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ded redd posted:or the us trying to feign plausible deniability about their involvement I think it's because, if Israel strikes any of the sites in Iran's nuclear program, not only is that a big deal, but just in terms of logistics, they required direct US involvement, in terms of aerial refuelling, to carry it out. Israeli aircraft are not capable of hitting targets deep inside Iran without direct US support. Sensibly, the nuclear research sites are located pretty far inside Iran. So, the US could be trying to establish a plausible explanation for USAF tankers, and presumably AWACS and EW assets forming part of the strike package, while backing away from what is very obviously a huge escalation, just in terms of US-Iran relations, if you think about the nuclear deal.
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Apr 17, 2024 15:59
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F_Shit_Fitzgerald posted:As much as I despise Israel I can't say that I blame them too much for not sharing information. What's Genocide Joe going to do about it, old man babble in front of a presser? joe knows theyre just distancing themselves from israel's probable plan to blow up a school or orphanage
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Apr 17, 2024 15:59
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If you remember the US tanker squawking a distress code the other day, this could get dangerous for the US fast. I would imagine the hope is that, by denying knowledge of the target, they aim to thread a needle where the entire strike package is made possible via US involvement, while somehow avoiding US aircraft being engaged, or US targets being bombarded in retaliation, that's a tall order. Not that it would matter in the media or whatever, but if the US was part of the mission, which I think they're hoping to deny by claiming to have no knowledge of the target, then it would obviously be acceptable for the Iranians to shoot down the US aircraft that are going to be flying support. They used a similar legal fiction in Yemen, but obviously there the US tankers, AWACS, recce and EW aircraft weren't actually at risk. e: I seem to remember a policy paper, or maybe it was a chapter in a book on air doctrine or coalition warfare, that used strikes on Iran as a specific case study, because of the amount of support US aircraft would have to provide.
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Apr 17, 2024 16:05
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Guessing Azerbaijan is not allowing Israel to use their airspace/land to launch attacks out of again
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Apr 17, 2024 16:06
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if they feed Aliyev more chunks of Armenia in return, who knows
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Apr 17, 2024 16:12
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DJJIB-DJDCT posted:I think it's because, if Israel strikes any of the sites in Iran's nuclear program, not only is that a big deal, but just in terms of logistics, they required direct US involvement, in terms of aerial refuelling, to carry it out. Israeli aircraft are not capable of hitting targets deep inside Iran without direct US support. Sensibly, the nuclear research sites are located pretty far inside Iran. Also all the vaunted cyber intelligence capability of Israel is mostly them copying the NSA’s equation group’s poo poo and then being the ones who gently caress it up- the whole reason we know about Stuxnet and a few other super hard to detect malware that the NSA made is because Unit 8200 who had it specifically to get into very well protected and air gapped machinery in Iranian nuclear fuel refining sites ran around using the most secret sensitive poo poo for routine bullshit that didn’t remotely require it.
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Apr 17, 2024 16:15
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I have to say, that like with Ukraine, the culture of "Publish or Perish" extending to academics and think tanks in the defence world, public and private, means that there's nearly always some sort of circumstantial evidence after the fact, even if people will adamantly deny it. ANALYSIS PAPER Number 20, June 2009, WHICH PATH TO PERSIA?: Options for a New American Strategy toward Iran "Leave it to Bibi": Allowing or encouraging an Israeli military strike For the United States, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been an enemy for 30 years, one that has sought to thwart U.S. policies in the Middle East, such as advancing the Arab-Israeli peace process and creating stable regional security arrangements. Crisis after crisis has arisen between Iran and the United States, but Iran has never been and almost certainly never will be an existential threat to the United States. It harbors no territorial designs on the United States, has never conducted a terrorist operation aimed at the American homeland, and, even should it acquire nuclear weapons, lacks the delivery systems to threaten the United States directly. Further, its economy is anemic, and even if substantially reformed, will probably never provide the base for Iran to make itself a challenger to the United States on par with Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, or Communist China. But for Israel, Iran is a much more dangerous opponent—it is close and threatening. There is a virtual consensus in Israel that Iran cannot be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. From left to right across the political spectrum, a great many Israelis see a threat to their very survival from a nuclear Iran. Former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said, “Israel will not tolerate a nuclear weapon in the hands of people who say openly, explicitly, and publicly that they want to wipe Israel off the map.” In his first speech to the Knesset after being sworn in as Prime Minister, Binyamin (“Bibi”) Netanyahu said, “We cannot afford to take lightly megalomaniac tyrants who threaten to annihilate us.” Other Israeli leaders are more reasoned but also are determined to prevent Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. Ephraim Sneh, former Deputy Defense Minister and a much-decorated retired General of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), notes that “the most salient strategic threat to Israel’s existence is Iran.” These leaders fear that Israel’s strategic room for maneuver in the region would be constrained by an Iranian nuclear deterrent. The success of Iranian-backed terrorist groups, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank, in the last few years has only added to Israel’s concern. Even relatively dovish analysts like the historian Benny Morris write about an Iranian bomb in apocalyptic terms: “The Iranians are driven by a higher logic. And they will launch their rockets. And, as with the first Holocaust, the international community will do nothing. It will all be over for Israel in a few minutes—not like in the 1940s, when the world had five long years in which to wring its hands and do nothing.” Only a few Israeli commentators have suggested the threat may be exaggerated or that it actually serves Israeli interests to have a threat from Iran. Former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy argues that “Ahmadinejad is our greatest gift. We couldn’t carry out a better operation in the Mossad than to put a guy like Ahmadinejad in power in Iran.” But even Halevy believes Iran is a serious threat to Israel’s interests. It is clear from discussions with Israeli military and intelligence officials, and from numerous press leaks and reports that Israel is well underway in planning for a military operation to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel’s Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, said in 2007 that “the things that we do behind the scenes, far from the public eye, are far more important than the slogan charade,” implying that Israeli covert capabilities are already hard at work trying to cope with the Iranian threat and preparing to attack it if they must. It is impossible to know what those plans entail in detail without access to the IDF’s secret planning, but Israelis say the mission is “not impossible.” The IDF’s September 6, 2007 attack on the Syrian nuclear facility at Dayr az-Zawr is widely believed in Israel to have been in part a message to Tehran that Iran may be next. Israeli leaders have been warning about the Iranian threat since the early 1990s. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin highlighted the danger Iran posed to Israel in his first visit to the United States in 1992 after his election. Israeli intelligence operations against Iran were stepped up even earlier and have included use of third parties to publicize the Iranian threat without revealing the Israeli hand. Iran’s secret enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs were publicly exposed in August 2002 by an Iranian dissident group (the Mujahedin-e Khalq), which reportedly was unwittingly fed the information by Israeli intelligence. In short, there is considerable reason to believe that under the right (or wrong) set of circumstances, Israel would launch an attack—principally airstrikes, but possibly backed by special forces operations—to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. This could create either an opportunity for or a threat to American interests with regard to Iran and the broader Middle East. It could constitute an opportunity, and thus a possible policy option, if the United States would like to see Iran’s nuclear program destroyed but prefers not to do it itself. It could be a threat if the United States believes that an Israeli attack would destabilize the region and would not advance (or would harm) American interests in relation to Iran. Not surprisingly, some Americans have expressed the hope that Israel would strike Iran—that Jerusalem would have the “guts” to do what Washington does not. Other Americans regard the prospect with horror, believing that an Israeli attack would have all the disadvantages of American airstrikes (as well as some unique ones) and none of their advantages. American decision-makers need to have a clear sense of what such an Israeli operation would look like, as well as the pros and cons for the United states, to decide whether to try to encourage or discourage it. Goal As in the case of American airstrikes against Iran, the goal of this policy option would be to destroy key Iranian nuclear facilities in the hope that doing so would significantly delay Iran’s acquisition of an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. However, in this case, an added element could be that the United States would encourage—and perhaps even assist—the Israelis in conducting the strikes themselves, in the expectation that both international criticism and Iranian retaliation would be deflected away from the United States and onto Israel. The logic behind this approach is that allowing Israel to mount the airstrikes, rather than the United States, provides a way out of the dilemma described in the previous chapter, whereby American airstrikes against Iran could become self-defeating because they would undermine every other American initiative in the Middle East, an outcome exactly the opposite of what a new Iran policy is meant to accomplish. As with American airstrikes against the Iranian nuclear program, this option would not entail any direct effort to deal with Iran’s support for terrorists and radical groups, nor would it directly seek to mitigate other Iranian efforts to subvert the status quo in the Middle East. At most, this policy assumes that Iran’s ability to pursue such activities would be greatly enhanced by possession of a (presumed) nuclear weapons capability, and therefore that removing this threat would help limit Iran’s ability to cause problems for the United States in the region. Likewise, this approach makes no effort to change the Iranian regime or otherwise reshape its character. Time Frame If the United States decided to encourage Israel to mount airstrikes against Iran, the entire operation could happen very quickly, probably much faster than a similar American campaign. Israel appears to have done extensive planning and practice for such a strike already, and its aircraft are probably already based as close to Iran as possible. As such, Israel might be able to launch the strike in a matter of weeks or even days, depending on what weather and intelligence conditions it felt it needed. Moreover, since Israel would have much less of a need (or even interest) in securing regional support for the operation, Jerusalem probably would feel less motivated to wait for an Iranian provocation before attacking. In short, Israel could move very fast to implement this option if both Israeli and American leaders wanted it to happen. However, as noted in the previous chapter, the airstrikes themselves are really just the start of this policy. Again, the Iranians would doubtless rebuild their nuclear sites. They would probably retaliate against Israel, and they might retaliate against the United States, too (which might create a pretext for American airstrikes or even an invasion). And it seems unlikely that they would cease their support for violent extremist groups or efforts to overturn the regional status quo in the aftermath of Israeli airstrikes. Their opposition to an Arab-Israeli peace treaty would likely be redoubled. Hence the United States would still need a strategy to handle Iran after the completion of the Israeli airstrikes, and this could mean a much longer time frame to achieve all of America’s goals. Overview of the Policy An Israeli air campaign against Iran would have a number of very important differences from an American campaign. First, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has the problem of overflight transit from Israel to Iran. Israel has no aircraft carriers, so its planes must take off from Israeli air bases. It also does not possess long-range bombers like the B-1 or B-2, or huge fleets of refueling tankers, all of which means that unlike the United States, Israel cannot avoid flying through someone’s airspace. The most direct route from Israel to Iran’s Natanz facility is roughly 1,750 kilometers across Jordan and Iraq. As the occupying power in Iraq, the United States is responsible for defending Iraqi airspace. The alternatives via Turkish airspace (over 2,200 kilometers) or Saudi airspace (over 2,400 kilometers) would also put the attack force into the skies of U.S. allies equipped with American-supplied air defenses and fighter aircraft. In the case of Turkey, an Israeli overflight would be further complicated by the fact that Turkey is a NATO ally that the United States has a commitment to defend, and it hosts a large, joint Turkish-American airbase along the most likely route of attack. For political and military reasons, Israel’s need to overfly Turkish, Iraqi-Jordanian, or Saudi airspace creates two problems. First, an Israeli strike must achieve surprise so that Israeli planes are not intercepted by the air defenses and fighters of those countries. Second, in part based on reason number one, the Israelis would get basically one shot at Iran. On the first pass, they likely would surprise any of those countries and be able to reach Iran and return before the Turks, Saudis, or Jordanians could activate their air defenses; but a second wave would meet alerted air defenses, creating military and political problems that Israel would likely find insurmountable. An initial Israeli attack across Iraqi territory would severely complicate the U.S. military presence there; a repeat performance would likely compromise it altogether. Thus, after the first round of strikes, Israel would have nothing but its small fleet of ballistic missiles and submarine-launched cruise missiles for follow-on attacks, and because the ballistic missiles are such valuable assets, Jerusalem would not likely squander them on anything but the highest value Iranian targets. Another problem Israel faces is distance. The IAF possesses 25 F-15i long-range strike aircraft, which have a combat radius of over 2,500 kilometers, giving them the range to hit Iranian targets even if they have to fly via Turkey or Saudi Arabia. However, 25 aircraft is a tiny number given the size, dispersal, and hardening of the Iranian nuclear program, especially since the planes could not carry much ordnance, nor would they have the ability to hit multiple facilities on a single sortie at that distance. So Israel’s F-15i fleet alone could not hope to do as much damage to the Iranian nuclear program as even the small-scale American airstrike discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, just employing the 25 F-15is probably would not make the operation worthwhile from Jerusalem’s or Washington’s perspective. In addition to the F-15is, Israel has acquired 100 F-16i fighter bombers. There is a great deal of speculation regarding the combat range of the F-16i, which most sources suggest is roughly 1,600-1,800 kilometers. However, at least one well-regarded Israeli source has stated that it has a range of 2,100 kilometers. Even if the longer distance is possible, this means that the F-16is only have the range to strike Iran unrefueled if they fly the shortest route across Jordan and Iraq—which is also the most politically problematic because it clearly incriminates the United States as Israel’s witting accomplice in the strike. From the American perspective, this negates the whole point of the option—distancing the United States from culpability—and it could jeopardize American efforts in Iraq, thus making it a possible nonstarter for Washington. Finally, Israeli violation of Jordanian airspace would likely create political problems for King Abdullah of Jordan, one of America’s (and Israel’s) closest Arab friends in the region. Thus, it is exceedingly unlikely that the United States would allow Israel to overfly Iraq, and because of the problems it would create for Washington and Amman, it is unlikely that Israel would try to fly over Jordan. Consequently, in most scenarios, for Israel to mount an airstrike of any size against Iran—assuming that Israel cannot secretly refuel its aircraft at an air base near Iran—it would have to provide in-flight refueling to enable the F-16is to participate. This is a further complication because while it is possible for fighter aircraft to refuel one another, doing so immediately halves the number of planes actually dropping bombs (the other half are doing the refueling and so carry fuel, not weapons). In addition, since “buddy refueling” by other fighter bombers is inefficient, it may take multiple refuelings—meaning that out of 100 F-16is committed, perhaps only 25 might be able to make it to the targets in Iran. The alternative is the more traditional method of using large tanker aircraft to provide the fuel, but these are extremely vulnerable. Because of this, and given the remarkable capabilities demonstrated by the IAF over the years, the possibility that Israel would find ways to “hide” tankers in international airspace or fly them with the strike packages for much of the way until their services are no longer needed should not be ruled out. However, such risky operations would only be feasible for the first round of strikes. Once the surprise is over and the Iranians, Turks, Jordanians, and/or Saudis have their air defenses on alert, the tankers would be highly vulnerable. What all of this means is that, realistically, an Israeli strike against Iran could consist of no more than 125 Israeli F-15i and F-16i sorties (with limited weapons loads because of the distance), backed by a small number of cruise missile shots. This is not a meaningless force, and it likely could do a considerable amount of damage to the best known of Iran’s facilities. But again, it probably could not do as much damage as even the limited American airstrikes option discussed in the previous chapter—it probably would not even be able to cover all the targets listed. Moreover, the IAF would have virtually no capability to conduct opportunity strikes on targets revealed by Iranian actions during the attacks themselves. Nor would it have much, if any, ability to follow up with repeat strikes to hit facilities where the initial attack failed to destroy the target. Overall, an Israeli strike would be even less likely to meaningfully set back the Iranian nuclear program than would an American air campaign.
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Apr 17, 2024 16:18
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DJJIB-DJDCT posted:If you remember the US tanker squawking a distress code the other day, this could get dangerous for the US fast. I would imagine the hope is that, by denying knowledge of the target, they aim to thread a needle where the entire strike package is made possible via US involvement, while somehow avoiding US aircraft being engaged, or US targets being bombarded in retaliation, that's a tall order.
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Apr 17, 2024 16:19
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any Israeli strike is unprovoked at this point ans iran will just counter strike again after the UNSC does nothing I mean one of the UNSC knows it’s happening for gods’ sake
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Apr 17, 2024 16:23
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Harik posted:there's zero way the US could plausibly deny operational knowledge if they're setting up the logistics of a strike. They absolutely would try it, bald-faced liars that they are, but nobody would buy it so I'm not sure what it would accomplish. There's just too much planning that goes into an operation for them to turn around and say "golly gee they told us they were totally going to blow up a runway with bunker busters that we had to account for the weight and drag of." If you read that 10 page chapter on having Israel do it, they believe they can deny knowledge (and retaliation) for providing all of the tanking, EW and AWACS support. "Advantages: As noted, the most salient advantage this option has over that of an American air campaign is the possibility that Israel alone would be blamed for the attack. if this proves true, then the United states might not have to deal with Iranian retaliation or the diplomatic backlash that would accompany an American military operation against Iran. it could allow Washington to have its cake (delay Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon) and eat it, too (avoid undermining many other U.S. regional diplomatic initiatives)." 
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Apr 17, 2024 16:34
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Lmao loving idiots. Iran will absolutely destroy Israel.
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Apr 17, 2024 16:37
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Did any country outside of America and it’s colonies condemn Irans retaliatory strike
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Apr 17, 2024 16:37
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Sanlav posted:When they butchered my baby boy Jeremy like that, I died a lot. I think it was around the time Bernie was getting dog walked through primary season by Debbie Dubbs. It was like a jungian shedding of any liberal rot. The mere aspiration to do better got him killed in the street, like a dog. Do you have an article that details what happened to Mr. Corbyn in its entirety? I would like to read about what happened to him from an unbiased source. Thank you.
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Apr 17, 2024 16:38
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Sancho Banana posted:"Yona Yahav [Mayor of Haifa] commits: I'll name a neighborhood in Haifa after Joe Biden" Has anyone called for the bombardment of Joe Biden(the place) yet?
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Apr 17, 2024 16:38
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Death to loving israel
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Apr 17, 2024 16:40
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Toph Bei Fong posted:Correct. had that sitting on my shelf since it came out but havent gotten to it yet. is it as good as the jakarta method
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Apr 17, 2024 16:43
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Iran is pretty stupid if they genuinely bought in on the nuclear restriction deal with Obama/EU and haven't rapidly advanced after trump tore it up
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Apr 17, 2024 16:47
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It is true that Iran may simply choose to pretend that the US isnt involved because they don’t want to escalate.
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Apr 17, 2024 16:54
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https://x.com/JenniferJJacobs/status/1780625654330880474
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Apr 17, 2024 16:54
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Iran just said they are done with “strategic patience “
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Apr 17, 2024 16:55
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https://www.businessinsider.com/us-warships-used-weapon-combat-first-destroy-iranian-missiles-2024-4 Turns out pretty much everything hard to intercept was shot down by the US/western forces and not by IDF lol
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Apr 17, 2024 16:58
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sleep with the vicious posted:Iran is pretty stupid if they genuinely bought in on the nuclear restriction deal with Obama/EU and haven't rapidly advanced after trump tore it up Would it shock you to know that they also telegraphed their intentions in this policy paper? Notice the scare quotes on "deal": AN OFFER IRAN SHOULDN'T REFUSE: Persuasion Overview of the Policy The core concept of the Persuasion approach re-mains the idea of simultaneously offering Iran a series of compelling rewards for giving up its nuclear program (and possibly ceasing its other deleterious behavior as well) and threatening to impose harsh penalties on Iran for refusing to do so. in essence, it means offering Iran a “deal,” but one that also contains an implicit ultimatum: change your ways and you will be rewarded; don’t and you will be punished. Because, after three decades of sanctions, the United states has virtually no ties to Iran it could threaten to cut, the pressure on iran must come principally from other members of the international community—particularly Iran’s leading trade partners in Europe, Russia, China, India, and elsewhere. This makes the Persuasion option wholly dependent on international cooperation to make it work. It is simply not possible for the United States to pursue this policy unilaterally. For this reason, the UN security council is the ideal mechanism through which to pursue the policy, and the Bush administration did enjoy some important successes there. It is less feasible but still possible to pursue the strategy outside the United Nations, and the Bush administration was able to secure some modest cooperation from the European Union and America’s asian trade partners outside of the UN framework. Because the Bush administration did eventually adopt a version of this policy, the key question that supporters of a Persuasion approach— including the Obama administration now that it has opted for this strategy—must answer is what can be done differently so that a new version can succeed where the last one failed? The heart of the critique of the Bush administration’s efforts is that it was never willing to offer Iran meaningful positive inducements, both because many administration hard-liners rejected on principle the idea of any “concessions,” and because the administration concurrently pursued a limited policy of regime change, which militated against taking any steps that could alleviate Iranian problems. This failure to address the inherent contradictions in the Bush administration’s approach to Persuasion undermined its incentives-based approach in two ways. First, it meant that Iranians them- selves did not believe that they were getting that much for giving up their nuclear program (let alone reversing their foreign policy more generally). certainly, any potential benefits were not ammunition enough for those Iranians interested in their economic fortunes to win the policy fight with hard-liners determined to preserve the nuclear program. Second, the meager benefits the Bush administration was willing to offer failed to impress european and east asian publics. American allies in Europe and east Asia are critical to an approach that relies heavily on sanctions both because they have typically had extensive trade relationships with Iran and because they can furnish exactly the kinds of capital, technology, and markets that Tehran needs to address its economic problems. Moreover, if the United states is unable to secure the cooperation of its closest allies, it is hard to imagine that it could win over Russia, China, India, and other countries with different agendas. if the Europeans and Japanese are on board with the United States, these other countries must take notice; if the United States stands alone, they can ignore us. The populations of many U.S. allies were suspicious of the Bush administration, believing (not incorrectly) that it remained committed to regime change and was simply attempting to give an offer to Tehran that it would never accept so that Washington could then use an Iranian rejection as justification for either implementing crippling sanctions or moving to war. In addition, it was generally the case that the publics of the European and east Asian democracies were only willing to sanction Iran for refusing to comply if they believed that Tehran had been offered a deal that was so good that only a regime determined to acquire nuclear weapons would refuse. Because the Bush administration’s incentives were never big enough to satisfy the European and East Asian concerns, few of these governments were willing to consider more than modest punishments against Tehran for refusing the offer. At this point, Iran remains very much on the wrong track, pushing hard to acquire an enrichment capability, heedless of the international consensus against it. Within the scope of the Persuasion approach, there is no question that what is most needed are new, much harsher sanctions to convince Iran to stop, reconsider, and hopefully change course. Paradoxically, however, the only way that the United states is likely to secure international support for new sanctions is if it offers up much greater rewards to Iran for doing the right thing.
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Apr 17, 2024 17:01
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With Israel proclamation of their planning strike on Iran, and given Israel history of statements and their actions toward Iran, Iran has a right and responsibility for a defensive preemptive strike on Israel to protect themselves.
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Apr 17, 2024 17:10
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DJJIB-DJDCT posted:I will say this about the Arab left, they have never forgotten who their enemies are. I don't think they even throw in with the liberals in opposing the monarchies and military dictatorships anymore, seeing how often they've been double crossed. How does your monarchism square with the Arab monarchies by the way?
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Apr 17, 2024 17:10
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Iran already said any strike even on their poo poo outside Iran will suffer severe consequences aka no more announcing 2 weeks before than stuff so i can only imagine a direct strike on iran
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Apr 17, 2024 17:25
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HallelujahLee posted:Iran already said any strike even on their poo poo outside Iran will suffer severe consequences aka no more announcing 2 weeks before than stuff so i can only imagine a direct strike on iran https://twitter.com/WorldWarNow_/status/1779922719045226696
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Apr 17, 2024 17:27
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thank you iran
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Apr 17, 2024 17:29
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SMEGMA_MAIL posted:Also all the vaunted cyber intelligence capability of Israel is mostly them copying the NSA’s equation group’s poo poo and then being the ones who gently caress it up- the whole reason we know about Stuxnet and a few other super hard to detect malware that the NSA made is because Unit 8200 who had it specifically to get into very well protected and air gapped machinery in Iranian nuclear fuel refining sites ran around using the most secret sensitive poo poo for routine bullshit that didn’t remotely require it.
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Apr 17, 2024 17:30
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Conspiratiorist posted:https://twitter.com/CBSNews/status/1780360447494967376 Well I’m sure whatever they’re planning won’t be insanely stupid and self destructive
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Apr 17, 2024 17:35
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Leandros posted:As far as I know, an asset from Dutch intelligence bridged the air gap with a USB stick? I don't know who was involved, but yes, probably via a USB stick. I was working in industrial automation at the time, the whole industry became affected. Probably still have a USB stick with Stuxnet on it lying around somewhere.
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Apr 17, 2024 17:52
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Leandros posted:As far as I know, an asset from Dutch intelligence bridged the air gap with a USB stick? i thought the whole point was that anybody could have introduced it as long as they moved files from the internet to the secure system? why use a million dollar exploit like stuxnet if you could have a guy upload trojan.exe?
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Apr 17, 2024 17:54
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Somebody has issued a correction as of 03:27 on Apr 18, 2024 |
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Apr 17, 2024 17:55
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lol at the eu/us sanctioning iran even more but not a peep at their embassy being destroyed these losers really dont care/realize that their entire garbage rules based order is dead and the rest of the planet is done with their horseshit
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Apr 17, 2024 17:57
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HallelujahLee posted:lol at the eu/us sanctioning iran even more but not a peep at their embassy being destroyed these losers really dont care/realize that their entire garbage rules based order is dead and the rest of the planet is done with their horseshit they’ve sanctioned themselves into china russia and iran forming an economic block which isn’t reliant on fictitious capital and instead turns inputs into things
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Apr 17, 2024 18:06
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what does sanctioning an iranian airliner even do besides give a huge middle finger to customers using that airspace
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Apr 17, 2024 18:07
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Jel Shaker posted:turns inputs into things that's cheating you're not allowed to do that
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Apr 17, 2024 18:07
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Conspiratiorist posted:https://twitter.com/CBSNews/status/1780360447494967376 There's no way the US isn't in on whatever the nazionists are planning. The two are joined at the hip. I think this is just some plausible deniability bullshit. Anyway, if the nazis do strike, I hope Iran takes out those fuckers. There won't be peace until the IOF is completely destroyed.
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Apr 17, 2024 18:09
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Jel Shaker posted:i thought the whole point was that anybody could have introduced it as long as they moved files from the internet to the secure system?
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Apr 17, 2024 18:10
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Jel Shaker posted:they’ve sanctioned themselves into china russia and iran forming an economic block which isn’t reliant on fictitious capital and instead turns inputs into things good the faster they own themselves the better
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Apr 17, 2024 18:13
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My favorite accusation I see all over reddit targeted at the protestors is that they are "virtue signaling" and just protesting for attention. like college students are willingly getting arrested and eating misdemeanor/felony charges for the 'gram
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Apr 17, 2024 18:14
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