West.[ 43] Some defectors must have done this memory work subconsciously, reappraising their pasts in light of current realities in a process all too familiar to the practitioners of oral history.[ 44] Others were dissimulating. For instance, an interrogator cast doubt on the testimony of a border guard who fled from Soviet territory to Iran, suspecting instead that ‘more immediate and compelling’ factors had been at work than the interviewee’s supposed hatred of communism.[ 45] In light of these facts, the CIA officer mentioned above was probably correct in arguing that ‘few of the defections of Soviets … can be attributed unequivocally and primarily to pure ideological motivation’.[ 46] No less authoritative a voice than that of then CIA director Allen Dulles agreed; when asked at an NSC meeting in 1953 ‘why the number of Iron Curtain escapees is so low’, he stated unequivocally that ‘for those who have escaped, human reasons have been the incentives, not high ideals’.[ 47]

For some defectors, no doubt, expressions of anti-Soviet sentiment were sincere. Even in these cases, however, defectors’ anti-communist convictions rarely attained the articulate character that Americans wanted to hear. Frequently, defectors’ opposition to communism rested on the basic conviction that life was better abroad than at home. A common refrain among these defectors was the shock they had experienced in discovering that the vanquished and occupied Germans lived better than the Soviet people did.[ 48] Comparing living standards in Germany and the USSR made one ‘increasingly discontented with Russian life’, as an army geologist who fled the GDR in the early 1950s put it. He contrasted Germany, where ‘even ordinary people lived in clean homes and had such luxuries as guest homes and gardens’, to Moscow, which he found ‘poor and miserable’ during his leave in 1948.[ 49] Defectors from rural backgrounds drew even starker contrasts, often citing their impressions gleaned from visiting their families in the impoverished postwar Soviet countryside.[ 50] Adding to such ideologically charged comparisons was the considerable privilege that some high-ranking Soviet personnel enjoyed in Germany in the chaotic months immediately after the war, during which some officers had managed to acquire cars and hire servants.[ 51] In short, such soldiers had decided that the West was a land of plenty, an attitude conditioned by the disastrous living standards during WWII and under late Stalinism to which they were accustomed.

The picture of defectors that emerges from interrogation records, then, is that of a group driven by self-preservation and self-advancement. There is nothing surprising here for the student of Soviet history. As Stephen Kotkin has argued, Stalin-era Soviet citizens approached ideology instrumentally, ‘speaking Bolshevik’ in order to get by in the unstable conditions of Stalin’s rule.[ 52] Even the defectors’ willingness to rewrite their biographies had a Stalin-era precedent in the strategies of imposture citizens employed in response to interactions with a coercive and unpredictable party-state.[ 53] However, defectors’ preoccupation with ‘immediate problems of survival’, as one interrogator somewhat dismissively put it, diverged from American expectations that they would be committed to the liberation of their homeland from Soviet rule.[ 54] In this sense, a myth about defectors obscured the real reasons why and how people fled the Soviet bloc, a conceptual shortcoming that would complicate American schemes to manage the defectors in the West and to utilize them for psychological warfare.

Some Guy TT
Aug 30, 2011

what about later periods of the cold war post stalin were defectors motivated by different factors by that point or were there just fewer of them despite the vague historical discourse implying that there was a steady stream of defectors throughout the cold war

Tankbuster
Oct 1, 2021
the 31% who defected for some pussy were real rear end dudes.

i say swears online
Mar 4, 2005

sounds like the ussr could have stopped a fifth of all defections with just a few more pizza parties

Some Guy TT
Aug 30, 2011

ive got another late cold war question to what extent does gorbachev cause the soviet union to collapse versus the soviet union collapsing causing gorbachev to come to power

alternately is my whole premise of gorbachev being a uniquely important factor to the soviet union collapsing flawed

Orange Devil
Oct 1, 2010

Wullie's reign cannae smother the flames o' equality!
I’m thinking the Sino-Soviet split may have been the most damaging thing.

i say swears online
Mar 4, 2005

Some Guy TT posted:

ive got another late cold war question to what extent does gorbachev cause the soviet union to collapse versus the soviet union collapsing causing gorbachev to come to power

alternately is my whole premise of gorbachev being a uniquely important factor to the soviet union collapsing flawed

if you watch For All Mankind you'll learn his free market policies turned the USSR into an economic powerhouse that expanded their reach and influence in the late 80s and early 90s

Raskolnikov38
Mar 3, 2007

We were somewhere around Manila when the drugs began to take hold

Some Guy TT posted:

ive got another late cold war question to what extent does gorbachev cause the soviet union to collapse versus the soviet union collapsing causing gorbachev to come to power

alternately is my whole premise of gorbachev being a uniquely important factor to the soviet union collapsing flawed

the soviet bloc was probably doomed regardless between the underdevelopment of eastern europe members and the whipsaws in politics from stalinism to collective leadership to a return to soft stalinism making the citizens of these states extremely unhappy with communsim. the soviet union probably would have been able to survive if andropov had lived, charting a dengist-lite path of some economic liberalism under party and GOSPLAN guidance with a willingness to crack down on nationalism and those who pushed or wanted to push liberalization too far forward ala tiananmen. gorbachev on the other idea was a blunderer who understood neither the inner workings of the soviet system nor the forces his programs were unleashing within the soviet union and its satellites. that said, there was not much, if any, opposition to gorbachev in the politburo until the second half of the 80s when it was clear his liberalization programs weren't going as well as had been hoped. i would charge the entire politburo with indecisiveness and incompetence with gorbachev being the most indecisive and incompetent

vyelkin
Jan 2, 2011

Raskolnikov38 posted:

the soviet bloc was probably doomed regardless between the underdevelopment of eastern europe members and the whipsaws in politics from stalinism to collective leadership to a return to soft stalinism making the citizens of these states extremely unhappy with communsim. the soviet union probably would have been able to survive if andropov had lived, charting a dengist-lite path of some economic liberalism under party and GOSPLAN guidance with a willingness to crack down on nationalism and those who pushed or wanted to push liberalization too far forward ala tiananmen. gorbachev on the other idea was a blunderer who understood neither the inner workings of the soviet system nor the forces his programs were unleashing within the soviet union and its satellites. that said, there was not much, if any, opposition to gorbachev in the politburo until the second half of the 80s when it was clear his liberalization programs weren't going as well as had been hoped. i would charge the entire politburo with indecisiveness and incompetence with gorbachev being the most indecisive and incompetent

yeah the basic problem is that by the mid-80s the Soviet system (including the satellites in Eastern Europe, which were heavily subsidized by Soviet oil exports) was entering a significant economic crisis that needed something to be done about it, and with the old guard literally dying off Gorbachev was pretty much the only leadership contender offering to actually try and do something, but then what he tried to do didn't work. He liberalized and decentralized Soviet politics in a way that unleased a lot of pent-up dissent and grievances while also severely restricting the ability of the central state to do anything about it (both in the repressive stamp-down-on-dissent sense and in the positive help-people-out sense), and he combined that with economic reforms that got people's hopes up about revitalizing the system but then failed to actually accomplish that. To answer your initial question, SGTT, it's both. The Soviet system was in crisis which led to the desire for a real reformer who would at least try to revitalize it, but Gorbachev's reforms didn't solve the existing problems and in the process unleashed new problems that they weren't prepared for.

Another big thing to remember about the late-socialist USSR is that it was heavily reliant on income from oil exports. Check out this graph:



The high price of oil in the 70s and early 80s and the USSR being one of the world's biggest oil exporters brought in a lot of foreign trade income, which the Soviets used to subsidize much of their state spending. Internationally that meant subsidizing Eastern Europe and domestically it meant subsidizing personal consumption. There's a stereotype that the Soviets were spending all that money on weapons, but actually the number one thing oil revenue was spent on was food imports, which kept stores full and prices low.

See how the price of oil collapsed in the mid-80s, right around the time Gorbachev came to power? That's a big cause of the economic crisis that people remember as the Soviet system failing. The low price of oil meant the Gorbachev-era USSR had to cut subsidies to Eastern Europe and subsidies on domestic consumption, which made Eastern Europe's debt crisis worse and contributed hugely to the shortages and long lines that people associate with the final years of the USSR. Maybe a more competent or better organized series of reforms could have overcome this problem, but it's an example of the kind of fundamental imbalances that any leader would have faced coming to power when Gorbachev did.

Incidentally, one of the biggest continuities across 1991 is the petrostate nature of the USSR/Russia. The 70s are remembered as an era of increasing living standards because that's when oil was high. The 80s are remembered as a time of stagnation because that's when oil prices stopped rising and started falling. The 90s are remembered as a time of collapse and crisis because that's when oil was cheap. The 2000s are remembered as a time of renewed prosperity (leading to social support for Putin) because that's when oil prices went up again. And so on. I even read an article once saying we should stop thinking about the USSR as an ideologically distinct socialist state and more as just a typical petrostate with a socialist veneer, which I think is overstating the case, but oil prices have been very strongly linked to the fortunes of the leadership in Moscow since the USSR became a major oil exporter in the 60s and 70s.

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Some Guy TT
Aug 30, 2011

does a hypothetical soviet state in an alt eighties where nuclear has replaced petro as the worlds main energy source do better or worse than the actual soviet union

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