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Cool. As a very infrequent flyer, I'd never heard of it. An old article (2014) on the Air France 447 crash, specifically on how advanced automation was a contributor to the crash.
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Nov 1, 2018 19:22
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hobbesmaster posted:Those aren’t fifth freedom flights. YVR-JFK-LHR flown by a Canadian flagged airline would use rights to the 5th freedom of the air in the US. Ah right, l completely misunderstood.
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Nov 1, 2018 19:32
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JFK-FRA on Singapore airlines is the best fifth freedom route
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Nov 1, 2018 20:06
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Nebakenezzer posted:Cool. As a very infrequent flyer, I'd never heard of it. I think part of the problem -- and you can see this in the tone of the article itself, although it doesn't seem to exhibit any self-awareness of the fact -- is that automation is too often looked at as something separate from pilotage, as if it can meaningfully exist apart from the pilot. Being a pilot means being able to control your aircraft. There is no difference, fundamentally speaking, between doing this job with your hands on the controls directly, or by correctly managing the systems that run the aircraft. To draw a significant distinction between those things would be like saying there's a significant difference between flying a plane with direct mechanical linkages to the controls, one with hydraulic control surfaces, and one that's entirely fly-by-wire. It's not incredibly difficult to do this job when things are going normally, either in a plane with advanced automation, or a 1970s-vintage C172. The problems come when things start going wrong, and that's when you have to have pilot skill -- this is agreed upon by pretty much everyone, I would say. The problem comes when we attempt to define "pilot skill." It can mean being able to hand-fly the aircraft skillfully in difficult situations for sure, but it isn't limited to that. Equally important is to understand the automation systems and their full operation, limitations, and failure modes. That it how airplanes are controlled now, and you have to be as skilled using those systems as you are with stick and rudder. One of the points raised in the article is that automation has allowed for too many poor or average pilots to get into the cockpit by masking their deficiencies. While that may be true to a point, the other truth is that being an exceptional pilot by 70s standards doesn't mean you're an exceptional pilot today -- if you haven't kept up with the changes in automation and you're not familiar with how those systems work on the aircraft you're flying, I don't give a gently caress how good your hands and feet are, you're not a good pilot.
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Nov 1, 2018 20:54
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The CRM breakdown that prevented them from recovering the plane would have been just as fatal in 100 other situations that weren't caused by unintuitive automation. It's a stretch to blame automation for getting someone behind a flight stick that cannot communicate clearly or overcome their confusion to let someone else handle the issue. I mean, at that point it's not even pilot skill.
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Nov 1, 2018 21:45
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bull3964 posted:The CRM breakdown that prevented them from recovering the plane would have been just as fatal in 100 other situations that weren't caused by unintuitive automation. It's a stretch to blame automation for getting someone behind a flight stick that cannot communicate clearly or overcome their confusion to let someone else handle the issue. Stuff like Crew Resource Management and Human Factors are very much Aviation skills though, because nobody else in the loving world even teaches that poo poo. It's dry as hell and everyone hates doing the recurrent training, but they really should teach Human Factors in high school as a mandatory course. EVERYONE would benefit from it, regardless of industry.
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Nov 1, 2018 22:06
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Finger Prince posted:Stuff like Crew Resource Management and Human Factors are very much Aviation skills though, because nobody else in the loving world even teaches that poo poo. It's dry as hell and everyone hates doing the recurrent training, but they really should teach Human Factors in high school as a mandatory course. EVERYONE would benefit from it, regardless of industry. This is also an excellent point. Being a good and safe pilot -- especially in a multi-crew environment -- is about so much more than simply being able to move the controls around properly, and the idea that somehow things like automation, human factors management, CRM, and even being able to read and interpret forecasts well aren't considered fundamental parts of the task of being a pilot is dangerous and stupid. Crashes rarely happen because someone is really lovely at the physical act of flying a plane.
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Nov 1, 2018 22:49
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PT6A posted:Crashes rarely happen because someone is really lovely at the physical act of flying a plane. Oh Ye of little faith...
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Nov 1, 2018 22:53
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MRC48B posted:Oh Ye of little faith... Helicopters don't count.
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Nov 1, 2018 23:01
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PT6A posted:I look forward to this robust technology being autonomously piloted to shuttle people around as Uber envisions. Whatever could go wrong??? and I look forward to the US Army's latest weapon system, the MIR-235 Multi-Balloon Drone Intercept System (MBDIS), designed to fill and launch hundreds of balloons to protect Army BCTs from the tactical drone threat.
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Nov 1, 2018 23:04
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Finger Prince posted:Stuff like Crew Resource Management and Human Factors are very much Aviation skills though, because nobody else in the loving world even teaches that poo poo. It's dry as hell and everyone hates doing the recurrent training, but they really should teach Human Factors in high school as a mandatory course. EVERYONE would benefit from it, regardless of industry. I don't disagree. But saying that automation is the contributing factor that's allowing these people to not learn those skills just feels like telling the kids to get off the lawn.
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Nov 1, 2018 23:06
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MRC48B posted:Oh Ye of little faith... I mean, I guess it happens, but it's a rounding error compared to accidents caused by loss of situational awareness, poor PDM, poor CRM, VFR into IMC, fuel starvation and all the other things caused more by human factors than an actual inability to control the aircraft properly. I suppose to a certain extent the line blurs between poor pilot decision-making and inability to control the aircraft. For example, there was an airplane on a training flight that crashed in our local practice area last year. It was a twin, and it's believed that it crashed after doing a stall and entering a spin. Data later showed that the flight school had been, in contravention of training guidelines, purposefully adding yaw at the point of stall in their twin-engine training syllabus to demonstrate the effects. Is the resulting crash a result of insufficient pilot skill for not being able to recover from the spin, or a result of poor pilot decision making for doing that in an aircraft not approved for spins, or even an example of bad CRM because there were two instructors on-board and either there might have been confusion over who should do what during the recovery, or they thought they were hot poo poo because they were both instructors? I think you could make a fairly compelling case for any or all of the above, but I'd argue that the decision to put the aircraft in that situation in the first place is a greater causal factor in the accident than not being able to recover quickly enough. EDIT: And not to turn this into "PT6A bitches about poor PDM" but after a number of crashes we've had in the mountains recently, I'm sick of hearing about how the weather was responsible for a crash. Bullshit. The pilot is responsible for taking their aircraft into an area of bad weather, and/or putting themselves in a situation without a way to turn back. PT6A fucked around with this message at 23:32 on Nov 1, 2018 |
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Nov 1, 2018 23:17
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PT6A posted:Crashes rarely happen because someone is really lovely at the physical act of flying a plane. Not at all discounting your point; I agree with you. ...But Asiana 214.
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Nov 1, 2018 23:49
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Finger Prince posted:Stuff like Crew Resource Management and Human Factors are very much Aviation skills though, because nobody else in the loving world even teaches that poo poo. It's dry as hell and everyone hates doing the recurrent training, but they really should teach Human Factors in high school as a mandatory course. EVERYONE would benefit from it, regardless of industry.
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Nov 1, 2018 23:56
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The idea of teaching aircraft crew risk management to all high schoolers is pretty hilarious. “I know professionals hate it, so let’s try having teens do it with public school teachers.”
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Nov 2, 2018 00:02
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MrYenko posted:Not at all discounting your point; I agree with you. I'd say 50/50 split between failure to control aircraft, and either poor PDM or CRM. A go-around should have been initiated at an altitude where it was safe to do so. It was necessary because the aircraft was not being controlled properly. EDIT: Or, to put it another way: good decision-making can get you out of a situation caused by incorrect handling of the aircraft in a lot of cases. Perfect, expert-level skill at controlling the aircraft will get out of a situation caused by poor decision-making much, much less frequently. PT6A fucked around with this message at 00:12 on Nov 2, 2018 |
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Nov 2, 2018 00:05
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Well I for one work at a car parts factory but make every fuckin new guy read the Pinnacle 3701 report and have been pushing that Bud Holland case study on our new training specialist. The broad, industry-secular lessons being, respectively, "Admit you're hosed and ask for help as soon as you know you're hosed because you'll only get more hosed if you wait" and "If you see everyone covering for a hot dog escalate that poo poo as far as you have to because he will get you killed" shame on an IGA fucked around with this message at 00:12 on Nov 2, 2018 |
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Nov 2, 2018 00:07
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The Bud Holland case is used for all kinds of stuff. But you can read the background in an hour or so and discuss it in another couple of hours without knowing anything about aviation.
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Nov 2, 2018 00:10
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mlmp08 posted:The Bud Holland case is used for all kinds of stuff. But you can read the background in an hour or so and discuss it in another couple of hours without knowing anything about aviation.
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Nov 2, 2018 00:18
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PT6A posted:I think part of the problem -- and you can see this in the tone of the article itself, although it doesn't seem to exhibit any self-awareness of the fact -- is that automation is too often looked at as something separate from pilotage, as if it can meaningfully exist apart from the pilot. Being a pilot means being able to control your aircraft. There is no difference, fundamentally speaking, between doing this job with your hands on the controls directly, or by correctly managing the systems that run the aircraft. To draw a significant distinction between those things would be like saying there's a significant difference between flying a plane with direct mechanical linkages to the controls, one with hydraulic control surfaces, and one that's entirely fly-by-wire. As far as the first bolded part, there is a world of difference between the two modes of flying. And the second bolded part is where you yourself noted them separately. Yeah in one sense (what your job is to put the airplane in the right place, at the end of the day) they're the same. And in the narrow sense, they're two components. But the narrow sense is nothing to gloss over, it's a fundamental part of what's going on with automation dependency. Here I'll quote myself talking about the crash of Indian 605 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Airlines_Flight_605) on another forum. It's a very similar crash as Asiana 214, where they flubbed up the automation modes and flew a perfectly good airplane, on a clear day, into the ground. Unlike Asiana, everyone was killed. quote:People react to unusual and/or sudden situations not by rational analysis (which if employed in these 2 cases would have said "Whoa, we're flying at the ground. Let's fly at the runway or the sky instead. And let's do so by making the appropriate pitch and power inputs.") but by gut-level reactions that are akin to instinctive reflexes. Or, a "comfort zone" if you will, of what actions will be taken. When in any (even slightly) non-normal thing happens, you'll always run to your comfort zone. Like that if something suddenly flies at your face, you'll blink. Now example is biological, and the aeronautical reflexes I'm talking about are not; but they're trained-in to a level where they might as well be. Like if you're driving a car and it starts drifting left, you'll automatically correct to the right without even thinking about it. Of course it's our job to be just as proficient with the automatics as with manual flight. But the attitude in the training department, and the cockpit, is that automation management is the paradigm not in addition to manual flight, but instead of it. Of course no one's gonna say that, but that's exactly how they treat it, without realizing. When I started at my regional, to my best memory, I had to hand fly something like 2 or 3 approaches throughout the entire course of training. Literally. And this is from glideslope intercept, with the flight director on. With that experience, I got shoved out onto the line with practically no ability or confidence to fly an approach. Now, I'd had a small background of IFR flying, a bigger background of learning to fly intimidating airplanes, an even bigger background in stick and rudder flying in intimidating situations, and a baseline of actual enjoyment of flying. And even so, guess what: the CRJ was intimidating! How to get past that? I fly on the line a lot without the automatics, pushing my own comfort, and gradually building up my proficiency and confidence. Now 2 years and 1000 hours later, I feel just about OK. But not much more than that. But if I followed the example from the left seat, in this time I would have turned the autopilot off above 1000 feet no more than a handful of times even in the most benign conditions, turned off the flight director an even smaller handful of times, flown in IMC maybe twice or 3 times ever, and not once so much as intercepted a course, intercepted a glideslope, levelled off at an altitude from a climb or descent, or changed speed or flap setting at an assigned altitude. Had I followed this example (which I can only assume most FO's do, especially ones coming in with less experience) then what experience would I have to fall back upon if the airplane suddenly went "chirp chirp chirp you have the controls?" And, on top of that, there's suddenly multiple aural alarms, a screenfull of warning/caution messages, and conflicting and erratic airspeed indications? How could I have any ability or confidence? Someone of the baseline I described can only reasonably be expected to do what the AF447 crew did: follow the erroneous +8000 fpm climbing flight director, and stall it. I see no other possibility. They say all kinds of things in favor of the automatics like reducing your workload, or helping you stabilize the approach, or letting you maintain better situational awareness, (or "I'm too old and lazy LOL"), which, each one of those things in context makes sense, but when you add them all up they strangely seem to add up to using the autopilot all the time and avoiding something uncomfortable. The attitude is that flying the plane is a whimsical lark reserved for only the calmest of days into the quietest of airports (and even then); and anything outside of that is toying around where responsible pilots are supposed to be working seriously - i.e., with the autopilot on. Any notion that we have a basis of experience to fall upon in hand flying, is a complete fig leaf. I hear from check pilots and ground instructors all the time, and overheard them with guys on OE, where the say something like "we know you can fly an airplane by now" - but it's bewildering to me because there's not a shred of basis for saying that - it seems to come out like a verbal tic - and go on to talk about "managing the situation," the focus instead. Automation doen't cause automation dependency, but in enables it. And it takes a huge amount of swimming upstream, in many senses, to avoid it. vessbot fucked around with this message at 01:59 on Nov 2, 2018 |
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Nov 2, 2018 00:46
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Here's some aeronautical insanity from the San Diego Air and Space Museum Archives:    I am now very sad that this design didn't make it into production.
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Nov 2, 2018 00:53
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StandardVC10 posted:Here's some aeronautical insanity from the San Diego Air and Space Museum Archives: That is a sexy aircraft.
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Nov 2, 2018 00:57
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Stupid question. In how many cases would "point nose at horizon -> apply 80% thrust" kill you? Disregarding engine failures etc it should be safe no? (Smarter ppl have thought about this im sure but curious etc..)
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Nov 2, 2018 01:00
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I see your Tradewind and raise you a SeaMaster.
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Nov 2, 2018 01:09
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InAndOutBrennan posted:Stupid question. In how many cases would "point nose at horizon -> apply 80% thrust" kill you? Disregarding engine failures etc it should be safe no? (Smarter ppl have thought about this im sure but curious etc..) Airbus pilots are told you cannot stall an Airbus. Air France was an exception when you can. Specifically nose at horizon + add power would have worked for them. We have this discussion every year or so. The normal conclusion is that an Airbus will tell you everything you need to know to fly it safely, if you get lots of sim time and training to know to look for it.. But, you know, money.
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Nov 2, 2018 01:11
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Here's a selection of crashes. My hall of horrors of automation dependency. Asiana 214 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asiana_Airlines_Flight_214) Most of us know about this one. Perfect airplane, clear day, mode confusion, no one's minding the store with the airspeed, crash into seawall. 3 people die Flash 604 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_Airlines_Flight_604) Perfect airplane, night, autopilot disconnects itself due to inadvertent pressure on controls, they flail around trying to turn the autopilot back on so the airplane will fly itself. It doesn't. Meanwhile no one flies it as it gently rolls into a dive into the water. About 60 seconds between the disengagement (which they knew about) and the crash. Everyone dies. A telling CVR transcript: 02:43:55 CA: Autopilot 02:43:56 MSR227: Right zero four 02:43:58 CA: Not yet 02:43:59 ATC: There is no problem Straight in ILS approach runway zero four left god willing report fuel establish QNH one zero one 02:44:00 FO Autopilot in command sir 02:44:01 CA: Exclamation remark 02:44:02 : Sound of A/P disengage warning 02:44:05 CA: Heading select 02:44:05 MSR227: Straight in approach runway zero four lrft, one zero one, next call full establish Egypt air two two seven 02:44:07 FO: Heading select 02:44:18 CA: See what the aircraft did! 02:44:27 FO: Turning right sir 02:44:30 CA: What? 02:44:31 FO: Aircraft is turning right 02:44:32 CA: AH 02:44:35 CA: Turning right? 02:44:37 CA: How turning right 02:44:41 CA: Ok come out 02:44:41 FO: Over bank 02:44:41 CA: Autopilot 02:44:43 CA: Autopilot 02:44:44 FO: Autopilot in command 02:44:46 CA: Autopilot 02:44:48 FO Over bank, over bank, over bank 02:44:50 CA: OK 02:44:52 FO: Over bank 02:44:53 CA: OK, come out 02:44:56 FO: No autopilot commander 02:44:58 CA: Autopilot 02:44:58 EC1: Retard power, retard power, retard power 02:45:01 CA: Retard power 02:45:02 : Sound similar to overspeed clacker 02:45:04 CA: Come out 02:35:05 FO: No god except... 02:35:05 SV: "whoop" sound similar to ground proximity warning 02:45:06 END OF RECORDING Aeroflot 593 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593) Perfect airplane, night, Captain's kid is in the left seat. Autopilot on, Captain is loving around over the kid's shoulder with the heading bug, letting him think he's flying. Autopilot disconnects itself in roll axis only due to inadvertent control pressure, and no warning. It slowly rolls itself into a dive, they start asking "why's it doing this?" instead of the FO, who's in his seat, deciding to fly and level the wings. Gobs of time before it reaches even 45 degrees of bank. By the time someone decides to fly it, it's in a vertical dive, severe overcorrection into hammerhead, crash, everyone dies. Indian 605 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Airlines_Flight_605) Perfect airplane, day visual, mode confusion, airplane crashes. 25 seconds before crash, they realized it's heading toward the ground way short of the airport, no one decides to fly. Further flurries of knob twists and button pushes, plane still crashes. Two thirds of people die. [edit: actually the autopilot was off, but due to mode confusion the autothrottle was holding the engines at idle. So it's a perfect duplicate of Asiana 214] Turkish 1951 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Airlines_Flight_1951) Day visual. Not quite perfect airplane. Momentary glitch of radar altimeter causes autothrottles to come back to idle (airplane thinks it's in the flare). Pilot notices and pushes throttles back up. Hey good idea! But he leaves autothrottle engaged, airplane still thinks it's in the flare, so it brings the throttles back to idle. No one minds the store for the next 30 seconds, airplane crashes short of the airport, 9 people die. vessbot fucked around with this message at 05:30 on Nov 2, 2018 |
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Nov 2, 2018 01:11
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vessbot posted:They say all kinds of things in favor of the automatics like reducing your workload, or helping you stabilize the approach, or letting you maintain better situational awareness, (or "I'm too old and lazy LOL"), which, each one of those things in context makes sense, but when you add them all up they strangely seem to add up to using the autopilot all the time and avoiding something uncomfortable. It's nice that pilots still talk like those are the underlying reasons for automation, and to an extent it's true, but let's not kid ourselves. Automation exists because of economics. Computers can fly an aircraft a lot more economically than a human. I wonder if the future of flight training and airline ops is training pilots to handle the emergency situations only, where the automation fails, instead of "how to program and monitor the FMS", and have the fully automated flight plans programmed and uploaded by dispatch.
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Nov 2, 2018 01:19
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hannibal posted:and I look forward to the US Army's latest weapon system, the MIR-235 Multi-Balloon Drone Intercept System (MBDIS), designed to fill and launch hundreds of balloons to protect Army BCTs from the tactical drone threat. Turns out, United Way pioneered the technique. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balloonfest_%2786
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Nov 2, 2018 01:20
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vessbot posted:As far as the first bolded part, there is a world of difference between the two modes of flying. And the second bolded part is where you yourself noted them separately. Yeah in one sense (what your job is to put the airplane in the right place, at the end of the day) they're the same. And in the narrow sense, they're two components. But the narrow sense is nothing to gloss over, it's a fundamental part of what's going on with automation dependency. Yeah, perhaps I didn't express quite what I wanted to with my earlier post -- obviously, there are huge differences in how the systems operate -- but my main point, and I think it's one you'd agree with given the bit I bolded, is that in the end these are tools we use to make the airplane do what we want it to do, and we must be completely proficient in controlling the aircraft using any of the systems we might use to do so. Is someone who's really proficient with automated systems but lovely at hand-flying worse than someone who doesn't understand the automation but attempts to use it anyway? Yeah, I think you could argue that, but the more important point is neither of them are good pilots at that point. There are two separate issues at play: the first one is a misunderstanding of the way automated systems are operating at a given time, which indicates a lack of full proficiency with the automated systems, the second one is a lack of proficiency in being able to control the aircraft without automated systems. They both end up under the broader category of not being able to control the aircraft using the systems available to control the aircraft, which is why I simplified the situation to the "these things are basically the same because we use them to put the aircraft where we want it" statement originally. You need to know how to use all of them and understand how they work, and how they fail. A lack of proficiency with any system onboard an aircraft has the possibility to lead to a crash. Maybe there's a little bit of personal under-confidence/bias in this, because I hand-fly all the time (what with no autopilot, and all) and I refuse to believe that makes me somehow better than someone who knows how to manage a technologically advanced aircraft proficiently. You need skill and experience to do that properly just the same. InAndOutBrennan posted:Stupid question. In how many cases would "point nose at horizon -> apply 80% thrust" kill you? Disregarding engine failures etc it should be safe no? (Smarter ppl have thought about this im sure but curious etc..) Spiral dive recovery comes to mind -- you need to reduce power to prevent overspeed and excessive altitude loss, then roll wings level, then point the nose at the horizon, only adding power at a safe speed. EDIT: In all honesty, it seems like a lot of those fuckups are from people who are poo poo at hand-flying and also bad at figuring out the automation. That's just mediocrity all the way around. PT6A fucked around with this message at 01:33 on Nov 2, 2018 |
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Nov 2, 2018 01:29
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I’m glad I cut my teeth in the automation realm with the garbage AP on the PC12, my first instinct any time the automation starts doing something weird/unexpected is to just disconnect and hand fly instead of troubleshooting and letting the problem exacerbate itself.
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Nov 2, 2018 01:35
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e.pilot posted:I’m glad I cut my teeth in the automation realm with the garbage AP on the PC12, my first instinct any time the automation starts doing something weird/unexpected is to just disconnect and hand fly instead of troubleshooting and letting the problem exacerbate itself. That seems fair. The autopilot on the Seneca I did my IFR training in was so bizarre that I hand-flew everything, including the entire checkride. So from that point of view, maybe that's why I see anyone who can actually coerce the AP into doing what they want it to do as skilled and possibly slightly magical 
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Nov 2, 2018 01:47
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PT6A posted:Yeah, perhaps I didn't express quite what I wanted to with my earlier post -- obviously, there are huge differences in how the systems operate -- but my main point, and I think it's one you'd agree with given the bit I bolded, is that in the end these are tools we use to make the airplane do what we want it to do, and we must be completely proficient in controlling the aircraft using any of the systems we might use to do so. Is someone who's really proficient with automated systems but lovely at hand-flying worse than someone who doesn't understand the automation but attempts to use it anyway? Yeah, I think you could argue that, but the more important point is neither of them are good pilots at that point. We do agree. And I pretty much knew what you meant already, but I was basically using the narrow sense of the statement as a springboard into my rant.
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Nov 2, 2018 02:06
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InAndOutBrennan posted:Stupid question. In how many cases would "point nose at horizon -> apply 80% thrust" kill you? Disregarding engine failures etc it should be safe no? (Smarter ppl have thought about this im sure but curious etc..) This is essentially the basis of the unreliable airspeed emergency checklist for most planes. You're on the right track.
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Nov 2, 2018 02:08
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Anecdote time: one night on the MOC desk I had an Airbus in Edmonton which had, IIRC, both autopilots fail on the gate, and no autothrottle (might have been a dual FMGC failure or something, it was years ago and I don't remember the details). No spares, no more flights to ship in spares, last flight to Ottawa, night flight, winter. Well gently caress. So, get the chief pilot on the horn because we need to have a conference with these pilots because they are not going to take this aircraft with both autopilots on MEL, and we need to be sure that we're all in agreement. I explain the situation, we're both expecting the pilots to refuse, I know the chief will back that decision. Pilots are like yup got it, bridge is off, we're going, no autopilots no problem, we'll hand fly it the whole way. Thanks for the effort! That. Never. Happens. I've had some superstar pilots help me out of some major jams before, but having them hand fly across the country at night without even being asked? NDA disclaimer: All characters and events in this post --even those based on real people-- are entirely fictional. All pilot voices are impersonated ... poorly. The preceding post contains coarse language and due to its content it should not be viewed by anyone.
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Nov 2, 2018 02:11
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Finger Prince posted:Anecdote time: one night on the MOC desk I had an Airbus in Edmonton which had, IIRC, both autopilots fail on the gate, and no autothrottle (might have been a dual FMGC failure or something, it was years ago and I don't remember the details). No spares, no more flights to ship in spares, last flight to Ottawa, night flight, winter. Well gently caress. So, get the chief pilot on the horn because we need to have a conference with these pilots because they are not going to take this aircraft with both autopilots on MEL, and we need to be sure that we're all in agreement. I don't get it, did they do it? e: I feel dumb asking, but I'm just not penetrating the (if any) layers of SA-style humor/sarcasm vessbot fucked around with this message at 02:22 on Nov 2, 2018 |
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Nov 2, 2018 02:14
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Finger Prince posted:Anecdote time: one night on the MOC desk I had an Airbus in Edmonton which had, IIRC, both autopilots fail on the gate, and no autothrottle (might have been a dual FMGC failure or something, it was years ago and I don't remember the details). No spares, no more flights to ship in spares, last flight to Ottawa, night flight, winter. Well gently caress. So, get the chief pilot on the horn because we need to have a conference with these pilots because they are not going to take this aircraft with both autopilots on MEL, and we need to be sure that we're all in agreement. I flew a 172 from Calgary to Peace River and back in one day, that’s probably about the same amount of tedious hand-flying. I’d give YEG-YOW in a jet a try, why not?
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Nov 2, 2018 02:21
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Would mandating 100 hours of your 1500 hours to ATP be in aerobatics save more lives than it kills? Airline interview. You think you’re going to the simulator. Except the bus takes you to the flight line. There’s a L-39 in United Airlines livery. Man in lab coat hands you a paper - your final assessment: 1v1 dogfight with the Chief Pilot. He’s orbiting at 15,000 ft at the SFO 300 radial, 35 DME. Good hunting! INTJ Mastermind fucked around with this message at 02:26 on Nov 2, 2018 |
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Nov 2, 2018 02:22
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StandardVC10 posted:Here's some aeronautical insanity from the San Diego Air and Space Museum Archives: Now imagine how long it might have lasted as an assault landing aircraft.
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Nov 2, 2018 02:34
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vessbot posted:I don't get it, did they do it? Yeah they took it! Believe me I would not have been surprised if they were pulling some meta level joke on me and actually were on the way back to the hotel already when I called them. But no, they were more than happy to take the aircraft. I've certainly had pilots refuse aircraft for less.
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Nov 2, 2018 02:34
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INTJ Mastermind posted:Would mandating 100 hours of your 1500 hours to ATP be in aerobatics save more lives than it kills? Unusual attitude recovery and spin recovery are part of standard pilot testing.
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Nov 2, 2018 02:45
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