skooma512 posted:

I got really spooked when one was trying to poke holes in my story until it happened again when I was coming back through France and realized this is just a game they play.

Jaguars! posted:

zoux posted:

What would a bombardier be in WWI, and what's a "chocolate soldier"

zoux posted:

What would a bombardier be in WWI, and what's a "chocolate soldier"

Cyrano4747 posted:

It’s an old way of saying the person isn’t a combat soldier. Basically REMF. I don’t know why, exactly. In the rear with the good rations like chocolate? Melts under pressure? No loving idea, but that’s what it means.

So yeah. That’s a pretty loaded dig in the context.

mrpwase posted:

After the end of WW2, part of the process of demobilisation was the replacement of the phrase with 'chocolate teapot' in British English - more palatable to the general public.

Gripweed posted:

Weren't chocolate soldiers like an actual thing back in the past? Like, in Easter you have the chocolate Easter bunny which is chocolate molded in the shape of a bunny with a foil wrapper with a bunny printed on it, and they did the same thing back then but instead of a bunny it was a soldier. Little kids would buy chocolate soldiers. So that's what it is, you're this thing that looks and is shaped like a soldier but can't actually do anything other than look like a soldier.

Trin Tragula posted:

Absolutely fascinating story, this. The subtext of the verdict appears to be, directed at the officers, "you idiots, don't swan round like Billy Big Bollocks in front of the other ranks, and don't start things you can't finish, not guilty".

zoux posted:

What would a bombardier be in WWI, and what's a "chocolate soldier"

zoux posted:

Also I didn't see one mention of the c-word in that report involving ANZAC soldiers getting in a fight so sadly I must question its veracity.

Xiahou Dun posted:

Please don’t joke.

Cyrano4747 posted:

It’s an old way of saying the person isn’t a combat soldier. Basically REMF. I don’t know why, exactly. In the rear with the good rations like chocolate? Melts under pressure? No loving idea, but that’s what it means.

So yeah. That’s a pretty loaded dig in the context.

Jaguars! posted:

I do feel a little tiny bit sorry for the original officer who was probably just trying to get home when a bunch of terrifying dudes who'll be more soldier than he ever will start accosting him

zoux posted:

Also I didn't see one mention of the c-word in that report involving ANZAC soldiers getting in a fight so sadly I must question its veracity.

Trin Tragula posted:

See, I think it's equally likely that what "they were impressed by his uniform" may actually mean is that he went up to them and started giving them poo poo about their turnout, which was something that ANZACs in general had very little time for.

Notes: Regarding Official History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ernest Joseph King Papers, Library of Congress, DC posted:

The deficiencies in the strength of our forces opposing the violent Japanese attacks in this most desperate and critical struggle of the war applied to all elements, but was particularly acute in the matter of aircraft. Especially desperate was the situation in regard to carriers and carrier aircraft. At one stage, our forces in the South Pacific (and in the entire Pacific, for that matter) were reduced to one damaged carrier, the ENTERPRISE (opposing at least five Japanese carriers).

In spite of this desperate carrier situation, the RANGER which was required for the support of our North Africa operation, was kept in the Atlantic. At this time, half of our available carrier force was, therefore, being retained for support of operations against Germany.

It was at this juncture that our most urgent requests for Army aircraft for use in the Guadalcanal area met with stubborn resistance on the part of the Army and particularly the Army Air Forces, who, concentrating on the objectives in Germany, objected to the diversion of even a small percentage of aircraft elsewhere. Under the conditions obtaining, the Navy had an urgent need for sufficient shore based aircraft to support our beleaguered position in Guadalcanal, which had been seized by the Navy to carry out a naval mission of maintaining control of sea communications to the Army area of the Southwest Pacific.

It was also at this juncture that in response to the request for assignment to the South Pacific of a British carrier, immediately needed in the South Pacific, the British dragged their feet for an extended period, demanding satisfactory answers as to the prospective employment of the British carrier, etc., with the result that the carrier (VICTORIOUS) did not arrive in the South Pacific for many months, and long after the urgent need had passed. – This was the British return for our employment of the WASP in British waters, both in the North Sea and in supplying aircraft to meet the Malta needs. This was the British return for the deployment of United States naval ships to Scapa Flow.

1942 October 27 0251 – CINCPAC to COMINCH info COMSOPAC, Nimitz Gray Book vol. 2, Naval War College, RI posted:

Most Secret. Halsey has requested reinforcement by 1 or more carriers of the British Eastern Fleet. In view urgent and immediate need for every possible increase particularly of carriers I recommend that this idea be explored to utmost.

Admiral Charles M. Cook Papers, Hoover Institute, Stanford University, CA posted:

United States Fleet
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
1942 November 5
Serial: 001338

Memorandum To: British Admiralty Delegation

Subject: Reinforcement by one or more carriers of the British Eastern Fleet

1. The following answer are given to the questions asked in your memorandum of 28 October 1942:

Q. Disposition, giving names of effective U.S. Capital ships as of 5 November 1942.

A. COLORADO, MARYLAND, NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI – all at Pearl Harbor.

Q. Which U.S. ships are in Southwest Pacific Area.

A. Five Task Forces:
a) SOUTH DAKOTA, ENTERPRISE (damaged), 1 Heavy and 1 Light Cruiser, 7 Destroyers.
b) 2 Heavy and 3 Light Cruisers, 10 Destroyers, HORNET was in this force.
c) WASHINGTON and 1 Heavy and 1 Light Cruiser, 6 Destroyers.
d) Submarines – 24.
e) Escort – 2 Light Cruisers, 5 Destroyers.

Q. What reinforcements it is intended to send to Southwest Pacific Area.

A. (a) INDIANA, 1 Light Cruiser, and 4 Destroyers leave Atlantic Coast early November
(b) NORTH CAROLINA, SARATOGA, both having received torpedo hits, complete repairs at Pearl Harbor early November and, with 3 Heavy and 1 Light Cruisers, and about 8 Destroyers, should arrive in area about 22 November.

Q. What new U.S. Carriers will come into service in 1942 and first half of 1943.

A. ESSEX, LEXINGTON, INDEPENDENCE, and possibly PRINCETON.

Q. The state in detail of Japanese Capital ships and Carriers.

A. (a) 12 Battleships in service. 3 or 4, of which one is damaged, are operating to southward from Truk. Remainder in home waters.
(b) 3 Fleet Carriers, of which 2 damaged vide my 1519/27. Other is ZUIHO whose characteristics are unknown.
(c) It seems clearly established that the following are sunk: AKAGI, KAGA, HIRYO, SORYO, RYUJO, SHOHO.

Q. U.S. policy regarding the Southwest Pacific Area.

A. General policy is hold the line of communications from United States to Australia. With this end in view, strong garrisons established Pearl Harbor, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia. To give depth to this line, Wallis, Funafuti, Efate, Espiritu Santos occupied. Airfields have been constructed in each occupied position and appropriately manned.

Line threatened by Japanese activities at Guadalcanal which were countered by U.S. occupation in August. Present situation Guadalcanal occupied by 24,000 troops, Espiritu Santos – 5,000, New Caledonia – 24,000. Reinforcements planned: 25,000 from New Zealand (of which 13,000 are New Zealand troops) plus 1 Infantry Division from U.S. Troops to be used to occupy Ndeni and to reinforce Guadalcanal whose sea approaches and land areas are in dispute.

In the New Guinea Area Japanese have been driven back beyond Kokoda. Operations are now underway to occupy the northeast coast.

It is the intention of the U.S. to consolidate their position in Guadalcanal and New Guinea and to then prepare to seize and occupy Rabaul. By such limited offensives protection will be given to the lines of communication to Australia and freedom of action will be denied Japanese forces.

Q. How was HORNET sunk and where did the action in which she was sunk take place.

A. HORNET was badly damaged by two air attacks (bombs and torpedoes) IN ACTION NORTH OF Ndeni on 26 October. The vessel was subsequently sunk by U.S. own actions.

Q. Though the Japanese may have only 2 auxiliary carriers in South West Pacific area at present time, they can according to our estimates send three and possibly four more there before ILLUSTRIOUS could reach the area.

A. It is estimated that the Japanese have available for service the HITAKA and HAYATAKA (58 planes each) plush ZUIHO characteristics unknown. In addition there are the small converted carriers OTAKA, ex-KASUGA MARU, UNYO, ex-YAWATA MARU, and CHUYO. These small converted carriers have in general been used for “plane ferry trips”, and not believed efficient for combat use. In the same class, the U.S. is now operating the converted carriers LONG ISLAND, NASSAU, COPAHEE, ALTAMEBA, in the Pacific.

Q. If the Southwest Pacific Area is fed with weak reinforcements at intervals, the United Nations Capital ships and Carrier strength will be liable to suffer further attrition and we may have the command of the sea wrested from us.

A. The reinforcements are the utmost that can be spared from the over-riding commitment of the “Special Operation”. The alternative seems to be the giving of the enemy quite a free hand.

E. J. King
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Fleet Air Arm Papers, 1942-1943, Naval Records Society posted:

106. Minute from First Sea Lord to Prime Minister
[PREM 3/163/1] 5 November 1942

Carrier reinforcements for South West Pacific Herewith are two preliminary investigations dealing with the possibility of reinforcing the S.W. Pacific after “Torch”, on the basis that we suffer no casualties to important units during that operation. The situation will be again reviewed when we know how “Torch” has fared.

106a. Appreciation by Admiralty
[PREM 3/163/1]
Carrier reinforcements for South West Pacific

Carrier Reinforcement of S.W. Pacific

The attached appreciation shows that in naval forces the Americans will be inferior to the Japanese in the South West Pacific until next Spring, even if we reinforce them by three aircraft carriers. Without these reinforcements they will be markedly inferior, and the security of the trans-Pacific air and sea routes may be endangered. Even if Guadalcanal falls, provided we dispute further Japanese advances to the South and maintain pressure in New Guinea, the Japanese should be sufficiently contained in the Pacific to prevent them from carrying out any major operations elsewhere.

2. It must be emphasised that with the limited knowledge of the naval, air and land forces engaged in this theatre which is available in the Admiralty, this conclusion must necessarily be somewhat speculative. Moreover, in our calculations we have made allowance for U.S.S. RANGER reinforcing this area after “TORCH”, though the Americans do not apparently like exposing this ship to any severe test on account of her poor underwater protection.

The Indian Ocean

3. Activity in the South West Pacific, combined with the general shortage of shipping will, in our opinion, limit Japanese activity in the Indian Ocean to naval sorties and carrier-borne raids against shipping or harbours. There are two methods of countering this:-
(a) By superior naval forces based in Ceylon and (b) By shore-based air forces, adequate to cover coastal shipping, ports and anchorages.

In addition naval escort against raiders will be required for important convoys outside the protection of shore-based air.

4. Owing to our shortage of aircraft carriers and destroyers, we are unlikely to be able to provide in the first half of 1943 an Eastern Fleet superior to the naval force which the Japanese could make available were they to accept risks in the Pacific area. Since the weaker Fleet is unable to provide protection, our proper course is to rely on anti-raider escort by cruisers, backed up by flying boat and shore-based reconnaissance and air striking forces. In accepting this course, we necessarily accept diversion or stoppage of trade during the period of any Japanese sortie in strength. This, however, should not be of very long duration in view of their inability to seize advance bases while contained in the South Pacific.

5. It therefore follows that by reinforcing the South Pacific with major units of the Eastern Fleet and so increasing the scale of attack which the Japanese must bring to bear concurrently with the threat which the Allied forces can mount, we should be able to do more to increase the security of the Indian Ocean than by retaining in this area a weak Eastern Fleet. Of such action, the build-up of flying boat and shore-based air forces in the Indian Ocean is a corollary.

The Atlantic Ocean

6. With the GRAF ZEPPELIN possibly in service by early 1943, two large Fleet Carriers must be retained in the United Kingdom or at Gibraltar to allow for docking and repairs.
If all other Fleet Carriers were to be detached to the South Pacific, the chances of giving increased protection to Russian convoys by the Home Fleet would be lessened, since the risks involved would be greater. Supplies to Russia by the Northern route may even increase in importance next year. Even if German air strength in Northern Norway deteriorates therefore, we are unlikely to be able to exploit it by providing adequate air protection for the Home Fleet east of Bear Island.

The Mediterranean

7. The Chiefs of Staffs have decided that our main amphibious operations in 1943 should be conducted in the Mediterranean with the object of stretching the enemy forces to the greatest possible extent. They have also recommended that in this theatre we should first aim at:–
(i) The elimination of Axis forces in North Africa from the East, together with such assistance as can be rendered from the West.
(ii) The capture of Sardinia from the West at the earliest opportunity.

Given adequate shore-based air forces on the North African coast at either end, cover of convoys to support the elimination of Axis forces in Libya should not require the presence of capital ships or carriers.

8. Investigations into the capture of Sardinia have, at present followed two lines:–

(a) capture by direct assault of Cagliari and

(b) the capture of Cagliari by overland advance from the West coast.

Owing to lack of intelligence no decision has yet been possible as to whether a direct assault on Cagliari is feasible but, if it is, we could establish our fighter forces ashore very much more quickly by this means. Air support for the assault could probably be provided from Tunisia by long range fighters amplified by fighters from Auxiliary
Aircraft Carriers. To interfere with a direct assault on Cagliari, the Italian Fleet must accept the threat of heavy air attack from Tunisia. Were this threat adequate, no heavy Naval covering force and therefore no Fleet carriers would be necessary against the Italian Fleet.

The alternative plan involves carrier borne air support for several days until the Army has captured Cagliari and its aerodromes. To cover this West coast landing, a force of 3 battleships and 2 carriers would probably be necessary to guard against interference by the Italian Fleet from the North. This alternative plan is probably not feasible unless the enemy fails to reinforce his land garrison and the strength of the German Air Force in the Mediterranean is much reduced.

9. For offensive naval action against the French or Italian Rivieras, the support of Fleet Aircraft Carriers would be required. Similarly, for any operation against Sicily, Fleet Aircraft Carriers would be needed to support heavy naval covering forces.

10. To sum up, if no Fleet Carriers can be made available for the Mediterranean the capture of Sicily is probably not possible. The capture of Sardinia might, however, be possible if a direct assault can be made on Cagliari. In this event we must, therefore, forego any hope of reopening the Mediterranean to a full flow of traffic. By denying ourselves offensive Naval sorties such as the bombardment of Genoa, we also curtail our ability to increase the liability of Italy to Germany.

Summary of the Problem

11. Our broad strategy is to defeat Germany, diverting from that object only the minimum forces necessary for the safeguarding of our interests in the East. The problem before us, therefore, lies in the interpretation of the word “minimum”. On the one hand, without British support, the American trans-Pacific air and sea routes may be endangered by the Japanese; on the other hand, with only two large carriers in the North Atlantic, we are unable to exploit our Mediterranean strategy to the full and cannot hope fully to reopen that area to our shipping.

12. We must avoid dividing our carrier forces into small groups. If we are to reinforce the Americans we must do so on as large a scale as possible, not only because any compromise will fail to achieve our object of containing the Japanese in this area, but also because weak reinforcements will subject us to greater risks of attrition.

13. We shall get no new Fleet carriers until 1944, when INDEFATIGABLE and IMPLACABLE come into service. By mid-1944 the Americans expect to complete eleven Fleet carriers and nine converted cruiser carriers additional to their present forces.

14. Unless we support the Americans to the utmost of our ability in the present emergency, we are unlikely to gain naval support for European operations – possibly in the Mediterranean – in the latter half of 1943 when the South Pacific situation should have been retrieved.

15. From the foregoing arguments and, of course, subject to any casualties sustained in “TORCH” and a satisfactory solution to the problem of the French Fleet, I recommend that we should reinforce the American naval forces in the South Pacific at the expense of the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean during the next six months.

Conclusion

16. This appreciation only deals with the question of Carriers. A separate paper on the Battleship problem is attached [not reproduced].

113. Message from Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force to Admiralty
[PREM 3/163/1] 2200, 19 November 1942
Requirements for aircraft carriers in Mediterranean
246. HUSH. Personal for First Sea Lord
Your 2345/18. My appreciation of forces required is based on the considerations given below.

(2) As long as the Italian Fleet is in being and in a position to interfere a considerable force of capital ships and therefore cruisers is essential. This applies even more strongly if we attempt any operations against Sicily, Sardinia or France. Even if we do not do so the Italian Fleet will be a constant nuisance and menace to through convoys in the Mediterranean and it must be our object to render it ineffective as soon as possible otherwise we shall lose much of the value from TORCH operations.

(3) Apart from the above there remains the requirement of a force for work in the Atlantic and until the fate and future activities of the French Toulon Fleet and the force at Dakar are definitely known, for this purpose a small capital ship force appears desirable.

(4) In regard to the Malta convoy it is proposed to await the result of [Operation] STONEAGE and of the operations in Tunisia. Should neither of these come up to expectations it will be necessary to fight the Western convoy through.

(5) If, however, we can get a proper scale of trained shore-based aircraft we shall be in much better position to get rid of the aircraft carriers which apart from other calls on them are much better out in open waters. It would also be possible to withdraw capital ships. It may not perhaps be realized that we have at present no repeat no anti-ship striking force at all except one of six Swordfish at Algiers.

(6) When TORCH was planned we pressed hard on this subject but all that we could obtain was a nebulous promise of one Beaufort T/B Squadron from Middle East … We are feeling this lack of an air Striking force very seriously at this moment with the Axis running supplies at this critical moment into Tunisia by day by sea virtually unhindered.

(7) I feel it of primary importance not to reproduce the situation we had in 1941 in Eastern Mediterranean when, owing to carrier losses, we had neither a sea borne nor a shore based air striking force with the results of which we are aware. I must earnestly press therefore for every effort to be made to have adequate air operationally under Naval control before my only striking force in the form of capital ships and carriers is removed.

(8) To summarise, the following is my view of the Naval Forces both major and minor which are needed. It is based on the assumption that we have effectively occupied Tunisia, that Spain remains neutral and the French Fleet passive.

(A) Aircraft carriers can be dispensed with as soon as an effective and trained naval co-operation group is established on similar terms to 201 Naval Co-operation Group. Adequate reconnaissance striking and fighter forces essential to include torpedo aircraft.

(B) Carriers would again be required for assault of Sardinia, to be withdrawn on establishment of R.A.F. there.

(C) When I am satisfied practically that the Naval Co-operation Group is up to the job I consider capital ships could be withdrawn except for one to work westward from Gibraltar with attendant cruiser and destroyers. A carrier is very desirable with this force …

2 December 1942, Churchill to Roosevelt #217, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579613 posted:

1) Ever since we received a request for carrier reinforcement for your Pacific fleet we have been earnestly seeking to meet your wishes. We did not feel able to come to a decision about these very few vital units until we knew how our carriers had fared in the restricted and dangerous waters in which they had to operate for Torch.

2) The hazards of Torch are not yet ended, as our build-up of shore-based aircraft will not enable the withdrawal for some time of the two carriers now employed on Torch. Knowing however, how urgently you require a reinforcement of carriers in the Pacific we are prepared to take a risk now and come to a decision as to what assistance we can give you.

3) As you are aware, our carrier strength consists of the following: A) four long endurance armoured fleet carriers: Victorious, efficient and just withdrawn from Torch, Illustrious, efficient and the only carrier now with the Eastern Fleet, Indomitable undergoing after action repairs and will not be worked up before January, Formidable, now employed on Torch but has turbine trouble and must go into dockyard hands for six or seven weeks as soon as possible B) One short endurance fleet carrier, Furious, which is now employed in Torch C) An aircraft repair ship, Unicorn, which can operate about twenty five aircraft but will not be ready for service until early February.

4) In the hope that your operations in the South Pacific will prevent the Japanese from making serous raids in the Indian Ocean we are prepared to take the serious risk of withdrawing Illustrious from the Eastern fleet, and given Admiral Somerville the Unicorn and an auxiliary carrier. We are also prepared to withdraw Victorious from the Home Fleet, and to send you both Victorious and Illustrious if you can allow Ranger to join the Home Fleet.

5) In view of the vital importance of the Atlantic communication, the necessity of supporting the North Russian convoys, the possible appearance of Graf Zeppelin at the end of the year, and the present condition of Indomitable and Formidable, we could not release both Victorious and Illustrious without the addition of Ranger to the home fleet.

6) I am in favour of sending you two carriers rather than one if this can be managed, as this will not only give increased strength but would allow the two ships to work as a tactical unit, which would appear to be necessary as neither ship carries sufficient aircraft to operate singly. I would propose to send Admiral Lyster, who is known to a good many of your officers, in command.

7) It is considered necessary for both ships to proceed to Pearl Harbour, where they should arrive about the end of December to adjust their complement of aircraft. 8) If you are in favour of this exchange Pound will settle details with King.

4 December 1942, King to Leahy, , Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579611 posted:

I enclose draft of a dispatch which I propose be sent by the President in answer to [Churchill]'s No. 217 of 2 December.

While I appreciate the willingness of the British to give us two carriers, I feel that any such scheme would result in having two mixed British-U.S. Task Forces, one built around two British carriers in the Pacific and the other built around RANGER in the home fleet. Mixed Task Forces, as you so well know, are always undesireable. They are particularly undesireable when carriers are included because of wide differences in the technique of carrier operations. I am convinced that we should keep our carriers in our own fleets to the greatest extent possible and that the British should do the same.

We do need temporary air reinforcement in the Pacific and, in order to obtain it, I think we should accept the offer of the ILLUSTRIOUS, but I do not think that any further mixing of U.S. and British carriers is either necessary or desirable.

I am particularly anxious that RANGER be kept under my control, in order that it may be used in the Atlantic or the Pacific as the situation may require.

Signed, E.J. King (attached draft dispatch matches that sent in response to Churchill's No. 217)

5 December 1942, Roosevelt to Churchill #226, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579611 posted:

Your despatch number 217 of December 2, 1942, has received serious consideration. Your offers of cooperation are deeply appreciated.

In spite of the advantages which would result from the employment of both Victorious and Illustrious as a tactical unit in the Pacific, other considerations make it necessary to forego the services of Victorious there. If it becomes necessary to send yet another carrier to the Pacific in the near future, Ranger would be chosen because she does not require special preparation for operations with other American forces.

The early arrival of Illustrious in Pearl Harbor is looked forward to with anticipation.

14 March 1942, Churchill to Roosevelt #44, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579599 posted:

We have decided to do Bonus (Operation Ironclad, Invasion of Madagascar), and as it is quite impossible to weaken our Eastern Fleet we shall have to use the whole of Force H now at Gibraltar. This will leave the Western exit of the Mediterranean uncovered, which is most undesirable. Would it be possible for you send say two battleships, an aircraft carrier, some cruisers and destroyers, from the Atlantic, to take the place of Force H temporarily? Force H would have to leave Gibraltar not later than March 30 and could hardly reach Gibraltar again before the end of June. We have not planned any operation for Force H inside the Mediterranean between April 1 and the end of June. It is most unlikely that French retaliation, if any, for Bonus would take the form of attacking United States ships by air. Moral effect of United States ships at Gibraltar would, in itself, be highly beneficial on both sides of the straits. Operation Bonus cannot go forward unless you are able to do this. On the other hand, there are the greatest dangers in leaving Bonus to become a Japanese base. We are not telling anyone about our plans and assaulting troops mingle easily with our March convoy to the east. A separate telegram will explain the meaning of Bonus.

16 March 1942, Roosevelt to Churchill #119, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579597 posted:

Prefer to meet request in your despatch number 44 regarding Ironclad as to temporary replacement of Force Hypo by sending detachment to join Home Fleet equivalent in strength to force detached therefrom to replace Force Hypo. Our ships now being made ready with view to early departure.

16 March 1942, Roosevelt to Churchill #120, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579597 posted:

1) Apropos my No. 119 this afternoon I feel that it would be more advisable if we reinforce your Home Fleet temporarily and you detach such ships as are necessary either to replace your H Force or to do the whole escorting job itself. We would send a force of two battleships, two cruisers, an aircraft carrier and a squadron of destroyers to take up their position at such bases like Scapa as are agreed upon between the Admiralty and the Navy. The difficulties of our operating in Gibraltar are very considerable and I should much prefer to reinforce your Home Fleet in a manner that would enable you to release the appropriate number of ships.

17 March 1942, Churchill to Roosevelt #48, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579599 posted:

1) Your numbers 119 and 120. If Tirpitz comes out only the fastest heavy ships are of any use. We must therefore keep two King George Fifths and Renown in north working with our only remaining fast aircraft carrier on this station. Tirpitz has gone north to strike at our joint munition convoys to Russia and action may easily arise. Texas class could not play any part in such fighting. They could not therefore release corresponding force to go to Gibraltar.

2) In view of your help we could send to Gibraltar one eight inch cruiser and four destroyers (British) from the home fleet and makeshift with that while force Hypo is away.

3) We should greatly welcome your sending to home fleet one or two heavy cruisers, not less than four destroyers, and above all please a fast carrier invaluable to join Victorious in catching Tirpitz.

4) We assume any ships you will send will be under operation orders of C in C, home fleet.

5) Your points about sinkings and Atlantic convoys are being gone into separately, and a further signal will be made from Pound to King.

17 March 1942, Churchill to Roosevelt #50, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579599 posted:

1) Pound has just informed me that he has received a very nice message from King in which the latter says he will do all he can to keep the Japanese interested in the Pacific, whilst we are building up our strength in the Indian Ocean.

2) King also mentions that he was considering sending your two new battleships to the Pacific when my request to you to put a force at Gibraltar was received. We had no idea that your new ships were ready for service, and therefore only had in mind two of your Texas class.

3) We greatly appreciate your willingness to send your new ships to us but, knowing how urgent it is that you build up your Pacific fleet, I think we should be wrong to accept your generous offer, thereby postponing this great reinforcement to your fleet. If you can send us the ships I mentioned in my number 48 we can manage and will be most grateful.

19 March 1942, Churchill to Roosevelt #52, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579599 posted:

1) We are deeply grateful for your sending a force in which is included one of your new battleships to join CINC Home Fleet.

2) This will enable us to send a force which will include the Renown to Gibraltar. We will get in touch with Ghormley where your ships should proceed.

3) When the time is approaching for your new battleships to go to the Pacific please give us sufficient warning to enable readjustments to be made in British dispositions.

18 March 1942 Roosevelt to Churchill #123, Message Files, FDR Presidential Papers, National Archives, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/27579597 posted:

Your Number 48 and 50. We will send departing about March Twenty third detachment under command of Wilcox comprising one new battleship, two heavy cruisers, one carrier, five or six destroyers to report for temporary duty to Ghormley to be under operational orders of CINC Home Fleet. We will keep ready on this side similar detachment in position suited to head off enemy when he comes into open Atlantic. We feel that you can now include battleship in your replacement for Force Hypo and otherwise make it more nearly adequate.

Roskill, Stephen W. 1954. The War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume II: The Period of Balance. London: H.M.S.O., available at Internet Archive posted:

Pg. 227-230, Chapter 9: The Pacific and Indian Oceans
The sinking of the Wasp made no difference to Halsey's determination to give the hard-pressed marines on Guadalcanal every support that lay within his power. His fleet was once again organised in three main groups. The first consisted of the Enterprise and the new battleship South Dakota, the second of the Hornet and cruisers, while the third was composed of the battleship Washington and more cruisers. Each group had its own destroyers for screening. Rear Admiral T. C. Kinkaid in the Enterprise was the senior officer afloat. A powerful Japanese force, which included four carriers, was operating near the Santa Cruz Islands with the same broad purpose as Halsey's relative to the fighting on Guadalcanal. Early on the 26th of October Kinkaid was ordered to attack it. Each side's search aircraft sighted the other's carriers at about 6:30 a.m., and the Americans started with the good luck of putting the Zuiho out of action with the first of the many bombs dropped that day. Then the main carrier air battle was joined. The Shokaku was so severely damaged that she was out of action for nine months; but the Japanese got her home. When the turn came for the Hornet and Enterprise to shield themselves, the defending fighters were overwhelmed and both ships were hit. The Enterprise, after some anxious moments got her damage under control; but the Hornet was repeatedly hit, caught fire and had to be abandoned. She finally sank in the small hours of the 27th. The Japanese once again suffered heavy losses in aircraft, but the Battle of Santa Cruz, the fourth carrier air battle to be fought in six months, left the Americans for the second time with only one carrier in the South Pacific, and she was considerably damaged.

The Americans estimated that by the beginning of December the Japanese would have three or four carriers with about 250 aircraft ready for service in the South-West Pacific, besides powerful battleship and cruiser strength. Their assessment of Japanese naval air forces was, we now know, somewhat exaggerated, but the prospective disparity in aircraft carriers caused the United States Navy to turn to its principal Ally with an appeal for help. We will therefore take leave temporarily of the men fighting desperately in, over and around the embattled Solomon Islands to review the messages which passed between London and Washington on the subject. They show how easily two Allies, even two as closely tied together by blood, language and friendship as we and the Americans, can get at cross purposes.

On the 23rd of October the First Sea Lord signalled to Admiral Sir Charles Little, the head of our mission in America and Admiral Pound's representative on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, that Admiral Stark (the head of the American mission in London) had suggested that 'now was a golden opportunity for positive action [by the Eastern Fleet] against the Bay of Bengal or along the Malay barrier'. Professor Morison tells us that this suggestion originated in a letter from Admiral Nimitz to Admiral King.[13] The Admiralty quickly followed up its first message to Washington with another saying that they 'could not discover what they could do to relieve the pressure', and pointed out that Operation 'TORCH', which was about to be launched in North Africa, and which had been given overriding strategic priority by both governments, had 'reduced the Eastern Fleet to one carrier and two battleships'. Admiral King was apparently away from Washington when this message arrived, and Admiral Little discovered that his Chief of Staff was wholly in the dark as to who had originated the request for help. However Admiral Little persevered in discovering the American needs, and the reasons for them, and on the 27th he signalled to the First Sea Lord urging that 'one or more of the Eastern Fleet's carriers be sent to Halsey's command'. 'This', said Little, 'is a real cry for immediate help', because the Hornet had been sunk and the Enterprise was only fifty per cent efficient. Next day Admiral Pound replied that the matter 'raises issues of the gravest importance concerning the ultimate command of the sea'. 'What', he asked, 'are the American dispositions? When and how was the Hornet sunk?'[14] Admiral Little was instructed to 'tell King that we are most anxious to help, but must have a clear picture of the whole situation'. In retrospect it does seem surprising that the highest naval authorities in London should have been kept so very much in the dark regarding American dispositions, and events in the Pacific.

On the 30th Little signalled that he had seen King that day, that the American Admiral had resented what he had called 'the catechism' given to him which, so he said, did not make it appear that we wished to help; further that King had said 'he had not asked any questions over giving us Task Force 99'.[15] 'Both of us' said Admiral Little 'were rather ruffled'. None the less that same day Little was able to signal a full statement of American dispositions, and their assessment of the enemy's strength. On the last day of the month the Admiralty tentatively offered a fleet carrier, but asked a lot of technical questions about what aircraft she was to operate. It was they said, impossible to be more definite until operation 'TORCH' had been launched, and we knew whether we had suffered any carrier losses in it. Meanwhile Admiral Somerville, Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, had been asked how he viewed being deprived of his last carrier--a proposition which did not appeal to him at all. On the 6th of December, by which time the success of 'TORCH' was well assured, the Admiralty signalled that the Victorious was being sent to the Pacific, which left the Home Fleet without a carrier. Admiral Cunningham was therefore asked to release the Formidable, since 'two carriers with Force H are a luxury in face of the inactivity of the Italian Fleet'. Finally on the 8th Admiral Little was instructed to tell King that the Victorious and three destroyers would be ready to leave the Clyde on the 19th. We will return to the period of her service in the Pacific in a later chapter. By the time she got there and had been re-equipped to use American aircraft, the crisis had, in fact passed.

In retrospect it seems that much of this signalling and most of the misunderstanding would have been avoided had the Admiralty been fully informed of the progress of the Pacific war. Nor was the Admiralty the only place where the lack of information regarding American accomplishments, plans and intentions was felt. Admiral Somerville had quite recently told the First Sea Lord that he was only able to glean such information through unofficial channels in Australia. It also seems certain that Admiral Nimitz's suggestion about sending a British carrier to the Pacific was passed to London without the American Navy Department having considered all aspects of the problem. Nimitz, of course, could not know all the details of operation 'TORCH', though he must have known that it was about to be launched. Admiral King and the Navy Department certainly knew all about it, knew that it had first claim on Allied resources, and that it involved the Royal Navy in very heavy commitments so long as the outcome was in the balance. Had these factors been carefully weighed in Washington, the problem might, even in face of the crisis which had arisen in the Pacific, have been viewed rather differently from the beginning. To send an aircraft carrier to fight on the other side of the world with a strange fleet is, of course, a very different matter from sending one to undertake short ferry operations such as the Wasp twice did to reinforce Malta.[16] If the Victorious took out her own aircraft complement, she would find no spares or replacements in the Pacific; so it was obviously preferable that she should be re-equipped with American aircraft. Yet her aircrews would certainly have to be re-trained to fly the latter. The technical and human problems involved were undoubtedly serious. That such a transfer was not as simple a matter as Washington seems to have felt, is shown by the fact that after her arrival at Pearl Harbor early in March 1943 some time elapsed before, even with all the help the Americans could give, the Victorious was ready to work with their Pacific Fleet.[17]

[13.] See Morison, Vol. V, p. 184.

[14.] The Hornet was actually sunk at 1:35 a.m. (local time) on 27th October in the Battle of Santa Cruz. This was equivalent to 12:35 p.m. on the 27th London time, only about twelve hours before Admiral Pound's signal was despatched.

[15.] This was the force commanded by Admiral R. C. Giffen, U.S.N., which came to Scapa in April 1942 (see p. 134). It was originally called Task Force 39.

[16.] See pp. 59 and 61.

[17.] See p. 415.

1942 July 16 - Memorandum, Subject: British CV’s posted:

1. Using the U.S. system of aircraft stowage and control, the capacity of British CV’s in U.S. aircraft, based on space studies, is about as follows:

INDOMITABLE
F4F-4 = 36
SBD-3 = 18
TBF-1 = 18
Total = 72

Present British complement is about 21 VF and 24 VTB (obsolescent).

ILLUSTRIOUS, VICTORIOUS, FORMIDABLE
F4F-4 = 36
TBF-1 = 18
Total = 54

Present British complement of the above three ships is about 12 VF and 21 VTB (obsolescent).

FURIOUS
F4F-4 = 18
SBD-3 = 12
TBF-1 = 12
Total = 42

Present British complement is about 12 VF and 18 VTB (obsolete).

Each of the above carriers has an adequate number of arresting wires and barriers for normal operations.

EAGLE and ARGUS are omitted because of size and age.

2. Combatant operations of U.S. Naval and Marine aircraft squadrons from these ships are possible under the following schemes:

a) Take over the whole ship.
(1) Replace bombs and torpedoes.
(2) Check oxygen and CO2 charging fittings.
(3) Install torpedo workshop tools (“travelling circus”).
(4) Check radio installation.
(5) Install Radar and homing gear if not already on.

b) Take over the Air Department complete.
(1) With this must go tactical control of the ship in order to insure a minimum safe coordination of operations between ship and squadrons.
(2) Take over radio communications.
(3) The Air Department is to include flight deck and hangar crews, signal officers, air plot, etc., in addition to squadron personnel.
(4) (As in (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) of subparagraph (a) above.)

c) Operate U.S. squadrons under the Fleet Air Arm Organization
(1) Under the British operation system, the aircraft complements would be only as follows:
INDOMITABLE
F4F-4 = 18
TBF-1 = 12
SBD-3 = 12
Total = 42

ILLUSTRIOUS, VICTORIOUS, FORMIDABLE
F4F-4 = 27
TBF-1 = 18
Total = 45

FURIOUS
F4F-4 = 12 (about)
SBD-3 = 6
TBF-1 = 6
Total = 24

(2) Put aboard aircraft landing signal officers.
(3) Put aboard a senior U.S. naval aviator of wide experience as liaison officer.
(4) Take over radio communications with aircraft, or provide radio operators and supervisory personnel.
(5) (As in (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) of subparagraph (a) above.)

3. (a) The United States needs large combatant type CV’s for operations against Japanese CV’s, naval forces, and island bases. On the other hand the major employment of CV’s by the British is in the protection of convoys and trade routes, for which purposes a number of slower vessels, each with a smaller complement of aircraft is adequate.
(b) It would appear proper to take over British CV’s on the basis of exchanging possibly 3 or 4 escort carriers for each large CV.

1942 August 3, Memorandum for Admiral King, Subject: Transfer of Two British Carriers to U.S. Navy posted:

1. Recent reconnaissance at GDYNIA shows that the upperworks of the GNEISENAU are being removed. This may well indicate her prospective conversion to a carrier. If the GNEISENAU is converted to a carrier, and the GRAF ZEPPELIN is completed, the Germans will have available a very powerful striking force, composed of two carriers, SCHARNHORST, TIRPITZ, and supporting craft.

2. If we assume the Germans equip these carriers with dive bombers as well as with torpedo planes and fighters, our position in the ATLANTIC, not to mention that of the British, may become very embarrassing.

3. There does not appear to be much prospect now of the British carriers being made ready to oppose successfully carriers operated as are American or Japanese carriers, and German carriers if similarly developed.

4. In view of this situation, it appears to me that the FURIOUS and INDOMITABLE should be transferred to the American Navy, fitted out with Navy planes and crews. The attached estimate shows that two months would be required to do this. Estimate also shows that there are a number of disadvantages in such a make-shift carrier. I am inclined to the view that these disadvantages must be accepted, and that a conversion time of one month must be directed.

5. It is recognized that the personnel problem of manning them is a stiff one.

6. If we should take them over, we will probably have to agree to keeping of at least one, possibly both of them, in the ATLANTIC, - and at least one of them serving with the HOME FLEET.

7. It will probably be very difficult to approach the British on this subject. Perhaps it could best be done, if you agree with the idea, directly between you and Admiral Cunningham.

[signed]
C. M. Cooke, Jr.,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans)
[Admiral E. J. King initialed the memo as having been read]

1942 August 3, Memorandum for Admiral Cooke posted:

1. A conference was held between a representative of the Bureau of Ships, two from Bureau of Aeronautics, and three officers who have recently done duty in England, two of them having made wartime cruises in British carriers. A concensus of opinion of these officers brings out the following details:

(1) The British man their ships with about fifty percent of the people that we consider necessary. The British carrier commanders recently requested to increase their complements from 1200 to 1600. It is probable that a minimum crew which could take care of 70 U.S. planes would be in the vicinity of 1600.

(2) British carriers are short-legged

(3) British carriers hold just under 100,000 gallons of gasoline, which makes them very short-legged as regards air operations.

(4) Personnel accommodations on British carriers make for “hard living.” Messing accommodations require two shift messing for British complements, which would mean at least three shifts for American complement. The men bathe in salt water, and the ships make so little fresh water that they are hard put to it now to keep up with the demand in the tropics.

2. The requirements for conversion to U.S. complement of planes were gone into in detail. The Bureau of Ships representative gave as his estimate, a period of two months after arrival in the yard for the accomplishment of these alterations which at this time appear to be the minimum necessary for operation of about 70 U.S. aircraft. These alterations would result in a makeshift ship, which would be unsuited for the unlimited operation which we expect of our carriers. The ships would have to be nursed both as to fuel and as to gasoline, the personnel would suffer disproportionate hardships, and at best the aircraft operations would be somewhat slower than on a U.S. ship.

3. Rapid conversion of these ships would require the assignment of the highest priority to them in our Navy yards, superseding priorities on almost everything else.

4. The suggestion was offered by Commander Cooper, who has made cruises on British carriers, that the best method of increasing the striking power of the British carrier is to assign a British carrier to an American Carrier Task Force, and thus to force them, by precept and by example, to develop the technic and the ability and the knowledge of to how to fight their ships. He stated that it was his understanding that the British have under development a torpedo plane which can dive bomb. When fitted out with this plane[?], and when put into an American task force, he believes that they will become reasonably efficient fighting units.

Respectfully,
[signed]
T. H. Robbins
[bolded portions have pencil underline annotations].

Fleet Air Arm, 1942-1943, Naval Records Society posted:

34. Minute from Director of Plans[1] to Vice Chief of Naval Staff[2]
[ADM 1/12058] 29 April 1942

Proposed approach to President Roosevelt for transfer of Fleet Carriers to Royal Navy

The suggestion that the President should be approached has arisen from the report that there are under construction in the United States 20 carriers and 80 auxiliary carriers and the view that our carriers are more often at risk.

Auxiliary Aircraft Carriers.
2. Of the figure of 80 auxiliary aircraft carriers only 55 are earmarked. Ships are requisitioned for conversion in groups, and as far as can be seen the Americans are proposing to allocate to the R.N. about half of their output. No further action regarding auxiliary aircraft carriers is therefore called for at present.

Fleet Aircraft Carriers.
3. The Americans have been at war for less than 5 months. Aircraft from their carriers have carried out raids on the Mandated Islands and on Japan and in so doing have naturally been in danger from shore-based enemy aircraft. U.S.S. SARATOGA has been damaged by a submarine’s torpedo.[3] In addition U.S.S. WASP has undertaken a ferrying trip to Malta and another is in prospect.[4] It was on this service that ARK ROYAL was sunk.[5] I do not consider, therefore, that we are justified in claiming that our aircraft carriers are, or will be, more often at risk.

4. An examination of the relative strength of the U.S. and Japanese Navies in the Pacific has recently been made … It will be seen from Table II [not reproduced] that the number of U.S aircraft carriers now in service in that area is considerably less than the Japanese total, and parity is only achieved in mid 1943. The U.S. carriers have, on the average, a greater capacity for aircraft than the Japanese so that the relative strength in seaborne aircraft is better than this comparison indicates. Nevertheless parity in seaborne aircraft for fleet operations in the Pacific is only achieved in April 1943. (Table IV) [not reproduced].

Battleships.
5. Comparisons of the number and fighting power of Japanese battleships and of U.S. battleships allocated to the Pacific are illustrated in Tables I and II [not reproduced]. The U.S. achieves no substantial margin of strength until 1944.

Conclusion.
6. We have ample evidence that the U.S. are wedded, in political and naval thought, to the two ocean navy programme, which is based on the hypothesis that the British have ceased to fight. At present they have in the Pacific a Navy inferior to the Japanese Navy and it will be some time before they have a margin of strength sufficient to undertake the strategic offensive in that area.

7. Our need for aircraft carriers may well be more urgent than that of the U.S. and from time to time circumstances may be favourable for obtaining the temporary loan of these ships. In view, however, of the U.S. attitude regarding the 2 ocean navy programme, I am firmly of the opinion that an approach to the President at the present juncture for the transfer of battleships and aircraft carriers has not the smallest chance of success.

8. Although our own weakness provides material for an approach, American weakness provides material for an answer. I believe that an approach now can only weaken the value of the Prime Minister’s influence in matters in which we have a valid case to press, such as a request for temporary loan of heavy forces.

9. If losses are inflicted on the Japanese or if we are assured that their new construction is less than is forecast, our case for permanent transfer of U.S. heavy ships to the R.N. may, at a future date, become valid …

[1] Capt C.E. Lambe.

[2] VA H.R. Moore.

[3] Saratoga was hit by a torpedo fired by I-6 400 miles south-west of Pearl Harbor on 11 Jan 1942.

[4] Wasp’s first ferrying trip was Operation ‘Calendar’. See Doc. 23 for details.

[5] Ark Royal was torpedoed by U-81 while returning from Operation ‘Perpetual’ on 13 Nov 1941. See Ben Jones (ed), The Fleet Air Arm in the Second World War: Volume I, 1939–1941 (Farnham, 2012), Docs Nos 164, 167 and 173.

Urcinius posted:

Was exploring Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King's papers at the Library of Congress and came across an interesting monograph in his post-war files involved with the historians writing the history of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is undated & unattributed but appears to be in King's voice. It's a very interesting and candid read of his high level (i.e. only a few dozen pages) thoughts about the long, intense war. Thus, what stands out to him is most telling about which events struck lasting chords with him.

In the midst of the monograph is a swipe about the relative cooperative spirit between the US Navy and Royal Navy. He specifically calls out two instances in 1942 where each navy requested a carrier of the other - Wasp in March and Illustrious in October. Right or wrong, the number of questions, delays, and ultimate selection of carrier by the Royal Navy in response to the US Navy request was less congenial than the US Navy's earlier response to the British request within two days (three days if we include the initial British confusion about which battleships King was offering).

Recently, I found King's response to the questionnaire that the British Admiralty Delegation hit King with back with upon his 27 October 1942 request for Illustrious or other carriers to reinforce Halsey's Southwest Pacific forces. To this I added some of the contextual correspondence so y'all can see the conversation from origin to finish. Then I further added the correspondence for the March 1942 British request that netted them Wasp. Between the two you can see what drove King's post war comparison.

DTurtle posted:

This was an extremely interesting read. It's interesting to see some of the incomplete information sharing (deliberate or not), miscommunication, etc. between two allies working so closely together. Just getting everything where it needs to be is already such a complicated thing to do. And then you actually have an enemy trying to stop you.

Also very "interesting" to see the amount of weight given to the Graf Zeppelin.

Urcinius posted:

Yeah! There’s some great scholarship on both points.

SlothfulCobra posted:

It's still a bit of a thing now.



Also a drink.

Greggster posted:

Something I'm curious about is what the process was for Great Britain and France to go from century-long enemies to closest of allies? I can't imagine it could've been easy for the two nations to go from waging total wat in the Napoleonic era to relying deeply on each other a mere 100 years later during ww1

Xiahou Dun posted:

Germany suddenly existing changed some things, for a start. A hundred years is a long time.

DTurtle posted:

This was an extremely interesting read. It's interesting to see some of the incomplete information sharing (deliberate or not), miscommunication, etc. between two allies working so closely together. Just getting everything where it needs to be is already such a complicated thing to do. And then you actually have an enemy trying to stop you.

Also very "interesting" to see the amount of weight given to the Graf Zeppelin.

Greggster posted:

Something I'm curious about is what the process was for Great Britain and France to go from century-long enemies to closest of allies? I can't imagine it could've been easy for the two nations to go from waging total wat in the Napoleonic era to relying deeply on each other a mere 100 years later during ww1

Pantaloon Pontiff posted:

100 years is a long time. The US, UK, and France were allied with the USSR/Russia during WW1 and WW2 against Germany up to the 1940s. By the 1950s, Russia was the big enemy of the US, UK, and France, and by the 1960s the part of Germany not controlled by Russia was allied with their former enemies. And now while Russia is still generally opposed to the US interests, some of the factions in the US country that used to have 'better dead than red' bumper stickers now support Russia. Similarly, US, UK, and France were allied with China to help defend against Japan in the 1940s, sympathy for China was one of the main factors in the US opposing Japanese expansion. By the 1950s China was a significant enemy of the US, UK, and France while Japan was an ally, and then shifted to where it is today as 'major trading partner but also has significant conflicting interests'.

Pantaloon Pontiff posted:

100 years is a long time. The US, UK, and France were allied with the USSR/Russia during WW1 and WW2 against Germany up to the 1940s.

Nessus posted:

Traditionally, WW1 is held to have ended in 1918, and I believe that Tsarist Russia was counted among the allies.

Greggster posted:

Something I'm curious about is what the process was for Great Britain and France to go from century-long enemies to closest of allies? I can't imagine it could've been easy for the two nations to go from waging total wat in the Napoleonic era to relying deeply on each other a mere 100 years later during ww1