|
What is the most powerful flying bug? This poll is closed. |
|||
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦋 |
|
15 | 3.71% |
| 🦇 |
|
115 | 28.47% |
| 🪰 |
|
12 | 2.97% |
| 🐦 |
|
67 | 16.58% |
| dragonfly |
|
94 | 23.27% |
| 🦟 |
|
14 | 3.47% |
| 🐝 |
|
87 | 21.53% |
| Total: | 404 votes | ||
|
Unrecoverable loses is killed or wounded, anyone who's not returning to their unit to keep fighting.
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 00:39
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 25, 2024 16:13 |
|
|
1stGear posted:Russian numbers on Ukrainian casualties/desertions should not be trusted for the same reason Ukrainian numbers on Russian casualties/desertions should not be trusted. I trust them both completely actually
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 00:40
|
|
|
I don't think anyone got hurt during the counteroffensive
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 00:46
|
|
|
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 01:03
|
|
|
Raskolnikov38 posted:https://twitter.com/Doomedphantasm1/status/1707113547568656881 
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 01:16
|
|
|
https://www.theguardian.com/world/l...f0844f4dfe55092quote:Speaking at a joint press conference with the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, Nato secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, said “every metre that Ukrainian forces regain is a metre that Russia loses”. When things are going well 
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 01:23
|
|
|
this for real https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yZT-wVnFn60
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 01:25
|
|
|
comedyblissoption posted:cool cool cool cool cool It's mostly forgotten now that Iran DID retaliate after the Suleimani killing. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Martyr_Soleimani The Iranians proved they could bomb American air bases with cruise missiles (and now presumably drones) and the Americans have little defense against it. Unless the United States is actually prepared for war with Iran it would be a disaster, and bombing Iran gives them the perfect excuse to retaliate proportionally and keep using cruise missiles.
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 01:31
|
|
|
I don’t like this new gang tag
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 01:35
|
|
|
Pener Kropoopkin posted:It's mostly forgotten now that Iran DID retaliate after the Suleimani killing. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Martyr_Soleimani I remembered it but I forgot so many American troops (110) were injured.
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 01:51
|
|
|
VoicesCanBe posted:/r worldnews is a cesspit lmao yeah. its not even world news and I think its just one of the default reddits? so a lot of people are directed there
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 01:51
|
|
|
Good news for Germany - German inflation fell in September to its lowest level since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, signalling what could be the beginning of the end for the high inflation that has weighed heavily on Europe's largest economy. Bad news for Germany - Five economic institutes predict Germany's economy will shrink by 0.6% this year, as rising interest rates take their toll on investment and still high inflation depresses consumption. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/german-eu-harmonised-consumer-prices-rise-by-43-september-2023-09-28/ German inflation falls to lowest level since start of Ukraine war Reuters September 28, 20239:24 PM GMT+8 Updated 11 hours ago BERLIN, Sept 28 (Reuters) - German inflation fell in September to its lowest level since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, signalling what could be the beginning of the end for the high inflation that has weighed heavily on Europe's largest economy. German consumer prices, harmonised to compare with other European Union countries, rose by an annual 4.3% in September, preliminary data from the federal statistics office showed on Thursday. Analysts polled by Reuters had forecast it slowing to 4.5% from 6.4% year-on-year in August. Germany's core inflation rate, which excludes volatile items such as food and energy, fell to 4.6% year-on-year from 5.5% in August. Food prices continued to show above-average growth, posting a 7.5% year-on-year increase. However, energy prices were only 1.0% higher on the year. The end of temporary government energy relief measures and the cheapest public transportation offers added to upward price pressure in September 2022, setting a higher base for this month's annual comparison. "About 1 percentage point of the decline in inflation is due to the fact that the 9-euro ticket and the fuel discount expired in September last year," said Ralph Solveen, said Ralph Solveen, senior economist at Commerzbank. But even without this base effect, he said the inflation trend was still pointing downwards because the waves of inflation in energy, food and industrial goods are easing. Meanwhile, five economic institutes predict Germany's economy will shrink by 0.6% this year, as rising interest rates take their toll on investment and still high inflation depresses consumption. They forecast inflation at 6.1% this year, slowing to 2.6% next year and 1.9% in 2025.
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 01:54
|
|
|
Good news for Ukrainian refugees - The Council of the EU has agreed to extend the temporary protection for people fleeing from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine from 4 March 2024 to 4 March 2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/09/28/ukrainian-refugees-eu-member-states-agree-to-extend-temporary-protection/ Council of the EU Press release - Ukrainian refugees: EU member states agree to extend temporary protection 28 September 2023 16:45 In order to provide certainty for more than 4 million Ukrainian refugees currently living in the EU, the Council agreed to extend the temporary protection for people fleeing from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine from 4 March 2024 to 4 March 2025. The EU will support the Ukrainian people for as long as it takes. The prolongation of the protection status offers certainty to the more than 4 million refugees who have found a safe haven in the EU. The temporary protection mechanism was activated on 4 March 2022 – only a few days after Russian armed forces launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine – and it was automatically extended by one year. What is temporary protection? The system provides immediate and collective (i.e. without the need for the examination of individual applications) protection to displaced persons who are not in a position to return to their country of origin. The objective is to alleviate pressure on national asylum systems and to allow displaced persons to enjoy harmonised rights across the EU. These rights include: - residence - access to the labour market and housing - medical assistance - social welfare assistance - access to education for children Background and next steps Following today’s political agreement, the Council will have to formally adopt the decision to extend the temporary protection. This will happen once the legal scrubbing and translation in all EU languages has taken place. Temporary protection is an EU emergency mechanism which is activated in exceptional circumstances of mass influx. The EU directive on temporary protection was adopted in 2001, in the aftermath of the large-scale displacement experienced in Europe due to the armed conflicts in the Western Balkans, in particular from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 01:55
|
|
|
lizard trying to shed the host skin
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 01:56
|
|
|
Yeowch!!! My Balls!!! posted:cbo is the single known case of someone discovering he's okay with fascists now actually as a result of being a fan of glenn greenwald i feel like this is probably not the best time to be arguing that the libs have a good grasp of what is or is not a fascist
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:00
|
|
|
Bad news for Ukraine - When MIC creatures like David French are writing (in the New York Times) articles like the article below, it's a clear sign that the Western establishment is going to cut its losses on Ukraine shortly. - Now, months into a counteroffensive that has struggled to regain the smallest amount of territory — for which Ukraine has paid a high toll — I see why. Ukrainian leaders weren’t spinning me when they tamped down expectations of military success. They were sharing genuine concerns. After more than a year of combat, Ukrainians know that, absent overwhelming Western support, they are David fighting Goliath. Russia still possesses immense, inherent advantages, and despite all their early success, Ukraine could still lose the war. - I fear that Ukraine’s past performance — including repelling the initial Russian attack on Kyiv and the rapid advances in the following months — had made us unrealistic about future results. We were hoping for similar advances in the face of much more formidable prepared fortifications. That was unrealistic, and it’s clear to me that the Ukrainian officials I talked to in May were plainly worried that the West was expecting too much. - What was once supposed to be a lightning Russian attack has turned into a grim contest of wills, and while Ukrainians are willing to fight, they will be unable to hold Russia back without continued Western support. That means a Russian victory over Ukraine would also constitute a victory over the United States — and a stunning reversal of fortune for Vladimir Putin after the colossal miscalculations of his initial plan. - Wars can surprise even the most seasoned observers, but for right now, one thing is clear: Ukraine’s surprising initial success has given way to a slow, grinding conflict, the outcome of which is very much in doubt. Ukraine Is Still David. Russia Is Still Goliath. Sept. 28, 2023, 3:48 p.m. ET One of the most important things to do when writing and thinking about the course of a war is the hardest for a journalist — it’s to wait. Don’t say anything and watch events unfold. When analyzing or covering a conflict, there are some things that are immediately apparent — like the failure of a Russian missile attack over Kyiv, or Ukraine’s urgent military need for better fighter aircraft — but other seemingly simple questions are surprisingly difficult to answer. When I traveled to Ukraine in May, I could see missile attacks firsthand, the vital role of Western equipment in the war effort and the remarkable courage of the Ukrainian people. But there were other things I saw that I couldn’t process immediately. I was there in the weeks before the Ukrainian counteroffensive, and while I was struck by the Ukrainians’ resolve, I was also struck by something else: a sense that the Ukrainians were, if not actually pessimistic, deeply sobered by the scale of their military challenge. Why would Ukrainians feel this way? After all, the Ukrainian military has outperformed virtually every informed prediction of its combat capability. It has thwarted Russia’s initial military objectives, recovered 54 percent of the territory seized by Russia since the beginning of the war and inflicted staggering losses on the Russian military in both material and manpower. Now, months into a counteroffensive that has struggled to regain the smallest amount of territory — for which Ukraine has paid a high toll — I see why. Ukrainian leaders weren’t spinning me when they tamped down expectations of military success. They were sharing genuine concerns. After more than a year of combat, Ukrainians know that, absent overwhelming Western support, they are David fighting Goliath. Russia still possesses immense, inherent advantages, and despite all their early success, Ukraine could still lose the war. To understand where we are now, I thought I’d walk through the questions I receive when I talk about my time in Kyiv and the war more broadly. My answers are based on conversations with high-ranking Ukrainian officials, current and former American officials, current and former members of the American military and tracking open-source information on troop movements and tactics wherever I can. The most recent Ukrainian counteroffensive has been underway for months. Why hasn’t it made substantial progress? In hindsight, the better question is perhaps: Why did we think it would? Ask a NATO general to attack a massively fortified defensive line without air superiority, without overwhelming superiority in artillery and without clear superiority in numbers, and the first question he’s likely to ask is: Can we wait to attack until we at least obtain superiority in one of those categories? Or perhaps two? I’d really love to wait until we have all three. I fear that Ukraine’s past performance — including repelling the initial Russian attack on Kyiv and the rapid advances in the following months — had made us unrealistic about future results. We were hoping for similar advances in the face of much more formidable prepared fortifications. That was unrealistic, and it’s clear to me that the Ukrainian officials I talked to in May were plainly worried that the West was expecting too much. But I’m reading that Ukraine is finally making some real gains. Can a breakthrough still happen? Maybe, but don’t count on it. It is absolutely the case that armies can be pushed to the breaking point and gradual success can eventually yield dramatic gains. After D-Day, for example, the allies slogged through the hedgerows of Normandy for weeks under nightmare conditions before finally breaking out. But there’s a danger in that notion. It can lead commanders to push offensives for too long, to push soldiers and armies past the breaking point in the belief that a true breakthrough is just around the corner. Historical analogies can be imperfect, but think of the German spring offensives in 1918, toward the end of World War I. The German army delivered blow after blow to the allies, made limited gains, but bled itself dry in the process, rendering it vulnerable to the immense allied offensives that won the war in the late summer and fall. So you’re saying Russia can still win? Yes. To be clear, I don’t see anything like a general Ukrainian collapse unfolding, or anything like a Russian blitzkrieg to victory, even if the Ukrainian counteroffensive proves too costly for Ukraine. Much of the Russian army’s striking power has been destroyed. But it is not hard to see the combination of a shift in momentum on the battlefield, combined with the prospect of waning Western support, that could perhaps lead to a form of defeat even more consequential and demoralizing in some ways than the original Russian plan to conquer Kyiv in a matter of days. What was once supposed to be a lightning Russian attack has turned into a grim contest of wills, and while Ukrainians are willing to fight, they will be unable to hold Russia back without continued Western support. That means a Russian victory over Ukraine would also constitute a victory over the United States — and a stunning reversal of fortune for Vladimir Putin after the colossal miscalculations of his initial plan. If Ukraine were forced to sue for peace even if it retains, for example, control of Kyiv, then it’s easy to imagine the fall of Volodymyr Zelensky, a restoration of Russian dominance in Ukrainian affairs and a battered Russian military regaining its prestige. After all, it will have won in the classic Russian way: by enduring more than its adversary could withstand and slowly grinding it into defeat — a catastrophic result for American security, the Western alliance, Ukrainian independence and the international order. Is there a scenario for Ukrainian victory? Also yes, but only if Western aid continues to flow. Ukraine is in the midst of an incredibly difficult task: It’s integrating a host of new weapons and tactics into an army that is already fighting for its life. Problems were inevitable. As The Times reported last month, Western-trained brigades have stumbled in battle. Ukraine’s way of war is different from the NATO way of war, and the most logical way of approaching the conflict is by achieving synthesis between the two methods, not by entirely overhauling Ukrainian tactics, especially when the Ukrainian army is fighting with a fraction of NATO’s capabilities. At the same time, a competent Republican Party could make a strong case that the Biden approach itself has hamstrung Ukraine — by providing stepped-up aid slowly, often after weeks and months of Ukrainian pleading. Ukraine would likely be in a substantially better position if it had received F-16s, Abrams tanks and ATACMS missiles sooner, and in greater numbers. Yet it is still true, in spite of these missteps, that the combination of Western arms and Ukrainian valor is proving incredibly potent on the front and beyond. With the exception of the Russian capture of Bakhmut earlier this year, its army has lost considerable ground since its initial offensive culminated in the spring of 2022. There’s an argument that as long as Ukraine retains Western aid, incorporates steadily more Western arms into its military and continues to evolve, it can, in fact, slowly but steadily push the Russians back. Maybe, just maybe, it can even cause a sudden collapse. What do you think will happen? I think some form of stalemate is the most likely outcome. And by “stalemate” I mean something short of Kyiv suing for peace or Ukraine pushing Russia entirely out of its territory. Instead I mean something that looks like Korea, where the back and forth of attack and counterattack eventually grinds down into something resembling a stable, static line of defense. But there are good stalemates and bad stalemates. The Korean War, in fact, provides an illuminating example. North Korea utterly failed in its drive to unify the peninsula, and while U.N. forces were driven back from the North by Chinese divisions, the resulting armistice left the South free, protected by the United States, and ultimately created the conditions that have built the nation that exists today — one of the most economically and culturally dynamic countries in the world. That’s what a good stalemate can look like for Ukraine — yes, Russia might retain some territory in the east, but the vast majority of Ukraine that would remain in Ukrainian hands would be free, independent and on the road to joining NATO. In 10 years, it would still be armed to deter Russia, but its future would look more like South Korea’s than, say, Belarus’s. A bad stalemate would mean Russia not only retains a large chunk of Ukrainian territory but also that the threat of renewed hostilities would cow both Ukraine and the West, creating the conditions for the Belarus scenario, an ostensibly independent nation that exists under the Russian thumb. A bad stalemate like this one would ultimately be no stalemate at all, but rather a slow-motion Russian victory that leaves Putin (or his successor) stronger, Ukraine subjugated and the West likely divided and uncertain. If a stalemate is probable, why not push for peace now? There are two quick answers to that question. First, there’s no indication that either party believes that the conflict is stalemated on present lines, and if the West actually tries to stalemate the conflict by, say, withholding the weapons Ukraine needs to press its offensives and repel additional Russian attacks, it makes peace less likely, not more. In other words, weakness will not result in Russian magnanimity. In one of the most insightful conversations I had while I was in Ukraine, a senior Ukrainian government official told me that Putin’s theory of victory depends on pushing as hard as he can and then waiting on elections in the West. A Western demand for peace on present lines would be a vindication of his strategy. A Western concession that Ukraine won’t enter NATO (or that it won’t offer other substantial security guarantees) would be seen as an ultimate vindication of his initial attack. Absent security guarantees, Ukraine will likely slowly re-enter Russia’s orbit, even in the absence of another war. In other words, while David might be able to win once against Goliath, if we let David remain David — utterly alone against a much larger foe — it’s only a matter of time before David falls. One final note: Remember that everything written about Ukraine is written in the fog of war. This war has been one of the most photographed conflicts in world history. We often have near-instant access to 4K video straight from the front. But our micro-view of individual engagements can obscure macro truths and overall trends. Wars can surprise even the most seasoned observers, but for right now, one thing is clear: Ukraine’s surprising initial success has given way to a slow, grinding conflict, the outcome of which is very much in doubt.
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:01
|
|
|
Too Many Birds posted:i've played a lot of breakthrough & rush on battlefield and what i learned from my service is that ukraine has hosed up big time by not coordinating the entire army to attack one target at the same time before moving to the next one. i still think they should've done this, like yeah the casualties would be huge but thats a problem for another day
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:05
|
|
|
Isnt some airforce base with major intelligence connections a major hub of.reddit activity?
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:09
|
|
|
fanfic insert posted:they should try bush again to see if they can fool him again
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:10
|
|
|
lol that's an edit, right?
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:26
|
|
|
This thread is usually pretty even-handed but I feel like the mood has become a bit anti-Ukrainian after that nazi guy in Canada got a bunch of Ukraine boosters to go mask off and argue that all Ukrainians who fought against the nazis were slaves forced to do so at gunpoint and the real heart and soul of Ukraine is personified by the guys who fought for the SS
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:27
|
|
|
For some reason I'm thinking of Icarus and the wax wings melting in the sun.
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:27
|
|
|
Don't take her to Beetlejuice
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:29
|
|
|
Endman posted:I don’t like this new gang tag it would be funny to buy it for canadian slavas
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:29
|
|
|
KomradeX posted:Isnt some airforce base with major intelligence connections a major hub of.reddit activity? Reddit has removed their blog post identifying Eglin Air Force Base as the most reddit-addicted "city" - Eglin is often cited as the source of some government social-media propaganda/astroturfing programs quote:The article as it was originally, now archived on archive.org: https://web.archive.org/web/20160604042751/http://www.redditblog.com/2013/05/get-ready-for-global-reddit-meetup-day.html
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:32
|
|
|
KomradeX posted:Isnt some airforce base with major intelligence connections a major hub of.reddit activity? Eglin AFB
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:34
|
|
|
it's edited out but she's making fart noises with her palms while the journalist is talking
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:36
|
|
|
Slava
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:37
|
|
|
https://twitter.com/TopMarx420/status/1706401037047771382?t=JzIhnIKiZ93oLUkl0ZoUXQ&s=19
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:38
|
|
|
fizzy posted:free, protected by the United States,
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:40
|
|
|
Good news for fizzy - fizzy finds endless bemusement at the SS-apologia occurring at r/canada. https://www.reddit.com/r/canada/comments/16tr1q9/tribute_to_nazi_veteran_worst_diplomatic/ quote:Wasn’t exactly a low profile. The guy (Hunka) had a blog about it. Ukrainians don’t see this the same way the west does. He doesn’t see himself as a Nazi. They joined to fight the Soviet Union who was brutally oppressive towards Ukrainians. His own aunt, uncle, and cousins were shipped away to Siberia. They didn’t care about Nazi ideology. Hence why the Ukrainians built statues and honoured the soldiers who fought against the Soviet Union. quote:So this might be controversial so bear with me and keep an open mind. Ukrainians love this division. They wear and bring the divisions flags to their football games and there are monuments in Ukraine and Canada to honour them. quote:I mean, they tried to use the Nazis to gain independence from the Soviets. It didn't exactly work out but I can sympathize with their motivations if not their chosen means. quote:Yeah and certainly there’s more than enough grey area here that none of those people should be receiving a standing ovation in parliament. It’s just more complicated than “he’s a nazi war criminal”. quote:He has never hidden this. His division was widely celebrated over the years for fighting against the Soviet Union. The division he fought with was never confirmed to have participated in war crimes. quote:By all accounts he has never hidden this.
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 02:45
|
|
|
Pener Kropoopkin posted:It's mostly forgotten now that Iran DID retaliate after the Suleimani killing. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Martyr_Soleimani Well that's just ridiculous, America would never want to bomb those two countries.
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 03:12
|
|
|
quote:Unfortunately to the west we see that they made an oath to Hitler, even if they had good intentions. He will be remembered as a Nazi.
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 03:13
|
|
|
https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1707426339236524407?t=XaoWdgCYYsP6Ur5SIRZGEw&s=19 Think about all the stay-behind cells that DIDN'T get caught
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 03:14
|
|
|
Making an oath to Hitler with good intentions
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 03:24
|
|
|
Clip-On Fedora posted:It was funny when Regan got himself killed trying to suck up to Hitler. yeah its a very fun shooty game where you kill scum.
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 03:24
|
|
|
gradenko_2000 posted:https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1707426339236524407?t=XaoWdgCYYsP6Ur5SIRZGEw&s=19 Kind of embarrassing for Ukraine that they're arresting their own staybehinds Now who's going to fight the Russians once they occupy the country!
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 03:28
|
|
|
So do the people who sincerely believe in the double holocaust poo poo also think FDR is like a terrible criminal/nazi sympathizer for collaborating with guys who were supposedly as bad as the nazis
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 03:34
|
|
|
gradenko_2000 posted:https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1707426339236524407?t=XaoWdgCYYsP6Ur5SIRZGEw&s=19 thats a pretty miserable cache of weapons
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 03:36
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 25, 2024 16:13 |
|
|
fizzy posted:Good news for fizzy - fizzy finds endless bemusement at the SS-apologia occurring at r/canada. The Azov phenomenon of 'this is a tiny fringe minority and equating them with all Ukrainians is putler's propaganda' leading to 'these men aren't really nazis because they're respected in the wider Ukrainian community' is repeating but both narratives are going on at the same time lol
|
|
#
?
Sep 29, 2023 03:45
|
|