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Kchama posted:Maybe in the very short term, but the long-term is an entirely different matter. I'd like to point out that at least 8 of those CVGs are stationed in the US. So if they get wind that China is doing something (which they will, it is VERY difficult to hide troop buildup on the scale needed to do anything, and it takes quite a long time to do it), then the US will have time to redeploy its assets. I'm not sure why you think that the US hasn't spent a massive amount of money on preparations, though. That's kind of the point of those 750 bases and dozen carrier groups. Half of the carriers are getting maintenance at any given time, so it's not like the US can put all of them in the western pacific at once.
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Sep 5, 2023 20:39
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wins32767 posted:Half of the carriers are getting maintenance at any given time, so it's not like the US can put all of them in the western pacific at once. There's roughly six Super-Carriers and 5 helo-carriers groups that appear to be available for deployment, which is actually more than I expected.
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Sep 5, 2023 20:52
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though i do agree, a lot of the US' military expenditure is just "maintain a genuinely global footprint to fight anyone, anywhere" á la the british empire circa 1890 - china's focus is more limited, and so the question is how long that global US reach extends into china's more limited area of focus. china's not going to be making aggressive patrols off of florida keys any time soon, after all.
V. Illych L. fucked around with this message at 21:03 on Sep 5, 2023 |
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Sep 5, 2023 21:00
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Kchama posted:Maybe in the very short term, but the long-term is an entirely different matter. I'd like to point out that at least 8 of those CVGs are stationed in the US. So if they get wind that China is doing something (which they will, it is VERY difficult to hide troop buildup on the scale needed to do anything, and it takes quite a long time to do it), then the US will have time to redeploy its assets. I'm not sure why you think that the US hasn't spent a massive amount of money on preparations, though. That's kind of the point of those 750 bases and dozen carrier groups. Kchama posted:There's roughly six Super-Carriers and 5 helo-carriers groups that appear to be available for deployment, which is actually more than I expected. The United States is big you realize? Are they all stationed out of California/Hawaii or are some by New Jersey and need to go through the Canal or around the other way? The Pacific ocean is also pretty big. Also not all of those bases are likewise anywhere near China, but in Western Europe, in South America, in the continental US, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean (also big and not near China). Essentially anything docked in the continental US, especially in Norfolk is effectively not going to be in the fight. It's also questionable how many of those carriers currently stated US-side, could be deployed; I think its a bit presumptuous to assume they are all available to be deployed if the order is given. The US Navy for example, and other regional commands might insist on some carriers being held in reserve in case of more pressing/urgent matters. And this is even assuming the US reacts swiftly and decisively and doesn't dither before doing so. It's a bit presumptuous to assume the US would activate all available assets and immediately commit them even if intelligence seems clear that China is mobilizing. But all of that doesn't matter though, the point and the original claim is that the Chinese can devote a larger share of their overall military (and this only increases every year) to a potential conflict with the US, suppose over Taiwan, but it could be over anything near and dear to their interests; than the US can devote at basically any given time. As per a previous example if suddenly a fire fight broke out between a passing CVG and the PLA in the SCS, the other carriers aren't going to be there, the battle will be over and the battlefield will move back to the diplomacy table. This talk about CVG's seems to me to be a bit of a pivot, because even if the US could deploy a majority of their cvgs (and I doubt this) to a conflict with China, that is still not a majority of the US's military might. Its a significant aspect of it, and quite the challenge; but it isn't like the entire perfectly spherical Chinese military fighting a perfectly spherical US military on an open field. I had only mentioned the US's carrier fleets in passing as part of a broader point; this is missing the forest for the (fairly substantial) trees. Kchama posted:But this seems a step back from the "they could potentially have a superior military" and shifting to "... they might be able to give the US a run for its money." Also I'm not sure what you're saying with your last sentence, can you quote who is making this claim? I did Ctrl+F on the past few pages and I don't see it, are you sure you're not misinterpreting someone's argument or taking something out of context? I think even if one poster made this claim, I don't see it as being the majority consensus claim, so I'm not sure why you're arguing against it as if its a claim shared by many?
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Sep 5, 2023 21:50
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Raenir Salazar posted:The United States is big you realize? Are they all stationed out of California/Hawaii or are some by New Jersey and need to go through the Canal or around the other way? The Pacific ocean is also pretty big. Also not all of those bases are likewise anywhere near China, but in Western Europe, in South America, in the continental US, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean (also big and not near China). Essentially anything docked in the continental US, especially in Norfolk is effectively not going to be in the fight. I mean, I kind of already stated how many appear to be deployable currently. And yeah, it'd take time to deploy them but the US would have a pretty good idea that China was doing something that required them to redeploy assets. Troop build-up takes a long time and is very visible. It's very hard to hide. This person stated it directly: The Artificial Kid posted:When you take into account purchasing power and the range of possible values for wastage on either side, spending of one third on the Chinese side could at least theoretically equate to a better military. which is what the discussion was about. China could have a better military. Which is not impossble, as nothing is, but extremely implausible with current information. But that's why I said the topic has gone from "China could have a better military due to PPP" to "China could give the US military a run for its money in a pretty limited engagement on the US's end".
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Sep 5, 2023 22:12
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I think it is interesting we’re at the point where it’s even mildly ambiguous if China has a better military, though. Not even 10 years ago these forums were laughing at the very idea they’d be able to create a workable carrier (come to think of it, just when is this thread title from lol), whereas now they’ve clearly moved much further than just that. Decades are long and any definitive prediction is something we make at our own peril, especially if Xi suddenly has a stroke tomorrow or something.
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Sep 5, 2023 22:28
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What is known about the PLA's training and readiness? All the fanciest equipment in the world is useless if the organization and people operating them aren't up to the task.
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Sep 5, 2023 22:47
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Mustang posted:What is known about the PLA's training and readiness? All the fanciest equipment in the world is useless if the organization and people operating them aren't up to the task. They apparently put into place reforms in 2016 because their training was apparently quite hazardous and of poor quality, according to an actual PLA soldier. The new (in 2016) premier sought to change that. I haven't found any information on how that went though.
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Sep 5, 2023 23:05
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Mustang posted:What is known about the PLA's training and readiness? All the fanciest equipment in the world is useless if the organization and people operating them aren't up to the task. The framing I'm getting from the folks I know on the front lines is that even as recent as 5 or 10 years ago, Chinese training exercises and developmental work-ups were pretty lackadaisical affairs, more concerned with the PR and politics involved than actual readiness. But that has done a massive 180 in the last few years. They've seemed to realize their biggest liability is their lack of actual combat experience and operational hours on their new platforms. And it is something they're now pounding into their operators' heads that they're automatically going to be working with a disadvantage against any near-peer. The best teacher is always going to be actual combat and strategic planning for major operations: Something they've yet to really experience. Of course, that's all second-hand. No one is going to know, particularly the PLA, until the bullets start flying.
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Sep 5, 2023 23:08
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Raenir Salazar posted:The United States is big you realize? Are they all stationed out of California/Hawaii or are some by New Jersey and need to go through the Canal or around the other way? The Pacific ocean is also pretty big. Also not all of those bases are likewise anywhere near China, but in Western Europe, in South America, in the continental US, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean (also big and not near China). Essentially anything docked in the continental US, especially in Norfolk is effectively not going to be in the fight. While I agree with the majority of your points, that last bit is highly dependent on how you define "in the fight." A CVN deployed out of Norfolk can reach the SCS in just over two weeks. They wouldn't have their screen with them but could easily link up with CRUDES out of Pearl or San Diego.
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Sep 5, 2023 23:15
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I mean the CEO of rayethon said there's no way they can decouple from China so that seems to solve the entire debate right there, they win.
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Sep 5, 2023 23:22
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nah military force is a matter of relative leverage. even if us military supply chains would be hosed without china, the actually-existing US military is a formidable stick to wave around. what raytheon is saying is that in the event of an actual war, a lot of stuff would have to be nationalised, dropped or massively subsidised. i don't think it would be a problem for very long, simply because i think the mushroom clouds would start rising the moment someone started seriously losing
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Sep 5, 2023 23:26
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AlternateNu posted:While I agree with the majority of your points, that last bit is highly dependent on how you define "in the fight." A CVN deployed out of Norfolk can reach the SCS in just over two weeks. They wouldn't have their screen with them but could easily link up with CRUDES out of Pearl or San Diego. I feel like depending on the specifics of the scenario, 2 weeks is too far out. If the war were to drag out like the Ukraine conflict, sure; but if it ends in like 72 hours that's basically a fait accompli. Kchama posted:I mean, I kind of already stated how many appear to be deployable currently. And yeah, it'd take time to deploy them but the US would have a pretty good idea that China was doing something that required them to redeploy assets. Troop build-up takes a long time and is very visible. It's very hard to hide. There's some implicit assumptions underlying your argument here that need upacking; where you assume they would all be deployable, and in time to make a meaningful contribution to a conflict, if the US manages to detect a build up, and if the US makes that decision to deploy them immediately, each of these steps is worth examining more close. That they might not, or it may not be possible; for the reasons I've alluded to. Sending the entire reserve could be disastrous, as it leaves the US dangerously spread thin in other theaters so its definitely going to hold something back no matter the circumstance; and this also takes it as a given that the US would send everything it has in the tank to defend Taiwan which also isn't a given. Additionally there's some assumptions happening here that the build up is akin to something like Russia's build up along the border with Ukraine, when instead it could be something more gradual, like just gradually building new ships which brings up the strength of the Eastern Theater Command. Because a gradual enough build up would make it seem like America is escalating things with hasty deployments. Also going by historical precedent China has experience in surprising the US military.  But anyways the point I made you seem to be responding to was: quote:If the US has 14 CVGs most of those are going to be useless if they can't be deployed until poo poo has hit the fan and its too late. Same for most of the US military and airforce; not all of the US's places can be devoted and on standby to engage China, and only so many can be hurriedly moved there in time if things escalate. "Well actually it looks like around 6 can be deployed..." Doesn't really seem to me on its face refutes my argument. Because for one this is a relatively small part of my overall argument which your respond isn't addressing. And for two you basically concede here that some proportion of the US's CVs aren't going to be available; and then for three, you don't respond to the point about everything else I mentioned even in just this paragraph, you just respond to the bit about the carriers? quote:This person stated it directly: I assumed they meant to say that "In some aspects in the context of a regional conflict", but they can clarify their own argument themselves. But if they made the argument you indicate then I wouldn't agree with it, except in some hypothetical far away timetable, but in the near time the more reasonable argument is that China could hypothetically challenge the US in a local conflict where it has the homefield advantage essentially for the reasons I've given. In any case I've been very clear what argument I'm making. Kchama posted:They apparently put into place reforms in 2016 because their training was apparently quite hazardous and of poor quality, according to an actual PLA soldier. The new (in 2016) premier sought to change that. I haven't found any information on how that went though. I've pointed this out before but I caution taking anything like this with a grain of salt. While I don't doubt that overall the US has better training, but the PLA has been reforming everything top-down since basically the 1970s; and any anecdotal experience of a specific soldier especially if its only second or third hand information is probably not actually generalizable. Sometimes primary sources aren't great for actually analyzing things on a systemic basis; and of course things are always changing. Raenir Salazar fucked around with this message at 00:02 on Sep 6, 2023 |
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Sep 5, 2023 23:51
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Raenir Salazar posted:I feel like depending on the specifics of the scenario, 2 weeks is too far out. If the war were to drag out like the Ukraine conflict, sure; but if it ends in like 72 hours that's basically a fait accompli. You should probably not assume things then, as they made stated no such narrow restriction, and it doesn't really flow from the "Their military might be superior because of PPP and wastage". The rest of your argument doesn't really need any more reply than I already gave. If China does the preparations for an assault or invasion of Taiwan, then the US isn't going to be caught unaware, because those preparations take an extremely long time and are obvious. That gives the US time to prepare themselves. I even looked up exactly how many fleets are potentially deployable. Would they all be deployed? No, but it isn't like China's carriers are particularly intimidating right now. Their indigenous modern supercarrier isn't ready to deploy just yet and the other two are modified Soviet designs of unknown quality. Even if the US can only deploy a CVG and a helo-carrier group immediately, that's rough parity. The Ronald Regan is in Japan so it is likely the one that'd be called in, and three others are in San Diego and seem to be available for potential deployment. The rest seem to be under maintenance, repairs, or in Norfolk which does not seem conductive to getting to China quickly. Also Russia's buildup for Ukraine WAS gradual. Literally almost a year, as build-up began in March of 2021 and the invasion didn't happen until February. Massing the kind of ships and troops needed for a successful invasion is easily noticed, and the longer things take, the more easily noticed it is. It's not like people didn't notice Russia's build up. As for training... That kind of assertion is pretty meaningless, don't you think? Everyone has basically been reforming since the 1970s because that was 50 years ago. And considering that the state of China's training was a big enough issue that the new premier promised to do a new reformation, it probably wasn't great as of 2016. But that's why I said "I don't know how it is currently" because I don't. Not a lot of information.
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Sep 6, 2023 00:41
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Benagain posted:I mean the CEO of rayethon said there's no way they can decouple from China so that seems to solve the entire debate right there, they win. This is the key point. Who cares about a US embargo on China when a Chinese embargo on the US would be a way bigger deal? The move to financialization and globalization means that the US is UNABLE to produce a huge, huge chunk of things by itself right now. It's hard to even know how long it would take for all of that to spin up, but our capacity for building poo poo is at the point where Apple could barely build a desktop PC here because our light machining sector is so dead that they had to order stuff like specialized screws from China in order to find a place with the capacity to make enough of them in a reasonable time frame. Letting private equity buy up factories and tooling and send them overseas is one of the worse strategic moves possible for warfare and it happened without much fanfare from any of our politicians. Right now, the US can still make microprocessors (the heart of many of our weapons, especially newer ones), but that's primarily through Intel and they're stuck on 5 nm technology. Not super backward yet, but the cutting edge stuff is currently coming out of Taiwan. All of this is unlikely to be a problem for something small scale like a fight over Taiwan, but even that could go bad if it drug out for a long time. Especially because the phone upgrade treadmill and a lot of other consumer goods that salve middle-class anger would go away without trade with China.
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Sep 6, 2023 01:59
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 https://www.tomshardware.com/news/chinese-netizens-mock-us-sanctions-following-huawei-chip-breakthrough quote:Chinese social media users are having fun teasing the U.S. government and the (in)effectiveness of its technology sanctions on chipmaking equipment. U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo has been a particular target, as her visit to China coincided with the Huawei Mate 60 Pro launch, a smartphone packing new cutting-edge Chinese technology that was produced exclusively by heavily sanctioned Chinese chipmaker SMIC. https://twitter.com/China4Tech/status/1698967668404133930
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Sep 6, 2023 17:12
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If they are no longer using those components, then isnt that the intended outcome?
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Sep 6, 2023 17:31
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Dandywalken posted:If they are no longer using those components, then isnt that the intended outcome? no, the intended outcome was delaying or damaging chinas domestic manufacturing capability
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Sep 6, 2023 17:34
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Dandywalken posted:If they are no longer using those components, then isnt that the intended outcome? The intended outcome was to restrict/delay access to the tech and capabilities that those components enabled (like 5G in mobiles for example).
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Sep 6, 2023 17:37
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You can argue that the sanctions mostly succeeded on doing that. But they also essentially forced China to go all in as far as developing completely indigenous solutions to circumvent the effect of said sanctions on its industry. Whether that strategy will bear fruit or not, remains to be seen.
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Sep 6, 2023 17:43
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Mr Lanternfly posted:
Huawei has been using Kirin chips in their phones for a decade. https://www.huaweicentral.com/heres-when-huawei-kirin-chipset-began-its-journey/ how is this even newsworthy that a Huawei phone is made with a kirin and (whatever related camera)?
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Sep 6, 2023 19:22
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notwithoutmyanus posted:Huawei has been using Kirin chips in their phones for a decade. https://www.huaweicentral.com/heres-when-huawei-kirin-chipset-began-its-journey/ The chips are made in China, not Taiwan.
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Sep 6, 2023 19:41
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The blockade was to delay China's access to higher density, smaller nodes which as far as I can tell is still effective. At this point 7nm is 4 to 5 years old and there's been no concrete proof as to the kirin actually being what it claims to be.
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Sep 8, 2023 11:16
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An anti-bearish case: https://twitter.com/nat_sperber/status/1700471261368115298 A counterpoint is that Chinese policy authorities did agree with Krugman's forecast, which is exactly why they responded with massive stimulus to the property market The mistake, I think, is to focus on Western commentators in a silo absent Chinese ones. e.g. why has China embraced the 'dual circulation' since 2020, or why has it felt a need to trim not-high-quality-development infrastructure of late. Sperber surely knows that the Chinese programmatic outlook parallels the Western financial-press outlook, so why misrepresent it to the reader? Why neglect e.g. the subtle difference between the insurgent Pettis thesis in the Western financial press and the Chinese financial press's own fascination with the 资产负债表衰退 balance-sheet recession thesis? I do agree with the conclusion, oddly (the most likely outcome is just slowing growth; the main stakeholder to be upset by that outcome is of course China's own 2035 targets), but the reasoning seems misplaced
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Sep 9, 2023 15:47
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I think it shows an interesting lack of self awareness for a writer to complain about writers being preoccupied with the financial industry other than "real economy" when "real economy" in this case is measured by GDP. which itself is sorta a flawed metric for a country's productivity that everybody continues to use anyway. Interesting read anyway.
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Sep 9, 2023 16:43
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Apropos (column in English): https://twitter.com/MishGEA/status/1701072005276041278 Supply side bias is stronk
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Sep 11, 2023 06:10
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Regarding those new Huawei phones, here is a great summary video by Asianometry. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-KrdcTsScKk
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Sep 13, 2023 17:57
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I'm not versed enough to actually comment on this, but it seems interesting coming right on the heels of the foreign minister stuff... https://www.ft.com/content/d0fa10c5-303c-4129-8283-a147639f70b3
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Sep 15, 2023 04:57
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New article on the balloon story: The bizarre secret behind China's spy balloon quote:It was surely the most bizarre crisis of the Biden administration: America's top-of-the-line jet fighters being sent up to shoot down, of all things, a balloon – a Chinese spy balloon that was floating across the United States, which had the nation and its politicians in a tizzy. So the stance appears to be that: - It didn't intentionally fly over the US - It didn't have the capability to manuever against the winds that pushed it over the US - It never transmitted to China while over the US - Its electronics were never on while over the US - We're still calling it a spy balloon I suppose it's entirely possible that it was a spy balloon intended for Hawaii, but at this pace I'm half-expecting them to admit that there was a radiosonde in there, 7 months from now. In any case, we should probably order sanctions on Eurus and Zephyrus for their interference at a critical diplomatic moment. Neurolimal fucked around with this message at 05:36 on Sep 18, 2023 |
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Sep 18, 2023 05:34
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There was a major weather event at the same time where the polar vortex around the north pole weakened significantly and a large amount of cold air quickly moved across Canada and the continental United States. I really think this balloon got caught in that event while it was in the Pacific or around Alaska and just got blown way off course. This was an international incident caused by climate change and the weather not being as reliable as it used to be. https://www.severe-weather.eu/global-weather/winter-season-coldest-air-january-2023-deep-freeze-snow-canada-united-states-mk/
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Sep 18, 2023 14:33
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KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih weighs forth: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwans-path-between-extremes:quote:Peace across the Taiwan Strait has always been a matter of maintaining a delicate equilibrium. My position is to further cross-strait relations based on the constitution of the Republic of China and its amendments. I support the 1992 Consensus, the approach to cross-strait dialogue agreed to by Taiwanese officials and counterparts from the mainland, consistent with the constitution. The "three Ds" seem to be the main novelty. In particular it seems to imply the "fortress Taiwan" strategy of asymmetric equipment options being inherently de-escalatory I can't help but feel that overall Beijing must feel more and more unhappy about the KMT having to increasingly burnish its anti-annexation, pro-democratic credentials to maintain relevance
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Sep 18, 2023 15:10
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I don't know if that's just politics being politics, but that statement completely contradicts itself several times. Is that just understood by everyone involved to be dog whistling or what?
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Sep 18, 2023 15:39
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Part of the issue is that none of the factions involved can really state what they want in clear terms: crudely speaking, the KMT wants to negotiate rejoining China with extensive privileges on par with Hong Kong (and their position has taken an obvious hit since Hong Kong was suppressed) while the DPP wants to be an independent country (but can't campaign on that without China throwing a tantrum). In the meantime both advocate for variations of the status quo that advance their preferred outcome. Right now, that consistently means deterring a Chinese invasion. KMT's position isn't contradictory when you consider they want closer relations with China, and eventual reunification, but with a lot of chips at the bargaining table so that they aren't just swallowed up. Having the US and Japan guarantee their special status, which the UK technically was supposed to do for HK, is part of that.
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Sep 18, 2023 15:47
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ronya posted:KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih weighs forth: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwans-path-between-extremes: If the PRC hadn't acted so harshly in Hong Kong, the KMT wouldn't be in this position in the first place. The PRC could have let soft power, international isolation and economic inevitability run its course. Showing so transparently what "two systems, one country" really meant was a wake up call for a lot of Taiwanese people who were otherwise resigned to having to become part of the People's Republic of China in the future to maintain the island's economic relevance and standard of living. KillHour posted:I don't know if that's just politics being politics, but that statement completely contradicts itself several times. Is that just understood by everyone involved to be dog whistling or what? This has been the life of Taiwanese people since 1979, if not earlier. Everyone knows there are unresolved contradictions that do not reflect the reality of the situation, but no one can fix them without a war that no one is crazy enough (for right now) to wage. Morrow posted:Part of the issue is that none of the factions involved can really state what they want in clear terms: crudely speaking, the KMT wants to negotiate rejoining China with extensive privileges on par with Hong Kong (and their position has taken an obvious hit since Hong Kong was suppressed) while the DPP wants to be an independent country (but can't campaign on that without China throwing a tantrum). In the meantime both advocate for variations of the status quo that advance their preferred outcome. Right now, that consistently means deterring a Chinese invasion. Also, given how the KMT had to be dragged kicking and screaming into allowing free elections, I'm sure the KMT would be totally okay becoming the local puppet self-governance veneer to legitimize Mainland Chinese control (akin to what has ended up happening in Hong Kong). Eric Cantonese fucked around with this message at 16:07 on Sep 18, 2023 |
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Sep 18, 2023 16:04
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nonetheless, Beijing might reasonably prefer for the KMT that expounds the unity of the Zhonghua Minzu and then loses by a landslide, to a party that promotes universal values and other denials of 中国民主制度 Chinese exceptionalist democracy and then still loses anyway a KMT local-issues strategy of picking off municipalities might be good for the KMT but condemns the mainland to likewise spending every Straits Forum appealing to an inexhaustible parade of small town subsidies ronya fucked around with this message at 16:51 on Sep 18, 2023 |
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Sep 18, 2023 16:46
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Neurolimal posted:New article on the balloon story: That's a kind of interesting statement and the intentional between the lines statement here is milley implying its control and communication transmissions were jammed (or perhaps otherwise nonfunctional, but that seems less likely). Given it's from Milley it's pretty directly intended as military signaling 'you try to spy on us, you'll get nothing and we'll steal your spy platform.' It's almost definitely getting messaged proactively because of repeated Chinese harassment of American surveillance flights and indeed that's probably the reason why they bothered to shoot the thing down, as a tit for tat thing. Herstory Begins Now fucked around with this message at 18:10 on Sep 18, 2023 |
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Sep 18, 2023 17:53
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Herstory Begins Now posted:That's a kind of interesting statement and the intentional between the lines statement here is milley implying its control and communication transmissions were jammed (or perhaps otherwise nonfunctional, but that seems less likely). Given it's from Milley it's pretty directly intended as military signaling 'you try to spy on us, you'll get nothing and we'll steal your spy platform.' It's almost definitely getting messaged proactively because of repeated Chinese harassment of American surveillance flights and indeed that's probably the reason why they bothered to shoot the thing down, as a tit for tat thing. Or, you know, it wasn't a spy balloon on a mission to surveil the continental US.
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Sep 18, 2023 19:50
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Yeah the more reasonable read of Milley is that this was a spy balloon that was probably supposed to potter about in international airspace around Hawaii hoovering up collection, and when it went off course and the spotlight of the whole world was on it China turned off the electronics rather than turn an accidental embarrassment into a deliberate diplomatic crisis.
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Sep 18, 2023 19:59
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Dante80 posted:Or, you know, it wasn't a spy balloon on a mission to surveil the continental US. There's a lot of 'it didn't' instead of 'it couldn't' in that statement, which leans a lot more heavily towards "calling it incompetent/jammed", instead of this "Oh he's saying it wasn't a spy balloon".
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Sep 18, 2023 20:25
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Alchenar posted:Yeah the more reasonable read of Milley is that this was a spy balloon that was probably supposed to potter about in international airspace around Hawaii hoovering up collection, and when it went off course and the spotlight of the whole world was on it China turned off the electronics rather than turn an accidental embarrassment into a deliberate diplomatic crisis. This is how it sounds to me but 
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