War in Ukraine CE: The Golf War

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ummel: Jun 17, 2002; <3 Lowtax; Fun Shoe

https://www.businessinsider.in/inte...w/101603088.cms

quote:

In a post on Telegram, Hanna Maliar, Ukraine's deputy defense minister, wrote that the Kerch Strait Bridge � which opened four years after Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 � was targeted to disrupt Moscow's supply lines. She noted that Saturday marks 273 days since the "first strike" on the bridge, which was carried out "in order to break the logistics of the Russians."

Ukraine officially admits to the attack on the Kerch bridge. No other details available besides that they did it.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 14:17

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# ? Jun 6, 2024 14:39

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

DOD Update, this time from Dr. Kahl, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). USD(P) is the senior of the USDs.
Intro then excerpts as I choose.

This is from Friday so not exactly breaking news anymore, but I generally prefer to captture some of the original language rather than Twittter (or threads or whatever) summaries.

The link below has the full transcript and video.
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transc...press-briefing/

Highlights:
Dr. Kahl's argument to give DPICM to Ukraine:
--1. Russia already using a variety cluster munitions indiscriminately in Ukraine to try to seize territory. Ukraine would be using DPICM to defend its territory.
--2. Compared to Russian cluster munitions, the US provided munitions are not as bad in the realm of dud rates, and Russia has spread likely tens of millions of submunitions over Ukrainian land (US claiming ~2.35% vs 30-40% for Russian dud rates). [My note: this will not be compelling to groups who find all clusters and their dud rates unacceptable.]
--3. Ukraine has agreed in writing to the US not to use DPICM on civilian-populated urban areas, and to log where they are fired, and US has pleldged $95m in demining/UXO support. [My note: That seems to give some wiggle room on urban areas that used to be civilian-populated, but no longer are, even if that wasn't the intent.]
--4. This will allow the US to provide ammunition to Ukraine for months. US and partners are still getting their conventional artillery munition production up and increased; DPICM donations buy time for that, and the US is committed to supporting Ukraine for the long haul.
Other Highlights
-Sees DPICM use as a bridge capability, not permanent solution, until sufficient 155mm conventional rounds and their supply lines are available to donate. DPICM exists in sufficient quantities for the US to give some up without too much risk to their other OPLANs/CONPLANs.
-The claim of 2.35% dud rate comes from five tests in 1998 to 2020 on new types of DPICM rather than the ordnance used in Desert Storm. Those tests are classified and not publicly available.
-US not going to broadcast the delivery timeline [My note: Since these are at least in large part coming from presidential drawdown, probably rather quickly, like days/week, not weeks/months.]
-US won't give specific numbers, but "hundreds of thousands" of DPICM rounds are available. US has even more of the older high dud rate variants, but is not giving those tot Ukraine.
-The Ukrainian counteroffensive has been slower than the US and Ukraine had hoped.
-Ukraine has not yet committed most of its offensive forces to the counteroffensive.
-Ukraine/US may have underestimated the effectiveness of Russia's defensive lines [My note: digging into the dirt and taking cover when shot at are both still very strong defensive tactics in modern warfare]
-Dr. Kahl doesn't know where Prigozhin is or what the end-game with that is, other than Russia taking apart portions of Wagner and either dismantling or placing them under RU governmental control.

quote:

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY DR. COLIN KAHL: Great, thanks, Dave.

Good afternoon, everybody. I'm deeply grateful for another opportunity to address you all today, this time, ahead of my travel to the NATO Summit in Vilnius with the president and with Secretary Austin next week, and before my eventual transition from leading our policy apparatus here in the Pentagon, which has been the honor of my lifetime at such a critical period in the global security environment.

As you know, NATO leaders will convene in Vilnius at a crucial juncture for transatlantic security. Seventeen months into Russia's unlawful aggression against Ukraine, we bear witness to the tragedy unfolding in the heart of Europe, a tragedy that Vladimir Putin can end at any time, as by every measure, his objectives have not been fulfilled and they will not be fulfilled in Ukraine.

The nations of NATO stand united alongside nations from around the world, showing an unwavering determination to provide unprecedented support to Ukraine, while simultaneously strengthening the alliance's own deterrence and defense. During our meetings in Vilnius, we will build upon years of adaptation, charting the course for a more safe, secure and prosperous world and refining our next steps in response to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine.

Today, the United States also continues to demonstrate its enduring commitment to Ukraine with the announcement of a new drawdown of military assistance to provide Ukraine's forces with additional munitions, weapons and equipment needed to defend their country and push back on Russia's war of aggression. With the announcement of this 42nd presidential drawdown package, the United States has committed more than $41.3 billion in military assistance since Russia first launched its unprovoked and brutal war against Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, and more than $44.1 billion in military assistance since Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine back in 2014.

Some of the capabilities in today's $800 million drawdown package include 155-mm artillery rounds, including Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions, or DPICMs, and 105-mm artillery rounds, additional munitions for Patriot air defense systems and ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, additional Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, additional Stryker armored personnel carriers, precision aerial munitions, demolition munitions and systems for obstacle clearing and various spare parts and operational sustainment equipment.

With this announcement, we will be able to provide Ukraine with hundreds of thousands of additional artillery ammunition immediately. This decision will ensure we can sustain our support for Ukraine by bridging us to a point where we are producing sufficient artillery ammunition on a monthly basis across the coalition. We recognize the complexities here, which is why I want to quickly provide a few additional pieces of information on DPICM.

First, Russia has been using cluster munitions indiscriminately since the start of this war in order to attack Ukraine. By contrast, Ukraine is seeking DPICM rounds in order to defend its own sovereign territory.

Second, compared to Russian cluster munitions, the DPICM rounds we will provide Ukraine have an extremely low failure, or dud rate. The DPICM ammunition we are delivering to Ukraine will consist only of those with a dud rate less than 2.35 percent. Compare that to Russia, which has been using cluster munitions across Ukraine with dud rates of between 30 and 40 percent. During the first year of the conflict alone, Russia fired cluster munitions deployed from a range of weapon systems have likely expended tens of millions of submunitions, or bomblets, across Ukraine.

Third, we're working with Ukraine to minimize the risks associated with the decision. The Ukrainian government has offered us assurances in writing on the responsible use of DPICMs, including that they will not use the rounds in civilian-populated urban environments and that they will record where they use these rounds, which will simplify later demining efforts. Ukraine also has committed to post-conflict demining efforts to mitigate any potential harm to civilians. The United States has already invested more than $95 million in Ukraine's demining activities, and we will provide more support to help Ukraine mitigate the impacts of cluster munition use by both sides in this conflict.

And fourth -- and this is critical -- by providing Ukraine with DPICM artillery ammunition, we will ensure that the Ukrainian military has sufficient artillery ammunition for many months to come. In this period, the United States, our allies and partners will continue to ramp up our defense industrial bases to support Ukraine. For the past year and a half, President Biden has been clear that we will support Ukraine for as long as it takes. I want to commend the tireless efforts of the department, our allies and our partners in delivering this historically-unprecedented level of security assistance.

Throughout the Kremlin's vicious war of choice, the Ukrainian forces have effectively leveraged assistance and shown outstanding bravery and skill. Ukraine's fight is a marathon, not a sprint, so we will continue to provide Ukraine with the urgent capabilities that it needs to meet the moment, as well as what it needs to keep itself secure for the long term from Russian aggression.

Finally, on a personal note, as I enter my last week as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, I want to thank the hundreds of patriots and professionals across OSD Policy. I believe they are the finest national security organization in the business, for all that they have done to support Ukraine, strengthen our alliances and partnerships around the world, and work tirelessly every day alongside our military and interagency colleagues to keep America safe.

And with that, I'll pass the mic back to Dave and look forward to your questions.

STAFF: Okay, thanks, sir. We'll go first to Tara Copp, AP.

Q: Hi, sir. Thank you very much for doing this. A couple of questions. If you could talk about the dud rate? There seems to be some questions about how the U.S. knows that its own munitions that will be provided will have such a low dud rate. And have you been able to assure allies that these munitions won't cause excessive civilian harm?

And then secondly, is the primary reason that the cluster munitions are being used now, because there is so much strain on the 155 millimeter stockpile.

DR. KAHL: Yeah, those are important questions. So, look, we're aware of reporting -- and I've seen some things in the press over the last 24 hours, you know, that references various DOD studies which analyze the dud rates of older versions of DPICMs.

There are lots of different variants. I think as we talked about, you know, the Russians are -- the -- you know, a cluster munition is not a cluster munition. There are there are big differences between them.

Many of those studies that have been referenced, at least the ones that I've seen in the press, were based on testing completed in the 1980s, and many of the DPICMs of those variants have since been demilitarized. We're not providing those variants of DPICMs to Ukraine.

Instead, we'll be providing our most modern DPICMs with dud rates assessed to be under 2.35 percent, demonstrated through five comprehensive tests conducted by the Department of Defense between 1998 and 2020. So, we're confident in those numbers.

I will also say how they're used matters, and that's one of the reasons why, as we deliberated on this -- and look, this was a decision that took us a while to come to. And all of the concerns that people have raised -- the humanitarian concerns, what the reaction of allies and partners would be, what the reaction would be on the Hill -- all of these things were debated and adjudicated within the interagency.

But one of the things, in addition to the fact that, you know, we weren't providing cluster munitions above the dud rate that I talked about, was the assurances that we got from the Ukrainian side on this. We've gotten these assurances in writing.

The Secretary had an opportunity to discuss this with Minister Reznikov yesterday and he reiterated those assurances. And as I said in my opening those assurances are essentially that they would not use DPICM in urban areas that are populated by civilians and that there would be a careful accounting of where they use these weapons. That's going to matter for future de-mining efforts.

I should also say, while none of us should minimize this issue, this is an issue the Ukrainians are going to have to grapple with regardless. If we had never made a decision on DPICM, the Ukrainians would be de-mining -- it's going to be a generational effort because of the amount of land mines, anti-personnel, anti-tank mines, cluster munitions that the Russians have been using.

So this is an issue we have to tackle regardless. We're committed to helping the Ukrainians do that.

You asked about the primary reason. I would -- I would really point to two reasons. One is the urgency of the moment, which is that, you know, the Ukrainians are in the midst of their counter-offensive. It's been a -- it's been hard sledding because the Russians had, you know, six months to dig in. And so those defensive belts that the Russians have put in place in the east and the south are hard. They'd be hard for any military to punch through.

And so we want to make sure that the Ukrainians have sufficient artillery to keep them in the fight, in the context of the current counter-offensive, and because things are going a little slower than some had hoped, there are very high expenditures of artillery rates.

So this is to make sure that the Ukrainians have the confidence that they have what they need, but frankly, also that the Russians know that the Ukrainians are going to stay in the game.

And then the second point, which is important, is we don't see this as a permanent solution but rather a bridge. We've already substantially increased the production of unitary 155 millimeter rounds. The Europeans and others are also investing in their defense industrial base. That's good news and it's starting to pay dividends, but the reality is we're going to need to build a bridge to the point at which that capacity is sufficient on a month-to-month basis to keep the Ukrainians in the artillery fight.

And the last point I will make is a strategic one. Vladimir Putin has a theory of victory, okay? His theory of victory is that he will outlast everybody. He'll outlast the Ukrainians, he'll outlast the United States, he'll outlast the Europeans, he'll outlast the international community. He will simply brute force his way through this. Having failed in kind of achieving a lightning victory, he's now going to play the long game.

That's why President Biden has been clear that we're going to be with Ukraine as long as it takes and why we are signaling that we will continue to provide Ukraine with the capabilities that will keep them in the fight.

And look, I'm as concerned about the humanitarian circumstance as anybody but the worst thing for civilians in Ukraine is for Russia to win the war. And so it's important that they don't.

...

Q: I had a couple questions on -- has the United States ever used the DPICM -- the DPICM in combat? I don't think they have. So how robust are our inventories and why were these in the U.S. inventory anyway? Were these used to plan for a North Korean invasion kind of scenario?

DR. KAHL: Yes, I'll have to get back to you on previous uses. My understanding is there were uses of DPICM that -- but it may go back to the Gulf War, I may have that wrong. So, let's get back to you on that. [My note: At a minimum, DPICM was used in Persian Gulf War, Iraq War. Cluster bombs (maybe not specifically artillery-fired DPICM were used by US forces in Afghanistan in the opening year of the war, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS22907/33]

I will say they're in our inventories because there are a range of contingency plans where this could be -- where this could be useful, but this is also an area where our inventories are quite large and we are not concerned that in the quantities we would transfer to the Ukrainians that it would have a meaningful impact on our readiness for other contingencies.

...

Q: If I'm a Ukrainian squad or platoon leader and I'm going into areas where these things have been fired in the counteroffense. How concerned I -- should I be that my troops may fall into things and get blown apart themselves?

DR. KAHL: I mean, frankly, I think the graver concern is that they wander into a Russian minefield or areas where the Russians have expended weapons with a much higher dead rate.

I think that this is a reason, though, A, that we're only transferring DPICM with a very low dud rate. There are variants with higher dud rates that that we're not transferring. And B, why it will be important for the Ukrainians to keep track of where they're firing these things, both for immediate force protection reasons and over the medium-to-longer term for demining operations in kind of post-occupation, post-liberation parts of Ukraine.

...

DR. KAHL: I will say we're confident that with this inflow of DPICM, in combination with the unitary 155 rounds, we continue to provide that the Ukrainians will be able to sustain the artillery fight for the foreseeable future, which I said is not only important in the moment for the counteroffensive, but to signal to Vladimir Putin that he can't just outlast the Ukrainians.

Look, I think we have been critical of the Russian use of this, but in large part for two reasons: one, because the Russians have been indiscriminate in their use of all kinds of weapons, they -- even their so-called precision guided munitions flying into apartment buildings and hit schools, and so -- and they have been indiscriminate in the usage of cluster munitions as well.

They're also using weapons that are much older with much higher dud rate and thus much higher risk of collateral damage, even when they're not used indiscriminately. So as I said before, I think this is kind of an apples to oranges comparison.

...

I'll also say that like with every system that we provide the Ukrainians, there will be not just training, but kind of coaching and mentoring associated with this.

...

Q: Each tranche -- that means you're going to have more tranches? This isn't just a one-time, right? That's fair?

DR. KAHL: I'm not -- I don't want to prejudge decisions that haven't been made since at the end of the day, these are decisions the president of the United -- you know, the secretary recommends to the president, the president signs off on. I will just say this: We have the capacity to continue to flow additional rounds forward, and if we were to do so, we have sufficient quantities to be able to do the things I said.

...

munition and one on Russia. On the cluster munitions, you mentioned five studies since 1998 until 2020 that prove you have in your stockpile the -- that rate lower than 2.35. Is the department willing to make these studies available so experts can verify the accuracy of the data?

Second one, in terms of providing cluster munition, is the -- this administration breaking the law passed by the Congress that prohibits the transfer of cluster munition that is -- with the level above 1 percent?

And finally on Russia, we've seen two incidents lately in Syria where Russian aircraft, according to the Pentagon, harassed U.S. drones. Before that, we saw something happening similarly in the Black Sea. Are you concerned that this -- Russia is kind of -- kind of normalizing this behavior? And is the deal he wouldn't take any actions to prevent Russia from continuing this type of behavior? Thank you.

DR. KAHL: Sure. So a bunch of things here. On the test itself, I think at this juncture, because the tests themselves are classified, we won't be releasing them, but we'll take that question back. Presently, those tests -- those reports are classified.

I can say this: We have high confidence in those numbers based on five consecutive tests. I also have high confidence that they will be far more efficient and discriminant than the cluster munitions that the Russians are using, and I think the Ukrainian assurances on top of that give me added confidence in that.

I'll also say that it's not a good thing for civilians in Ukraine or the humanitarian situation in Ukraine for Ukraine's counteroffensive to be unsuccessful, or for the Russians to be more successful. That seems like a recipe for more humanitarian suffering. So to the degree that there's a utilitarian calculus in this, I think it's worth thinking that through. And I think that's ultimately why even though this is a decision that the administration deliberated on and that the president thought very carefully about, there was no disagreement among the president's principal advisors on whether we should provide this system, and that includes across the departments. It's not just the Department of Defense.

Are we breaking the law? We are not breaking the law. I would say first of all, the prohibition against exporting above 1 percent, these munitions are pretty close to 1 percent, but they are not at the 1 percent level. But the president does have the authority to waive that requirement on national security grounds, and that's what he has done in this instance.

There's no dispute that he has that authority, it's in law, but we also didn't make this as a unilateral decision. We've been having conversations with -- informal conversations for weeks with the Hill. I'm sure many of you have had your own conversations with members on both sides of the aisle on the Hill.

This is obviously a capability that the Ukrainians have been asking for a while, and we continued those consultations with the Hill and escalated them as we got closer to this decision. So, it doesn't mean everybody in Congress will agree but I think everybody will agree that it was within the right of the President to do this.

Q: Yes, Dr. Kahl, you acknowledged that the, you know, Ukrainian counter-offensive is going slower than anticipated, and attributing some of that to the Russian defenses, including minefields.

But you could you also discuss the limitations of the combined arms training, the short duration training that they got -- the Ukrainians, and to what extent they've been able to absorb that -- those -- that kind of training and apply it in this kind of difficult battlefield situation? Thank you.

DR. KAHL: Yeah, I mean, first, I think, as the Ukrainian leadership has said, you know, this isn't a movie, right? So, things are hard. In real war, things are hard. Sometimes, things go faster than you think, like in Kharkiv last fall. Sometimes, it's a slog, like it was in Kherson last fall.

I think when you're talking about eastern and southern Ukraine, the Russians have had -- you know, during the winter, neither side was standing still, right? The Ukrainians, with our assistance and the assistance of the allies and partners, were building this mountain of steel for the counter-offensive. The Russians were digging in, laying minefields, anti-tank obstacles and barriers, trench lines. And so we always knew it was going to be tough.

Eric, I think, to your point about the combined arms training, I think we should draw lessons at the end, not in the -- not in the middle, and I think we're only in the beginning of the middle. And I say that because, yeah, you know, a number of brigades went through training in Germany and elsewhere by the United States and our allies to get them ready for this fight. It was truncated, relative to, you know, what a U.S. Army unit might go through, but I think the Ukrainians have regularly proved that they can kind of step on the accelerator pedal and be pretty proficient.

It does of course -- you know, it pushes them out of their comfort zone a little bit because this, you know, has them employing fire and maneuver in a way that's more familiar to NATO forces than kind of forces that have a Soviet legacy and Soviet doctrine behind them. So it is, you know, requiring them to fight in different ways.

But I will say this -- you know, it is slower than we had hoped -- again, Ukrainian officials have said as much -- but the Ukrainians have a lot of combat power left. And in fact, the majority of their combat power for this fight has not been brought to bear.

And so what you're seeing across the east and the south is the Ukrainians deliberately, and understandably deliberately, probing for weak spots, and I think the real test will be when they identify weak spots or create weak spots and generate a breach, how rapidly they're able to exploit that with the combat power that they have in reserve and how rapidly the Russians will be able to respond.

Q: Yeah, just a quick follow on that. I mean, do you think then that the Ukrainians are making effective use of the materials the United States has provided or not yet?

And then I want to ask you about Prigozhin. What do you -- what do you know about him? What is his status? What is he doing in -- in Russia? What do you think his future is? Thanks.

DR. KAHL: So, on the effective use piece, look, this stuff is hard, especially if you're encountering it and using tactics, techniques, procedures, and capabilities that you're not familiar with. I think the Ukrainians are doing their best, I think they are determined to liberate these areas from Russian occupation.

I think the Russians probably were more successful in digging in more deeply than perhaps was fully appreciated. You know, no plan survives first contact with the enemy. So, they are moving deliberately against the threat that's there.

I would return to the point that I made -- I think that it's too early to judge how the counter-offensive is going one way or the other because we're at the beginning of the middle. They are still probing Russian lines and Russian areas for weak spots, and the real test will be when they identify those, how rapidly they are able to exploit those weak spots.

And we will continue to offer our advice where it's useful, but at the end of the day, these are Ukrainian choices, because after all, it's their lives that are on the line, it's their territory that's on the line. So we can provide coaching, advice, mentoring, but at the end of the day, they're going to make the decisions that they believe is right.

Prigozhin, where he is, what he's up to, I have no idea. And so I -- and I really don't want to speculate. I see the same things that you see. You know, it's clear that the Russian state is trying to systematically dismantle his empire and put piece parts in different places.

What the ultimate end game Putin has for Prigozhin and the remnants of Wagner, I think, is still to be determined, but I just don't want to speculate about, you know, is he in Belarus, is he in St. Petersburg or Moscow or somewhere else. I don't know where he is.

mlmp08 fucked around with this message at 15:23 on Jul 9, 2023

# ? Jul 9, 2023 14:40

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

In another display of Erdogan giving the finger to Putin, Ukraine is getting an undisclosed amount of Turkish T155 Firtina SPG's, a license version of the South Korean K9 Thunder.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 15:02

SpeedFreek: Jan 10, 2008; And Im Lobster Jesus!

Moon Slayer posted:

Yeah, this pearl clutching about the US supplying cluster munitions to Ukraine is just the same "why is the West prolonging this fight!?" argument with a thin veneer of current events.

This is reminding me of the "No way they would have blown up the dam." debate. From my view the only thing worth debating is how much this will affect the timeline of the war. The best thing for the people would be Russia loving off and going home, second best would be resolving this shitshow in favor of Ukraine. I have this crazy theory that if the Russian military were forcibly removed they would find it much more difficult to murder or torture Ukrainians.

What is the current civilian casualty count and what is the projected number of future injuries/casualties due to UXO? Without looking I'd guess one of those numbers is significantly higher.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 15:06

Raenir Salazar: Nov 5, 2010; College Slice

A lot of the meta discussions about whether to help Ukraine or give some specific weapon system over another I think can be succinctly responded to with the Letter from General Sherman to Atlanta, these words are just as effective today as they were then.

quote:

You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into our Country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to Secure Peace. But you cannot have Peace and a Division of our Country. If the United States submits to a Division now it will not stop, but will go on until we reap the fate of Mexico, which is Eternal War.

...

You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home, is to stop the war, which can only be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride.

...

I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, hundreds of thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands upon thousands of families of rebel soldiers left in our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you, you feel very different. You depreciate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and moulded shells and shot, to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, to desolate the homes of hundreds of thousands of good people who only asked to live in peace at their old homes, and under the Government of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it (can) only be reached through union and war, and I will ever conduct war with a view to perfect and early success.

It is pointless to try to reduce the apparent barbarity of the war as long as Russia continues to insist on invading, what people seek to reduce in one aspect will merely shift and increase that same barbarity in a different manner. Ukraine thus needs all the tools as its disposal, within reason, to bring the war to a quick and decisive conclusion on its terms. If Ukraine thinks these munitions will help, then its no one's business to criticize them because of some hypothetical increase in harm compared to the real harms happening now.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 15:16

Charliegrs: Aug 10, 2009

I think everyone has belabored the various arguments for and against the cluster munitions to death already.

- They're bad! They will kill kids!

- Russia will also kill kids so we need to give Ukraine everything they need to kick them out. It will save lives in the long run.

That's literally the arguments being made non stop. It doesn't matter. Ukraine is getting them.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 15:20

Jon: Nov 30, 2004

Freudian slippers posted:

Well, Ukraine wouldn't be using cluster ammunition on civilians for one. So there's that. A pretty obvious thing, really. If you're arguing in god faith, that is.

Why not? Russia targeted civilians first, and if targeting Russian civilians would help end the war faster it would be justified, wouldn't it?

# ? Jul 9, 2023 15:29

MatchaZed: Feb 14, 2010; We Can Do It!

Jon posted:

Why not? Russia targeted civilians first, and if targeting Russian civilians would help end the war faster it would be justified, wouldn't it?

First it's morally wrong. Second, it doesn't speed up the war. Using cluster munitions on enemy civilians is a fast way to get propaganda used against you in the international sphere, losing you support which you absolutely need to keep fighting. Cluster munitions on Russian civilians is cruelty for no benefit.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 15:37

Chalks: Sep 30, 2009

Jon posted:

Why not? Russia targeted civilians first, and if targeting Russian civilians would help end the war faster it would be justified, wouldn't it?

Ukraine has specially agreed that they will not use these weapons in populated areas, it is a condition of the supply

I'm ignoring the specific accusation that Ukraine might use them to commit war crimes because it is a stupid thing to say. It would not help to win the war faster for many reasons.

Chalks fucked around with this message at 15:40 on Jul 9, 2023

# ? Jul 9, 2023 15:38

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Jon posted:

Why not? Russia targeted civilians first, and if targeting Russian civilians would help end the war faster it would be justified, wouldn't it?

Don't target civilians; that is bad.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 15:41

Cocaine Bear: Nov 4, 2011; ACAB

Because it would not help win the war faster.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 15:41

Malachite_Dragon: Mar 31, 2010; Weaving Merry Christmas magic

Jon your hand-wringing is telling me, at a most charitable interpretation, that you believe Ukraine will turn around and do the exact same things back to Russia as Russia is doing to them if they are supplied with the same armament.

I think you are pretty heavily biased here.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 15:42

Djarum: Apr 1, 2004; by vyelkin

Can we just kill the circular argument about the cluster munitions? People have said their piece and it isn't going anywhere.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:06

Cpt_Obvious: Jun 18, 2007

Targeting civilians usually has the opposite effect, generally it increases support for the war.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:07

Back Hack: Jan 17, 2010

Malachite_Dragon posted:

Jon your hand-wringing is telling me, at a most charitable interpretation, that you believe Ukraine will turn around and do the exact same things back to Russia as Russia is doing to them if they are supplied with the same armament.

I think you are pretty heavily biased here.

Not mention, every time they've carried out an operation in Russia, they've been extremely careful not target civilian or civilian infrastructure.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:09

Shogeton: Apr 26, 2007; "Little by little the old world crumbled, and not once did the king imagine that some of the pieces might fall on him"

Groggy nard posted:

Do you know whats worse than any of that?

500 days of literal genocide.

Yep. But the question isn't 'Is Ukraine better than Russia' . They are. By leagues. Cluster munitions or not.

The utilitarian comparison, if you wanna try to get it really mathematical. Make an estimation about how many days sending Ukraine Cluster ammunition will shorten the war. Multiply that number by the amount of suffering the Russians cause each day. Compare this to the suffering that the sent cluster munitions UXO will cause over the years to come. (Keeping into account the efforts made to clean them up) Which side weight heavier?

Then you also need to add that this whole thing makes Cluster ammunition 'acceptable' and leads to an attitude of 'Hey, war is hell, so why worry about war crimes, right?' which is undesirable as well. There's degrees of suffering caused in war. And it's in everyone's interest to try to get that degree lower. Because if this totally breaks the reluctance to use cluster bombs, if it means that the things suddenly become in vogue, than the body count can go very much up.

So even if you say 'Ukraine should get them' I think that should be taken as a sign of Russia's exceptional cruelty that this lesser evil is acceptable, and the circumstances that most of the battlefields are filled with cluster bombs UXO anyway, and not an endorsement to say that 'Cluster bombs are fine actually' or 'War is hell, throw out the Geneva conventions, ends justify the means'

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:15

fatherboxx: Mar 25, 2013

Back Hack posted:

Not mention, every time they've carried out an operation in Russia, they've been extremely careful not target civilian or civilian infrastructure.

Belgorod raids by "Russian" volunteer units had Grads hitting civilian buildings - on a small scale fortunately

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:17

Rust Martialis: May 8, 2007; by Fluffdaddy
(and can't post for 4 days!)

Malachite_Dragon posted:

Jon your hand-wringing is telling me, at a most charitable interpretation, that you believe Ukraine will turn around and do the exact same things back to Russia as Russia is doing to them if they are supplied with the same armament.

I think you are pretty heavily biased here.

Have the claims that Ukraine will be setting up concentration camps to purge the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Donbass and Lugansk popped up here yet? This is another reason why Ukraine must not be supported, etc.

If not, just wait! I agree it seems as you paint it - the Russians did it therefore inevitably so must the Ukrainians.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:18

Kraftwerk: Aug 13, 2011; i do not have 10,000 bircoins, please stop asking

Attacking civillian targets as a means of inflicting terror doesn�t work. It�s been argued that terror bombings in WW2 were completely ineffective in breaking the enemy�s will to fight. It just makes them hate you more.

The best thing that can happen right now is for Ukraine to be given all the means necessary to inflict disproportionately higher casualties on Russian troops than their own and for this capability to increase until the Russians are so demoralized they�d rather turn their guns against their own leaders than proceed to their almost guaranteed deaths. This ends the same way WW1 ended for Russia. Outside that, there can be no peace.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:21

Shogeton: Apr 26, 2007; "Little by little the old world crumbled, and not once did the king imagine that some of the pieces might fall on him"

On that note of 'there can be no peace' I just notice Perun has a video about how wars end. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PnvJzup8i-c

Also, disagreeing with the 'WW I style ending is the only solution' statement. Tomorrow, Putin could die, and whoever ends up in charge could decide that this is a good time to get out of that quagmire.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:29

fatherboxx: Mar 25, 2013

Djarum posted:

Can we just kill the circular argument about the cluster munitions? People have said their piece and it isn't going anywhere.

Yes and it would be helpful if people directly engage arguments presented rather than fighting imaginary strawmen that ask for chemical weapons, immediate Ukrainian surrender or whatever

fatherboxx fucked around with this message at 16:35 on Jul 9, 2023

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:31

Paladinus: Jan 11, 2014; heyHEYYYY!!!

fatherboxx posted:

Belgorod raids by "Russian" volunteer units had Grads hitting civilian buildings - on a small scale fortunately

The town of Shebekino near Belgorod was almost completely destroyed during this war, which both Russia and Ukraine prefer not to focus on a lot. Russia because they want to keep up the fa�ade of security within Russian borders (whatever they are supposed to be nowadays), and Ukraine because the official line is Ukraine doesn't strike anywhere outside of its borders. There is no doubt Ukraine tried to strike military targets there, as the town is close to the border, and a lot of Russian military equipment and soldiers either travel through it to Ukraine or are stationed there, but it was still enough to make it almost uninhabitable for civilians. No matter how careful you are, and I'm going to argue that in some situations it's easier to convince yourself you're being careful when you're not, this stuff is bound to happen.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:40

WarpedLichen: Aug 14, 2008

Back Hack posted:

Not mention, every time they've carried out an operation in Russia, they've been extremely careful not target civilian or civilian infrastructure.

I would say here that while the Ukrainians have generally had very good PR. There is still a difference between who they are and who wish they would be.

If the Kerch bridge attack was really them for example, they had no trouble blowing up a civilian truck driver as the attack vector.

There's also very strong evidence that Ukraine has shelled civilian areas in the Donetsk:
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1538527197740269568.html

I do not intend this as a message to damp support to Ukraine, just to offer an explanation on why others would have trepidation about doing so.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:53

Enjoy: Apr 18, 2009

fatherboxx posted:

Yes and it would be helpful if people directly engage arguments presented rather than fighting imaginary strawmen that ask for chemical weapons, immediate Ukrainian surrender or whatever

or Ukrainian concentration camps?

Rust Martialis posted:

Have the claims that Ukraine will be setting up concentration camps to purge the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Donbass and Lugansk popped up here yet? This is another reason why Ukraine must not be supported, etc.

If not, just wait! I agree it seems as you paint it - the Russians did it therefore inevitably so must the Ukrainians.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:53

Qtotonibudinibudet: Nov 7, 2011; Omich poluyobok, skazhi ty narkoman? ya prosto tozhe gde to tam zhivu, mogli by vmeste uyobyvat' narkotiki

Shogeton posted:

Also, disagreeing with the 'WW I style ending is the only solution' statement. Tomorrow, Putin could die, and whoever ends up in charge could decide that this is a good time to get out of that quagmire.

wait... an abrupt change in the leadership of the russian state leading to their pulling out of a war isn't a WW I-style ending?

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:54

Mederlock: Jun 23, 2012; You won't recognize Canada when I'm through with it; Grimey Drawer

Mr. Apollo posted:

This is how all the Polish people I know make borscht.

Interesting, the two Polish families I'm acquainted with only make barszcz as a clear soup with no solids in it. Must be a regional thing?

# ? Jul 9, 2023 16:59

Shogeton: Apr 26, 2007; "Little by little the old world crumbled, and not once did the king imagine that some of the pieces might fall on him"

Qtotonibudinibudet posted:

wait... an abrupt change in the leadership of the russian state leading to their pulling out of a war isn't a WW I-style ending?

Oh, yeah, that would count as Russia's pulling otu of the war. I was thinking the way Germany did it.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 17:00

Paranoea: Aug 4, 2009

Enjoy posted:

or Ukrainian concentration camps?

Who is reporting on these camps? What type of objective evidence has been provided so far? Russia's equivalent could be confirmed by satellite imagery and via the Red Cross. I would expect similar types of evidence here.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 17:07

Maera Sior: Jan 5, 2012

Enjoy posted:

or Ukrainian concentration camps?

I read this as a rhetorical device in response to Jon's posts, not as a genuine claim or concern.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 17:10

Qtotonibudinibudet: Nov 7, 2011; Omich poluyobok, skazhi ty narkoman? ya prosto tozhe gde to tam zhivu, mogli by vmeste uyobyvat' narkotiki

Mederlock posted:

Interesting, the two Polish families I'm acquainted with only make barszcz as a clear soup with no solids in it. Must be a regional thing?

every time i read a familiar word in polish it's an "oh. ohhhhhhhhh. i get it now" moment followed by "who and why hurt you(r orthography)"

# ? Jul 9, 2023 17:15

Rust Martialis: May 8, 2007; by Fluffdaddy
(and can't post for 4 days!)

Maera Sior posted:

I read this as a rhetorical device in response to Jon's posts, not as a genuine claim or concern.

Difficult to report on something that doesn't exist...

# ? Jul 9, 2023 17:26

Chalks: Sep 30, 2009

WarpedLichen posted:

I would say here that while the Ukrainians have generally had very good PR. There is still a difference between who they are and who wish they would be.

If the Kerch bridge attack was really them for example, they had no trouble blowing up a civilian truck driver as the attack vector.

There's also very strong evidence that Ukraine has shelled civilian areas in the Donetsk:
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1538527197740269568.html

I do not intend this as a message to damp support to Ukraine, just to offer an explanation on why others would have trepidation about doing so.

I think there's a distinction between the purpose of an attack and collateral damage. Ukraine was certainly behind the Kerch bridge attack, but their target wasn't a truck driver.

That is not the same thing as launching a cruise missile at a pizza restaurant filled with civilians then officially announcing that they successfully struck their intended target.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 17:54

ummel: Jun 17, 2002; <3 Lowtax; Fun Shoe

A Ukrainian official admitted responsibility for the Kerch bridge today. It's the first post on this page. It's the first admission, although it's been an open secret.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 18:08

Rugz: Apr 15, 2014; PLS SEE AVATAR. P.S. IM A BELL END LOL

Shogeton posted:

Cluster munitions do lead to higher rates of civilian suffering

Higher rates than what?

# ? Jul 9, 2023 18:13

Telsa Cola: Aug 19, 2011; No... this is all wrong... this whole operation has just gone completely sidewaysface

People are not defining their terms and you are arguing in circles as result of it.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 18:15

WarpedLichen: Aug 14, 2008

Chalks posted:

I think there's a distinction between the purpose of an attack and collateral damage. Ukraine was certainly behind the Kerch bridge attack, but their target wasn't a truck driver.

That is not the same thing as launching a cruise missile at a pizza restaurant filled with civilians then officially announcing that they successfully struck their intended target.

I think the distinction there is if the truck was carrying the explosives, they used an unwitting victim as a suicide bomber which is more morally questionable. The indiscriminate firing of grad rockets into Donetsk is also indefensible, in my opinion.

I just think forgiving everything Ukraine does is not the best thing to do. Obviously, you need to have to be very careful and tactful, since Russia is ultimately at fault, but I think leveraging criticism and curtailing excesses is still something Western powers should do.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 18:21

Hieronymous Alloy: Jan 30, 2009; Why! Why!! Why must you refuse to accept that Dr. Hieronymous Alloy's Genetically Enhanced Cream Corn Is Superior to the Leading Brand on the Market!?!; Morbid Hound

Edit: nebermind I'm posting too hard

# ? Jul 9, 2023 18:38

Mr. Apollo: Nov 8, 2000

Mederlock posted:

Interesting, the two Polish families I'm acquainted with only make barszcz as a clear soup with no solids in it. Must be a regional thing?

Most likely. The Poles I know (including my own family) are all from the south.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 18:38

Chalks: Sep 30, 2009

WarpedLichen posted:

I think the distinction there is if the truck was carrying the explosives, they used an unwitting victim as a suicide bomber which is more morally questionable. The indiscriminate firing of grad rockets into Donetsk is also indefensible, in my opinion.

I just think forgiving everything Ukraine does is not the best thing to do. Obviously, you need to have to be very careful and tactful, since Russia is ultimately at fault, but I think leveraging criticism and curtailing excesses is still something Western powers should do.

Yeah, the truck bombing is very unfortunate to have involved a civilian, but I don't think raising that point in a conversation about Russia intentionally bombing civilians in a terror campaign is valid. These things should not be conflated.

I'm going to avoid talking about the Donetsk issue since IMO it's too unclear what is actually happening here. Both sides accuse each other of it, but even if you could say for certain which side did it, what was the intent, what was the target and did it have government approval? It's far too difficult to say anything. Obviously, if the situation is that the Ukrainian government ordered the bombardment of civilians to terrorise them then this would be equivalent and would change my opinion on things, but that's not what you're citing here.

# ? Jul 9, 2023 18:42

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# ? Jun 6, 2024 14:39

Rinkles: Oct 24, 2010; What I'm getting at is...
Do you feel the same way?

Barszcz for me was a clear soup. On Christmas eve with added miniature dumplings (uszka).

# ? Jul 9, 2023 18:46

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Debate & Discussion > War in Ukraine CE: The Golf War

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