Register a SA Forums Account here!
JOINING THE SA FORUMS WILL REMOVE THIS BIG AD, THE ANNOYING UNDERLINED ADS, AND STUPID INTERSTITIAL ADS!!!

You can: log in, read the tech support FAQ, or request your lost password. This dumb message (and those ads) will appear on every screen until you register! Get rid of this crap by registering your own SA Forums Account and joining roughly 150,000 Goons, for the one-time price of $9.95! We charge money because it costs us money per month for bills, and since we don't believe in showing ads to our users, we try to make the money back through forum registrations.
What is the most powerful flying bug?
This poll is closed.
🦋 15 3.71%
🦇 115 28.47%
🪰 12 2.97%
🐦 67 16.58%
dragonfly 94 23.27%
🦟 14 3.47%
🐝 87 21.53%
Total: 404 votes
[Edit Poll (moderators only)]

 
  • Post
  • Reply
Frosted Flake
Sep 13, 2011

Semper Shitpost Ubique

I'm sure at least a few Ukrainians have realized that the plans being made for them are all the result of the Gulf War, not that it helps.

I was just reading about Iraqi fortifications - most of which were not assaulted by the Coalition - and it's estimated that 30-40% of Iraqis, perhaps more, had either deserted as individuals or retreated as units out of Kuwait before the ground war began - as a result of the aerial bombardment shattering their morale, and because the Iraqi senior command had no intention to fight for Kuwait - both they and Saddam had assumed there would be negotiations. So - the assaults on those fortifications which two generations of officers have taken as proof that fortifications, as a concept, are obsolete, were against positions that were at least partly unmanned. Also, the aforementioned weeks of aerial bombardment.

Okay, so overlooking the incorrect lessons NATO may have learned from this, we didn't even give Ukraine the same tools. If you believe fortifications are obsolete because you can assemble a massive air campaign against a mostly hapless enemy, that does not mean fortifications are obsolete without the air campaign, or if the enemy isn't hapless. If Ukraine had 2500 aircraft and bombed those positions for 40 days, then mostly manoeuvred around them through empty desert, sure. Why would they possibly succeed, even if you believe NATO has a method to overcome them?

Adbot
ADBOT LOVES YOU

Comrade Koba
Jul 2, 2007

Random rear end in a top hat posted:

The West criticizes the Ukrainians for 'Soviet-style tactics,' but really they all their military strategies from Starship Troopers.

i'm from Langley and i say coup 'em all!!!

VoicesCanBe
Jul 1, 2023

"Cóż, wygląda na to, że zostaliśmy łaskawie oszczędzeni trudu decydowania o własnym losie. Jakże uprzejme z ich strony, że przearanżowali Europę bez kłopotu naszego zdania!"

Frosted Flake posted:

I can't get over 18 of Ukraine's 20 ports being state owned on the eve of Maidan before free market efficiencies transferred the hundreds of millions of dollars of annual revenue into private hands.

Good lord. Post-Maidan Ukraine really boils down to stripping its infrastructure and state assets to parts to be sold to whichever western capitalists are willing to pay. What a scam.

Cerebral Bore
Apr 21, 2010


Fun Shoe

Mr SuperAwesome posted:

when was the last time an army did this successfully, smashing through a peer army through a full frontal assault on their prepared defenses (i.e. not just going around them)? maybe end of ww1 but that doesn't really count? D-day, ish?

probably the north vietnamese 1974-75 offensives

mark immune
Dec 14, 2019

put the teacher in the cope cage imo
when trump wins how will the us involvement in Thee Ukraine change?

VoicesCanBe
Jul 1, 2023

"Cóż, wygląda na to, że zostaliśmy łaskawie oszczędzeni trudu decydowania o własnym losie. Jakże uprzejme z ich strony, że przearanżowali Europę bez kłopotu naszego zdania!"

stephenthinkpad posted:

Are there stats that support before maiden, Ukraine's economy has higher share of state owned enterprise and "healthier" military industry?

Tbf, this one is Russia's fault, but Ukraine certainly had a healthier Navy before Russia annexed Crimea and like half of the stationed Ukranian soldiers in Crimea defected immediately.

Hedenius
Aug 23, 2007

Frosted Flake posted:

I'm sure at least a few Ukrainians have realized that the plans being made for them are all the result of the Gulf War, not that it helps.

I was just reading about Iraqi fortifications - most of which were not assaulted by the Coalition - and it's estimated that 30-40% of Iraqis, perhaps more, had either deserted as individuals or retreated as units out of Kuwait before the ground war began - as a result of the aerial bombardment shattering their morale, and because the Iraqi senior command had no intention to fight for Kuwait - both they and Saddam had assumed there would be negotiations. So - the assaults on those fortifications which two generations of officers have taken as proof that fortifications, as a concept, are obsolete, were against positions that were at least partly unmanned. Also, the aforementioned weeks of aerial bombardment.

Okay, so overlooking the incorrect lessons NATO may have learned from this, we didn't even give Ukraine the same tools. If you believe fortifications are obsolete because you can assemble a massive air campaign against a mostly hapless enemy, that does not mean fortifications are obsolete without the air campaign, or if the enemy isn't hapless. If Ukraine had 2500 aircraft and bombed those positions for 40 days, then mostly manoeuvred around them through empty desert, sure. Why would they possibly succeed, even if you believe NATO has a method to overcome them?

Also explains how everyone in the west expected Russia to collapse as a result of sanctions. Nobody realized that Russia is not Iraq.

really queer Christmas
Apr 22, 2014

OctaMurk posted:

showing my gratefulness by summoning your ambassador and chewing him out

Ukarena

dk2m
May 6, 2009

VoicesCanBe posted:

Good lord. Post-Maidan Ukraine really boils down to stripping its infrastructure and state assets to parts to be sold to whichever western capitalists are willing to pay. What a scam.

the grain deal is so important to the west because huge western agri-businesses set themselves up in the arable regions of ukraine.

the post-maidan government started leasing out that state-owned land and if those businesses can’t export the grain out, there’s a financial hit

the cover that it feeds africa and asia is mostly to make it appear as a moral issue when in reality, there’s friction between poland and ukraine due to these largely US owned businesses undercutting grain prices in Europe

Frosted Flake
Sep 13, 2011

Semper Shitpost Ubique

Hedenius posted:

Also explains how everyone in the west expected Russia to collapse as a result of sanctions. Nobody realized that Russia is not Iraq.

There were all of those official statements and the media cycle referring to Russia as a "Gas Station".... :psyboom:

Palladium
May 8, 2012

Very Good
✔️✔️✔️✔️

Frosted Flake posted:

There were all of those official statements and the media cycle referring to Russia as a "Gas Station".... :psyboom:

america, #1 best at handling pandemics in 2019 according to experts

Regarde Aduck
Oct 19, 2012

c l o u d k i t t e n
Grimey Drawer

Palladium posted:

america, #1 best at handling pandemics in 2019 according to experts

#2 was the UK

gradenko_2000
Oct 5, 2010

HELL SERPENT
Lipstick Apathy
https://twitter.com/eyrtxd/status/1686867321325748224?t=5bsF1HbQ4nDo1wDRNnNAdg&s=19

Lostconfused
Oct 1, 2008


How many people answered this one incorrectly?

ContinuityNewTimes
Dec 30, 2010

Я выдуман напрочь

Lostconfused posted:

How many people answered this one incorrectly?

They only blew half his face off with artillery. Finland prevails

Egg Moron
Jul 21, 2003

the dreams of the delighting void

Look here tankies, let us draw a distinction between being of the Nazis and being with the nazis

Nonsense
Jan 26, 2007

Mr. Lira is not in the news, nobody cares if he's in Russia or Bofa. It's not news.

Some Guy TT
Aug 30, 2011
Probation
Can't post for 5 hours!

Toplowtech posted:

Attacks aren't supposed to make your political enemies look cooler than they are.

then why are these the only ones the democrats use against trump

sullat
Jan 9, 2012

Megamissen posted:

no that was the opposite

It started because the allies were tired of being pushed off their land and treated like second class citizens, which they were. The Romans annihilated a couple of major city-states but ended the war by granting everyone (male, non-slave) in Italy Roman citizenship.

The Oldest Man
Jul 28, 2003

Cerebral Bore posted:

where it falls apart is that western countries are not going to build a million flying lawnmowers, but rather like two dozen overengineered bespoke superdrones that need about as much maintenance as your average fighter jet

Observing the problem has never once enabled neoliberalism to solve it

Frosted Flake
Sep 13, 2011

Semper Shitpost Ubique

sullat posted:

It started because the allies were tired of being pushed off their land and treated like second class citizens, which they were. The Romans annihilated a couple of major city-states but ended the war by granting everyone (male, non-slave) in Italy Roman citizenship.

There are some great recent books on this, and the other Italic peoples of Italy. A lot of the scholarship is starting to make connections to Late Antiquity insofar as elite group behaviour, cultural connections and frontier theory is concerned.

The gist is that Rome unified Italy so quickly not through bloody conquest - which later Roman historians mythologized as an example of Roman valour and foreshadowing the future glories of the empire, and contemporaries propagandized because a successful career as a general was important to a political career - but through cutting deals with the elite of the other cities of Italy, who often moved to Rome as part of the process of unification. The exception were the Samnites, who, as a tribal society, had no urban elites to negotiate with - as they had a fundamentally different political economy and social structure, no deal could be worked out.

Anyway, this initially worked out really well, as all of these states either allied with Rome or initially resisted before negotiating a place for their elites in the Roman senate. The problems started to happen once Rome started reneging on those deals. So you're entirely right, it's just worth pointing out who was being treated like second class citizens - the same elites they had forged this relationship with.

OctaMurk
Jun 21, 2013

Cerebral Bore posted:

where it falls apart is that western countries are not going to build a million flying lawnmowers, but rather like two dozen overengineered bespoke superdrones that need about as much maintenance as your average fighter jet

thats because we care about the lives of our drones unlike the bolsheviks

euphronius
Feb 18, 2009

accommodation and assimilation of elites goes way back to Rome’s founding.

Megamissen
Jul 19, 2022

any post can be a kannapost
if you want it to be

sullat posted:

It started because the allies were tired of being pushed off their land and treated like second class citizens, which they were. The Romans annihilated a couple of major city-states but ended the war by granting everyone (male, non-slave) in Italy Roman citizenship.

they were not forced to become citizens though, that was a concession rome had to give

supersnowman
Oct 3, 2012

fizzy posted:


A comedy screenwriter and the childhood sweetheart of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, Ms Zelenska gave up her day job to become an ambassador for Ukraine after Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.


Is it still nepotism when you give a position to your wife or it has a more specific term?

mawarannahr
May 21, 2019

supersnowman posted:

Is it still nepotism when you give a position to your wife or it has a more specific term?

when you give a position to your wife it's a sacrament of matrimony

Morbus
May 18, 2004

Frosted Flake posted:

Okay, so overlooking the incorrect lessons NATO may have learned from this, we didn't even give Ukraine the same tools. If you believe fortifications are obsolete because you can assemble a massive air campaign against a mostly hapless enemy, that does not mean fortifications are obsolete without the air campaign, or if the enemy isn't hapless. If Ukraine had 2500 aircraft and bombed those positions for 40 days, then mostly manoeuvred around them through empty desert, sure. Why would they possibly succeed, even if you believe NATO has a method to overcome them?

This is really the most egregious thing about the way the war is being fought. Massive amounts of air power can, in principle, substitute for a deficiency in tube and rocket artillery. Whether it's efficient to do that as opposed to just making lots of guns and shells is another matter, although there are advantages especially for the attacker.

But having a huge disadvantage in artillery *and* having a huge quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in the air *and* a huge disdvantage in ground based air defenses....and then thinking, what, you are going plow through with the power of positive thinking maneuver? It is terminal germanbrain

Slavvy
Dec 11, 2012

Ukraine need to wait for an overcast day to nullify the Russian air power advantage, amateurs

stephenthinkpad
Jan 2, 2020

supersnowman posted:

Is it still nepotism when you give a position to your wife or it has a more specific term?

But his wife was already working for him, so its just asking the wife to look over the accounting book.

tristeham
Jul 31, 2022

fizzy posted:

Good news for Ukraine - Ukraine is destined for succeeding at its breakthrough campaign.
On an unrelated note, "it took quite a while for the Allies’ tactical acumen to catch up with that of the Wehrmacht"



https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/03/ukraine-counteroffensive-breakthrough-problem/

Ukraine Has a Breakthrough Problem
By Barry R. Posen, the Ford international professor of political science of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
AUGUST 3, 2023, 6:38 AM

It is the stated policy of the Ukrainian government to retake all of the territory that Russia has seized since 2014, including Crimea. To achieve this goal through military action, the Ukrainian military must accomplish one of the most daunting of military tasks: It must break through dense, well-prepared defensive positions, find some running room, and then either move quickly toward an important geographic objective such as the Sea of Azov, hoping to unravel the remains of the defending Russian army along the way, or quickly attempt to encircle a portion of Russia’s sizable forces in hopes of annihilating them.

To fail at this kind of campaign will mean that Ukraine is likely destined for a long war of attrition—an inauspicious one, pitting it against a much more populous country. Ukraine naturally wishes to avoid the attritional war by succeeding at its breakthrough campaign. But military history suggests the challenges here are also more daunting than have been commonly understood—at least among the public in the West.

The breakthrough problem emerged during the First World War, when European countries first became rich and populous enough to defend very long fronts—in some cases nearly their entire borders. They were assisted in this effort by vast improvements in firepower, including range, rate, accuracy, and lethality, which augmented the typical advantage that defenders have: the ability to choose the terrain on which they will fight, to construct fortifications, and to arrange their forces in ways that allow the most effective use of firepower — for example, by ambushing.

The perfection of the tank, fighter aircraft, and radio allowed skilled attackers to overcome defenses early in World War II, but over time, defenders found ways to employ the same assets. The mobility of armored forces allows the defender to rapidly move reserves to whatever segments of its defense seem in greatest danger of collapse. Assuming a reasonable air defense, the lateral movement of armor behind one’s own lines is vastly easier than the offense’s forward movement of armor against a defended position. The defense added the mass employment of anti-tank and anti-personnel land mines to its bag of tricks, which U.S. analysts concluded shortly after World War II had been very cost-effective as anti-armor weapons, accounting for as much as 20 percent of all tanks damaged by enemy action.

Though cinematic representations of World War II seem to portray a more fluid battlefield than World War I, both wars degenerated into brutal and bloody attrition slugfests. As in the First World War, soldiers on all sides groped for ways to cut through the defense, restore mobility, and maneuver to the battlefield. Ultimately, they found ways to do so, though only after much hard fighting, and usually only after mustering vast material superiority. A military rule of thumb emerged that at least a 3-to-1 advantage in combat power is necessary to have a reasonable chance of success against a well-crafted defense.

But attackers must do much more than organize material superiority. The defender must be rendered thin at the front so that it loses coherence after some initial fighting; its tactical reserves much be degraded through prior action, delayed during the fight, or simply defeated as they appear; and its operational reserves must also either be degraded in advance or diverted to other tasks by deception or supporting attacks, or also defeated as they appear. All of these tasks need to be integrated and synchronized, no mean feat for any army.

As of this writing, we can observe, to the limited extent the combatants allow, Ukraine’s efforts to address some of these issues—mainly, the problem of an initial breach. As is now known to all, the Russians have prepared a dense and well-constructed defensive system. Minefields, deep anti-tank ditches, and concrete obstacles slow the attacker. Dug-in defenders, some in earthworks and others in concrete bunkers, cover these obstacles with direct fire from machine guns and anti-tank missiles. They are likely augmented by tanks and armored vehicles firing from their own dug-in positions. Defensive combat vehicles frequently move among multiple prepared positions to elude the offender’s suppressive fires. Artillery fire from the rear allows for sudden concentrations of large numbers of shells and rockets on the attacker, sometimes with cluster munitions. The attacker must clear minefields and eliminate other obstacles while under observed fire. It is often stalled while doing so, and thus the defender’s fire is very effective. The attacker may have to move despite the presence of mines, and thus the mines extract their toll.

We have also seen that Russian attack helicopters function as very mobile tactical reserves. When a Ukrainian unit is hung up on an obstacle or minefield, helicopter-fired missiles augment the local Russian defenders. Because of the low altitude tactics that the Russian flyers probably employ and the range of their anti-tank weapons, these helicopters are very difficult for ground-based air defenses to engage.

Obstacles and fires thus work together to slow and ultimately destroy attackers. Reports from the fighting suggest that the very best Western armored vehicles in these fights — Leopard II tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles — have suffered significant damage in their attempted attacks. The only silver lining for Ukraine is that the crews and infantry squads tend to survive the vehicle damage, a tribute to Western designers. But this is not enough for the offensive to succeed. For a successful breakthrough, the vehicles themselves need to be able to move forward, taking their firepower into the depth of the enemy’s positions.

Historically, defenders have been rendered thin through two measures. The most straightforward is prior attrition, supplemented by the immediate shock of truly massive offensive firepower. The attacking force just fights the defender for a long time, accepting high costs, and bets that the defense cannot replace their losses at the rate that the attacker can.

This is what the Allies did during the Second World War as they fought the Germans. Over time, German combat power was simply worn away, mostly in fighting at the front, but also as a result of allied bombing. Greatly superior in combined population and industrial power, the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the British produced many more weapons and fielded many more units than the Nazis. The German army’s best efforts to maintain a coherent defense, backed by mobile reserves, simply failed due to lack of sufficient resources, though it took quite a while for the Allies’ tactical acumen to catch up with that of the Wehrmacht.

Sheer destruction was also a crucial Allied tool to achieve the final thinning of the defense. When breakthrough efforts were launched in the West, the U.S. and the British combined massive artillery fire with concentrated bombing strikes. The Soviets in the east did the same, though they relied more on their artillery than on their air power.

It does not appear that Ukraine’s suite of artillery, rocket launchers, and drones is quite up to this task, but only the unfolding campaign can answer this question. And though Ukraine hopes that the West will soon supply it with fighter aircraft, U.S. experience in the Desert Storm operation against a far less capable adversary than Russia suggests that the number required both to suppress the Russian air defenses and then attack the Russian ground forces in depth is far in excess of any figure thus far suggested.

The other way to render the enemy forces thin on the ground is to surprise them on a stretch of front that, for their own reasons, they have left thinly defended. This is what the Germans did against the Americans in the Ardennes Forest in December 1944 in the Battle of the Bulge. The United States and Britain did not have sufficient forces to sustain offensives all along the front. The United States used the hilly and forested terrain of the Ardennes, considered more defensible, to achieve an “economy of force.” Not only did they cover the front at a density half of what their own doctrine recommended, but they also used the Ardennes as what historian Charles B. MacDonald later called a “nursery and old folks home,” breaking in green divisions new to the theater and providing a space for veteran divisions that had suffered unusually high attrition to recover their strength.

German intelligence figured this out, and careful camouflage and deception allowed the Germans to concentrate a very large force in the sector without U.S. detection, achieving a favorable overall force ratio of perhaps 3-to-1. Initially, the Germans enjoyed some success, but their inability to defeat Allied tactical and operational reserves, and to fully resupply their forward elements, eventually caused them to break off the attack.

The Ukrainians found a thinly held section of the front in their successful offensive in the Kharkiv Oblast in autumn 2022. The Russians had taken sufficient losses earlier in the year that they needed to economize somewhere, and they did that in Kharkiv. Ukrainian intelligence figured this out, and either managed to surprise the Russians, or the Russians simply chose to accept the loss. Though their withdrawal looked like a rout, they avoided the capture or destruction of most of their units.

The Ukrainians have, no doubt, hoped to repeat the Kharkiv experience in their summer 2023 counteroffensive, but as of this writing, success is still elusive.

On first appraisal, Russian forces in Ukraine do appear thin on the ground, which has fed the hope of successful offensives. By my count, the Russians started the war with perhaps 40 brigades. Some have been battered, and most have suffered high attrition, but the Russian reserve troop mobilization in the autumn of 2022 seems to have allowed them to restore their fighting power. But even if we assume that they are again at full strength, at best, the Russians can only defend the entire 1,000 kilometers (more than 600 miles) or so of front by using every brigade with no reserves—and even that may be a stretch. During the Cold War, analysts would have said that 15-20 km (about 9-12 miles) is about the most a brigade can defend successfully, even for a short time.

But modern technology — including drones, advanced artillery and ground-based rocket systems, and long-range, anti-tank guided missiles — allows defensive units to take on bigger tasks than their forbearers. The Ukrainian army’s offensive success in fall 2022 has also paradoxically allowed the Russians to shorten their lines, and thus eased their defensive task. The destruction of the Kakhovka dam in southern Ukraine made the south easier to defend, permitting a further consolidation of Russian combat power.

The Russians may also have added additional combat units to their forces in Ukraine. Ominously, Gen. Christopher Cavoli, the U.S. supreme allied commander Europe, declared in April that Russian forces in Ukraine were stronger than they were at the outset of the war. He offered no figures, but I have heard numbers as high as 300,000 troops, compared to 200,000 at the outset of the war. If true, then Russia probably has deployed additional brigades to Ukraine, improving Russia’s ability to maintain tactical and operational reserves.

Some Western experts suggest that the Russians are devoid of reserves, but this would imply that the Russians are still the military amnesiacs that they were at the outset of the campaign. The Russians have been fighting effectively now for months, however, so they must have remembered something from their old manuals and practices, and they too have managed to exploit new technology. If Western and Ukrainian intelligence believe there are no significant Russian reserves, that would explain both Ukraine’s determination to continue its efforts to gnaw through Russia’s defensive positions and Western military declarations of confidence in the offensive. They can still hope ultimately to crack the first line of Russian defenses, restore mobility to the battlefield, and unhinge the remaining Russian forces.

If this assumption is wrong, however, then there is probably little point in Ukraine continuing current efforts, because even if it penetrates deeply into Russian-held real estate, it will likely meet significant Russian counterattacks, under the worst possible circumstances—with its own forces weakened by attrition, strung out and scattered by virtue of the prior battles, and probably undersupplied. At that moment, the Ukrainian forces may also be beyond the range of some of their own supporting drones, artillery, and rockets, upon which they have come to rely, and which now, due to Russian jamming, seem less effective than they once were.

Such a dire outcome is by no means certain, but the problem for Ukraine is that it will have no experience to draw upon if this possibility unfolds. And because its air force is small and largely committed to defense, air power cannot rescue the Ukrainians. They will be on their own. Though the Russians have not demonstrated a lot of skill at mobile operations in this war, nor shown much of an ability to improvise, they have improved over the course of the conflict, and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that they are waiting for their moment.

The Ukrainians are still in the early days of their summer offensive. As of this writing, they are grinding forward in what appears to be one major offensive aiming for the Sea of Azov and a supporting offensive around Bakhmut. If these efforts begin to gather momentum, they may nevertheless still have two important problems to confront—Russian tactical reserves deployed in their path to break their momentum, and Russian operational reserves that may gather for counterattacks into the lengthening Ukrainian flanks. Russian air power, which has been much more successful at ground attack in recent weeks than it was early in the war, can further slow the Ukrainian advance by striking both combat units and logistics.

It is likely that these problems have been analyzed during war games with NATO advisors, and solutions have probably been devised, at least in theory. But history suggests these are very demanding operations in terms of materiel, planning, and military skill. Facts sufficient to make an educated guess about Ukraine’s odds of success are few. But observers should not be surprised if this offensive peters out with, at best, a partial success.

wonderful news

Cerebral Bore
Apr 21, 2010


Fun Shoe

Frosted Flake posted:

There were all of those official statements and the media cycle referring to Russia as a "Gas Station".... :psyboom:

its p funny if you think about it even medium hard, basically what's being said is that russia is irrelevant because all they have is a massive slice of the thing that everybody needs and keeps the world economy running

euphronius
Feb 18, 2009

heartwarming human interest story today in the nyt about ukriane cleansing orthodox churches out of Ukraine.

mawarannahr
May 21, 2019

euphronius posted:

heartwarming human interest story today in the nyt about ukriane cleansing orthodox churches out of Ukraine.

that's too bad. for a while they were trying to make them more appealing to certain local elements





Типовий Кременець in 2017 on Facebook:

quote:

Temple of the Holy Transfiguration of the Lord. Kremenets.

The Orthodox Church from the time of the baptism of Russia-Ukraine is an integral part of the Ukrainian people. In the periods of ascension in her environment actively developed art, writing, medicine... And in times of distress, spiritual leaders helped the people survive the turmoil, gave people hope for a bright future, as an example pointing to the suffering and Resurrection of Christ, often took an active part in the struggle against enslaves, strengthening the brethren with their courage, participation-presence, the word of God and the word of discord.

The influence of the people and the Church has always been mutual. Society was under the custody of svâ цтennoslužitelív, and religious art displayed events from the lives of the people. There are many examples, but here are just some of them: spreading the reverence of the saint. Yuri the Winner (icons, temples) in the times of Mongolian and Moscow (theologian, long-handed) devastating raids on Kiev Rus, construction in such periods of temples-fortress, spreading respect to the svt. Nicholas the Wonderworker at the time of the development of shipwreck, the background of icons often served the landscapes of the Ukrainian villages, writing icons of the Intercession of the Virgin with images of cossacks and hetmans... This list could go on for a long time.

In Muscovy, it was considered a temptation even when the painters unequally drew biblical plots. The order of the Moscow Roof Cathedral was followed there. : "From your imagination to change nothing... ". Albums with icons were laid and only they could be depicted in churches. Such icons were considered canonical, everything else is heresy.

After Ukraine was set ablaze by Muscovy, authentic ancient Ukrainian church paintings, books and architectural monuments were largely destroyed, imposing foreign traditions. The wings of creativity in church art have been clipped.

However, now that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has become independent again (Kyiv Patriarchate), the first vapors of that grain, which everyone thought it had already gone, and it resurrects with Christ!

The icon in the Holy Transfiguration Cathedral of the city. Kremencâ, which is dedicated to the events of the Maidan and the Ukrainian Liberation War (ATO), can be considered one of such young shoots. We don't claim to be perfection, but even more imperfection. This is an attempt to restore the ancient traditions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Please note that work on the icon is still in progress. Especially to you honourable abbot fathers,you have a great opportunity to do better by expressing all your theological views on your temples wall paintings.

## The meaning of an icon
In the wall painting of our cathedral, we sought to reflect a turning point in the modern history of the Ukrainian nation: Maidan (Revolution of dignity) and ATO (Ukrainian Liberation War). To give these events some theological insight and highlight a nurturing moment for present and future generations.

The symbol of the unbreakable spirit, the rise of the people to the status of the nation during the Revolution of dignity on the Kiev Maidan became the Independence Monument (stella). Among the many Maidanívcív depicted on the icon - Heroes of Heavenly Hundred and national images. In particular, such are the people in the first row: a man with a wooden shield, a volunteer girl and a journalist. That's the patriots Maidan stood and won.

Another symbol that personifies the invincibility of the Ukrainian army is the Donetsk airfield tower with the Ukrainian flag on top of it. About these events says the saying: "Cyborgs endured, did not withstand concrete". An example of combat trains became those who died in battle with glory and honor. They became an example to others. They fulfilled the commandment of Christ: "there is no greater love when who soul his puts for friends of their". The most famous of them are depicted on the icon. And in the front row - national insults: Ukrainian soldier in full combat equipment, military doctor and military priest-chaplain. Next to the blue and yellow flags of the Ukrainian state, red and black flags, flags of the struggle for the independence of the Ukrainian people.

The depicted events of Maidan and ATO are not their own icons, they form as if the background of icons, serve as its meaningful design.

This design is complemented by two angels placed in the upper corners of the icon. Archangel Michael, warrior, archistratig, leader of the heavenly armies, patron saint of Kiev, Ukraine and the Ukrainian army. As well as Archangel Rafael, the patron saint of doctors and volunteers.

In the thickness of the niche, in the form of a geraldic painting (ornament), depicts the emblems of the genus of the Ukrainian army and volunteer battalions. Because they are not visible from the position of the camera, these symbols were placed on the right and left sides of the icon in the photo.

The main attention, when looking at the icon, is concentrated on the central plot, the struggle of the Great Martyr Yuri with the devil. The feature of this icon is that a demon is depicted in the form of a two-headed eagle, which Yuri the Winner permeates with his spear, crowned with a blue-yellow ribbon.

The Ukrainian Liberation War is the same vizolno Украї, not the zagarbnicʹko є, so the vizolʹnu struggle is blessed by the Lord. He is depicted in the form of God-Father "Old (Old) Days" with the biblical inscription "Holy, holy, holy Lord Savaof". Savaof is one of the names of God which means "God of heaven," "God of armies". God-Son symbolizes the cross, in this particular case the cross in the form of the general military emblem of the Ukrainian Land Forces. God-the Holy Spirit is in the form of a pigeon framed by a trident.
Above Maidan and ato on conditional tapes depicted verbal generalization of the meaning of the icon: "God is with us. Ukraine is behind us ".

The size of the icon is 70 m. square Icon painter Vasyl Stetsko.

Tsitsikovas
Aug 2, 2023

fizzy posted:

Bad news for Russia - More than 8,500 Russian paratroopers have been wounded while fighting in Ukraine


https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.politico.eu/article/over-8500-russian-paratroopers-wounded-ukraine-war/amp/

8,500+ Russian paratroopers wounded in Ukraine, admits Moscow commander
BY NICOLAS CAMUT
AUGUST 3, 2023 2:44 PM CET

More than 8,500 Russian paratroopers have been wounded while fighting in Ukraine, a Russian general said Wednesday in a rare official admission about the number of casualties suffered by Moscow’s troops in Ukraine.

“More than five thousand wounded paratroopers returned to the front after treatment, and over three and a half thousand of our wounded refused to leave the front line at all,” Mikhail Teplinsky, commander of Russia’s Airborne Forces, said Wednesday in a video message posted on state-run broadcaster Zvevda, which is run by the Russian defense ministry.

Initially published in the early hours of Wednesday, the video was then taken down from Zvevda’s website and Telegram channel, according to the Moscow Times.

Neither
Ukraine nor Russia provide up-to-date, official counts of their own losses in the war.

Western intelligenc
e estimates put Russia’s losses between 40,000 and 60,000 deaths, and as many as 200,000 casualties in total, while a recent statistical analysis by two independent Russian media outlets and a German scientist showed that about 47,000 Russian soldiers had been killed since the start of Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Second Hand Meat Mouth
Sep 12, 2001
im going to kiss putin and help him do an imperialism :twisted:

Backcountry
Jan 16, 2009
War is bad. I don't like war

Cerebral Bore
Apr 21, 2010


Fun Shoe

Second Hand Meat Mouth posted:

im going to kiss putin and help him do an imperialism :twisted:

sounds hot

Second Hand Meat Mouth
Sep 12, 2001

Backcountry posted:

War is bad. I don't like war

wow so your saying that the ukrainians should all just commit suicide?

Ardennes
May 12, 2002

Morbus posted:

This is really the most egregious thing about the way the war is being fought. Massive amounts of air power can, in principle, substitute for a deficiency in tube and rocket artillery. Whether it's efficient to do that as opposed to just making lots of guns and shells is another matter, although there are advantages especially for the attacker.

But having a huge disadvantage in artillery *and* having a huge quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in the air *and* a huge disdvantage in ground based air defenses....and then thinking, what, you are going plow through with the power of positive thinking maneuver? It is terminal germanbrain

I would say this war also has shown the limits of airpower as well, as long-range SAMs coupled with AWACS support can make potential strikes too costly to consider, which is going to limit the effective range of airpower. But yeah, without superiority in the air or a superiority in artillery, they just had no way to move forward and were just setting up tank grave yards.

DC wants this war to be over, and the assumption was the great counter-offensive was the way to do it, and every criticism about how impractical it was, was swept aside.

Adbot
ADBOT LOVES YOU

Frosted Flake
Sep 13, 2011

Semper Shitpost Ubique

When you put it that way, forcing the Ukrainian army to destroy itself and then being stingy with suppling them after might end the war sooner than however long Ukraine might be able to hold out on the defensive.

  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • Post
  • Reply