War in Ukraine CE: The Golf War

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(Thread IKs: fatherboxx)

ethanol: Jul 13, 2007

Dick Ripple posted:

Ukraine choosing to go against US advice on massing forces is interesting. Of course the decision should come down to those commanders on the ground, but generally I do not see US planners being to aggressive in the sense that they would risk gambling a large portion of their or Ukrainian combat power unless it was worth it.

It seems like the Ukrainians are going for infiltration and the bite & hold strategy, which is not a bad call considering they probably want to try and maintain the initiative well into the winter.

i am a moron posted:

I wasn�t a general, but as a grunt US doctrine seemed to heavily emphasis risk mitigation so I�d tend to agree. On the same token I wonder if our unmatched combined arms capabilities color some of how US staff level folks would view this kind of thing

this kind of stuff is going on syllabi at US military academies
https://www.amazon.com/Seconds-Die-Military-Nagorno-Karabakh-Warfighting/dp/1636241239
some commanders are slow to learn and/or have to work with the tools in the shed. its no secret massing forces under traditional risk mitigation will not work anymore.

that said we're not exactly throwing unlimited resources at this. There are no F35s flying around. the m1 abrams they sent are pushing 50 I think. hell there are 113s rolling around

ethanol fucked around with this message at 16:15 on Aug 18, 2023

# ? Aug 18, 2023 16:09

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# ? Jun 1, 2024 17:41

OddObserver: Apr 3, 2009

Pretty sure the M1s are currently at zero.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 16:17

ethanol: Jul 13, 2007

OddObserver posted:

Pretty sure the M1s are currently at zero.

yeah I mean the ones queued up

# ? Aug 18, 2023 16:18

FuturePastNow: May 19, 2014

Not So Fast posted:

I think the point is that Russia hasn't had to use its reserves yet to prop up the ruble. Here's an expanded chart from the same website.

How do they know how much gold reserves Russia has? If it's a self-reported thing it's probably fictional

# ? Aug 18, 2023 16:19

Grip it and rip it: Apr 28, 2020

FuturePastNow posted:

How do they know how much gold reserves Russia has? If it's a self-reported thing it's probably fictional

I think generally reports like that are audited on some level, but I don't know that for a fact.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 16:25

Cpt_Obvious: Jun 18, 2007

Rinkles posted:

For hanging posters?

I don't think Poland has the freedom of speech. For example, they recently passed a law making it illegal to teach Polish collaboration in the Holocaust. So holocaust denial was literally enshrined in the law until international pressure drove them to repeal it.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amendment_to_the_Act_on_the_Institute_of_National_Remembrance

# ? Aug 18, 2023 16:30

mustard_tiger: Nov 8, 2010

Why is the lack of immediate success for the Ukrainian offensive seen as a massive failure. In kherson they spent months slowly grinding down the Russian front line and rear supply lines until the Russians had to pull out.

They are doing the same thing here as well. There are credible reports that the Russians aren't rotating their front line companys. Every day we see supply depots and logistic locations being blown up far behind the line.

This slow and methodical push has already been shown to work retaking the largest city that Russia had controlled. I don't think it's insane to think it could work again.

The kharkiv push was an outlier in this war but also proved that the Ukrainians can exploit holes when they find them.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 16:30

Mederlock: Jun 23, 2012; You won't recognize Canada when I'm through with it; Grimey Drawer

mustard_tiger posted:

Why is the lack of immediate success for the Ukrainian offensive seen as a massive failure. In kherson they spent months slowly grinding down the Russian front line and rear supply lines until the Russians had to pull out.

They are doing the same thing here as well. There are credible reports that the Russians aren't rotating their front line companys. Every day we see supply depots and logistic locations being blown up far behind the line.

This slow and methodical push has already been shown to work retaking the largest city that Russia had controlled. I don't think it's insane to think it could work again.

The kharkiv push was an outlier in this war but also proved that the Ukrainians can exploit holes when they find them.

There are a lot of people watching the events of this war play out who have practically no understanding of military tactics/strategy/analysis, even at an interested amateur history nerd level. They don't understand why things have shaken out the way they have so far, so their only point of reference for what a successful military campaign looks like are the Kharkiv and Kherson offensives, the initial Russian push into Ukraine, and stuff like Desert Storm.

So their expectations are set way too high, out of ignorance, of what made those faster offensives look the way they did. They don't understand the role of different logistics structures and what disrupts them, km deep minefields across a 1000km frontage, artillery duels, how local terrain impacts defense/offense, the capabilities gaps between Russia and Ukraine, or much of anything else. Of course that doesn't reflect poorly on them as a person or anything like that, it's not subjects that everyone should be deeply informed in if they're not personally interested or need to know it for military service.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 16:51

ethanol: Jul 13, 2007

probably has something to do with rebroadcasting the same 14 Bradleys or however many getting stuck in a minefield for weeks

# ? Aug 18, 2023 16:57

Deteriorata: Feb 6, 2005

mustard_tiger posted:

Why is the lack of immediate success for the Ukrainian offensive seen as a massive failure. In kherson they spent months slowly grinding down the Russian front line and rear supply lines until the Russians had to pull out.

They are doing the same thing here as well. There are credible reports that the Russians aren't rotating their front line companys. Every day we see supply depots and logistic locations being blown up far behind the line.

This slow and methodical push has already been shown to work retaking the largest city that Russia had controlled. I don't think it's insane to think it could work again.

The kharkiv push was an outlier in this war but also proved that the Ukrainians can exploit holes when they find them.

Much of it is just the effect of Russian propaganda, filtering itself through various media. Building up false hopes of what it could achieve and then being critical for not achieving it has been a constant drumbeat in the background.

People are getting influence by it without being aware of the source.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 16:58

TheDeadlyShoe: Feb 14, 2014

mustard_tiger posted:

Why is the lack of immediate success for the Ukrainian offensive seen as a massive failure. In kherson they spent months slowly grinding down the Russian front line and rear supply lines until the Russians had to pull out.

They are doing the same thing here as well. There are credible reports that the Russians aren't rotating their front line companys. Every day we see supply depots and logistic locations being blown up far behind the line.

This slow and methodical push has already been shown to work retaking the largest city that Russia had controlled. I don't think it's insane to think it could work again.

The kharkiv push was an outlier in this war but also proved that the Ukrainians can exploit holes when they find them.

Kherson worked because of the logistical chokepoint induced by the river. Russia has no such problem here.

The goal of the Ukrainian offensive on its own terms is to choke off the supply routes to the south, which would be meaningful progress to actually winning the war. After months of being stalled by the enormous minefields and defense lines there's no particular reason to think a maneuver victory is gonna happen. The battles seem attritional at the moment. Part of the issue is that having committed so much of their forces means that even if they manage to eventually bull through the defenses they may lack the reserve forces to push it open wider and deeper; a relatively narrow salient will not be able to hold against inevitable counterattack, and Ukraine cannot keep up the offensive forever.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 17:07

ethanol: Jul 13, 2007

TheDeadlyShoe posted:

The battles seem attritional at the moment. Part of the issue is that having committed so much of their forces means that even if they manage to eventually bull through the defenses they may lack the reserve forces to push it open wider and deeper; a relatively narrow salient will not be able to hold against inevitable counterattack, and Ukraine cannot keep up the offensive forever.

u should have to back up these kinds of statements with numbers and their sources imo. 'I've seen a lot of photos on twitter'

# ? Aug 18, 2023 17:12

TheDeadlyShoe: Feb 14, 2014

ethanol posted:

u should have to back up these kinds of statements with numbers and their sources imo. 'I've seen a lot of photos on twitter'

2 months is just a long time for an offensive, particularly an armored offensive. To put it in perspective, Russia invaded on Feb 24th and essentially declared its assault in Kyiv a failure by the end of March.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 17:19

Dandywalken: Feb 11, 2014

Well no I believe it was declared a feint

# ? Aug 18, 2023 17:20

ethanol: Jul 13, 2007

TheDeadlyShoe posted:

2 months is just a long time for an offensive, particularly an armored offensive. To put it in perspective, Russia invaded on Feb 24th and essentially declared its assault in Kyiv a failure by the end of March.

The number of armored vehicles Russia threw hundreds of km deep with no plan for logistics support and in the middle of rasputitsa is wholly different from what ukraine is doing to prod at a well entrenched and heavily mined front line

ethanol fucked around with this message at 17:39 on Aug 18, 2023

# ? Aug 18, 2023 17:26

the holy poopacy: May 16, 2009; hey! check this out; Fun Shoe

mustard_tiger posted:

Why is the lack of immediate success for the Ukrainian offensive seen as a massive failure. In kherson they spent months slowly grinding down the Russian front line and rear supply lines until the Russians had to pull out.

They are doing the same thing here as well. There are credible reports that the Russians aren't rotating their front line companys. Every day we see supply depots and logistic locations being blown up far behind the line.

This slow and methodical push has already been shown to work retaking the largest city that Russia had controlled. I don't think it's insane to think it could work again.

The kharkiv push was an outlier in this war but also proved that the Ukrainians can exploit holes when they find them.

There's some concern about a perceived window of good weather before the winter sets in and complicates the offensive, the idea being that even if Ukraine is keeping casualties to a sustainable level they're still on a clock, so slowly grinding forward for another 2 months isn't going to get very far.

On the other hand, winter is more of a problem for the sort of breakthrough lightning advance that people were originally hoping for, so if Ukraine has deliberately shifted gears to a slow grinding advance they may very well plan on being at it through the winter. Which still won't necessarily recover vast swathes of territory, but it means they're not limited to whatever they can recover by October and then the lines are frozen effectively forever.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 17:33

Paranoea: Aug 4, 2009

Remember that Ukraine still hasn't penetrated the first proper defensive line, just the initial defensive positions, owing to Russia's fierce defense of everything (vs. defense in depth, like noted earlier here). No one knows for sure how many reserves Russia has to pull on, so whether or not the two defensice lines between Ukraine's current position and Tokmak will be properly manned us anyone's guess (Mike Kofman refused to believe Russian reserves are exhausted in his previous War on the Rocks visit, but that still leaves room for a lot of options). On the other hand, Ukrainian elite forces that were previously being held back to push on those breaks in the line are now veing committed (see https://www.forbes.com/sites/davida...unteroffensive/). I'm not an expert on any of this, but would personally conside är the offensive successful if they reach Tokmak by mud season. And they may be months away from that if the current rate of progress continues.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 18:04

Dante80: Mar 23, 2015

Troop Deaths and Injuries in Ukraine War Near 500,000, U.S. Officials Say
or https://archive.ph/s0di4

quote:

The total number of Ukrainian and Russian troops killed or wounded since the war in Ukraine began 18 months ago is nearing 500,000, U.S. officials said, a staggering toll as Russia assaults its next-door neighbor and tries to seize more territory.

The officials cautioned that casualty figures remained difficult to estimate because Moscow is believed to routinely undercount its war dead and injured, and Kyiv does not disclose official figures. But they said the slaughter intensified this year in eastern Ukraine and has continued at a steady clip as a nearly three-month-old counteroffensive drags on.

Russia�s military casualties, the officials said, are approaching 300,000. The number includes as many as 120,000 deaths and 170,000 to 180,000 injured troops. The Russian numbers dwarf the Ukrainian figures, which the officials put at close to 70,000 killed and 100,000 to 120,000 wounded.

But Russians outnumber Ukrainians on the battlefield almost three to one, and Russia has a larger population from which to replenish its ranks.

Ukraine has around 500,000 troops, including active-duty, reserve and paramilitary troops, according to analysts. By contrast, Russia has almost triple that number, with 1,330,000 active-duty, reserve and paramilitary troops � most of the latter from the Wagner Group.
(...)

man, that is grim

# ? Aug 18, 2023 18:47

FMguru: Sep 10, 2003; peed on;
sexually

Dante80 posted:

man, that is grim

All because a single idiot thought he'd stumbled across the One Weird Trick to reassemble the Tsarist/Soviet empire in an instant.

:smith:

# ? Aug 18, 2023 18:55

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

TheDeadlyShoe posted:

2 months is just a long time for an offensive, particularly an armored offensive. To put it in perspective, Russia invaded on Feb 24th and essentially declared its assault in Kyiv a failure by the end of March.

It's not an armoured offensive, though. Unless mine clearing, infiltration and artillery bombardments are called that now. It's a completely different kind of offensive than the Russian balls to the wall gung ho grab attempt on Kyiv.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 19:09

Vox Nihili: May 28, 2008

mustard_tiger posted:

Why is the lack of immediate success for the Ukrainian offensive seen as a massive failure. In kherson they spent months slowly grinding down the Russian front line and rear supply lines until the Russians had to pull out.

They are doing the same thing here as well. There are credible reports that the Russians aren't rotating their front line companys. Every day we see supply depots and logistic locations being blown up far behind the line.

This slow and methodical push has already been shown to work retaking the largest city that Russia had controlled. I don't think it's insane to think it could work again.

The kharkiv push was an outlier in this war but also proved that the Ukrainians can exploit holes when they find them.

The summer offensive has been more or less a failure for a few reasons. First, because Uklraine had to default to this new strategy focused on infantry assaults and attrition after losing a bunch of valuable Western kit attempting to do mechanized maneuvers that just didn't work. Second, because they aren't presently close to taking or retaking any significant cities or otherwise valuable positions, they have instead been assaulting areas around the exact same handful of tiny villages for months. Third, because they have yet to break through or even reach the primary Russian lines between them and the meaningful objectives, such as Tokmak, that they are targeting. Basically, they accumulated a bunch of equipment and men and haven't actually moved the lines with them. It has the same general feeling of the preceding Russian offensives where huge bombardments and major mechanized forces were thrown into the pot to take single fields or half of a small town at a time.

Targeting and destroying Russian logistics hubs, command centers, artillery, etc. is all well and good but that's not an offensive push, it's attrition warfare. It isn't yet clear if continuing with that strategy of attrition will actually result in retaking strategically significant positions.

Vox Nihili fucked around with this message at 19:35 on Aug 18, 2023

# ? Aug 18, 2023 19:32

i am a moron: Nov 12, 2020; "I think if there’s one thing we can all agree on it’s that Penn State and Michigan both suck and are garbage and it’s hilarious Michigan fans are freaking out thinking this is their natty window when they can’t even beat a B12 team in the playoffs lmao"

Dante80 posted:

Troop Deaths and Injuries in Ukraine War Near 500,000, U.S. Officials Say
or https://archive.ph/s0di4

man, that is grim

War is hell on earth. I got extremely lucky when I signed up for one on purpose. It�s the most evil, perverted thing you can inflict on people. I can�t imagine being forced to defend yourself or being forced to fight someone else. My heart breaks for everyone in the thick of it on both sides. They�re all going to lose ultimately.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 19:34

Jasper Tin Neck: Nov 14, 2008; "Scientifically proven, rich and creamy."

Dick Ripple posted:

Ukraine choosing to go against US advice on massing forces is interesting. Of course the decision should come down to those commanders on the ground, but generally I do not see US planners being to aggressive in the sense that they would risk gambling a large portion of their or Ukrainian combat power unless it was worth it.

It seems like the Ukrainians are going for infiltration and the bite & hold strategy, which is not a bad call considering they probably want to try and maintain the initiative well into the winter.

It gels with reports of western trainers and advisers severely underestimating the extent of Russian minefields and fortifications.

Ukraine lacks air superiority and is short on specialized breaching equipment, so a combined arms assault against deep mine fields and heavy fortifications backed up by rotary wing aviation would likely have ended badly.

Instead it seems, the AFU is taking advantage of the fact that while well built, the Russian fortifications are reportedly severely undermanned and undersupplied. Ukraine also appears to be aggressively using its advantage in artillery range and precision to pick off enemy artillery.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 19:58

WarpedLichen: Aug 14, 2008

https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2023/08/17/russia-iran-drone-shahed-alabuga/

Interesting read from the the Washington Post about leaked documents about the Russian Shahed production. Previously I had posted an analysis of a downed drone showing a redesign to use Russian parts for the GPS. The behind the scenes look goes more in depth:

quote:

Under the deal, the new documents show, Tehran agreed to sell Moscow what is effectively a franchise, with Iranian specialists sharing project documentation, locally produced or reverse-engineered components, and know-how. A document created in February by the project�s chief manager details the parameters of the effort and estimates the cost for some aspects of the project to be 151 billion rubles, more than $2 billion at the exchange rate at the time. Under agreements reached earlier, more than half of that sum was to go to Iran, which insisted on being paid in dollars or gold because of the volatility of the ruble, the individual who provided the documents said.

quote:

The documents identify the sourcing of components required to build the Shahed-136 as an immediate challenge, after Western restrictions disrupted Russian access to foreign-produced electronics.

A detailed inventory, based on data provided to the Russians by Tehran, shows that over 90 percent of the drone system�s computer chips and electrical components are manufactured in the West, primarily in the United States. Only four of the 130 electronic components needed to build the drone are made in Russia, according to the document.

The research team led by Albright and Burkhard noted that none of the required items appears to be exclusively for use in military drones, and none is listed as a sensitive technology that is subject to export controls by the U.S. Commerce Department. The components would, however, fall under a near-blanket ban the United States recently imposed on the export of electronics to Russia, the team said.

Scarce components

The documents identify the sourcing of components required to build the Shahed-136 as an immediate challenge, after Western restrictions disrupted Russian access to foreign-produced electronics.

A detailed inventory, based on data provided to the Russians by Tehran, shows that over 90 percent of the drone system�s computer chips and electrical components are manufactured in the West, primarily in the United States. Only four of the 130 electronic components needed to build the drone are made in Russia, according to the document.

The research team led by Albright and Burkhard noted that none of the required items appears to be exclusively for use in military drones, and none is listed as a sensitive technology that is subject to export controls by the U.S. Commerce Department. The components would, however, fall under a near-blanket ban the United States recently imposed on the export of electronics to Russia, the team said.

The flight-control unit, used to pilot the drone, comprises 21 separate electronic components manufactured by the Dallas-based company Texas Instruments. At least 13 electronic components manufactured by the Massachusetts-based company Analog Devices are present in all of the drone�s major circuit boards, including an accelerometer critical for the craft�s operation that allows the UAV to navigate along a preprogrammed route if the GPS signal is lost.

One document highlights the need to develop a supply channel for various American components, including a Kintex-7 FPGA, a processor used in the drone�s navigation and communication system, made by a company that was acquired last year by California-based AMD. Without elaborating, another spreadsheet notes the domestic availability of Western-made components inside Russia and lists U.S.-based electronics distributors Mouser and DigiKey as potential suppliers.

AMD, DigiKey, Texas Instruments and Analog Devices told The Post that they comply with all U.S. sanctions and global export regulations and work to ensure that the products they make or distribute are not diverted to prohibited users. Mouser did not respond to requests for comment.

quote:

Other components proved harder to obtain. Documents highlighted a problem that perpetually plagues Russian military production: the lack of a capable domestic engine industry. The Shahed-136 is powered by a reverse-engineered German Limbach Flugmotoren L550E engine, which Iran illicitly obtained two decades ago.

To reach the final stage of the project, Russia would have to come up with its own version of the engine, which engineers described in internal documents as their most complex task. A spreadsheet created by a senior engineer on Nov. 5, titled �Questions asked to Iran at the very beginning of cooperation,� listed a request for a copy of the engine as �the most important point.�

�Better two: one to take apart, and after the chemical analysis it will not be functional; the second one is for comparative tests. The propeller is also needed for testing,� the engineer wrote. �We�ll copy it too.�

Fun read, but I think it presents more evidence on what gives Russia (and other sanctioned nations) trouble in manufacturing. They are reliant on foreign electronics but are using low grade commercial parts to evade sanctions. I don't think a domestic chip design/production will spring up anytime soon. The engine/prop part I'm pretty surprised about. I guess we know Russian tanks have had issues with their engines, so I guess its a fairly far reaching problem?

# ? Aug 18, 2023 19:59

Djarum: Apr 1, 2004; by vyelkin

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4158312-us-approves-delivery-f16s-ukraine/

quote:

The U.S. has approved the transfer of F-16s to Ukraine from the Netherlands and Denmark, according to officials from both countries, finally agreeing to send a long-asked-for advanced warplane to Ukrainian troops.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken earlier this week signaled his approval for the transfer in a letter to Dutch and Danish leaders. Although Denmark and Netherlands own the aircraft, the planes are made in the U.S., and deliveries must be approved by Washington.

It is a major step forward for Ukraine, which has asked for the jets since the beginning of the war more than a year ago.

Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister Wopke Hoekstra on Friday thanked Blinken �for the good and swift cooperation� on the approval of the jets.

�This marks a major milestone for Ukraine to defend its people and its country,� Hoekstra wrote on X, the platform formerly known as Twitter.

For now, the decision has opened the door to allowing the two European countries to send the prized fighter jets to Ukraine, with more exact details expected to come later.

Delivery of the aircraft and arrival on the battlefield could take months. Ukrainian pilots still need to train on the F-16s. But now, Kyiv could deploy the aircraft sooner than next spring or summer, as had been feared.

Danish officials will turn over the F-16s after getting more advanced F-35 aircraft this fall. The first four F-35s are expected to be delivered Oct. 1.

U.S. officials long argued the F-16s were not needed in the current phase of the war against Russia, rebuffing numerous requests from Kyiv since early 2022.

Ukraine operates aging, Soviet-era aircraft, and it is outgunned by Russia in the skies. Ukrainian officials have said advanced aircraft could help turn the tide of a slow-going counteroffensive in the southeast.

In May, President Biden said European allies would train Ukrainian pilots on the fighter jets, marking a reversal in the stance. A coalition of 11 allies agreed at a major NATO summit in July to begin training Ukrainian pilots in August, which is expected to begin soon.

Danish Defense Minister Kasja Ollongren said Friday the U.S. approval now �allows us to follow through on the training of Ukrainian pilots.�
�We remain in close contact with European partners to decide on the next steps,� Ollongren wrote on X.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 20:19

Tomn: Aug 23, 2007; And the angel said unto him
"Stop hitting yourself. Stop hitting yourself."
But lo he could not. For the angel was hitting him with his own hands

With regards to the offensive, it might be worth keeping some perspective in mind - at the beginning of the war, the general opinion was that Ukraine was doomed to total defeat and occupation and eternal guerrilla war. Afterwards, it became clear that Ukraine could keep from total occupation but it seemed like it was doomed to being slowly ground down as Russia conducted slow but steady advances over time - whether Russia could keep it up indefinitely was unknown but it didn't seem like there was any trend possible but downwards. The fact that Ukraine is in a position to conduct any offensives at all is a hell of an upgrade from the prognosis early on, and demonstrates that the contest is a lot more even than anyone would have believed early on. It's going to take a fair bit more trying, and possibly some more failed offensives before we can safely claim that nothing will change forevermore I think.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 20:43

Kchama: Jul 25, 2007

TheDeadlyShoe posted:

2 months is just a long time for an offensive, particularly an armored offensive. To put it in perspective, Russia invaded on Feb 24th and essentially declared its assault in Kyiv a failure by the end of March.

2 months is not a very long time for an offensive. To put it in perspective, the reason why Russia declared its Kyiv assault a failure by the end of March isn't because they were still grinding away, but because they had been defeated outright and forced to withdraw entirely. So it's not a very good example of how long an offensive takes, because it was outright defeated quickly.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 21:50

EasilyConfused: Nov 21, 2009; one strong toad

Ms Adequate posted:

That's a fair point, although I suppose the counter would be that in the very early hours of the war that wasn't an entirely unfair belief. Like, things might have gone differently if Russia had hit an early objective like taking Antonov Airport, or they had managed to capture Zelensky. But once the initial strikes were repelled and Ukraine got their defense stiffened, it was always clear that the only way the war ends in a hurry was if Putin decided it did, and he clearly wasn't about to order that.

Totally agree there, I was speaking specifically of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 22:10

EasilyConfused: Nov 21, 2009; one strong toad

Vox Nihili posted:

The summer offensive has been more or less a failure for a few reasons. First, because Uklraine had to default to this new strategy focused on infantry assaults and attrition after losing a bunch of valuable Western kit attempting to do mechanized maneuvers that just didn't work. Second, because they aren't presently close to taking or retaking any significant cities or otherwise valuable positions, they have instead been assaulting areas around the exact same handful of tiny villages for months. Third, because they have yet to break through or even reach the primary Russian lines between them and the meaningful objectives, such as Tokmak, that they are targeting. Basically, they accumulated a bunch of equipment and men and haven't actually moved the lines with them. It has the same general feeling of the preceding Russian offensives where huge bombardments and major mechanized forces were thrown into the pot to take single fields or half of a small town at a time.

Targeting and destroying Russian logistics hubs, command centers, artillery, etc. is all well and good but that's not an offensive push, it's attrition warfare. It isn't yet clear if continuing with that strategy of attrition will actually result in retaking strategically significant positions.

The offensive isn't over, so I don't think it's fair to call it failure. It they don't make significant improvements in the next month or two it certainly will be an overall failure though.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 22:17

kemikalkadet: Sep 16, 2012

TheDeadlyShoe posted:

2 months is just a long time for an offensive, particularly an armored offensive. To put it in perspective, Russia invaded on Feb 24th and essentially declared its assault in Kyiv a failure by the end of March.

The Kherson offensive started in late August and Russia was cleared out of the right bank in mid November. People look back on that as a rousing success but it was an attritional slog for a long time.

edit:
Start
https://twitter.com/jimsciutto/status/1564206149783650304

End
https://twitter.com/sternenko/status/1591058326624010244

kemikalkadet fucked around with this message at 22:22 on Aug 18, 2023

# ? Aug 18, 2023 22:20

ChubbyChecker: Mar 25, 2018

when does general mud usually strike?

# ? Aug 18, 2023 22:24

EasilyConfused: Nov 21, 2009; one strong toad

kemikalkadet posted:

The Kherson offensive started in late August and Russia was cleared out of the right bank in mid November. People look back on that as a rousing success but it was an attritional slog for a long time.

edit:
Start
https://twitter.com/jimsciutto/status/1564206149783650304

End
https://twitter.com/sternenko/status/1591058326624010244

The Kharkiv offensive was the rousing success.

The Kherson offensive was important and necessary, but I wouldn't call it a rousing success.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 22:29

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

Kchama posted:

2 months is not a very long time for an offensive. To put it in perspective, the reason why Russia declared its Kyiv assault a failure by the end of March isn't because they were still grinding away, but because they had been defeated outright and forced to withdraw entirely. So it's not a very good example of how long an offensive takes, because it was outright defeated quickly.

It is a long time for an all out offensive across multiple fronts over lots of territory, though. But the current operation has been sluggish systematic clearing of obstacles and causing pain to Russian troops in the way in a few locations. Little advance means logistics has had no trouble keeping up. Limited frontages means that few units have been committed at a time.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 22:29

jaete: Jun 21, 2009; Nap Ghost

So as I understand it Ukraine is getting closer to the first major Russian defensive line, which is just before Tokmak. What would be the Ukrainian plan for if/when they breach the first line? Defensive lines like this are probably more vulnerable from the rear; would Ukraine try to breach and then go around, to clear out the defenses from a longer stretch of the front? But Tokmak and also the second Russian line (and all kinds of other towns etc) are pretty close to the first line so I'm not sure such maneuvering would be feasible in that space.

The major obstacle so far has been minefields, but I would guess right now there aren't that many mines inside the defensive lines, which should enable easier maneuvering in theory.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 22:35

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

jaete posted:

So as I understand it Ukraine is getting closer to the first major Russian defensive line, which is just before Tokmak. What would be the Ukrainian plan for if/when they breach the first line? Defensive lines like this are probably more vulnerable from the rear; would Ukraine try to breach and then go around, to clear out the defenses from a longer stretch of the front? But Tokmak and also the second Russian line (and all kinds of other towns etc) are pretty close to the first line so I'm not sure such maneuvering would be feasible in that space.

The major obstacle so far has been minefields, but I would guess right now there aren't that many mines inside the defensive lines, which should enable easier maneuvering in theory.

That remains to be seen. It's not like either side will tell us just how good or dire the situation is for them, because that would help their enemy. I would expect there to be more mine fields, but how extensive? And how willing are the defenders to stay in trenches taking cluster munitions to face? How many fresh troops does Ukraine have and can they keep the artillery superiority in the area? Does Russia have useful reserves that can be thrown once more unto the breach? These are questions that we can't answer yet.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 22:49

Kchama: Jul 25, 2007

Nenonen posted:

It is a long time for an all out offensive across multiple fronts over lots of territory, though. But the current operation has been sluggish systematic clearing of obstacles and causing pain to Russian troops in the way in a few locations. Little advance means logistics has had no trouble keeping up. Limited frontages means that few units have been committed at a time.

I mean you just explained why the offensive taking a long time makes sense, success or failure. It's not a blitzkreig or some other kind of lightning assault. Attacks into heavily prepared defenses are going to take a long time, and Russia had a long time to make it VERY fortified. See: Russia's offensive against Bahkmut took nearly a year, though calling it a successful offensive despite taking the city is debatable.

Vox Nihili posted:

Targeting and destroying Russian logistics hubs, command centers, artillery, etc. is all well and good but that's not an offensive push, it's attrition warfare. It isn't yet clear if continuing with that strategy of attrition will actually result in retaking strategically significant positions.

"All these aspects of an offensive being done together in support of an offensive" not being 'an offensive' is a pretty silly thing to post.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 22:49

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

Kchama posted:

I mean you just explained why the offensive taking a long time makes sense, success or failure. It's not a blitzkreig or some other kind of lightning assault. Attacks into heavily prepared defenses are going to take a long time, and Russia had a long time to make it VERY fortified. See: Russia's offensive against Bahkmut took nearly a year, though calling it a successful offensive despite taking the city is debatable.

Well, yes... that was the point I was making.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 22:57

socialsecurity: Aug 30, 2003

I think the general back and forth nit picking about whether an offensive we know very very little about is pointless, none of us are qualified to determine how successful this is or should be even if we did somehow know everything that was happening.

# ? Aug 18, 2023 23:11

EggsAisle: Dec 17, 2013; I get it! You're, uh...

For me, this really shows the disparity between offensive and defensive operations. Spamming minefields and covering them with heavy weapons isn't anything innovative, complicated, or particularly high-tech, but you need to invest a disproportionately high amount of offensive resources ( troops, materiel, planning) to overcome it. As I understand it, the solution is to comprehensively smash all those heavy weapons so that the sappers can clear routes, but there's not an easy way for the Ukrainians to do that, so they have to resort to the hard way instead. Which is, indeed, very hard. Is that about the state of things?

# ? Aug 18, 2023 23:48

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# ? Jun 1, 2024 17:41

SaTaMaS: Apr 18, 2003

EggsAisle posted:

For me, this really shows the disparity between offensive and defensive operations. Spamming minefields and covering them with heavy weapons isn't anything innovative, complicated, or particularly high-tech, but you need to invest a disproportionately high amount of offensive resources ( troops, materiel, planning) to overcome it. As I understand it, the solution is to comprehensively smash all those heavy weapons so that the sappers can clear routes, but there's not an easy way for the Ukrainians to do that, so they have to resort to the hard way instead. Which is, indeed, very hard. Is that about the state of things?

Ukraine can make slow, steady progress using drone directed artillery to smash the heavy weapons, but that will require more shells and time than anyone wants to say out loud.

# ? Aug 19, 2023 00:06

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Debate & Discussion > War in Ukraine CE: The Golf War

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