Frosted Flake posted:

The official said Russia’s reluctance to retaliate has influenced the risk calculus of Secretary of State Antony Blinken, a key Biden confidant who has been an influential voice encouraging the administration and U.S. allies to do more to support Ukraine.
“You factor that in your decision-making. We did this — there was no escalation or response — can we do the next thing? We’re constantly weighing those factors, and it becomes the hardest judgment call we have to make,” said the official.

quote:

Russia’s long-range strike campaign of air and missile attacks has fallen short of producing the strategic
effects necessary to achieve a decisive victory.
▪ Key drivers of this failure have been the Ukrainian military’s extensive use of dispersion, mobility, and
deception and the comparative slowness of Russia’s over-the-horizon targeting cycle.
▪ At the war’s outset, Russia significantly underestimated the scale of effort required to accomplish its goals.
In its initial operation to gain air superiority, Russia failed to achieve mass and tried to attack too many
targets with too few missiles over too short a period to achieve its desired results.
▪ Russia’s strike campaign has also been undermined by frequent shifts in targeting priorities and the
irregular availability of precision-guided munitions.
▪ Ukrainian air defenses have deterred Russian Air Force aircraft from launching penetrating sorties against
strategic targets deep behind the front lines. This success has greatly shaped the course of the war,
limiting Russian striking power to diminishing numbers of stand-off missiles or uncrewed aerial systems.
▪ Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and industry have deepened Ukraine’s dependency
on the West. This dependency supports Russia’s goal of exhausting the West’s patience and compelling
Western capitals to pressure Ukraine to make concessions. This Russian theory of victory will also fail,
however, unless Western governments accommodate it.
▪ Russia has seen relatively greater operational success in its campaign to degrade the Ukrainian electrical
grid, though Ukraine has proven resilient to these hardships.
▪ Ukraine has seen increasing success in intercepting Russian cruise missiles, particularly since the influx of
Western air defenses systems in October and November 2022.
2 | Putin’s Missile War
▪ Ukrainian air and missile defenses have not been leak-proof, however, highlighting the importance of
passive defense and maintaining the capacity to quickly reconstitute capabilities and infrastructure.
▪ Since the fall of 2022, Russia’s long-range missile attacks against Ukraine have become larger but less
frequent as Russia attempts to overcome the growing efficiency of Ukrainian air defenses.
▪ Russia is likely to struggle to maintain the frequency of attacks moving forward as its missile
stockpiles diminish and it becomes more reliant on newly produced or recently acquired projectiles
to fuel its attacks.
▪ Even with a diminished frequency, sustained air attacks against Ukraine’s electrical grid over the long
term risk exhausting Ukraine’s capacity to sustain repairs.
▪ In addition to degrading Ukraine’s electrical grid, the composition of Russian missile salvos since October
2022 suggests a secondary Russian goal of depleting Ukrainian air defense capacity.
▪ Diminished air defense capacity would not only put Ukraine at greater risk from Russian missile attack but
raise the prospects of the Russian Air Force resuming penetrating sorties into Ukrainian airspace.
▪ To the extent possible, replenishing Ukraine’s air defense capacity should remain a priority for Western
military aid for the foreseeable future.
▪ Ukraine has demonstrated throughout the war that Russian ballistic and cruise missiles are manageable
threats and can be countered effectively through active and passive defenses.

quote:

Executive Summary
The scale of Russian losses in 2022, combined with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation confronting NATO systems they had not previously contended with, has caused a significant deviation in Russian operations from the country’s doctrine. This report seeks to outline how Russian forces have adapted their tactics in the Ukrainian conflict and the challenges this has created for the Ukrainian military that must be overcome. The report examines Russian military adaptation by combat function.

Russian infantry tactics have shifted from trying to deploy uniform Battalion Tactical Groups as combined arms units of action to a stratified division by function into line, assault, specialised and disposable troops. These are formed into task-organised groupings. Line infantry are largely used for ground holding and defensive operations. Disposable infantry are used for continuous skirmishing to either identify Ukrainian firing positions, which are then targeted by specialised infantry, or to find weak points in Ukrainian defences to be prioritised for assault. Casualties are very unevenly distributed across these functions. The foremost weakness across Russian infantry units is low morale, which leads to poor unit cohesion and inter-unit cooperation.

Russian engineering has proven to be one of the stronger branches of the Russian military. Russian engineers have been constructing complex obstacles and field fortifications across the front. This includes concrete reinforced trenches and command bunkers, wire-entanglements, hedgehogs, anti-tank ditches, and complex minefields. Russian mine laying is extensive and mixes anti-tank and victim-initiated anti-personnel mines, the latter frequently being laid with multiple initiation mechanisms to complicate breaching. These defences pose a major tactical challenge to Ukrainian offensive operations.

Russian armour is rarely used for attempts at breakthrough. Instead, armour is largely employed in a fire support function to deliver accurate fire against Ukrainian positions. Russia has started to employ thermal camouflage on its vehicles and, using a range of other modifications and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), has significantly reduced the detectability of tanks at stand-off ranges. Furthermore, these measures have reduced the probability of kill of a variety of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) at ranges beyond 1,400 m.

Russian artillery has begun to significantly refine the Reconnaissance Strike Complex following the destruction of its ammunition stockpiles and command and control infrastructure by guided multiple-launch rocket systems (GMLRS) in July 2022. This has resulted in much closer integration of multiple UAVs directly supporting commanders authorised to apply fires. Russian artillery has also improved its ability to fire from multiple positions and to fire and move, reducing susceptibility to counterbattery fire. The key system enabling this coordination appears to be the Strelets system. There has been a shift in reliance upon 152-mm howitzers to a much greater emphasis on 120-mm mortars in Russian fires; this reflects munitions and barrel availability. Responsive Russian fires represent the greatest challenge to Ukrainian offensive operations. Russian artillery is also increasingly relying on loitering munitions for counterbattery fires.

Russian electronic warfare (EW) remains potent, with an approximate distribution of at least one major system covering each 10 km of front. These systems are heavily weighted towards the defeat of UAVs and tend not to try and deconflict their effects. Ukrainian UAV losses remain at approximately 10,000 per month. Russian EW is also apparently achieving real time interception and decryption of Ukrainian Motorola 256-bit encrypted tactical communications systems, which are widely employed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Russian air defences have also seen a significant increase in their effectiveness now that they are set up around known, and fairly static, locations and are properly connected. Although Russia has persistently struggled to respond to emerging threats, over time it has adapted. Russian air defences are now assessed by the Ukrainian military to be intercepting a proportion of GMLRS strikes as Russian point defences are directly connected to superior radar.

Russian aviation remains constrained to delivering stand-off effects, ranging from responsive lofted S-8 salvos against Ukrainian forming-up points, to FAB-500 glide bombs delivered from medium altitude to ranges up to 70 km. The Ukrainian military notes that Russia has a large stockpile of FAB-500s and is systematically upgrading them with glide kits. Although they only have limited accuracy, the size of these munitions poses a serious threat. The Russian Aerospace Forces remain a ‘force in being’ and a major threat to advancing Ukrainian forces, although they currently lack the capabilities to penetrate Ukrainian air defences.

Following the destruction of Russian command and control infrastructure in July 2022, the Russian military withdrew major headquarters out of range of GMLRS and placed them in hardened structures. They also wired them into the Ukrainian civil telecommunications network and used field cables to branch from this to brigade headquarters further forward. Assigned assets tend to connect to these headquarters via microlink, significantly reducing their signature. At the same time, from the battalion down, Russian forces largely rely on unencrypted analogue military radios, reflecting a shortage of trained signallers at the tactical level.

An overview of Russian adaptation reveals a force that is able to improve and evolve its employment of key systems. There is evidence of a centralised process for identifying shortcomings in employment and the development of mitigations. Nevertheless, much of this adaptation is reactive and is aimed at making up for serious deficiencies in Russian units. The result is a structure that becomes better over time at managing the problems it immediately faces, but also one that struggles to anticipate new threats. The conclusion therefore is that the Russian Armed Forces pose a significant challenge for the Ukrainian military on the defence. Nevertheless, if Ukraine can disrupt Russian defences and impose a dynamic situation on them, Russian units are likely to rapidly lose their coordination. Changes in the air combat environment, for example, have led rapidly to incidents of Russian fratricide.

Neurolimal posted:

He's busy with other stuff atm

Delta-Wye posted:

Regarde Aduck posted:

there's a very good chance i'm reacting to psyops or some poo poo but everything i've heard from ordinary Russians just makes them seem so tired and done with the war almost from the get go

speng31b posted:

it talks about the blurred avatar as his main crime

mawarannahr posted:

Futanari Damacy posted:

Can anyone accurately recount what even happened with this? iirc it was a blurred version of an avatar some gbs nazi bought for themselves, but the chain of custody or w.e of the blurred version being re-bestowed was interpreted 100% non-disingenuously as an actual factual endorsement of nazism by one or more of the most tedious posters ever to blight this place

Truga posted:

lol that owns

this is how this "unprovoked" war started, and it's gonna end in an "unprovoked" nuclear exchange in the same way lmao

speng31b posted:

yeah, but what say do they have in it? if the state really feels the fight is existential, and ending it before they get what they want will just put them up against a more hardened NATO-backed Ukraine in a few years, well.

mawarannahr posted:

Russia’s Strategic Failure and Ukraine’s Secure Future - United States Department of State

sisu? I know that from somewhere...



striking logo too:

Zeppelin Insanity posted:

I'm really interested to know how much of it is "keeps it secret" and how much is "western analysts think learning foreign languages is beneath them"

Regarde Aduck posted:

wait how hard is it to smuggle a single round of ammo out of China? This is beyond western intelligence agencies?

Frosted Flake posted:

I keep thinking about this. How the gently caress are they even going to make the case here?

The realpolitik case for keeping the Chinese Civil War going, backing Sore Loser Island, that's all straightforward. Fine. An unsinkable aircraft carrier that can threaten Red China.

But liberals don't work like that, so there will have to be a tortured explanation for why a military dictatorship cum one party state that claims to be the government of China is actually a vibrant democracy and distinct thousand year old culture or whatever.

Frosted Flake posted:

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the PRC just has to wait. I don't know why the Taiwanese would declare independence and ignite a war before American power declines to the point where it suits them to work out a deal to rejoin the mainland.

Lostconfused posted:

The tattoo needs an accompanying paragraph because it needs to explain a finish word to English speakers.

A "my Nazi looking tattoo is bringing a lot of questions answered by my Nazi looking tattoo" if you will.

Zeppelin Insanity posted:

I'm really interested to know how much of it is "keeps it secret" and how much is "western analysts think learning foreign languages is beneath them"

Delta-Wye posted:

holy lol

Starsfan posted:

Sometime after this all blows over Zelenskyy could make quite the windfall selling those authentic Zelenskyy worn green shirts. There has to be dozens or hundreds of them by now, I hope he's not throwing them out

Starsfan posted:

Sometime after this all blows over Zelenskyy could make quite the windfall selling those authentic Zelenskyy worn green shirts. There has to be dozens or hundreds of them by now, I hope he's not throwing them out

Throatwarbler posted:

https://twitter.com/ianbremmer/status/1664382058750263296

quote:

"This is the chant of the most radical chauvinists from Western Ukraine who collaborated with Nazis, who killed hundreds of thousands of Poles, Jews, and anyone else they got their hands on," Milanović said at the event. "These are the facts."

quote:

Milanović compared it to the chant used by sympathisers of the Croatian World War II-era Nazi puppet state, known as the Independent State of Croatia or NDH. It was led by some of Europe's most fervent Hitler adherents, who conducted brutal ethnic cleansing campaigns.

“There is no difference between the chant ‘For the Homeland, Prepared!’ and 'Glory to Ukraine,'” Milanović insisted, referring to a Nazi battle cry from NDH days.

quote:

Although some Croatians contend that "For the Homeland, Prepared!" was also used before World War II, progressive historians point out that, unlike Ukraine, Croatia had a full-fledged Nazi state controlling significant territories, including not just today's Croatia but also parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.

tristeham posted:

he has been wearing the same since the start