Tomn posted:

Ran into this in the OSHA thread and it seemed relevant to the thread's interests.

Defenestrategy posted:

A one stroke penalty for a bombing raid seems kinda harsh.

TooMuchAbstraction posted:

https://twitter.com/gschnakenberg/status/1611746618906234881

samcarsten posted:

Here's a milhist question: Was Sarumans plan at Helm's Deep flawed? It seemed to almost work, before Gandalf showed up.

samcarsten posted:

Here's a milhist question: Was Sarumans plan at Helm's Deep flawed? It seemed to almost work, before Gandalf showed up.

MikeC posted:

I have no doubt people take pictures of all sorts but in the field, it is unlikely they pack 3+ pistols. Troopers in cavalry units in service with the army and not on irregular duties are far more likely to value their shoulder-fired weapons. Federal cavalry especially since as the war progressed, they were given the lion's share of the most advanced small arms such as revolver rifles and magazine-fed metal cartridge semi-automatics. I have read about Rebel "cavalry" units who were more robbers and partisans than anything else carry a pair on their bodies as well as additional pistols on pommel holsters because they would never be doing real fighting and the pistols were best when dealing with pursuing horsemen.

Assuming that soldiers would preserve and carry the weapons most useful to them, a Confederate report on Wheeler's Cavalry Corps in late 1864 showed the following armaments being in "serviceable conditions":

Among around 6670 men supposedly inspected, 3896 Rifles, 500 Carbines, and 1978 pistols was the total count. In total 50 sabres were found in the entire corps and the report noted that the men largely used captured weapons and complained about the non-uniformity of calibres within the Corps. It can be inferred that the troopers valued long guns far more than pistols though I guess there is the chance that pistols were difficult to loot and maintain and that no one gave a poo poo about swords (the report complains even many officers failed to have swords). I don't want to undersell pistol and sword as both saw some limited use in cavalry skirmishes and certain units were retained as cavalry with sabre, carbine, and pistol, but by mid war most cavalry units in regular service fought dismounted on foot. Rifles and carbines were the predominant weapons of choice.

From Cavalry Tactics: Or, Regulations for the Instruction, Formations, and Movements of The Cavalry of the Army and Volunteers of the United States (1864)

SerCypher posted:

Also a lot of those pictures are in studios.

They probably have a bunch of props you can use, including more guns. I wouldn't look at them as factual representations of gear, they're dudes flexing so their mom has a cool photo to remember them by after they die of dysentery.

SerCypher posted:

Also a lot of those pictures are in studios.

They probably have a bunch of props you can use, including more guns. I wouldn't look at them as factual representations of gear, they're dudes flexing so their mom has a cool photo to remember them by after they die of dysentery.

Arrath posted:

After all what soldier/kid wouldn't say "Hell yeah I do" when asked if they want more guns in the picture.

Xiahou Dun posted:

A picture of a pair of tiny eyes peering through an enormous stack of firearms - Tommy, age 13.

Tomn posted:

But as a general thing regarding more pistols being better than, it does seem like you'll reach a point of diminishing returns pretty quickly where the odds of your ever needing to whip out the other pistols in a serious combat scenario goes down with each additional pistol until they end up having minimal combat utility but still take up weight and space all the same.

I mean, you'll basically want the following specific conditions:

1) You're in a position where pistols are preferable to long guns, i.e. close quarters combat (this is already starting to look dodgy when Minie balls are a thing - cavalry on cavalry fights seem like the main situation where this might come up, and only under certain circumstances).

2) You're in a position where you do in fact have reasonable odds of actually hitting someone with said pistol - I don't know much about shooting but I'm going to guess that firing a pistol while at going at full gallop while firing at another target that may itself be going at full gallop is actually pretty tricky.

3) You're in a position where it's important to not only fire off these pistols, but to fire them off repeatedly and quickly without stopping.

4) You're in a position where it's likely that you'll get a chance to actually fire off every shot, in conditions where you're likely to survive long enough to do so.

quote:

It sometimes helps wonderfully, when brisk people come together, whether Noble or non Noble, and are there to fight with hatred, how also today the weapons in the brawling are not equal, and may soon reduce one to the other in thrusting and in cutting, how it is now the custom in several Lands, which is also heard, where one has a dagger and rappier and the other has a short barreled weapon and rappier, and rather, when one is forced to use rappier and dagger, and he has learned nothing of it: So your grace, instead of the Dagger, take a short barreled weapon, and there it will be well revealed, what is the best thing to do, or not, Where dissimilar weapons before the opponent will be used, then in the case of emergency must one use, what one can think of, because it is all come to the utmost, now in these dangerous times in the World.

Siivola posted:

Siivola posted:

Could you recommend a good source that explains that in detail? The Crecy book I listened to earlier made me realize I can't really imagine how things look from a scout’s perspective, because I’ve only looked at battles from above in games and books.

Ensign Expendable posted:

Problem exists between reins and saddle

Siivola posted:

The Crecy book I listened to earlier made me realize I can't really imagine how things look from a scout’s perspective, because I’ve only looked at battles from above in games and books.

Siivola posted:

That does help a lot, thanks! I guess skirmishing infantry do the same thing, but on a smaller scale? So instead of riding to the next town to see what's up, they would hustle up a key hill to make sure there's nobody hiding behind it in ambush?

Unfortunately I can't find a copy of The English Cavalryman Failure in the Saddle anywhere. If I were to get into the ACW in general, is The Battle Cry of Freedom still the go-to book, or is there a better introduction these days?

Siivola posted:

If I were to get into the ACW in general, is The Battle Cry of Freedom still the go-to book, or is there a better introduction these days?

Siivola posted:

That does help a lot, thanks! I guess skirmishing infantry do the same thing, but on a smaller scale? So instead of riding to the next town to see what's up, they would hustle up a key hill to make sure there's nobody hiding behind it in ambush?

Unfortunately I can't find a copy of The English Cavalryman Failure in the Saddle anywhere. If I were to get into the ACW in general, is The Battle Cry of Freedom still the go-to book, or is there a better introduction these days?

zoux posted:

had sent a brigade under JJ Pettigrew to "requisition" some shoes from the nearby town of Gettysburg,

zoux posted:

Contrast with CSA Cavalry commander Gen. Jeb Stuart, who was by all accounts a dashing and gallant cavalry officer, liked to own the Feds by riding his entire division around and through their whole dang army, decided to do that instead of what he was ordered to do, which was screen the right flank of the Army of Northern Virginia while it moved elements across a river. You know, in case the entire Union army showed up or something. When Jeb finally arrived in the middle of the battle, Lee hit him with a 'General you are here at last' and was cold to him and I understand did not even offer him an iced tea or other cool repast, despite the perishing heat of the afternoon.

quote:

Looking across the broad sweep of events, judging Jeb Stuart’s performance isn’t as simple as it seems. Certainly, not all of his objectives were fulfilled. Most prominently, Stuart spent most of the campaign on a wild raid in which he was out of contact with his commander. He never linked up with General Ewell (not in a timely fashion, at any rate), and Lee was not kept appraised of the enemy’s movement. Whatever his raid may have accomplished, it also fatigued his troopers and possibly limited their effectiveness in the final fight on July 3rd.

Yet there are facts which defend Stuart’s course of action as well. Robert E. Lee’s orders to Stuart offered the young cavalier a tremendous amount of discretion; that he utilized that discretion rests at much on Lee’s shoulders as on Stuart’s. Materially, he brought need supplies back to the army, captured hundreds of prisoners, and disrupted the enemies supply line. Nor did his raid leave Lee entirely without cavalry. Although Stuart undoubtedly took some of the finer Confederate troopers with him, the brigades of Beverly Robertson, “Grumble” Jones, and Albert Jenkins were at Lee’s disposal. Lee can hardly be said to be bereft of cavalry when Stuart left nearly five thousand horsemen behind. While Stuart attempted to notify Lee of Union movement north, those messages never got through. Yet the three brigades of cavalry left to Lee could have detected those movements as well.

What ultimately motivated Stuart to take off on his raid? Again, answers don’t come easily. It is hard, however, not to see the battle at Brandy Station as the catalyst that pushed Stuart to undertake his grand raid, however risky. That “discreditable” debacle perhaps spurred Stuart to greater risks in order to repair his tarnished reputation. At least twice, Stuart had chances to abort his raid. On the very first day, Stuart was surprised to discover Yankee infantry blocking his path as it trudged northward. Instead of reporting to Lee and moving up the valley himself, he choose to continue his venture by moving further southeast, lengthening the raid’s duration and his distance from the Army of Northern Virginia. Again when Stuart crossed the Potomac, he could have bolted northwest to unite with Ewell as his orders directed; instead he continued his raid by scaring the Washington suburbs. Stuart pushed the raid to its limits, and the result was that Lee was without his best cavalry commander.

quote:

Most prominently, Stuart spent most of the campaign on a wild raid in which he was out of contact with his commander.

zoux posted:

Seems pretty damning. Didn't know that Lee had that many cav on hand, why didn't he use them?

zoux posted:

Seems pretty damning. Didn't know that Lee had that many cav on hand, why didn't he use them?

MikeC posted:

Of the 4 brigades left to Lee, two were essentially partisan/home guard cavalry (Imboden and Jenkins) and assigned to areas of least risk due to being untested and unreliability. The other 2 brigades (Robertson and Jones) were left the responsibility of blocking Snickers and Ashby Gap.

The former were in proper screening position and Imboden turned out to be a good commander. Jenkin's brigade came up short and Ewell's men were generally not impressed. Jones and Robertson were supposed to keep watch and pass movement of Federal forces to Lee while Stuart was incommunicado but it is likely they were overtaxed and had personality issues between them.

The timeline of events meant that for Lee to cover Stuart's mistake, he would have had to know immediately that the Stuart would fail his screening mission and reassign that task even before Stuart left Middleton. Not a realistic option for Lee