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(Thread IKs: fart simpson)
 
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stephenthinkpad
Jan 2, 2020
Lol, all DPP top leaderships are scammers, they will not go near the independent declaration with a 5 inch stick.

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fizzy
Dec 2, 2022

by Jeffrey of YOSPOS
Bad news for China - Bankers’ 40% Pay Cuts Show the China Dream Fading in Its Richest Cities. Prestigious sectors like finance — where senior bankers report compensation cuts of as much as 40% — and technology are suffering. But even the typically stable government jobs that employ vast swathes of China’s middle class are not immune. Yet China’s limited room for debt-fueled stimulus gives Xi few easy solutions.


https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-09-12/pay-cuts-in-finance-tech-threaten-xi-s-campaign-to-revive-china-economy

Bankers’ 40% Pay Cuts Show the China Dream Fading in Its Richest Cities
By Bloomberg News
September 13, 2023 at 7:30 AM GMT+8

For decades, China’s biggest cities have been home to one of the world’s greatest economic success stories: a nearly unbroken rise in living standards that lifted millions into the middle class.

That trend is now coming to a halt, creating an under-the-radar threat to President Xi Jinping’s campaign to revive growth.

Hiring salaries in Shanghai and Beijing dropped by 9% and 6% respectively in the second quarter from a year ago, Zhaopin Ltd. data compiled by Bloomberg show. It’s the biggest slump since at least 2015 and a stark contrast with government figures indicating wages rose nationwide. For many white-collar workers, the blow has been compounded by companies quietly slashing benefits including travel and meal allowances. Prestigious sectors like finance — where senior bankers report compensation cuts of as much as 40% — and technology are suffering. But even the typically stable government jobs that employ vast swathes of China’s middle class are not immune.

The risk is a downward spiral that leaves workers cutting back further on spending even as Beijing tries to restore confidence. To escape the middle-income trap and keep a lid on social unrest, authorities must work out how to create better jobs for city dwellers. Yet China’s limited room for debt-fueled stimulus gives Xi few easy solutions.

“Unless we see a steady growth in disposable income, I don’t think consumption’s going to improve in China anytime soon,” said Alicia Garcia Herrero, chief Asia Pacific economist at Natixis SA. “Everybody thinks Chinese consumers are not consuming because they feel there’s too much uncertainty, they don’t feel like it. Some people in China cannot consume.”

Conversations with 18 people employed in the private sector and the government, most of whom declined to give their full names discussing sensitive matters, illustrate a growing unease over job security and personal spending. The pain in China’s labor market goes well beyond its record youth unemployment rate. Despite growing resentment, many urban workers of all ages are willing to accept steep pay cuts, fewer frills and longer working hours just to hang on to a job.


Compensation Cuts

Salaries are under pressure on multiple fronts. After three years of costly pandemic measures, many employers are struggling to deal with a slowdown that’s straining already tight budgets. For many more affluent businesses, the bigger challenge is Xi’s sweeping “common prosperity” campaign, aimed at reining in “the disorderly expansion of capital” in the private sector.

Citic Securities Co., one of the country’s top investment banks, slashed some bankers’ basic salaries by up to 15%. Its rival China International Capital Corp. cut senior banker compensation, including bonuses, by more than 40%, Bloomberg News reported previously. CICC also instructed its bankers to fly coach and to book the cheapest “hard seats” on most trains.

Eason, a business head at a commercial bank in Shanghai, is frustrated that his pay dropped 10% last year, despite double-digit growth at the institution and strong personal performance.
“On the one hand, authorities encourage households to increase consumption, but on the other hand they call for pay cuts and limits,” he said.

“It’s not easy for financial institutions to keep salaries stable,” he added. “Once you raise pay, you’ll most likely be summoned to authorities.”

The consequences may reach much further than individual spending. One Hong Kong banker with mainland clients said that with fewer financial incentives and more emphasis on cutting risk, personal apathy is setting in and the financial industry is “lying flat.”

Benefits are also being chipped away, in finance and beyond. Chinese corporates often boost compensation with cash payments nominally aimed at improving one facet of life or another. But even these are now deemed too luxurious. This year, Eason’s bank replaced its usual summertime hot-weather subsidy with cans of Coca-Cola and sun visors.

A Shanghai-based consultant at a multinational firm said his daily meal allowance was slashed by nearly 80% to $27. Huang, a manager at a new media company in Hangzhou, said their firm had stopped paying for late-night taxi rides, ended overseas travel for team-building events and closed its second cafeteria.

“The company was aiming big for a public listing before the pandemic,” said Huang. “Now, the consensus is just trying to seize possible opportunity to survive.” They added that the firm has cut headcount by a third over the past three years and may let go of more people in the future.


Quiet Firings

Employees in the so-called new economy are suffering too.

In industries such as electric vehicles, batteries or solar and wind power, the average entry-level salary declined 3.6% to 13,755 yuan in June from a year ago, according to a private survey by Caixin Insight Group and Business Big Data Co. That’s the worst drop since at least 2015, despite double-digit growth in investments and exports. Wages declined again in August by 1.8% compared with a year earlier.

The once free-wheeling technology sector is still grappling with the fallout of the common prosperity crackdown, which has wiped out billions in market value over the past two years. While policymakers signaled an end to the clampdown in July, the industry’s prospects remain uncertain.

China’s giant tech sector cut tens of thousands of jobs in 2022 in an unprecedented wave of cost controls, and of those, the industry’s twin stars — Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. and Tencent Holdings Ltd. — let go more than 20,000 employees alone. Many laid-off workers are willing to accept up to a 50% pay cut for a new position, according to Prima Yi, a tech headhunter with Shanghai Jinfang Management Consultancy. Meanwhile, firms have become more cautious about offering pay increases and promotions to woo new candidates, she said.

Redundancies appear to be slowing, but quiet firings continue behind the scenes. One Shenzhen-based Tencent employee was asked to find a new job by her boss, who explained the human resources department would tell her next employer that she’d resigned. The strategy worked — when she took a new job with Alibaba in Beijing, she bagged a pay raise, although at 20% it was less than half the amount she’d come to expect as industry standard.


Local Government Strain

Even China’s “iron rice bowl” — jobs that typically guarantee a modest but stable paycheck for life — is showing cracks. The government is trimming a combination of bonuses, cash subsidies and base pay for many employees, according to interviews with 10 local civil servants.

As a prison officer in a city in northern Guangdong province, Jason Wu has enjoyed annual pay rises for half a decade. But his bonus has been shrinking since 2021 without any official explanation, leaving his overall compensation 15% lower. After spending most of the pandemic barred from travel – even to attend his grandmother’s funeral – and socializing, he’s dismayed.

Cuts like Jason’s are a sign of the strain on local governments as China’s property crisis deepens. Already weakened by pandemic-control costs, the massive drop in income from land sales has hit governments hard, and civil servants in poorer provinces are suffering most. In one heavily indebted northern province, an official said his overall pay had been cut by 35% while another reported his bonus had been close to zero for three years.

Some government employees have been asked to return bonuses or cash subsidies going back as far as five years. For those without savings, repayment means a drastic drop in their monthly wages. Two officials in Chengdu and Shenzhen said they’ve been told to return payments designated for alleviating the impact of extreme climate events like flooding – in addition to coping with an overall drop in salary.


Plunging Confidence

Beijing has ramped up restrictions on sensitive or unflattering information about the nation’s faltering recovery as growth has slowed, making pay cuts increasingly hard to quantify.
Liu Yuanchun, president of Shanghai University of Finance & Economics and a sometime adviser to the Politburo, is one of the few prominent Chinese economists to speak out on the issue of wages. “If we let the pay cuts become a trend, this will be very bad for the recovery of confidence and consumption,” he wrote in a May article. “We must not let the downward spiral of falling prices and income be formed.”

But wage pressures are now spilling over into broader sentiment. While nationwide salaries rose after the pandemic, confidence in the job market and incomes plunged to new lows. For the past five quarters, the Income Confidence Index — a gauge measuring near-term income expectations — has indicated an expected contraction in future income, according to the central bank’s quarterly survey published in late June. It’s a record slump in a dataset that dates back to 2001.

Some workers are considering moving out of big cities as a result.

Tech worker Li worries that gender discrimination will make her job more precarious as she approaches age 35 and thinks about starting a family. A layoff would make her Beijing mortgage impossible to manage. So she and her husband may relocate to Xi’an, giving up access to better-quality healthcare and education in return for lower living costs.

Continued urbanization is key to the economy’s transition into high-value services and production. If the promise of a better life in the big city loses its appeal, avoiding the middle-income trap only gets harder.

China’s 10 biggest cities only account for about 12% of the country’s population. And a slowdown in inflation this year — prices rose by the least in over a decade during the January-August period — may lift the living standard of those who still experience wage growth. But the spending problem will be compounded if salary stagnation spreads beyond the middle-class jobs that dominate metropolises to further deepen deflationary pressures and the property slump.

“If wage declines are happening for white-collar workers, that is quite a worrying sign with respect to the broader structural concern about economic rebalancing,” said Eli Friedman, a professor at Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations who specializes in Chinese labor politics and urbanization. To increase domestic consumption, he added, “individuals and households need to have more money and more confidence about the future.”


Older Workers

Tougher working conditions and a slowing economy risk undermining the implicit social contract in China. For decades, millions of people have accepted limited personal freedoms in exchange for a better life. Now the opportunities — for a better job, more money and the chance to buy a home guaranteed to make you richer — appear to be fading.

Under-25s are bearing the brunt of this shift. Official statistics in June showed more than one in five could not find a job, before China stopped publishing the numbers. But the data also point to tougher conditions for older workers in cities, who are hanging onto jobs for longer at a moment when they’re also expected to put in more hours.

Since 2020, the official jobless rate in 31 major cities has exceeded the national average, but unemployment among staff aged 25 to 59 reached a record low of 4.1% in May and June. Meanwhile, average working hours have hovered close to 50 a week since April – the highest level since data began in 2018.

“Older workers in big cities have become willing to accept lower wages and longer hours in order to save up and increase their sense of security,” said Gao Shanwen, chief economist at Essence Securities who has advised former premier Li Keqiang and various government agencies in the past. “This has squeezed out younger workers.”

China doesn’t permit labor unions that are independent from the Communist Party or the government, leaving workers with few opportunities to bargain with employers.


Downward Spiral

Ensuring the labor market can provide enough jobs is one of the government’s top priorities, with various measures in place to drive growth, such as expanding recruitment by state-owned enterprises.

But so far, authorities haven’t launched any significant efforts to boost wages. Household savings rose by 11.9 trillion yuan in the first eight months of this year – up 10% from a year earlier, official statistics show. That’s after savings soared 80% in 2022.

In the US, the Biden administration turned to cash handouts to boost post-pandemic consumption and confidence. But China is unlikely to follow suit. While the government has made numerous modest policy announcements to support real estate and other sectors, Xi has previously lashed out at “welfarism” as an approach that encourages “lazy people.”

For Jason Wu, it’s unclear if his paycheck will ever return to what he once considered the norm.

“No one explained to us if those bonuses will still be paid, or when they may be paid,” said Wu. “But I don’t really need them to tell me. I just need to look at how bad the economy is.”

crepeface
Nov 5, 2004

r*p*f*c*

Josef bugman posted:

Thank you very much. Also from what I've seen what would be the threads general read on Sun Yat-Sen?

he seems pretty good to me.

quote:

It is my idea to make capitalism create socialism in China so that these two economic forces of human evolution will work side by side in future civilization.

quote:

If China stood on an equal basis with other nations, she could compete freely with them in the economic field and be able to hold her own without failure. But as soon as foreign nations use political power as a shield for their economic designs, then China is at a loss how to resist or to compete successfully with them.

quote:

The government should help and guide the weak and small racial groups within its national boundaries toward self-determination and self-government. It should offer resistance to foreign aggression, and simultaneously, it should revise foreign treaties in order to restore our equality and independence among the nations.

crepeface
Nov 5, 2004

r*p*f*c*

Marzzle posted:

(from t.me/DDGeopolitics/80905, via tgsa)

“Yes, they are investing in science. India landed a lunar rover. But this does not mean that this country understands exactly what the modern world is. "

this guy eatin' good from the garbage bin of ideology

crepeface
Nov 5, 2004

r*p*f*c*

Ytlaya posted:

edit: And also the fact that any American who works in some tech-related field is fully aware of how many Chinese people there are with those skills, so they have to tell themselves that they're missing some "spark" that whitesAmericans have makes them capable of ~true innovation~.

yea it's called a soul

ModernMajorGeneral
Jun 25, 2010

fizzy posted:

A Shanghai-based consultant at a multinational firm said his daily meal allowance was slashed by nearly 80% to $27. Huang, a manager at a new media company in Hangzhou, said their firm had stopped paying for late-night taxi rides, ended overseas travel for team-building events and closed its second cafeteria.

Lol

Good job president xi, keep it up

euphronius
Feb 18, 2009

overseas travel for team building events

corona familiar
Aug 13, 2021

ModernMajorGeneral posted:

Lol

Good job president xi, keep it up

lol $135 per diem for meals in China

was this guy eating at Michelin-level restaurants for every meal? a meal at a place like https://www.tripadvisor.com/Restaurant_Review-g308272-d8261321-Reviews-Epices_Foie_Gras-Shanghai.html is like 200-500 RMB

corona familiar has issued a correction as of 04:01 on Sep 13, 2023

Some Guy TT
Aug 30, 2011


i dunno doesnt seem very practical have they invented a version that lets you give out parking tickets or cause explosions

tatankatonk
Nov 4, 2011

Pitching is the art of instilling fear.
George Magnus: Yeah, I was going to say it's a sort of a fantasy, but I think people still entertain the idea that maybe things get kind of bad enough that the government will change its direction, change its trajectory. To me, this is like asking leopards to change their spots. I just don't think that's going to happen. So these people are basically Leninists and they focus very much on a kind of production, investment, supply orientation of the economy, from which they think that trickle-down benefits will raise the quality and standard of living of the population. They do not really believe in the kinds of things that we practice in varying degrees in liberal leaning democracies, of we think social welfare is fundamentally a kind of an okay idea. We have different kind of perceptions about how far it should go, but we actually think that social safety nets are a good thing. We think that public intervention in the economy to promote consumption and low taxes is a good thing, generally speaking. For Xi Jinping, this is all somewhat alien, to be honest. He, certainly now, if not in the beginning of his term of office, certainly believes, like we do, that national security is really important, or the government is really kind of obsessed, I think with stability and with controlling risks. They're not really interested in going for growth. They're not really interested in risk taking, certainly not the kind of what they would call egregious risk taking, which we think is part of the whole process of creative destruction, et cetera. And so this controlling repressive view about how to manage the economy, which is built on a faltering model, if you see what I mean. I think this is almost like a bit of a doom loop actually.

??????

mark immune
Dec 14, 2019

put the teacher in the cope cage imo

fizzy posted:

Bad news for China - Under Xi Jinping's hardline approach, China is faced with a real estate crisis, record high youth unemployment, and massive debts at the local government level


https://www.wsj.com/podcasts/opinion-free-expression/the-china-crisis-how-bad-is-it/bf80e144-f5d6-4b59-906f-3557399edbd0

The China Crisis: How Bad is it?
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2023

FULL TRANSCRIPT
This transcript was prepared by a transcription service. This version may not be in its final form and may be updated.

Speaker 1: From the opinion pages of the Wall Street Journal, this is Free Expression, with Gerry Baker.

Gerry Baker: Hello and welcome to Free Expression, from the Wall Street Journal opinion page. I'm Gerry Baker, editor at large of the journal. Thanks very much for joining us. If you're not already a subscriber, please do sign up at Apple's Podcast, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. This week, China's crisis. How serious are the economic woes facing the People's Republic of China? Over the summer, the scale of the challenges facing Xi Jinping and the ruling Communist Party become dramatically clearer. China, remember, we're supposed to bounce back this year after its disastrously restrictive zero COVID lockdown policy, was finally lifted at the end of last year, but the recovery is really nowhere in sight. Manufacturing activities are declining, exports are falling, home prices are down, consumer prices have dropped in deflation, youth unemployment has reached record highs, financial instability stalks the country, overbuilt real estate has produced the collapse of at least one major real estate company, and is bringing down another. Massive debts at local government level are making matters worse. Things look so grim that the parties have recently deep-sixed formally publicly available economic data. So what's going on? Is this merely a glitch in China's long progression towards what many people have long argued would be its global economic ascendancy, or is there something more serious afoot? Are the structural weaknesses and contradictions in its Communist Party's led economic model now laid bare, with really serious long-term economic consequences? What does it all mean for the rest of us, particularly for US/China relations and the strategic challenge that China poses? Well, to talk about all this, this week I'm delighted to say I have with me, George Magnus. George is a longtime, very experienced and widely regarded observer of and commentator on China. He was formerly chief economist at UBS. He now writes and speaks widely as an analyst at the China Center at the University of Oxford, and a scholar at SOAS, the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. He's written several books, including one published just a few years ago, which looks both prescient and extremely germane to the discussion we're having. It's called Red Flags, Why Xi's China is in Jeopardy. And George Magnus joins me now. George, thanks very much indeed for joining Free Expression.

George Magnus: Yeah, thank you for having me.

Gerry Baker: We're looking at the state of China. There's obviously been a lot of focus on China's economy in the last couple of months. You've written widely about it, others have too. I want to get an overall sense from you on how bad things are right now. We came into this year, China had finally abandoned what seemed, everybody seemed to think was a fairly disastrous zero COVID policy and the restrictions were lifted. I think we all expected, as other economies came back after they lifted their COVID restrictions, China particularly, given the severity of the restrictions would come back strongly. Yet the slew of data we've seen, particularly over the last few months, whether it's manufacturing, whether it's unemployment, whether it's the overall level of demand, whether it's things like exports and others, seem to suggest really quite pronounced weakness. What's going on? Why is China not bouncing back as we expected?

George Magnus: Well, that's a good question. I'm sure there are a lot of people in Communist Party headquarters in Beijing who are looking at the same question. It's been a big disappointment because we thought, and I'm sure that Chinese officials thought, that once people would be allowed to congregate and mixed freely again, as we found out ourselves, there would be this kind of revenge consumption which took place as a reaction to people being shut down and forcibly restricted in residential compounds and so on, so forth. And we did see a bit of a flurry of consumption spending in restaurants, eating out, transportation, theme parks, leisure and hospitality in the beginning of the year, but it didn't touch the big areas that really account for the elephant really of consumer spending, which is housing and automobiles. And I think that this overlay of the property bust in China, which began really three years ago, I mean, it's sometimes been a bit sort of slow motion, but it began in 2020 with the imposition of balance sheet constraints and regulations on property developers. This has really been a kind of a huge downer on the Chinese economy and on the confidence of the Chinese middle class. It's not the only thing that's been disappointing, but it certainly accounts for a lot of the reasons for China's disappointing performance this year.

Gerry Baker: Let's talk about that, the problems in the real estate sector. We've seen, whatever it was, last year, a couple of years ago, we had the collapse of Evergrande, the big developer. This year, the name that's been on everybody's lips is Country Garden. There are rumors and stories about others. Again, give us some background on that. The story generally that we read is that there was massive overbuilding, hear about these ghost cities in China, that's been a story for at least a decade. Is this just the accumulation of many, many years of essentially misdirected investment, over investment in the real estate sector, building up this huge excess, this huge glut of real estate, people taking out mortgages, hear these stories sort of sight unseen buying these places which end up never being built. Tell us what's been going on in the real estate sector and what's at the root of the problem there?

George Magnus: Sure. I mean, I don't want to go too deeply into sort of way back history, but I think it's important to have some kind of appreciation for really how we came here. So obviously from the moment that or from the time when China transformed its housing welfare system into a proper residential housing market, I mean, the boom kind of set in. And from roughly the financial crisis onwards, so around about 2008, 2009, I mean, it really picked up a lot of momentum, aided and abetted by this big shift that took place in China's development model towards a kind of reliance on credit for housing and for infrastructure. And this all really began to come to, well, it didn't come to a grinding halt originally, but the whole kind of de-leveraging campaign that started off in 2017, 2018 really has had a deleterious effect, not just on the whole kind of credit system and the liabilities of financial institutions, but it's kind of shifted everything away from concern about how do banks fund themselves and what's the risk of contagion, which is something that we worried about sort of six, seven years ago, towards assets and the fact that property prices and property transactions had been artificially bolstered every time the Chinese economy got into a little bit of trouble. And so now finally, when I say now, I mean, within the last few years, Xi Jinping has basically professed this kind of mantra about housing is for living in not for speculation. And the government has really bitten the bullet as it were. I mean, I don't think they're doing this because they think it's a good idea. I think they just are frightened about the instability of rampant credit growth in the economy. But actually the fall guy, so to speak, has really been the property market, which has been, as I said, bolstered for far too long and which now is oozing excess inventory, particularly in towns and cities that most tourists never go to. These are the smaller, medium-sized cities, tier three, tier four, they call them, as administrative kind of categories, where there's a huge and chronic excess supply. So not necessarily Shenzhen or Beijing or Shanghai, but a lot of other places where prices are falling pretty quickly and where transactions volumes have collapsed.

Gerry Baker: Some people have said, compared what China's going through right now, and these analysis are always imperfect, but I want to get your sense of the scale of this and the significance of this, but some people have compared it to the Lehman Brothers collapse and the financial crisis obviously that followed that in the United States and the West in 2008. Again, there are so many differences between the economy and not least obviously the role of government, the way the government can do things in China that governments in the West and democracies can't do. Is it on that kind of a scale, the problems we're seeing in the real estate sector, is it that kind of a crisis for them?

George Magnus: Yes. I mean, the similarity of course is that property is at the center of instability that's kind of rampant in the economy, but I think beyond that, the dissimilarities are probably much greater. So when Lehman's happened and in the wake of the kind of property bust in the United States, the real estate sector was what, I mean, broadly defined, maybe eight, 9% of GDP. I mean, residential investment was probably about five or 6% of GDP and put a bit onto that for housing services and commodities and so on. So perhaps even a little bit bigger than that. But according to this now and well digested research paper that was produced by Ken Rogoff and a Chinese associate of his a couple of years ago, I mean, China's real estate sector broadly defined, is about 25, 26% of GDP. So that's bigger than Spain's was in 2007, 2006. And so losing the momentum in that sector and the demographics are terrible for China's household formation in the future and for first time buyers. So this chronic excess capacity is going to be with China for many years to come, I think, even if sales were to pick up to a moderate level in the next couple of years. But that's one dissimilarity is scale. The second dissimilarity is no big Chinese banks are going to be allowed to go bust in the way that Lehman's was. And so I think the likelihood of there being a major financial blowup in China, the like of which we experienced in 2007, 2008, I think it's not small, like infinitesimally small, but I think it's unlikely. But that doesn't mean that it's a kind of a free lunch for China. I mean, the economy and the people will pay the price of this misallocation of capital, but in a different way.

Gerry Baker: I do want to talk about the extent to which these are structural problems in the Chinese economy, as opposed to even what sounds like you're describing almost sort of a classic bubble, even though one on a very large scale, given the size of the real estate sector in the Chinese economy. But I do want to get onto that, but just very quickly, when we've seen periods of weakness in China in the past and we have seen them repeatedly over the last 10 or 15 years and including some problems in the financial sector, there's usually been a response. Central government's usually pretty reliable, big fiscal stimulus. Local governments can help out too. The People's Bank of China weighs in with easing of policy. We don't seem to be seeing that this time. So the expected stimulus response that you do get, and again, we're used to it again in the United States and in Britain elsewhere too, when you see these kinds of economic weaknesses, the Fed cuts interest rates, maybe we get a big fiscal stimulus, we don't seem to be getting that this time. What's going on there?

George Magnus: Well, we're getting something from the government because they can't sit idly by and sit on their hands and just allow this just to unfold, because the consequences of an unconstrained housing collapse I think could be disastrous. So we are seeing some reaction, but it's not the bazooka type of stimulus reaction that we have seen in the past. And that's because I think the government realizes that if they were to do this, they would actually exacerbate misallocation of capital and the eventual costs which would have to be paid in terms of losses and possibly even to financial stability. Whilst we've all been fritting about all these economic numbers that you described earlier, during the summer, I mean, mortgage rates have come down for both new mortgage owners and existing mortgage owners. There have been attempts to stoke up the stock market by cutting trading fees, for example, and by talking the market up, I mean, not always successfully. The government really thinks it's got a consumer confidence problem. So they've relaxed personal income tax allowances for families that have children or with elderly care in the family, and tried to stabilize the decline in the renminbi. So all of these things actually say that the government does know that there's a problem that needs to be addressed. And they've also accelerated local government borrowing. Local governments are in a terrible financial situation. They can't really afford, many of them, to finance the kind of social spending which they are responsible for. So many of these things are happening, and we may see some further measures during the next few weeks if rumors are correct. But we're not going to see, I don't think, this kind of heavy duty credit creation, bazooka type infrastructure stimulus, which have characterized past episodes of economic weakness. And I think that's because the government is scared really about propagating greater instability in the economy and in the financial system.

Gerry Baker: You talked about local governments, and again, that's been a notable feature of this current problems. Why are local governments so financially strapped? Is that because they've been hit hard by this real estate problems in the form of lower revenues and what's going on with local governments?

George Magnus: The proximate reason for the dire straits of local governments, and then I think people need to understand the significant role that local governments play in China, they account for the lion's share of the provision of public goods and services, but only a relatively small share of total taxed revenue. So most of the tax revenues go to Beijing, most of the spending is done by local governments. And so there is this kind of system which they have, which is not exactly like the US system of revenue sharing, but actually the Beijing government does play a role in trying to sort of even out these kinds of inconsistencies. But the proximate reason that they're in trouble is because on average, about a third of their revenues come from land sale revenues and because property prices are weak and land auctions have been canceled or have failed, they're critically short of revenues to supply or to finance the public goods and services they're supposed to supply. But the fundamental and systemic problem that China has is this severe imbalance between the spending and revenue responsibilities of local versus central governments. I mean, the United States had this kind of problem in the 19th century and it triggered at least three financial crises that I'm aware of, and eventually had to be solved or sorted out by rule of law and the appropriate responsibility defined in law. But China doesn't really have this, and Beijing likes to keep local governments on a bit of a tight leash, but something is going to have to change there because the status quo is not sustainable really.

Gerry Baker: How should we see this, George, these problems? We've all got used, in the last 20 years, to thinking of the Chinese economy as this extraordinary behemoth that's growing steadily, growing from a fraction of the size of the US economy 30 years ago to basically, certainly in terms of purchasing power parity, roughly similar size to the US economy. Obviously much smaller in terms of per capita because of the size of the population. But we've been used to seeing China as being on this trajectory of economic ascendancy. And certainly here in the United States, there've been hundreds of scholarly articles and books talking about China's century and China's inevitable rise to the economic superpower status. Should we see this as either cyclical or even if there's structural problems, maybe problems that are going to have to be resolved, will be resolved, as you say, there's going to have to be some of these imbalances in the system are going to have to be worked out. The government's going to have to figure out a better composition of demand. But we can see all of this as a kind of glitch in China's steady rise. Or does this to you, and I should say, I mentioned in my introduction, you wrote a book a couple of years ago about red flags, about the perils that China was facing. Is this something more serious than that? Is this something that actually calls into question the actual sustainability of the economic model that China has, in particular, the idea that China could achieve a level of economic success and prosperity equal to or greater than the United States with this very different economic system, does it fundamentally challenge our assumptions about China's economic trajectory?

George Magnus: I think it does, and I think if you have to kind of pin the donkey really on the person really, I think you have to say that something dramatically changed in China's governance structure and its performance metrics when Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. It's not to say that he's personally responsible for everything that's happened, because he certainly inherited imbalances and problems, headwinds, which had already kind of been blowing a little bit, I would say roughly since the financial crisis, but maybe they even predate that. But he's definitely made them worse. And obviously we don't have time to go into all the kind of thorny details, but the problems that China faces now, they're all essentially homemade. I mean, the bad external environment, export controls, constraints on technology, these things don't help, and they certainly make for a dramatically different sort of environment from the China that we experienced and watched during the last 20 or 30 years. But the domestic or the homemade made in China, problems are really, and we've alluded to them all really, I mean, we've alluded to the debt problem, which is a tax on future growth. We've alluded to the kind of rapid aging of the population. We haven't really spoken about productivity growth, which has stalled. The governance problem, particularly that of private enterprises, the message to private enterprises is certainly we want you to make money, but only if you basically align your interests with the social and political goals of the Communist Party. So there are big constraints under which private entrepreneurs and firms now operate in the shadows really of the state system, state enterprises. So for all of these reasons, I think that China faces systemic problems. I mean, we would say as external economists, should we say, but actually this is also true of some Chinese economists as well, that the model of China needs a dramatic overhaul, but it's politically extremely difficult for the Communist Party to embrace these changes because they would threaten the raison d'etre of the party, which is to rule unchallenged. So I think China's tipping point in debt and real estate and demographics, these are all very important things, but the politics really, which underlies whether it can change or not, I think is really important. And maybe under a different government in the future, things could change, but I think under Xi Jinping's government, I think it's very unlikely.

Gerry Baker: The Wall Street Journal reported just in the last week or so, we had a very interesting piece about the attitude of the Xi Jinping and his economic advisors to this, and particularly Xi Jinping, and that in particular, he seems to be actually ideologically opposed to the idea of promoting consumer-led growth, which is one of the things that has been talked about in China for a very long time, as the way for China to transition from that, from a developing economy to a more developed one, you need a much higher level of consumption as a total proportion of GDP. He seems to be not just reluctant to do that, but actually ideologically against that because he sort of sees in that kind of expressions of individuality, it elevates the individual and individual consumption tastes and the expression of the individual, he's against it. So if that's true, if that's right, that does suggest that it is almost a choice here that China's making, that it's not going to do things that could maybe assist it to transition towards a model of sustained growth, but actually that it wants to maintain this, what you've just described, the mistakes that Xi Jinping's making, he seems to be almost doubling down on them.

George Magnus: Yeah, I was going to say it's a sort of a fantasy, but I think people still entertain the idea that maybe things get kind of bad enough that the government will change its direction, change its trajectory. To me, this is like asking leopards to change their spots. I just don't think that's going to happen. So these people are basically Leninists and they focus very much on a kind of production, investment, supply orientation of the economy, from which they think that trickle-down benefits will raise the quality and standard of living of the population. They do not really believe in the kinds of things that we practice in varying degrees in liberal leaning democracies, of we think social welfare is fundamentally a kind of an okay idea. We have different kind of perceptions about how far it should go, but we actually think that social safety nets are a good thing. We think that public intervention in the economy to promote consumption and low taxes is a good thing, generally speaking. For Xi Jinping, this is all somewhat alien, to be honest. He, certainly now, if not in the beginning of his term of office, certainly believes, like we do, that national security is really important, or the government is really kind of obsessed, I think with stability and with controlling risks. They're not really interested in going for growth. They're not really interested in risk taking, certainly not the kind of what they would call egregious risk taking, which we think is part of the whole process of creative destruction, et cetera. And so this controlling repressive view about how to manage the economy, which is built on a faltering model, if you see what I mean. I think this is almost like a bit of a doom loop actually.

Gerry Baker: We're going to take a short break there, but when we come back, I'll have more with economist and China expert, George Magnus. Looking at not only the economic weakness that China's facing, but what the strategic implications of that might be. Stay with us.

Speaker 1: You're listening to Free Expression with Gerry Baker. Don't forget, you can listen to the latest episode anytime on your smart speaker. Just say, "Play the Opinion Free Expression podcast." Now, back to Gerry Baker.

Gerry Baker: Welcome back. I'm speaking with George Magnus, economist and China expert. We're talking about the current crisis facing the Chinese economy. While a great experience of Marxism and Leninism obviously in the 20th century, was the Soviet Union, which failed and failed in large part because of the simple economic dysfunction and stagnation that those top-down policies produced. Would it be only too far to think that this approach that Xi Jinping's taken could lead China in the same direction?

George Magnus: There's the 64 trillion yuan question. I mean, I'm not really in the collapse school. I think China is in a lot of trouble in terms of managing its economy in the next few years. Obviously a little bit like Japan 40 years ago. I mean, it's got great companies, it's doing incredible things in science and technology and engineering, but it's macroeconomic structure and its governance actually really isn't working. It's not fit for purpose anymore. So both of these things can be true. So I don't think China's going to collapse. It maintains a lot of controls over the economy, over people's lives, over capital movements. So I actually think they can probably keep going, but that keeping going doesn't necessarily mean that they're going to end up successfully navigating a transition to a more dynamic, sustainable economy. That, I think, is basically beyond the pale actually at this juncture. I think something very, very dramatic would have to change politically for us to believe that that was possible.

Gerry Baker: We haven't talked about the demographics. I mean, China's famously got awful demographics, and I think one of the things that marks China out from a sort of development model, is unlike those economies that grew after the second World War, those East Asian economies like Korea and Japan, and then Singapore and Southeast Asian nations too, they grew with these tremendous inputs of resources and obviously labor, and they were able to grow rich essentially, and then developed, in Japan's case in particular, developed these huge demographic problems. China, in the old saying, is sort of growing old before it gets rich. Thanks in large part to the one child policy, the broader tighter restrictions on population, they have astonishing numbers already right now in terms of the dependency ratio. People talk about the number of workers that there are for retirees. And if you look 20, 30 years, hence they're going to have a dramatically worse demographic situation than certainly than the United States and indeed most other countries in the world. I mean, how much of an issue is that for them in terms of their long-term growth prospects, and is there any signs at all that they're tackling that?

George Magnus: I think it's a dramatic issue. I don't think it's probably something that I would put in my top three of the most pressing issues for China, not least because it's a kind of a glacial phenomenon, but incrementally, it'll accumulate over time. And so the decline in the working age population, as we know from our own experiences in faster aging countries, it will lead to financial pressures for individuals, for the government, for the pension system, healthcare system, and what have you. So there are ways we can try to compensate for this, but unfortunately, not very many to be honest. But if you look at the kind of coping mechanisms, as I call them, China really doesn't score very high on any of them. So there's no immigration virtually to speak into China to compensate for a declining working age population. They have falling female participation rates in the labor force. I mean, actually in contrast, Japan has had a rising female participation, from a low base, but actually the kind of direction of change has happened in Japan, it's not happened in China. And productivity growth, as I said before, has stalled. So you look at, for example, what ought to be, I mean, it's politically fractious even in France, but one of the most obvious things that governments can do, of course, is to raise the pension eligibility or the retirement age. But this is something which is very, very sparsely being followed, here and there maybe by one or two cities and provinces, but there is no national policy to lift pension eligibility age. I mean, that's one of the first things that you really need to do to try to keep people who will have long life expectancy, in jobs and in productive jobs for longer, but that's politically proven to be something very, very difficult to do. As I said, China's not the only country that has that problem, so it's not unique.

Gerry Baker: Finally, George, just look at the international dimensions of this. Again, the assumption of China's continuing growth and ascendancy to this sort of global economic superpower status has very much underpinned the strategic debate, the strategic challenge that China poses to the United States with its rising power in the Pacific, its rising power in Southeast Asia, the South China Sea, the threat that it poses to Taiwan. Again, if we're right here in that China's facing these fundamental structural problems, which seem to be, as you've said, kind of a choice almost in terms of what Xi Jinping has been doing and the kind of economy, the kind of country and society he wants to create. Does this make the China challenge less of a concern, weaker for us? Because people are already revisiting some of their assumptions that China's going to overtake the United States in terms total economic power in the next 10 or 20 years, a lot of those views are being revised, so maybe the United States doesn't have to worry so much about that. Or does it actually heighten the tension because China's not going to achieve what was expected for it a few years ago. If it is weakening at home, it may seek, as Xi Jinping has also done, and obviously in his 10 years, to pursue a much more assertive policy overseas. But how does this all feed into the whole question of the China challenge?

George Magnus: I'm sort of laughing, not because it's funny, but because if only our crystal balls were good enough to be able to predict exactly what the outcomes might be. I'm torn myself between this idea that if China was sort of a confident striding country that was elbowing the United States aside and getting its way in global governance left, right, and center, would we think that that was a good place for the rest of us to be? Probably not. So we're kind of focused really now on whether a weakened China or a more challenged China in the future might actually be a threat because it might distract the government to adopt international relations postures, which could be more truculent and more threatening. And I think that is a possibility, and we'll just have to be prepared for it and monitor it very, very carefully. But I think to be honest, I mean, it wouldn't be good for the world if China did have 20 years of no growth, not that I'm suggesting that's what's going to happen, but I think the balance of probability is that China will have more difficulty, not less.

Gerry Baker: Well, on that note, I guess, again, as you say, it's not necessarily unalloyed good news if China's struggling, but it is, at least I think, what's causing many people to revisit their assumptions about the kind of a challenge that China poses. George Magnus, thank you very much a indeed for joining Free Expression.

George Magnus: Thank you very much.

Gerry Baker: Well, that's it for this week. Thanks very much for joining us here on Free Expression. We're back again next week with another deep look at one of the most important topics in the news. Thanks for joining us. In the meantime, have a great week.

tyvm

Morbus
May 18, 2004

tatankatonk posted:

George Magnus: Yeah, I was going to say it's a sort of a fantasy, but I think people still entertain the idea that maybe things get kind of bad enough that the government will change its direction, change its trajectory. To me, this is like asking leopards to change their spots. I just don't think that's going to happen. So these people are basically Leninists and they focus very much on a kind of production, investment, supply orientation of the economy, from which they think that trickle-down benefits will raise the quality and standard of living of the population. They do not really believe in the kinds of things that we practice in varying degrees in liberal leaning democracies, of we think social welfare is fundamentally a kind of an okay idea. We have different kind of perceptions about how far it should go, but we actually think that social safety nets are a good thing. We think that public intervention in the economy to promote consumption and low taxes is a good thing, generally speaking. For Xi Jinping, this is all somewhat alien, to be honest. He, certainly now, if not in the beginning of his term of office, certainly believes, like we do, that national security is really important, or the government is really kind of obsessed, I think with stability and with controlling risks. They're not really interested in going for growth. They're not really interested in risk taking, certainly not the kind of what they would call egregious risk taking, which we think is part of the whole process of creative destruction, et cetera. And so this controlling repressive view about how to manage the economy, which is built on a faltering model, if you see what I mean. I think this is almost like a bit of a doom loop actually.

??????

lmao

Cerebral Bore
Apr 21, 2010


Fun Shoe

tatankatonk posted:

George Magnus: Yeah, I was going to say it's a sort of a fantasy, but I think people still entertain the idea that maybe things get kind of bad enough that the government will change its direction, change its trajectory. To me, this is like asking leopards to change their spots. I just don't think that's going to happen. So these people are basically Leninists and they focus very much on a kind of production, investment, supply orientation of the economy, from which they think that trickle-down benefits will raise the quality and standard of living of the population. They do not really believe in the kinds of things that we practice in varying degrees in liberal leaning democracies, of we think social welfare is fundamentally a kind of an okay idea. We have different kind of perceptions about how far it should go, but we actually think that social safety nets are a good thing. We think that public intervention in the economy to promote consumption and low taxes is a good thing, generally speaking. For Xi Jinping, this is all somewhat alien, to be honest. He, certainly now, if not in the beginning of his term of office, certainly believes, like we do, that national security is really important, or the government is really kind of obsessed, I think with stability and with controlling risks. They're not really interested in going for growth. They're not really interested in risk taking, certainly not the kind of what they would call egregious risk taking, which we think is part of the whole process of creative destruction, et cetera. And so this controlling repressive view about how to manage the economy, which is built on a faltering model, if you see what I mean. I think this is almost like a bit of a doom loop actually.

??????

china doesn't just rush into doing extremely dumb poo poo and this is bad, actually

Trimson Grondag 3
Jul 1, 2007

Clapping Larry
growth doesn’t mean building stuff and lifting people out of poverty you know.

Slavvy
Dec 11, 2012

tatankatonk posted:

George Magnus: Yeah, I was going to say it's a sort of a fantasy, but I think people still entertain the idea that maybe things get kind of bad enough that the government will change its direction, change its trajectory. To me, this is like asking leopards to change their spots. I just don't think that's going to happen. So these people are basically Leninists and they focus very much on a kind of production, investment, supply orientation of the economy, from which they think that trickle-down benefits will raise the quality and standard of living of the population. They do not really believe in the kinds of things that we practice in varying degrees in liberal leaning democracies, of we think social welfare is fundamentally a kind of an okay idea. We have different kind of perceptions about how far it should go, but we actually think that social safety nets are a good thing. We think that public intervention in the economy to promote consumption and low taxes is a good thing, generally speaking. For Xi Jinping, this is all somewhat alien, to be honest. He, certainly now, if not in the beginning of his term of office, certainly believes, like we do, that national security is really important, or the government is really kind of obsessed, I think with stability and with controlling risks. They're not really interested in going for growth. They're not really interested in risk taking, certainly not the kind of what they would call egregious risk taking, which we think is part of the whole process of creative destruction, et cetera. And so this controlling repressive view about how to manage the economy, which is built on a faltering model, if you see what I mean. I think this is almost like a bit of a doom loop actually.

??????

The people running poo poo are failsons of failsons who don't actually know or understand jack about poo poo and just repeat the nonsense they've absorbed through osmosis like a religious catechism yes

Maximo Roboto
Feb 4, 2012

yellowcar posted:

true innovation is having a dozen different food delivery apps

Hell yeah



https://ltl-beijing.com/order-food-in-china/

gradenko_2000
Oct 5, 2010

HELL SERPENT
Lipstick Apathy

Some Guy TT
Aug 30, 2011

Tankbuster posted:

I am watching the show that gave us the current thread title and it seems pretty pro capitalism to me.

preposterous how could chinese television possibly air a pro capitalism television show everyone knows they censor all the freethinkers

comedyblissoption
Mar 15, 2006

https://twitter.com/mtracey/status/1701471397615161688

Cerebral Bore
Apr 21, 2010


Fun Shoe
china is clearly engaging in unprovoked aggression by existing close to so many us military bases

Maximo Roboto
Feb 4, 2012

There should be some U.S. military bases on the mainland or at least Hainan to fully encircle and contain Nationalist Chinese aggression

fizzy
Dec 2, 2022

by Jeffrey of YOSPOS
Bad news for China's attempt to challenge US air superiority in the Pacific - China's newest aircraft carrier still trails the USA's nuclear-powered warships
- Compared with the US Navy’s advanced carriers, which use nuclear propulsion systems, the conventionally powered Fujian will still be slow and have limited range.
- defence experts said the Fujian would not be able to play a real battle role any time soon.
- But Chinese and foreign observers believe the PLA needs significantly more time to “learn” carrier operations that the US military has been conducting for decades. According to Japanese military officials, the Liaoning and the Shandong manage only about 20 fighter sorties a day on average, less than one-seventh of the rate the Gerald Ford has achieved.
- Yet it remains unclear when China will be able to deploy large carrier battle groups including submarines and build a nuclear-powered carrier.

- Asked on Monday what would change when the Fujian enters service, Admiral Richard Chen, a former commander of Taiwan’s Navy, said the carrier would make “no difference” to the PLA’s real naval capabilities.
- “Their qualified naval aviators are not enough,” he said. “Of course [the PLA Navy is] showing their muscle, but their capacity is still far behind that of the US.”[/b]


China’s newest aircraft carrier prepares to take to the seas
Kathrin Hille in Taipei
7 HOURS AGO

Smoke rising from the chimney of a huge warship moored at Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai this month was the clearest sign yet that the Fujian, China’s newest aircraft carrier, was getting ready to sail.

After sheds on the warship’s deck were dismantled over the past few months, “it has started testing its propulsion system”, said Hsu Yen-chi, a researcher at the Council on Strategic and Wargaming Studies think-tank in Taipei.

The ship, China’s third aircraft carrier and the first designed domestically, marks a leap in Beijing’s pursuit of projecting armed force far beyond its shores — part of leader Xi Jinping’s goal of making the People’s Liberation Army a “world-class military” by the middle of the century.

Foreign defence officials and analysts said the Fujian’s test runs and entry into service would offer clues as to how quickly China can catch up with the US amid intensifying competition and Beijing’s growing military pressure on Taiwan.

Hsu said the Fujian’s mission would be to offset the air superiority of the US and its allies in the western Pacific and east Asia and equip the PLA with greater operational freedom.

“Because the Fujian uses many new technologies that the PLA has not utilised before, the testing time will definitely be longer than that of the previous carrier,” he said. “However, I think she will start sea trials before the end of this year.”

Over the past two years, the PLA Navy has begun sending the two aircraft carriers it already has in service on training missions outside the first island chain, which runs from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines, and much closer to Guam, home to several large US military bases. But the small size and outdated design of the Liaoning and the Shandong limit the scale and scope of their operations.

Compared with the US Navy’s advanced carriers, which use nuclear propulsion systems, the conventionally powered Fujian will still be slow and have limited range. But in other respects, it demonstrates a substantial evolution from China’s earlier carriers.

The Fujian is built to launch fighter jets with an electromagnetic catapult, a system on a par with the USS Gerald Ford, the US Navy’s most advanced carrier in service. By contrast, the Liaoning, China’s first carrier built from a Ukrainian-made hull acquired in 1999, and the Shandong, a copy of that ship manufactured in China, use older ski-jump ramps.

Moreover, the Fujian is the first PLA carrier that can carry a complete fleet of aircraft, including patrol aircraft and early warning and control planes.

“The experience of managing such a mixed fleet cannot be learned from the previous two carriers, and managing and dispatching carrier-based aircraft is the key to the combat effectiveness of an aircraft carrier,” Hsu said.

None of that is likely to start until next year at the earliest. Sea trials of the Liaoning and the Shandong took more than a year before they began operations with China’s carrier-borne J-15 fighters in earnest.

“This phase is bound to drag out longer for the Fujian as the crew needs to familiarise itself with an entirely new set of equipment, procedures and even dimensions,” said a senior military official of a neighbouring country.

Even then, defence experts said the Fujian would not be able to play a real battle role any time soon.

“The first two carriers were really experimental platforms,” said Alexander Neill, an expert on the Chinese military at the Pacific Forum. “The Liaoning helped the Chinese navy get into aircraft carrier operating mode for the first time — working up a cadre of operators, generating a group of officers familiar with the issues. The Shandong was an experiment in gearing up the shipbuilding industry to supply the PLA Navy with these kinds of ships.

“Now, once they have the Fujian in service, they will be experimenting with carrier operations at scale and at pace.”

The Chinese navy’s learning curve has been steep. The Liaoning did not conduct its first training mission with aircraft outside the first island chain until 2021, almost nine years after it entered service. The Shandong shortened that period to a little more than two years. In more regular large-scale exercises since April 2021, the two warships have increased their range and operating pace.

The Japanese military counted about 300 sorties during two Liaoning exercises in the western Pacific in December 2021 and May 2022. That figure increased to more than 600 such sorties during a similar drill by the Shandong in April this year.

While PLA Navy aviators practised take-off and landing on the Liaoning just over 700 nautical miles off the Chinese coast in May last year, the carrier pushed that range to 1,300 nautical miles during its most recent western Pacific drill in December — a distance at which analysts said the jets would have had no option to refuel on land.

These were truly “blue water operations”, wrote Mike Dahm, a former US naval intelligence officer and now an analyst at the Mitre Corporation think-tank, which conducts defence research for the US government, in a paper published in January. “China’s navy is evolving at an astonishing rate,” he added.

On Monday, the Shandong passed through the Bashi Channel south of Taiwan en route to China’s largest-ever training exercises involving an aircraft carrier in the western Pacific.

But Chinese and foreign observers believe the PLA needs significantly more time to “learn” carrier operations that the US military has been conducting for decades. According to Japanese military officials, the Liaoning and the Shandong manage only about 20 fighter sorties a day on average, less than one-seventh of the rate the Gerald Ford has achieved.

The larger Fujian, with its advanced launch system, is expected to help the PLA Navy master those tasks. Yet it remains unclear when China will be able to deploy large carrier battle groups including submarines and build a nuclear-powered carrier.

“Those are the next goalposts, but they would be a major leap,” said Neill.

He added Beijing might aim for a prototype for a nuclear-powered carrier by 2040, when Australia starts receiving nuclear-powered submarines under its Aukus deal with the US and UK.

Asked on Monday what would change when the Fujian enters service, Admiral Richard Chen, a former commander of Taiwan’s Navy, said the carrier would make “no difference” to the PLA’s real naval capabilities.

“Their qualified naval aviators are not enough,” he said. “Of course [the PLA Navy is] showing their muscle, but their capacity is still far behind that of the US.”

stephenthinkpad
Jan 2, 2020
Do people read the China doom articles (read the full article, not just the title) have any long term memories? Do they not remember the rush of articles declaring China couldn't get out of the Covid lockdown about 1 year ago? Like this is just the one batch, not even the last batch.



He should include the F35 operation range in the map, because it's just large enough to fly from Okinawa to Taiwan and back.

Also draw out the 30 much closer Chinese airports next to Taiwan.

gradenko_2000
Oct 5, 2010

HELL SERPENT
Lipstick Apathy
Look if China didn't want any trouble they shouldn't have placed their bodies of water so close to American bases

Palladium
May 8, 2012

Very Good
✔️✔️✔️✔️

fizzy posted:

[“Their qualified naval aviators are not enough,” he said. “Of course [the PLA Navy is] showing their muscle, but their capacity is still far behind that of the US.”

oh remember the time the US won in vietnam when they parked every single carrier unopposed of the coast

Frosted Flake
Sep 13, 2011

Semper Shitpost Ubique

Palladium posted:

oh remember the time the US won in vietnam when they parked every single carrier unopposed of the coast

Mantis42
Jul 26, 2010

You laugh now but once we burn enough hydrocarbons to make Waterworld a reality those carriers won't seem so useless

crepeface
Nov 5, 2004

r*p*f*c*
https://twitter.com/chenweihua/status/1701864523513090495?t=4yaX_ReNDl5BbOrDOS-4Gw&s=19

fizzy
Dec 2, 2022

by Jeffrey of YOSPOS
Bad news for China - China's growth is buried under great wall of debt


https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/chinas-growth-is-buried-under-great-wall-debt-2023-09-13/

China’s growth is buried under great wall of debt
By Yawen Chen
September 13, 20239:27 AM GMT+8
Updated 39 min ago

LONDON, Sept 13 (Reuters Breakingviews) - Where is Wen Jiabao when you need him? China’s former premier is remembered for his decision to unleash a huge state spending plan after the 2008 financial crisis. Today’s leaders wish they could deploy similar fiscal firepower to kickstart their sputtering economy. The options before President Xi Jinping aren’t great. Yet letting some heavily indebted local governments’ investment arms fail would be better than keeping them on pricey life support or counting on an elusive rebound in consumption.

Wen exited the political stage a decade ago but his legacy lives on, for better and, mostly, for worse. His plan to throw 4 trillion yuan ($555 billion), or about 13% of China’s GDP in 2008, at everything from railroads to airports contributed to a debt overhang that’s still haunting Beijing today. In the 15 years since, China’s debt-to-GDP ratio has doubled to a whopping 280%, with the bulk of liabilities held by local government financial vehicles (LGFVs).

Most of these 3,000-plus entities were created by local governments during the 2008 crisis to skirt a central government ban on direct state borrowing. They were then contracted by regional governments to build public infrastructure, from uneconomical leisure parks and roads to slightly more cost-effective highways, subway stations and high-speed bullet trains. Many also developed land for regional governments before it was sold on to residential developers. Today those vehicles are a ticking time bomb that hampers China’s ability to spend its way out of the current economic doldrums. Economists are busy downgrading the country’s full-year growth to below the official goal of around 5%, which was already seen as modest, because an initial recovery following December’s pandemic reopening quickly faded. China is flirting with deflation as the property sector - which accounts for a quarter of GDP – has sunk and pandemic-scarred consumers and businesses hesitate to spend.

Xi’s dilemmas are compounded by his belief that the traditional stimulus playbook of boosting real estate has run its course. He has frowned at house prices that made Shanghai less affordable than New York and made an example of over-leveraged developers that disrupted the market, such as China Evergrande (3333.HK), which is struggling to restructure some $300 billion in liabilities. He has eased home purchase curbs recently to stabilise property sales, but they are still on course to decline around 10% this year, per Gavekal Dragonomics.
That leaves much of the heavy lifting to fiscal spending. Yet LGFVs’ debt stands in the way. These vehicles had already accumulated 80 trillion yuan of liabilities at the end of 2022, according to analysts at Guosheng Securities. Of that, 54 trillion yuan was interest-bearing, mostly owed to Chinese banks.

The bulk of these debts are separated from local governments’ balance sheets, but Beijing's decade-long efforts to sever the implicit guarantee between local governments and their LGFVs have been largely unsuccessful. A third of LGFVs didn’t generate positive cash flow last year, according to Guosheng. And 60% of them, holding about 32 trillion yuan of outstanding debt, would struggle to pay interest with their own EBITDA, Citi analysts estimated. Yet local officials remain reluctant to let them default on public markets, for fear that such a shock would shut their regions’ funding access and even trigger a run on government bonds.

Beijing wants to buy time. Its latest move includes a mooted plan to allow local governments to raise 1 trillion yuan in total through bond sales to repay LGFV debt. The Ministry of Finance may also ask banks to extend loans and slash the interest. Zunyi Road and Bridge Construction, a LGFV in China's Southwestern Guizhou province, set a precedent earlier this year, as its creditor banks agreed to roll over its loans for 20 years and halved interest on them. Xi could also help by letting local governments shuffle their debt into the state’s balance sheet since the central government has a debt-to-GDP ratio of just 20%.

The problem with these measures is that they wouldn’t reduce LGFVs’ pile of debt. A harsher medicine is needed. The shock therapy option for Beijing is to force a fire sale to raise much-needed cash. LGFVs have 133 trillion yuan in total assets, around 60% of which are in land and physical assets such as industrial parks, transport infrastructure and investment properties, according to Guosheng.

Local officials have pushed back at Beijing's requests to sell, arguing most of these assets are illiquid, according to the Financial Times. But even if the portfolio of land and fixed assets was put up for sale at a massive 80% discount to entice vulture and bad debt investors, that would raise around 16 trillion yuan, enabling the LGFVs to pay back all their outstanding bonds. At a more optimistic 30% discount, the proceeds would jump to 55 trillion yuan, which would cover all outstanding interest-bearing debt.

Even with asset sales, it's inevitable that some LGFVs, especially in poorer regions, will have to fail. Beijing fears that would break the banks. S&P analysts calculate that about 20 trillion yuan of LGFVs’ loans may be at risk of restructuring. Letting these loans roll over with interest slashed - as in Zunyi's case - would result in a 5 trillion yuan hit to bank capital, and reduce banks' average capital adequacy ratio by 2.6 percentage points to 12.6%; that's still within regulatory requirements.

The stakes are high. Despite Xi's distaste for propping up the economy through real estate, the danger is that a fire sale of LGFVs’ assets could spark a widespread fall in the value of collateral for bank loans and cause a deeper crisis of confidence. That, in turn, might deal a considerable blow to lenders’ balance sheets and destabilise the financial system.

That said, the banking sector is sitting on 335 trillion yuan of total assets, and bad loans, impairments and provisions will only be an issue once lenders come clean on them. So far, they are not. As of June 2023, Chinese commercial banks claimed that non-performing loans were just 1.6% of all loans. Investors have already priced in more damage and pushed the average valuation of those listed to less than half of book value.

The makeup of China’s growth makes drastic action on LGFVs even more imperative. Unlike in the United States and other Western countries, China’s growth is still driven by investment rather than consumption. Investment as a share of GDP is a lofty 40%, according to Oxford Economics, double that of the United States.

Chinese households have ample savings, having accumulated 17.8 trillion yuan of bank deposits last year alone. But darkening job prospects, a diminishing wealth effect from real estate, and scars from years of pandemic lockdowns have made them extremely reluctant to spend them.

If Xi won't boost property wholeheartedly and is not able to count on consumers, his efforts to revive China’s growth have to focus on smashing the great wall of local debt.

Oglethorpe
Aug 8, 2005

bloomberg, wallstreetjournal, reuters

operation mockingbird working overtime

Truga
May 4, 2014
Lipstick Apathy

fizzy posted:

Bad news for China - China's growth is buried under great wall of debt
country with lowest debt buried under debt ftw

stephenthinkpad
Jan 2, 2020
Fizzy is expanding his news franchise to the Eurasian thread and he is going to push out Someguy TT.

euphronius
Feb 18, 2009

fizzy owns and is literally my #1 news provider

Palladium
May 8, 2012

Very Good
✔️✔️✔️✔️
not sure i like this gimmick here, but ok

Orange Devil
Oct 1, 2010

Wullie's reign cannae smother the flames o' equality!

stephenthinkpad posted:

Fizzy is expanding his news franchise to the Eurasian thread and he is going to push out Someguy TT.

Finally., some good news for the Eurasian thread.

Nosfereefer
Jun 15, 2011

IF YOU FIND THIS POSTER OUTSIDE BYOB, PLEASE RETURN THEM. WE ARE VERY WORRIED AND WE MISS THEM
The great wall of debt sounds like a ramirez comic

crepeface
Nov 5, 2004

r*p*f*c*
fizzy are you banned from d&d or just the Ukraine threads?

Centrist Committee
Aug 6, 2019
banned 4 truth

mila kunis
Jun 10, 2011
someone tell comrade xi to fix gacha monetization

quote:

In May 2021, miHoYo established the Communist Youth League Committee under Shanghai miHoYo Network Technology Co., Ltd. The committee aims to integrate youth into company development and partake in the innovation and publicization of traditional Chinese culture. The committee created comics and travel maps with the help of Genshin Impact material to promote Xuhui District cultural tourism landmarks. The character Paimon was formally named "Xuhui Youth Culture Star Promoter."[79][80]

In September 2021, Shanghai miHoYo Network Technology Co., Ltd. got promoted from a party branch to a party committee under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The committee has five members, including Liu Wei as the committee secretary and miHoYo vice president Yin Chunbo (殷春波).[81]

On 8 July 2022, Shanghai miHoYo Network Technology Co., Ltd. had its first trade union congress. miHoYo vice president Yin Chunbo was elected as the chairman of the first session of miHoYo's trade union committee. The meeting stated miHoYo's establishment of a trade union not only helps safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of employees, promotes the high-quality development of enterprises and industries, but also serves the economic development of trade union organizations.[82]

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Truga
May 4, 2014
Lipstick Apathy

mila kunis posted:

someone tell comrade xi to fix gacha monetization

afaik he already did to some extent...
... in china. gacha exports are still as predatory as ever to make china grow larger lmfao

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