(Thread IKs:
fatherboxx)
|
Fork of Unknown Origins posted:That seems to create a bad situation where Russia has a good reason (from their standpoint) to never leave. They already have that situation since Russia has according to their own "laws" annexed chunks of Ukraine they do and do not currently occupy. The only point of having Ukraine join NATO before the war ends would be for NATO to immediately enter the war. Which might happen if Russia does something next-level-stupid, but obviously everyone is trying to avoid that and Ukraine is well aware of the issues with that scenario. NATO should guarantee succession after the war, and continue to escalate the amount of arms they give Ukraine to end the war faster. That's the best option in this extremely bad situation.
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 18:17
|
|
|
|
| # ? Jun 8, 2024 09:23 |
|
|
Fork of Unknown Origins posted:That seems to create a bad situation where Russia has a good reason (from their standpoint) to never leave. This has been the case since they invaded in 2014 and was part of the reasoning behind that attack.
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 18:19
|
|
|
Irony Be My Shield posted:Zelensky is specifically asking for accession after the war is finished. NATO's charter does not allow a country currently at war to join. People keep saying this and maybe I'm just bad at reading international treaties. But which article of NATO's charter would not allow Ukraine to join? (I know it's not happening as a practical matter) Edit: I suppose one might make a case for Article 10 when it comes to Ukraine fighting Russia: quote:The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. But that's still not as clear cut as the original claim. beer_war fucked around with this message at 18:32 on Jul 11, 2023 |
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 18:24
|
|
|
So, do you folks think Russia will try to hold onto Bakhmut now that the Russian troops down there start getting trapped in a pincer, or will they bugger off? Ukrainian command was criticized by some for holding onto Bakhmut for no real purpose but Russia doesn't gain anything by holding onto it either. COULD IT BE that the longest battle in modern* history will end in coming weeks!?!? *there were some decades long sieges in the good ol' days, but they are hardly comparable in intensity Fork of Unknown Origins posted:That seems to create a bad situation where Russia has a good reason (from their standpoint) to never leave. Then the costs of war, mobilizations and sanctions would also continue forever. This is costing Russia A LOT, and as the state runs out of money it touches every sector of society. Eventually an army of babushkas will besiege the Kremlin and hang Putin for touching their pensions. The alternative is that NATO countries go to war against Russia which, even if geographically limited, could escalate in unfortunate ways and I don't think the general population is really favourable to the idea.
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 18:31
|
|
|
VitalSigns posted:We're talking about dropping internationally banned cluster bombs on Ukrainian territory which will continue to maim and kill for decades, and those are the same people that are being killed in Russian attacks: Ukrainian civilians Ah, I misunderstood that part.
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 18:32
|
|
|
beer_war posted:People keep saying this and maybe I'm just bad at reading international treaties. But which article of NATO's charter would not allow Ukraine to join? (I know it's not happening as a practical matter) It's part of the 1995 Study on Enlargement: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm 6: States which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance.
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 18:33
|
|
|
beer_war posted:People keep saying this and maybe I'm just bad at reading international treaties. But which article of NATO's charter would not allow Ukraine to join? (I know it's not happening as a practical matter) Because if Ukraine joins NATO now then it leads to either of the following interpretations: 1) NATO stays out of the pre-existing war, leaving Ukraine on its own anyway or 2) NATO becomes a combatant in the war with Russia In either case the decision requires the unanimous agreement of 31 (soon 32) member states, including Hungary and Turkey. It's not going to happen because you will not find one country in NATO that wants to go to war with Russia. The ones that care the most about Ukraine are the ones that neighbour Ukraine, and therefore would be at highest risk of retaliation strikes.
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 18:39
|
|
|
WarpedLichen posted:It's part of the 1995 Study on Enlargement:
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 18:47
|
|
|
Nenonen posted:So, do you folks think Russia will try to hold onto Bakhmut now that the Russian troops down there start getting trapped in a pincer, or will they bugger off? Ukrainian command was criticized by some for holding onto Bakhmut for no real purpose but Russia doesn't gain anything by holding onto it either. I don't think Russia can hold on to Bakhmut. It is obvious between the loss of Wagner and Russia pulling troops to try and shore up the Southern lines, especially around Donetsk has put Bakhmut in a bad way. I think it is a matter of time before we see a major breakthrough around Bakhmut. Russia will have to make some serious choices on if they want to try and stymie the breakthrough there or hold on to Donetsk as best they can. The choices in the North will directly effect the South. They don't have a lot of great options since the more you pull from Donetsk the more unstable that becomes. Also you are stretching lines and having to build rapid defenses which as we have seen before Russia is not great at. I think there is a huge potential at Russia losing both Bakhmut and Donetsk with a Russian retreat back to Luhansk and perhaps even Mariupol although the latter is unlikely. I imagine Starobesheve will be the mostly likely next point after Donetsk.
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 19:00
|
|
|
Has the pincer/cauldron/motti at Bakhmut been confirmed by anyone credible? I no longer have Twitter, but don't recall seeing anything posted in this thread, at least. NoelReports were being thrown around elsewhere and, well.
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 19:10
|
|
|
Shoigu claiming big countetattack underway, says its progressed 1.5km in depth, 2km in width. https://twitter.com/mylordbebo/status/1678806638411513864?s=46&t=zM8WL3IBOgX2I1IgRVSx_w
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 19:13
|
|
|
Djarum posted:I don't think Russia can hold on to Bakhmut. It is obvious between the loss of Wagner and Russia pulling troops to try and shore up the Southern lines, especially around Donetsk has put Bakhmut in a bad way. I think it is a matter of time before we see a major breakthrough around Bakhmut. Russia will have to make some serious choices on if they want to try and stymie the breakthrough there or hold on to Donetsk as best they can. The way Ukraine handled Bahkmut was a fantastic military and political trap. Russia have a big problem on the horizon as Ukraine threatens to recapture the city, despite it being of little strategic value. Who knows if this was how it was meant to work out but the timing is amazing too. In other news, more confirmation that Ukraine captured the territory where they lost all those Bradleys and were able to recover some of them https://twitter.com/WarUpdater/status/1678755524068745218 Chalks fucked around with this message at 19:23 on Jul 11, 2023 |
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 19:18
|
|
|
fatherboxx posted:Silly me hoping people realize that having final statement responding to final final statement only clogs up the thread Gentlemen you can't clusterfuck in here this is the gently caress cluster discussion
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 20:06
|
|
|
Paranoea posted:Has the pincer/cauldron/motti at Bakhmut been confirmed by anyone credible? I no longer have Twitter, but don't recall seeing anything posted in this thread, at least. NoelReports were being thrown around elsewhere and, well. no. Ukrainian sources claim the place is under fire control / will be surrounded imminently and 50,000 Russian soldiers will be forced to surrender. Russian sources say that the Ukrainians have been blown to poo poo trying to capture some fields outside of the suburbs of Bakhmut and everyone inside the town is having a big BBQ actually, things are incredibly chill. The actual situation on the ground is unknown and probably won't be possible to determine until this all washes out in a few weeks.
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 20:29
|
|
|
There's some footage floating around today reported to be Chechen forces in Klishchiivka so if they're still hanging around there I doubt the situation in Bahkmut is too serious right now. Not that they produce very reliable reports, but Ukraine isn't claiming any control there at the moment either. That said, the lines to the north and south are only moving in one direction at the moment and I don't see how Russia changes that without weakening the south Chalks fucked around with this message at 20:59 on Jul 11, 2023 |
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 20:56
|
|
|
Dandywalken posted:Shoigu claiming big countetattack underway, says its progressed 1.5km in depth, 2km in width. This is several days old. There is footage of Ukraine shelling in the area confirming they've lost a good chunk of land. It's interesting to see that Russia has been able to push there but struggle around areas like Avdiivka still.
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 21:44
|
|
|
Bashez posted:This is several days old. There is footage of Ukraine shelling in the area confirming they've lost a good chunk of land. DeepState seems to think that some moron posted themselves being shelled as them shelling Russians, and us citing neighboring units as thinking there are no Russians there, so it may be less clear than that, too. The Russians do seem to have a lot of troops there, at any rate. They also did try a major push in Adviivka but that got mangled.
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 22:02
|
|
|
fatherboxx posted:Silly me hoping people realize that having final statement responding to final final statement only clogs up the thread I admire your faith in posters against all evidence. WarpedLichen posted:It's part of the 1995 Study on Enlargement: Even if that document has been enshrined as NATO policy (has it?), "a factor in determining" is very wishy-washy and wouldn't prevent an immediate Ukrainian accession if that was desired (which it obviously isn't for good reasons).
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 22:24
|
|
|
EasilyConfused posted:Even if that document has been enshrined as NATO policy (has it?), "a factor in determining" is very wishy-washy and wouldn't prevent an immediate Ukrainian accession if that was desired (which it obviously isn't for good reasons). In the sense that international treaties are all calvin ball and the member states can do whatever they want if they all agree to it, sure. The member states can amend the accession rules or ignore them. Its not as if there's any penalty that can apply besides leaving the agreement. The NATO articles aren't any sort of binding contract with some NATO court deciding what can/can't be done here.
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 22:55
|
|
|
WarpedLichen posted:In the sense that international treaties are all calvin ball and the member states can do whatever they want if they all agree to it, sure. The member states can amend the accession rules or ignore them. Its not as if there's any penalty that can apply besides leaving the agreement. The NATO articles aren't any sort of binding contract with some NATO court deciding what can/can't be done here. I'm saying that rule wouldn't need to be amended or ignored to admit Ukraine. The very next bullet in the document you linked is: quote:7:
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 23:15
|
|
|
EasilyConfused posted:I'm saying that rule wouldn't need to be amended or ignored to admit Ukraine. The very next bullet in the document you linked is: I'm trying to agree with you, I'm the furthest thing from an international law expert and I have neither the ability nor desire to speculate on the paperwork process involved for NATO accession except that maybe some dude might have to update the NATO website in the future. 
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 23:23
|
|
|
WarpedLichen posted:e some dude might have to update the NATO website in the future. That's actually the hardest part. Jens Stoltenberg can never remember his password.
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 23:28
|
|
|
Jon posted:If Ukraine is admitted into NATO during the war, does that mean NATO is obliged to enter into the war? Perhaps semantically. But no, in the sense that NATO cannot be obliged to do something it is not already committed to doing, there is no higher power compelling NATO to 'do' anything. NATO is not currently committed to entering the war to defend Ukraine. If Ukraine were admitted into NATO then NATO would be 'obliged' to enter the war by their own charter, but in order to get to that point NATO would have to have decided to admit Ukraine with the full knowledge that it entailed entering a war. In this case are they actually obliged?
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 23:51
|
|
|
"Honey, a new Anders Puck Nielson video just dropped." But really, solid analysis of the frontline like always.
|
|
#
?
Jul 11, 2023 23:53
|
|
|
Paranoea posted:Has the pincer/cauldron/motti at Bakhmut been confirmed by anyone credible? I no longer have Twitter, but don't recall seeing anything posted in this thread, at least. NoelReports were being thrown around elsewhere and, well. Noel is among the least reliable commentators on up-to-date front-line news. They will literally retweet anything pro-Ukrainian without an attempt to vet the accuracy. Djarum posted:I don't think Russia can hold on to Bakhmut. It is obvious between the loss of Wagner and Russia pulling troops to try and shore up the Southern lines, especially around Donetsk has put Bakhmut in a bad way. I think it is a matter of time before we see a major breakthrough around Bakhmut. Russia will have to make some serious choices on if they want to try and stymie the breakthrough there or hold on to Donetsk as best they can. There is no evidence at all currently that the Russians have to choose or will be forced to make a choice in the short term. A full week after the hoopla about some breakthrough at Klichiivka by the Ukrainians, it is clear that nothing has been achieved and the Russians continue to control the heights around the village. There are reports that the Russians had to move in reinforcements into the area but that could just be a rotation of troops. There are also no indications at all of any instability on the Surovikin line. The village of Robotyne was reported by the usual suspects as captured and once again it turned out to be false. Robotyne is the closest the Ukrainians have gotten to reaching the first set of fortifications that sit around 1 km south of the village. It's been just over a month and there is still plenty of time but the news for the Ukrainians is almost uniformly bad. The best hope right now is that the Ukrainians are actually getting ahead on the counter-battery war and that they wrap up this phase before mud season starts up again in the next 2 and a half months with time to make more serious advances. Believe it or not the Russians aren't afraid to post bad news when it happens. They were seriously nervous about some cross Dnipro op and the bridgehead got a lot of focus but one thing you don't hear is any concern about the Surovikin line. They recognize what the AFU is trying to do in Bakhmut (princer north and south at Soledar and Klichiivka) but there isn't the level of concern that would be associated with serious trouble.
|
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 00:47
|
|
|
OddObserver posted:They also did try a major push in Adviivka but that got mangled. Yeah, their attempted solution to the problem Ukraine testing the whole front and then punching the weakest spot has become trying to mount a minor offensive to prevent the Ukrainians from having the freedom to hold reserves ready to go wherever looks soft. It's not an unreasonable idea, and it reclaims the initiative to a certain extent. But luckily on the offensive they really don't do as well as the Ukrainian forces.
|
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 01:41
|
|
|
The point of the push on Bakhmut isn't really to accomplish anything, but to threaten accomplishing things so that the Russians can't pull troops out or are forced to reinforce. Everything that goes to Bakhmut doesn't go to the south.
|
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 02:10
|
|
|
What KO'd the vehicles in question? Interesting that the Russians did not have the wherewithal to recover them first I am guessing it was mines and artillery
|
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 02:48
|
|
|
MikeC posted:It's been just over a month and there is still plenty of time but the news for the Ukrainians is almost uniformly bad. I suppose I only listen to certain analysts, but my impression was that things are going as one would expect them to go. Ukraine has a hard fight and Russia has the advantage of being on the defensive. Ukraine does not have endless artillery ammunition and does not have western-style air might to batter those defensive position and establish the kind of air superiority the US had in Iraq. (Even if they did have the necessary air force resources, we'd be talking about a month or more of nothing but air missions with not much going on with the infantry.) Anyone forecasting big, quick gains wasn't to be taken seriously to begin with.
|
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 02:54
|
|
|
 EFFORT-POST ON INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE LESSONS FROM UKRAINE The US Army plans to replace the M2/M3 Bradley as part of its XM30 (née Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV)) program. While the procurement is too far along for the Russo-Ukrainian War to inform original requirements, I do think recent lessons can validate those requirements and inform doctrinal applications of new capabilities brought by a new infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). Of course, the US doesn't like learning things from other countries, so we'll see.  The Bradley is great, but it's over 40 years old and there have been many advances in engines, transmissions, passive protection, active protection, electronics, power distribution, weapons, optics, and so forth. Ukraine is demonstrating (again) that force employment matters as much as tactical capabilities, but tactical capabilities still help (see: a bunch of Ukrainians praising the relative survivability of Western vehicles compared to Soviet vehicles). This will be the 4th or maybe 4.5th attempt to replace the Bradley, but it looks like the US Department of Defense is going to get it done this time. The most recent previous attempt (the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV)) failed for various reasons, but what's important for this post is that General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and Rheinmetall made it to the finals. For the XM30, five companies digitally created concept vehicles. Point Blank Enteprises A company mostly known for its personal body armor, this was always going to be a stretch. So far as is known publicly, they didn't have a platform to build from: it was going to be new design, from scratch.  They're out.  Hanwha/Oshkosh They proposed the K21 "Redback" IFV. It came with a cool video.. This IRV is also in the running for Australia's LAND 400 program, along with Rheinmetall's. They're also out. BAE Systems Current producer of the Bradley, it's unclear what they proposed, it seems to have been a derivative of the Bradley-based AMPV currently replacing a bunch of M113s (including all of those M113s sent to Ukraine). Last time they proposed a CV90 derivative, but apparently neither was good enough to make final two, either last time or this time. They're out.  So now it's down to two vendors:General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) GLDS got to the finals last time along with Rheinmetall. They've been very hush-hush on what vehicle they're actually proposing, and haven't even released concept images. My guess is that they're proposing something based on the Griffin III, which came from Ajax (aka ASCOD). The Griffin II (it's unimaginatively-named predecessor) served as the base platform for the Army's new M10 Booker assault gun. So there may be logistical benefits, however small. (The M10 booker is going to light divisions. The XM30 is going to armored divisions.) This video about the Griffin III is a little sales-y, but note the list of capabilites he mentions that we're seeing discussed about tactical actions in Ukraine today: thermal camoflauge, integration with drones, active protection (against missiles), etc. American Rheinmetall Originally proposed either the KF31 or KF41 Lynx in the previous program. They're probably proposing a smaller version of the KF41 to keep the mass lower. The KF41 comes in at 50 tons and was designed for 3+9 crew+passengers. Both GDLS and Rheinmetall are now proposing 2+6 crew+passenger, so a smaller version closer to the KF31 would make sense.  What can the Russo-Ukrainian war inform about the XM30 program?   First, mass. As much shade as the US military gets for the 70-ton mass of the M1 Abrams, in general the US prefers its vehicles to be lightweight. Why? Because it's fundamentally an expeditionary military, and the fastest way to get places is by air. That means vehicles need to fit on one of three platforms:
We've seen Ukraine experiment with converting tank hulls into IFVs, just as Israel has done. It makes for a heavy IFV, but lets you use simpler armor (more steel; less composites) for the same protection in exchange for mass. I could envision NATO's eastern flank doing this, but the US can't afford to. In a similar vein, most European countries seem to be settling on the Boxer for their wheeled armored vehicles, but at 25 tons you need something as big as a C-17 to carry it. The US and Canada use Strykers, which at 18 tons can be carried by C-130s. (This also lets them deploy to unfinished, rough airstrips). Ukraine is clearly seeing the benefit of higher protection levels, so after the war when they almost inevitably rationalize their systems (while storing everything left just in case), it will be interesting to see if they go with heavier or lighter (and more expensive) IFVs.  Second, firepower. The original XM30 requirements asked for a 30mm autocannon, with an option to later upgrade to a 50mm. Both GDLS and Rheinmetall are proposing 50mm out of the gate, likely both using the XM913. I actually think 50mm versus 30mm matters more for anti-infantry and anti-drone than anti-armor. I don't think Russia today has anything that can sustain 25mm depleted uranium APFSDS, much less 30mm, though perhaps a modern T-80 or T-90 could from the front. Maybe. 50mm? Almost certainly not. But 50mm lets you put a much larger explosive in HE rounds, which gives you a larger burst radius, which makes it easier to shoot over a trench, into a building, or against a small drone that's zipping around.Lots of Ukrainian accounts from Mariupol and other battles discuss the value of having friendly autocannon fire, and the deadliness of enemy autocannon fire. So I'd say Ukraine proves out the value of this upgrade in the XM30. Oh, and the XM913's ammunition is programmable, so it can burst at a set distance. This makes the weapon itself very viable for anti-air, as well as anti-personnel. Pair it with a radar (a goon posted earlier about small mm radars becoming cheap and easy), and every IFV can have some basic anti-drone defense for a couple km around itself.  Third, crew and passengersThe original requirement called for 2-3 crew and 6-8 passengers. Both GLDS and Rheinmetall have settled on 2 crew and 6 passengers. The KF41 can carry 8 passengers, so I think this comes down to weight. This will have interesting implications for platoon structures: either the current three 9-soldier dismounted squads get smaller (or reduce to two squads), or more vehicles gets added to the platoon. Either way: 3x9=27 soldiers don't fit in 4x6=24 seats. Another interesting option: the Army could go for 3 squads of 12 soldiers each. Personally I would love this option. I'm a big fan of the 12-person squad over the 9-person squad for dismounted operations, and I organized my scout platoon's dismounted patrols in Iraq in 2003 in this manner. I do wonder if Ukrainian operations will inform how the US Army looks at its infantry squads. The US Marine Corps is changing their current squads, going from 3 fire teams of 4 Marines each to 3 fire teams of 3 Marines each and 3-Marine headquarters section (basically, it gets every squad a dedicated drone operator). As of [now, Army fire teams will continue to have 4 soldiers. I've noticed a lot of footage from Ukraine shows infantry working in teams of 3, and some of the Russian tactical documents which have been captured show that as a team size. So it's possible that Ukraine and Russia are finding that 3 people in a team works well. If so, that could inform how the US sets up its mechanized infantry squads in the future.  Fourth, protection.It's not news--I think it's been well-known since the First Gulf War--but there remains significant value to vehicle survivability. While specifics on passive protection (i.e. armor) aren't being discussed, I suspect the US wants at least STANAG Level 6 protection, which resists 30mm APFSDS. Bradleys have STANAG Level 4 and maybe Level 5, depending on which source you believe. In addition, both GDLS and Rheinmetall are proposing active protection systems. GDLS' Griffin III demonstrater had thermal camouflauge, and Rheinmetall has a fabric for the same purpose apparently being used by the Canadian military. I'll be curious to see how thermal camo systems work with explosive reactive armor (ERA), or if it becomes an either-or. I kind of expect it to be modular, such that the US could up-armor its XM30's once they get off the planes. Closing thoughts I think the war validates most if not all of the known requirements for the XM30. Armored vehicles are not obsolete, and that means armored vehicles with even greater maneuverability, protection, firepower, sensors, and sustainability will be valuable in future conflicts. Cost is going to be a challenge. I'll bet these come in somewhere between $10-15M a piece, though the US wants to export them so that could help. And, of course, I still don't have universal healthcare, so we should have the money. Popular Mechanics has a good article for those interested. Wikipedia's article on the XM30 is pretty good too. I hope others itt found this post interesting or informative or both. *Note: I found some conflicting sources on the transportable load from a C-5, with some claiming it can carry ~50 tons more than a C-17. I'd appreciate any goons with better (unclassified) knowledge correcting my numbers if needed.
|
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 03:04
|
|
|
Huggybear posted:What KO'd the vehicles in question? Interesting that the Russians did not have the wherewithal to recover them first It's difficult to evacuate vehicles in the middle of a minefield, especially if it's not in your interests to clear the mines. I'm just surprised that Russian artillery didn't mince them while they were left as sitting ducks.
|
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 03:39
|
|
|
If NATO signals they will accept Ukraine but they cannot do so until the war is over, isn't that a strong incentive for Russia to stay away from the negotiating table if and when that time comes? Like even if Ukraine starts taking back massive territory or something else changes that greatly increases pressure on Russia to negotiate an end to the war isn't it possible Putin decides to keep the war going indefinitely to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO? I mean I don't think they can keep it going at this intensity forever but even if the Russians were beaten back to their borders Putin could keep small attacks or fighting going just enough to not provide a window in which Ukraine could join. I'm not well versed on this stuff so I am genuinely curious if this is a possibility.
|
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 04:02
|
|
|
Ynglaur posted:*Note: I found some conflicting sources on the transportable load from a C-5, with some claiming it can carry ~50 tons more than a C-17. I'd appreciate any goons with better (unclassified) knowledge correcting my numbers if needed. 'Tanks' for the ride posted:Two M-1 Abrams tanks from Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., are loaded in the cargo area of a C-5M Super Galaxy assigned to Dover Air Force Base, Del.  https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/112093/tanks-for-the-ride/ C-5 Cargo Compartment posted:Maximum Cargo: 281,001 pounds (127,460 Kilograms) Mirificus fucked around with this message at 04:08 on Jul 12, 2023 |
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 04:03
|
|
|
D-Pad posted:If NATO signals they will accept Ukraine but they cannot do so until the war is over, isn't that a strong incentive for Russia to stay away from the negotiating table if and when that time comes? Like even if Ukraine starts taking back massive territory or something else changes that greatly increases pressure on Russia to negotiate an end to the war isn't it possible Putin decides to keep the war going indefinitely to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO? I mean I don't think they can keep it going at this intensity forever but even if the Russians were beaten back to their borders Putin could keep small attacks or fighting going just enough to not provide a window in which Ukraine could join. Russia's only negotiating position has been "surrender and give us your country so we can kill everyone and replace them with Russians." Putin would not survive settling for anything less. Therefore, Russia is going to keep going until their military collapses and fragments. So no, it's not going to make any difference at all.
|
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 04:08
|
|
|
Yo that was a hell of a post, hoss. Thanks.
|
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 04:09
|
|
|
It's hard for me to wrap my head around the idea.of a 50t IFV given Ukraine's main MBT (pardon the expression) is ~41.5t. Edit: a fun comparison is the 18.7t Russian BMP-3, which has both an auto-cannon and a 100mm cannon... with ammunition that likes to go off. You can feel the difference in how much crew safety is valued, can't you? OddObserver fucked around with this message at 04:21 on Jul 12, 2023 |
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 04:19
|
|
|
Echoing thanks for the effort post on the IFVs, makes me curious how the US will organize their drone operators in the future. The dedicated drone operators in a control vehicle concept is interesting, but I'm also wondering if it'll ever make sense to have a dedicated drone operator per vehicle some day. On the NATO front, I do think that its a pretty clear signal that the West is saying a hypothetical "neutral" Ukraine is out of the picture. I think if the Russian side was more open to diplomacy a year ago, we might have seen some hypothetical peace deals where Ukraine promises not to join NATO but is free to become closer economically to the EU. I still think full restoration of Ukrainian territory to be a long shot, but I think removing potential Russian off-ramps is a clear sign of confidence in the Ukrainian position. It will come down to if Russia wants the economic sanctions to end more than it wants to spite Ukraine, and it seems like people are placing their bets or ok with either outcome.
|
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 04:23
|
|
|
D-Pad posted:If NATO signals they will accept Ukraine but they cannot do so until the war is over, isn't that a strong incentive for Russia to stay away from the negotiating table if and when that time comes? Like even if Ukraine starts taking back massive territory or something else changes that greatly increases pressure on Russia to negotiate an end to the war isn't it possible Putin decides to keep the war going indefinitely to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO? I mean I don't think they can keep it going at this intensity forever but even if the Russians were beaten back to their borders Putin could keep small attacks or fighting going just enough to not provide a window in which Ukraine could join. Small attacks don’t really necessitate a NATO response other than “keep supplying new munitions to Ukraine” so it’s not dealbreaker to membership.
|
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 05:02
|
|
|
WarpedLichen posted:Echoing thanks for the effort post on the IFVs, makes me curious how the US will organize their drone operators in the future. The dedicated drone operators in a control vehicle concept is interesting, but I'm also wondering if it'll ever make sense to have a dedicated drone operator per vehicle some day. Well the conflict is not winnable by Russia. Once we got out of the first couple of weeks that became abundantly clear. Honestly I don’t think anyone thought that Russia would be not only continuing this foolhardy adventure but escalating it at this point. Every NATO country offloading all of their 30-40 year old kit designed to destroy Soviets while they replacing them is an easy choice for most. Russia is degrading itself from a superpower to arguably a regional power at this point. We have started to see major cracks within their government with the aborted coup. Putin doesn’t have the control he once had nor the influence as evident by the abrupt face turn by Erdogan. When it comes crashing down it will be sudden and hilarious, much like how the coup was.
|
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 06:06
|
|
|
|
| # ? Jun 8, 2024 09:23 |
|
|
UK just inked a major ammo production deal with BAE ($361 million USD): https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/bae-systems-gets-uk-order-boost-output-battlefield-munitions-ft-2023-07-10/ Not sure how much or when this ammo will materialize or even if it will make it to Ukraine, but definitely displaying the increased appetite for defense funding. Given that the UK is not part of the EU ammo procurement deal, I wonder if we start running into a global bottlenecks as competition ramps up. I believe the EU production deals cited sourcing fuses as a problem? Edit: It was explosive powders: https://www.ft.com/content/aee0e1a1-c464-4af9-a1c8-73fcbc46ed17 WarpedLichen fucked around with this message at 07:16 on Jul 12, 2023 |
|
#
?
Jul 12, 2023 06:29
|
|