|
They were states with an egregious history of suppression.
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:04
|
|
|
|
| # ? Jun 10, 2024 21:51 |
|
|
Really though, it should've just been applied to everyone.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:09
|
|
|
hobbesmaster posted:Ask air traffic controllers how that works. Our union might be a decent model for others to follow now I guess? We have to represent non-members that don't pay dues and we make it work. You have to have good local leadership to keep membership up though.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:10
|
|
|
Keeshhound posted:Really though, it should've just been applied to everyone. That's what I was wondering really, whether there's a legal reason that it couldn't. Would Shelby preclude Congress from passing a VRA that applied across the country (leaving aside the disingenuity of the conservative justices)?
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:15
|
|
|
 Opinions! JANUS v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31, ET AL. Holding: Under Illinois law, public employees are forced to subsidize a union, even if they choose not to join and strongly object to the positions the union takes in collective bargaining and related activities. We conclude that this arrangement violates the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern. We upheld a similar law in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977), and we recognize the importance of following precedent unless there are strong reasons for not doing so. But there are very strong reasons in this case. Fundamental free speech rights are at stake. Abood was poorly reasoned. It has led to practical problems and abuse. It is inconsistent with other First Amendment cases and has been undermined by more recent decisions. Developments since Abood was handed down have shed new light on the issue of agency fees, and no reliance interests on the part of public-sector unions are sufficient to justify the perpetuation of the free speech violations that Abood has countenanced for the past 41 years. Abood is therefore overruled. … As illustrated by the record in this case, unions charge nonmembers, not just for the cost of collective bargaining per se, but also for many other supposedly connected activities. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a–39a. Here, the nonmembers were told that they had to pay for “[l]obbying,” “[s]ocial and recreational activities,” “advertising,” “[m]embership meetings and conventions,” and “litigation,” as well as other unspecified “[s]ervices” that “may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local bargaining unit.” Id., at 28a–32a. The total chargeable amount for nonmembers was 78.06% of full union dues. Id., at 34a. Petitioner Mark Janus is employed by the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services as a child support specialist. Id., at 10a. The employees in his unit are among the 35,000 public employees in Illinois who are represented by respondent American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (Union). Ibid. Janus refused to join the Union because he opposes “many of the public policy positions that [it] advocates,” including the positions it takes in collective bargaining. Id., at 10a, 18a. Janus believes that the Union’s “behavior in bargaining does not appreciate the current fiscal crises in Illinois and does not reflect his best interests or the interests of Illinois citizens.” Id., at 18a. Therefore, if he had the choice, he “would not pay any fees or otherwise subsidize [the Union].” Ibid. Under his unit’s collective-bargaining agreement, however, he was required to pay an agency fee of $44.58 per month, id., at 14a—which would amount to about $535 per year. … The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids abridgment of the freedom of speech. We have held time and again that freedom of speech “includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” … Compelling individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable violates that cardinal constitutional command, and in most contexts, any such effort would be universally condemned. Suppose, for example, that the State of Illinois required all residents to sign a document expressing support for a particular set of positions on controversial public issues—say, the platform of one of the major political parties. No one, we trust, would seriously argue that the First Amendment permits this. … [P]etitioner in the present case contends that the Illinois law at issue should be subjected to “strict scrutiny.” Brief for Petitioner 36. The dissent, on the other hand, proposes that we apply what amounts to rational-basis review, that is, that we ask only whether a government employer could reasonably believe that the exaction of agency fees serves its interests. See post, at 4 (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (“A government entity could reasonably conclude that such a clause was needed”). This form of minimal scrutiny is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence, and we reject it here. At the same time, we again find it unnecessary to decide the issue of strict scrutiny because the Illinois scheme cannot survive under even the more permissive standard applied in Knox and Harris. … In Abood, the main defense of the agency-fee arrangement was that it served the State’s interest in “labor peace,” 431 U. S., at 224. By “labor peace,” the Abood Court meant avoidance of the conflict and disruption that it envisioned would occur if the employees in a unit were represented by more than one union. … We assume that “labor peace,” in this sense of the term, is a compelling state interest, but Abood cited no evidence that the pandemonium it imagined would result if agency fees were not allowed, and it is now clear that Abood’s fears were unfounded. … As we have noted, “free-rider arguments . . . are generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections.” … Implicitly acknowledging the weakness of Abood’s own reasoning, proponents of agency fees have come forward with alternative justifications for the decision, and we now address these arguments. The most surprising of these new arguments is the Union respondent’s originalist defense of Abood. According to this argument, Abood was correctly decided because the First Amendment was not originally understood to provide any protection for the free speech rights of public employees. Brief for Union Respondent 2–3, 17–20. As an initial matter, we doubt that the Union—or its members—actually want us to hold that public employees have “no [free speech] rights.”...[T]he Union has offered no basis for concluding that Abood is supported by the original understanding of the First Amendment. … The principal defense of Abood advanced by respondents and the dissent is based on our decision in Pickering, 391 U. S. 563, which held that a school district violated the First Amendment by firing a teacher for writing a letter critical of the school administration. Under Pickering and later cases in the same line, employee speech is largely unprotected if it is part of what the employee is paid to do, see Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 421–422 (2006), or if it involved a matter of only private concern, see Connick, supra, at 146–149. On the other hand, when a public employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the employee’s speech is protected unless “‘the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees’ outweighs ‘the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern.’” Harris, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 35) (quoting Pickering, supra, at 568). Pickering was the centerpiece of the defense of Abood in Harris, see 573 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 17– 21) (KAGAN, J., dissenting), and we found the argument unpersuasive, see id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 34–37). The intervening years have not improved its appeal. … First, the Pickering framework was developed for use in a very different context—in cases that involve “one employee’s speech and its impact on that employee’s public responsibilities.” … Second, the Pickering framework fits much less well where the government compels speech or speech subsidies in support of third parties. Pickering is based on the insight that the speech of a public-sector employee may interfere with the effective operation of a government office. When a public employer does not simply restrict potentially disruptive speech but commands that its employees mouth a message on its own behalf, the calculus is very different. … Third, although both Pickering and Abood divided speech into two categories, the cases’ categorization schemes do not line up. Superimposing the Pickering scheme on Abood would significantly change the Abood regime...Under Abood, nonmembers may be required to pay for all this speech [germane to collective bargaining], but Pickering would permit that practice only if the employer’s interests outweighed those of the employees. Thus, recasting Abood as an application of Pickering would substantially alter the Abood scheme. … Even if we were to apply some form of Pickering, Illinois’ agency-fee arrangement would not survive. Respondents begin by suggesting that union speech in collective-bargaining and grievance proceedings should be treated like the employee speech in Garcetti, i.e., as speech “pursuant to [an employee’s] official duties.”...[I]f the union’s speech is really the employer’s speech, then the employer could dictate what the union says. Unions, we trust, would be appalled by such a suggestion. For these reasons, Garcetti is totally inapposite here. Since the union speech paid for by agency fees is not controlled by Garcetti, we move on to the next step of the Pickering framework and ask whether the speech is on a matter of public or only private concern….Even union speech in the handling of grievances may be of substantial public importance and may be directed at the “public square.” Post, at 16. For instance, the Union respondent in this case recently filed a grievance seeking to compel Illinois to appropriate $75 million to fund a 2% wage increase. In short, the union speech at issue in this case is overwhelmingly of substantial public concern. The only remaining question under Pickering is whether the State’s proffered interests justify the heavy burden that agency fees inflict on nonmembers’ First Amendment interests. We have already addressed the state interests asserted in Abood—promoting “labor peace” and avoiding free riders, see supra, at 11–18—and we will not repeat that analysis. … For the reasons given above, we conclude that publicsector agency-shop arrangements violate the First Amendment, and Abood erred in concluding otherwise. There remains the question whether stare decisis nonetheless counsels against overruling Abood. It does not. … Abood was wrongly decided and is now overruled. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Alito, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch. Dissent by Sotomayor. Dissent by Kagan, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Notes From Other Opinions: Sotomayor (dissenting): I join JUSTICE KAGAN’s dissent in full. Although I joined the majority in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552 (2011), I disagree with the way that this Court has since interpreted and applied that opinion. See, e.g., National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, ante, p. ___. Having seen the troubling development in First Amendment jurisprudence over the years, both in this Court and in lower courts, I agree fully with JUSTICE KAGAN that Sorrell—in the way it has been read by this Court—has allowed courts to “wiel[d] the First Amendment in . . . an aggressive way” just as the majority does today. Post, at 27. Kagan (dissenting): Today, the Court succeeds in its 6-year campaign to reverse Abood. See Friedrichs v. California Teachers Assn., 578 U. S. ___ (2016) (per curiam); Harris v. Quinn, 573 U. S. ___ (2014); Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. 298 (2012). Its decision will have large-scale consequences. Public employee unions will lose a secure source of financial support. State and local governments that thought fair-share provisions furthered their interests will need to find new ways of managing their workforces. Across the country, the relationships of public employees and employers will alter in both predictable and wholly unexpected ways. Rarely if ever has the Court overruled a decision—let alone one of this import—with so little regard for the usual principles of stare decisis. There are no special justifications for reversing Abood. It has proved workable. No recent developments have eroded its underpinnings. And it is deeply entrenched, in both the law and the real world. More than 20 States have statutory schemes built on the decision. Those laws underpin thousands of ongoing contracts involving millions of employees. Reliance interests do not come any stronger than those surrounding Abood. And likewise, judicial disruption does not get any greater than what the Court does today. I respectfully dissent. … Abood’s reasoning about governmental interests has three connected parts. First, exclusive representation arrangements benefit some government entities because they can facilitate stable labor relations. In particular, such arrangements eliminate the potential for inter-union conflict and streamline the process of negotiating terms of employment. Second, the government may be unable to avail itself of those benefits unless the single union has a secure source of funding. The various tasks involved in representing employees cost money; if the union doesn’t have enough, it can’t be an effective employee representative and bargaining partner. See id., at 221. And third, agency fees are often needed to ensure such stable funding. That is because without those fees, employees have every incentive to free ride on the union dues paid by others. See id., at 222. The majority does not take issue with the first point. See ante, at 33 (It is “not disputed that the State may require that a union serve as exclusive bargaining agent for its employees” in order to advance the State’s “interests as an employer”). The majority claims that the second point never appears in Abood, but is willing to assume it for the sake of argument. See ante, at 31–32; but see Abood, 431 U. S., at 221 (The tasks of an exclusive representative “often entail expenditure of much time and money”). So the majority stakes everything on the third point—the conclusion that maintaining an effective system of exclusive representation often entails agency fees. Ante, at 12 (It “is simply not true” that exclusive representation and agency fees are “inextricably linked”); see ante, at 14. But basic economic theory shows why a government would think that agency fees are necessary for exclusive representation to work. What ties the two together, as Abood recognized, is the likelihood of free-riding when fees are absent. Remember that once a union achieves exclusive-representation status, the law compels it to fairly represent all workers in the bargaining unit, whether or not they join or contribute to the union. See supra, at 4. Because of that legal duty, the union cannot give special advantages to its own members. And that in turn creates a collective action problem of nightmarish proportions. Everyone—not just those who oppose the union, but also those who back it—has an economic incentive to withhold dues; only altruism or loyalty—as against financial self-interest—can explain why an employee would pay the union for its services. And so emerged Abood’s rule allowing fair-share agreements: That rule ensured that a union would receive sufficient funds, despite its legally imposed disability, to effectively carry out its duties as exclusive representative of the government’s employees. The majority’s initial response to this reasoning is simply to dismiss it. “[F]ree rider arguments,” the majority pronounces, “are generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections.” … Abood thus dovetailed with the Court’s usual attitude in First Amendment cases toward the regulation of public employees’ speech. That attitude is one of respect—even solicitude—for the government’s prerogatives as an employer. So long as the government is acting as an employer—rather than exploiting the employment relationship for other ends—it has a wide berth, comparable to that of a private employer. And when the regulated expression concerns the terms and conditions of employment—the very stuff of the employment relationship—the government really cannot lose. There, managerial interests are obvious and strong. And so government employees are . . . just employees, even though they work for the government. Except that today the government does lose, in a first for the law. Now, the government can constitutionally adopt all policies regulating core workplace speech in pursuit of managerial goals—save this single one. The majority claims it is not making a special and unjustified exception….The majority goes wrong at every turn. First, this Court has applied the same basic approach whether a public employee challenges a general policy or an individualized decision. … Second, the majority’s distinction between compelling and restricting speech also lacks force. … Third and finally, the majority errs in thinking that under the usual deferential approach, the government should lose this case. … But the worse part of today’s opinion is where the majority subverts all known principles of stare decisis. The majority makes plain, in the first 33 pages of its decision, that it believes Abood was wrong.4 But even if that were true (which it is not), it is not enough. “Respecting stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions.” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 7). Any departure from settled precedent (so the Court has often stated) demands a “special justification—over and above the belief that the precedent was wrongly decided.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984). And the majority does not have anything close. To the contrary: all that is “special” in this case—especially the massive reliance interests at stake— demands retaining Abood, beyond even the normal precedent … There is no sugarcoating today’s opinion. The majority overthrows a decision entrenched in this Nation’s law— and in its economic life—for over 40 years. As a result, it prevents the American people, acting through their state and local officials, from making important choices about workplace governance. And it does so by weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy. … And maybe most alarming, the majority has chosen the winners by turning the First Amendment into a sword, and using it against workaday economic and regulatory policy. Today is not the first time the Court has wielded the First Amendment in such an aggressive way. See, e.g., National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, ante, p. ___ (invalidating a law requiring medical and counseling facilities to provide relevant information to users); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552 (2011) (striking down a law that restricted pharmacies from selling various data). And it threatens not to be the last. Speech is everywhere—a part of every human activity (employment, health care, securities trading, you name it). For that reason, almost all economic and regulatory policy affects or touches speech. So the majority’s road runs long. And at every stop are black-robed rulers overriding citizens’ choices. The First Amendment was meant for better things. It was meant not to undermine but to protect democratic governance—including over the role of public-sector unions. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf FLORIDA v. GEORGIA Holding: This case concerns the proper apportionment of the water of an interstate river basin. Florida, a downstream State, brought this lawsuit against Georgia, an upstream State, claiming that Georgia has denied it an equitable share of the basin’s waters. We found that the dispute lies within our original jurisdiction, and we appointed a Special Master to take evidence and make recommendations. After lengthy evidentiary proceedings, the Special Master submitted a report in which he recommends that the Court deny Florida’s request for relief on the ground that “Florida has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that its injury can be redressed by an order equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin.” Report of Special Master 3. The case is before us on Florida’s exceptions to the Special Master’s Report. In light of our examination of the Report and relevant portions of the record, we remand the case to the Master for further findings and such further proceedings as the Master believes helpful. This original action arises out of a dispute over the division of water from an interstate river basin known as the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin. The Basin drains an area of more than 20,000 square miles across the southeastern United States. Three interstate rivers form the heart of the Basin and are central to this case. They are the Chattahoochee River, the Flint River, and the Apalachicola River. It is easiest to think of these three rivers as forming the capital letter “Y,” with each branch starting at a different point in northeastern Georgia near Atlanta and the stem running through the Florida panhandle and emptying into Apalachicola Bay in the Gulf of Mexico….In total, the Apalachicola River accounts for 35% of the fresh water that flows along Florida’s western coast. Florida and Georgia have long disputed the apportionment of the Basin’s waters. Florida contends that Georgia is consuming more than its equitable share of Flint River water. It adds that, were Georgia to consume less water from the Flint River, more water would flow into Lake Seminole, pass through the Woodruff Dam and subsequently flow down the Apalachicola River (the Y’s stem) and into Apalachicola Bay. The additional water that would result from a cap on Georgia’s consumption would, Florida argues, help (among other things) to recover and maintain its oyster industry, which collapsed following a drought in 2012. Georgia believes that it should not have to cut back on its Flint River water consumption because, in its view, it consumes no more than its equitable share. “This Court has recognized for more than a century its inherent authority, as part of the Constitution’s grant of original jurisdiction, to equitably apportion interstate streams between States.” But we have long noted our “preference” that States “settle their controversies by ‘mutual accommodation and agreement.’” … We recognize that Florida and Georgia (sometimes with the help of the Federal Government) have long tried to do so. But so far they have failed. ... In 2013, Florida, the downstream State, sought to sue Georgia, the upstream State, asking us to exercise our “original and exclusive jurisdiction” and issue a decree equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin. … At the outset, the United States declined to waive its sovereign immunity from suit in this case. And shortly thereafter, Georgia asked the Special Master to dismiss the case on the grounds that the United States was a necessary party but could not be forced to intervene. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(b). The Master concluded that the motion to dismiss Florida’s complaint should be denied. The Master reasoned that a decree binding the Corps might not prove necessary. … The Master then held lengthy discovery and evidentiary proceedings. See Brief for Georgia 11; post, at 23 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (“During their 18 months of discovery, the parties produced 7.2 million pages of documents”). Ultimately, the Master submitted a 70-page Report to this Court in February 2017. He recommended that the Court dismiss Florida’s complaint. … For present purposes, we note that Florida and Georgia agree that the Master’s recommendation “turned on a ‘single, discrete issue’—whether Florida had shown that a cap on Georgia’s consumption would redress its injury if the decree did not bind the [Army Corps of Engineers] as well.” … In reviewing this determination, we do not agree with the dissent’s view that the Master applied the “ordinary balance-of-harms test” that our equitable apportionment cases require. Post, at 14 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also Part III–A, infra, (describing equitable apportionment doctrine). As we shall explain, the dissent’s assertion that “the balance of harms cannot tip in Florida’s favor” is, at best, premature. Post, at 34–35. That judgment may eventually prove right or it may prove wrong. Here, as we just said, we consider only the “single” and “threshold” question of “redressability” upon which the Master rested his conclusion and which the parties have now argued here. … Florida has filed exceptions to the Special Master’s Report. Florida first challenges the legal standard the Master applied in resolving what the Master called the “threshold” question whether Florida had “proven. . . that its injury can be redressed by an order equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin.” Id., at 24, 3. The Master wrote that Florida must meet a “clear and convincing evidence” evidentiary burden. Id., at 3. Second, Florida argues that, in any event, its showing in respect to redressability was sufficient. We consider each of these exceptions in turn. … We must approach interstate disputes “in the untechnical spirit proper for dealing with a quasi-international controversy, remembering that there is no municipal code governing the matter, and that this court may be called on to adjust differences that cannot be dealt with by Congress or disposed of by the legislature of either State alone.” Where, as here, the Court is asked to resolve an interstate water dispute raising questions beyond the interpretation of specific language of an interstate compact, the doctrine of equitable apportionment governs our inquiry. … First, as the Special Master pointed out, “the relevant guiding principle in this case” is a simple one. Report 26– 27. Given the laws of the States, both Georgia and Florida possess “‘an equal right to make a reasonable use of the waters of the stream’”—which, in this case, is the Flint River. ... Second, our prior decisions emphasize that, when we are confronted with competing claims to interstate water, the Court’s “effort always is to secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas.” ... Third, in light of the sovereign status and “equal dignity” of States, a complaining State must bear a burden that is “much greater” than the burden ordinarily shouldered by a private party seeking an injunction. … In addition, to the extent the Court has addressed the “initial burden” a State bears in respect to redressability, our prior decisions make clear that, as a general matter, “[t]o constitute a justiciable controversy, it must appear that the complaining State has suffered a wrong through the action of the other State, furnishing a ground for judicial redress, or is asserting a right against the other State which is susceptible of judicial enforcement according to the accepted principles of the common law or equity systems of jurisprudence.” … Fourth, in an interstate water matter, where a complaining State meets its “initial burden of showing ‘real or substantial injury,’” Colorado II, supra, at 317 (quoting Colorado I, 459 U. S., at 188, n. 13), this Court, recalling that equitable apportionment is “‘flexible,’” not “formulaic,” will seek to “arrive at a ‘“just and equitable” apportionment’ of an interstate stream” by “consider[ing] ‘all relevant factors.’” … Applying the principles just described, we conclude that the Special Master applied too strict a standard when he determined that the Court would not be able to fashion an appropriate equitable decree. See Report 3 (“Florida has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that its injury can be redressed by an order equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin”); see also id., at 31 (“The evidence does not provide sufficient certainty that an effective remedy is available without the presence of the Corps as a party in this case”). The Special Master referred to the relevant showing that Florida must make in this respect as a “threshold” showing. Report 24. We agree that the matter is “threshold” in one particular sense—namely, the sense that the Master has not yet determined several key remedy-related matters, including the approximate amount of water that must flow into the Apalachicola River in order for Florida to receive a significant benefit from a cap on Georgia’s use of Flint River waters. … In our view, unless and until the Special Master makes the findings of fact necessary to determine the nature and scope of likely harm caused by the absence of water and the amount of additional water necessary to ameliorate that harm significantly, the complaining State should not have to prove with specificity the details of an eventually workable decree by “clear and convincing” evidence. Rather, the complaining State should have to show that, applying the principles of “flexibility” and “approximation” we discussed above, it is likely to prove possible to fashion such a decree. … To require “clear and convincing evidence” about the workability of a decree before the Court or a Special Master has a view about likely harms and likely amelioration is, at least in this case, to put the cart before the horse. And that, we fear, is what the Master’s statements, with their apparent references to a “clear and convincing” evidence standard in respect to “redressability” (where that refers to the availability of an eventual decree) have done here. … We next address Florida’s exceptions to the Master’s evidentiary determinations....Our “independent examination of the record,” Kansas v. Missouri, 322 U. S. 213, 232 (1944), leads us to conclude that, at this stage, Florida has met its “initial burden” in respect to remedy. But, we also believe that a remand is necessary to conduct the equitable-balancing inquiry. This dispositive threshold question [does the Corps have to be part of the case for Florida to have an effective remedy] leads us, in turn, to focus upon five subsidiary questions: First, has Florida suffered harm as a result of decreased water flow into the Apalachicola River? (The Special Master assumed “yes.”) Second, has Florida shown that Georgia, contrary to equitable principles, has taken too much water from the Flint River (the eastern branch of the Y-shaped river system)? (Again, the Special Master assumed “yes.”) Third, if so, has Georgia’s inequitable use of Basin waters injured Florida? (The Special Master assumed “yes.”) Fourth, if so, would an equity-based cap on Georgia’s use of the Flint River lead to a significant increase in streamflow from the Flint River into Florida’s Apalachicola River (the stem of the Y)? (This is the basic question before us.) Fifth, if so, would the amount of extra water that reaches the Apalachicola River significantly redress the economic and ecological harm that Florida has suffered? (This question is mostly for remand.) As our parentheticals suggest, the Special Master assumed that the answer to the first three questions was “yes.” The fourth question is the question before us now. And the fifth question is partly for us now and partly for the Master to answer on remand. ... Would an equity-based cap on Georgia’s use of the Flint River lead to a significant increase in streamflow from the Flint River into Florida’s Apalachicola River (the stem of the Y)? The answer depends upon (1) the amount of extra water that would flow into Lake Seminole as a result of a cap on Georgia’s Flint River water consumption; and (2) the amount of water that could actually flow through the Corps-controlled Woodruff Dam at Lake Seminole’s southern end and into Florida’s Apalachicola River. The record shows that Florida’s proposed cap on Georgia’s water consumption could result in the release of considerable extra water into Lake Seminole. Florida’s expert, Dr. David Sunding, testified that the cap would limit the average amount of water that Georgia could use annually and also reduce the amount of water that Georgia could use during drought years, which could “materially reduce [Georgia’s] depletions of river flows . . . by 1,500 to over 2,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) in peak summer months of drought years.”...And[] the record suggests that an increase in streamflow of 1,500 to 2,000 cfs is reasonably likely to benefit Florida significantly. The key question, however, is whether the 1,500 to 2,000 cfs of extra water that will flow into Lake Seminole from the Flint River as a result of a cap on Georgia’s water consumption will flow beyond Lake Seminole, through the Woodruff Dam, and into the Apalachicola River at the relevant times….The Special Master and Georgia believe that—at any relevant time— the Corps might “offset” any extra Flint River water that flows into Lake Seminole by simultaneously reducing the amount of water that flows into that lake from the Chattahoochee River. … [O]ur reading of the record convinces us it is highly unlikely that the Corps will always reduce the flow in this way; it leads us to believe that, acting in accordance with the its own revised Master Manual, the Corps is likely to permit, and in some cases may be required to ensure that, material amounts of additional Flint water to flow through the Woodruff Dam and into the Apalachicola River. At the very least, we believe that more proceedings are necessary to reach a definitive determination. … When the Corps is conducting “nondrought operations,” the Master Manual requires the Corps to release into Florida all or some of any extra water that flows from the Flint River into Lake Seminole, where it will then flow through the Woodruff Dam. … [I]f additional water were to flow into Lake Seminole from the Flint River while the Corps is in drought operations, the Corps, pursuant to its Master Manual, must reduce the flow of its controlled upstream Chattahoochee water in order to maintain a defined water level in the pools behind its Chattahoochee dams, and no more than 4,500 cfs or 5,000 cfs can flow beyond the Woodruff Dam regardless. … But even then, as we just said, the Corps must make certain that at least 4,500 cfs and more often 5,000 cfs flows though the Woodruff Dam. And, if more water flows from the Flint into Lake Seminole, and if the Corps uses that water to keep the water level high in its Chattahoochee reservoirs, then there will be fewer days in which the Corps is conducting either “drought operations” or “extreme drought operations.” … The upshot is that, even when the Corps conducts its operations in accordance with the Master Manual, Florida’s proposed consumption cap would likely mean more water in the Apalachicola—as much as 2,000 cfs more water when the Corps is conducting normal or “nondrought operations,” which could take place in dry periods, including the driest days of summer, and 500 cfs more on days when the Corps is conducting “drought operations.” And a cap would likely allow the Corps to conduct “nondrought operations” (i.e., reservoirs-sufficiently-full operations) more often as well. … Our final question is this: Would the amount of extra water that reaches the Apalachicola significantly redress the economic and ecological harm that Florida has suffered? There is evidence indicating that the answer to the question is in the affirmative….But the Master’s Report does not explicitly answer this question. We consequently must remand the case to find the answer to this question (and others). … We repeat, however, that Florida will be entitled to a decree only if it is shown that “the benefits of the [apportionment] substantially outweigh the harm that might result.” In assessing whether that showing has been made, the Master may find it necessary to address in the first instance many of the evidentiary and legal questions the answers to which we have here assumed or found plausible enough to allow us to resolve the threshold remedial question. … We consequently do not dismiss this case. Rather, we remand the case to the Special Master for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Breyer, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Dissent by Thomas, joined by Alito, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Notes From Other Opinions: Thomas (dissenting): Florida asks this Court to cap Georgia’s use of water in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (Basin). Florida claims that such a cap would allow additional water to flow into the Apalachicola River and Bay, which would benefit Florida by alleviating certain ecological harms. To prevail under our precedents, Florida must present clear and convincing evidence that its proposed cap will benefit Florida more than it harms Georgia. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U. S. 176, 187 (1982) (Colorado I ). The Special Master applied this balance-of-harms standard and, after presiding over a 1-month trial involving 40 witnesses and more than 2,000 exhibits, found that Florida had not met its burden. Because that finding is well supported by the evidence, I would have overruled Florida’s objections to the Special Master’s Report (Report) and denied Florida’s request for relief. I respectfully dissent. … Florida and Georgia are not the only stakeholders in the Basin. The United States, through the Corps, operates five dams and four reservoirs on the Chattahoochee River. Only the three northernmost dams can store significant amounts of water. The two dams that are farthest south on the Chattahoochee—the George W. Andrews Dam and the Jim Woodruff Dam—cannot store an appreciable amount of water. The Corps does not operate any dams on the Flint River, which flows unimpeded until it reaches the Jim Woodruff Dam at Lake Seminole. The Corps operates its dams as a unit. It must do so in a way that achieves its congressionally authorized purposes, such as facilitating navigation, generating hydroelectric power, protecting the national defense, promoting recreation, maintaining the commercial value of riparian lands, and protecting the water supply for the surrounding metropolitan Atlanta area. … Given these numerous demands, the Corps has long relied on water-control manuals to guide its operations of the dams. The current manual dictates the minimum amount of water that the Corps must provide to the Apalachicola River under various conditions. Three variables affect that minimum amount of water: the time of year, the amount of water in the Corps’ storage reservoirs, and the amount of additional water entering the Basin. … The manual provides that, as a general rule, most additional water that enters the Basin will pass through to Florida via the Apalachicola River. But, in certain circumstances, the Corps will artificially increase or decrease the amount of water that passes through to ensure that 5,000 cubic feet per second flows into the Apalachicola River. For example, if the natural streamflow entering the Basin (Basin inflow) is less than 5,000 cubic feet per second, then the Corps will artificially augment the flow by releasing additional water from its reservoirs. Or, if the amount of water in the Corps’ reservoirs falls below a certain amount, the Corps will trigger what it calls “drought operations.” During drought operations, no matter how much water is entering the Basin, the Corps will generally release only 5,000 cubic feet per second into the Apalachicola River until its reservoirs are completely replenished. ... Florida raises three objections to the Special Master’s Report. First, it argues that the Special Master required it to satisfy a legal standard that was too demanding. Second, Florida argues that it should prevail under the correct standard because, if this Court enters an equitable-apportionment decree, the Corps will likely allow more water to flow into Florida during droughts. And third, even if the Corps does not release more water into Florida during droughts, Florida argues that a cap on Georgia would still benefit it during nondroughts. None of these arguments has merit. … The Special Master applied the balance-of-harms test from this Court’s precedents. A State seeking an equitable apportionment that interferes with established uses must “demonstrat[e] by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of the [apportionment] substantially outweigh the harm that might result.”... As part of the balance-of-harms analysis, this Court has repeatedly held that the State seeking to divert water from existing uses must show that it will obtain some appreciable benefit from an equitable apportionment. The Special Master applied this appreciable-benefit requirement. As he explained, Florida “ha[d] not proven by clear and convincing evidence” that the Corps would release any additional water “at a time that would provide a material benefit to Florida (i.e., during dry periods).” Report 47; see also id., at 47–48 (“[T]he Corps’ operation[s] . . . rende[r] any potential benefit to Florida from increased streamflow in the Flint River uncertain and speculative”). The Special Master likewise found “an absence of any significant benefit to Florida” during nondrought conditions. … The Court does not disagree that Florida failed to prove an appreciable benefit. Instead, it simply asserts that a decision on that question is “premature.” Ante, at 8. It is incredibly odd to conclude that a Special Master’s merits determination is “premature” after a full trial. … [T]he Special Master applied the ordinary balance-of-harms analysis and found that Florida had not demonstrated an appreciable benefit from a cap on Georgia’s use. Tellingly, the Special Master relied exclusively on cases conducting the balance-of-harms analysis. His Report does not cite any standing cases, or even mention “standing” or “Article III.” Neither do any of the pre-trial or post-trial briefs that the parties filed. True, the Special Master’s Report sometimes describes the appreciable-benefit requirement as a question of “redressability”—a word that is also associated with Article III standing. But the Special Master was merely following the parties’ lead, as they phrased the appreciable-benefit requirement in terms of “redress” throughout the litigation. ... Because the Court wrongly assumes that the Special Master denied relief on the basis rejected in Idaho II or for lack of Article III standing, it faults the Special Master for imposing the higher burden of proof that governs the merits—i.e., “clear and convincing evidence.” See ante, at 15–18.7 Of course, the far simpler explanation for why the Special Master applied the merits standard is that he was, in fact, making a decision about the merits, not about remedies or standing. … Even if the Court is correct that the Special Master denied Florida relief for some reason other than the merits, there is no reason to send this case back for a do-over. As the Court acknowledges, “‘the ultimate responsibility for deciding what are correct findings of fact remains with us.’” We “must bring our independent judgment to bear based upon ‘our own independent examination of the record.’” An independent examination of the record confirms that the Special Master was correct to find that the Corps would not change its operations during droughts if this Court capped Georgia’s water use and thus Florida would not benefit from a cap during droughts. See Part IV–B–1, infra. The Special Master also was correct to find that Florida presented no evidence of a benefit during nondroughts. See Part IV–B– 2, infra. Those findings support a judgment in Georgia’s favor under the traditional balance-of-harms analysis. … Florida’s second and third objections—which challenge the Special Master’s finding that Florida had not met its burden under the balance-of-harms test—also fail. ... Florida did not demonstrate that, if this Court caps Georgia’s water use, Florida would receive a meaningful amount of additional water during droughts. For Florida to receive more water, the Corps must change its current operating procedures. But the Corps is not a party, and it would not be bound by any decree issued by this Court. Because Florida cannot ask this Court to require the Corps to change its existing operations, it must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Corps will voluntarily make the necessary changes. Florida cannot do so. … Taking a different tack, the Court suggests that additional water will pass through to Florida even if the Corps does not change its manual. Specifically, the Court concludes that the additional water will pass through to Florida during droughts so long as the Corps does not enter drought operations. See ante, at 25–27. According to the Court, the Corps will allow additional water to pass through to Florida whenever the natural flow of the Apalachicola River is between 5,000 and 10,000 cubic feet per second during normal or “nondrought” operations. See ante, at 25–26. The Court’s conclusion depends on the premise that, during droughts, the natural streamflow into Florida is “between 5,000 and 10,000” cubic feet per second. Ibid. That premise is false.10 During droughts, the natural streamflow in the Apalachicola River is usually less than 5,000 cubic feet per second. Supra, at 25; see also Bedient 23 (showing that Basin inflow in 2012 was generally below 5,000 cubic feet per second between June and December); id., at 27 (same for 2007). … For this reason, even when the Corps is in nondrought operations, a cap on Georgia would generally not increase flows to Florida….Florida has not shown that these infrequent and sporadic additional flows during droughts would appreciably benefit it. … Because Florida will not receive additional water during droughts, it argues that it will benefit from additional water during nondroughts. As the Special Master correctly found, however, Florida presented no evidence to support such an assertion. That is because no such evidence exists. Florida would not benefit from additional water during nondroughts, because flows on the Apalachicola River during nondroughts are already plentiful. In the final analysis, Florida has not shown that it will appreciably benefit from a cap on Georgia’s water use. Absent such a showing, the balance of harms cannot tip in Florida’s favor. Accordingly, I would have overruled Florida’s objections to the Special Master’s Report and denied Florida’s request for relief. I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/142%20orig_h3ci.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout]
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:20
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:i've heard people say this and i don't think people actually have thought it through at all. the VRA has to be enforced through the courts because it's about blocking laws that state governments pass. you can tell the supreme court to go gently caress itself and enforce its own legal rulings when it's trying to stop you from doing something, but you can't enforce the VRA without the court system unless you're willing to re-impose the occupation of the confederate states. Hillary should have campaigned much harder on the supreme court vacancy too. It was barely a footnote. UberJew posted:Northerners didn't want their racism interfered with. Keeshhound posted:Really though, it should've just been applied to everyone. They do apply to every state. It goes as distinct as the district level and can apply to whole states and the formula is based on which have previously used discriminatory practices to discourage voting. Like literacy tests. It just so happens that the south was hit hardest by it because they universally had such things in place... and are now looking to put them back in place. Plenty of northern districts were affected by it. New York, California, South Dakota, Alaska, and Michigan all had districts that required preclearance. And not all southern states were completely affected either. Florida for example only had a few districts that required it. You have to twist your head sideways and ignore centuries of racism and decades of direct disenfranchisement (after actually gaining suffrage ofc) to come to the conclusion that they were unfairly singled out. I wouldn't be against make the formula even stricter, but it was up to Congress to decide the appropriate legislation and they had renewed it just years before it got struck down for being "too old".
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:23
|
|
|
fknlo posted:Our union might be a decent model for others to follow now I guess? We have to represent non-members that don't pay dues and we make it work. You have to have good local leadership to keep membership up though. But everyone that belonged to the previous ATC union was fired when they striked.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:24
|
|
|
Zeeman posted:That's what I was wondering really, whether there's a legal reason that it couldn't. Would Shelby preclude Congress from passing a VRA that applied across the country (leaving aside the disingenuity of the conservative justices)? No, it wouldn't have (to be clear, only for preclearance; the rest of the VRA is still around). And some Congress members wanted to try that approach. But Congress as a unit really didn't want to do anything that might fix any VRA problems.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:25
|
|
|
Zeeman posted:Why did the VRA have to be set up to require preclearance only in specific jurisdictions anyway? Politics? State powers? Preclearance is a fairly intrusive measure that makes it hard to make even minor changes to your voting system (e.g. moving polling sites) and that level of interference in state and local affairs was not deemed necessary. It also exceeds Congress's power when applied to non-federal elections unless you rely on Congress's power to enforce the 15th Amendment. I do not see how applying preclearance to everyone solves the nonsense legal arguments that the conservatives put forward in Shelby because then you're applying preclearance to states without a finding that they engaged in racism.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:25
|
|
|
moths posted:They were states with an egregious history of suppression. Actually the way the VRA selected states for preclearance was kinda odd, I think specifically to avoid needing to single out states. If you had a banned voting suppression measure (e.g. a literacy test) and had lower than a specific percentage turnout in certain presidential elections, you got added to the preclearance list. It was specifically engineered to make sure to sweep up the southern states but it did lead to odd corner cases. My personal favorite is that New Hampshire always had a literacy test since it became a state (a real one, not the southern ones where there was no way to pass) and then had certain districts with very low population have lower than the cutoff turnout just because of bad luck, even though there was no history of racial discrimination in voting in New Hampshire. Not because New Hampshirites were pure folk who would never dream of racism: because there essentially weren't even any black residents so nobody would have bothered suppressing their votes in the first place because New Hampshire is hilariously white.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:29
|
|
|
fknlo posted:Our union might be a decent model for others to follow now I guess? We have to represent non-members that don't pay dues and we make it work. You have to have good local leadership to keep membership up though. The Majority's reasoning in Janus will support dismantling collective bargaining as an institution with the next case that rules restricting employees from bargaining individually with their employers because of the presence of a collective bargaining agreement is impermissible curtailing of speech. Its simply a matter of time until they accept cert on an applicable case.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:29
|
|
|
hobbesmaster posted:But everyone that belonged to the previous ATC union was fired when they striked. Yes, I know that. The current union has been operating under the new normal for all public unions though and might be a model to look at. UberJew posted:The Majority's reasoning in Janus will support dismantling collective bargaining as an institution with the next case that rules restricting employees from bargaining individually with their employers because of the presence of a collective bargaining agreement is impermissible curtailing of speech. Never thought about it like this. That's fun.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:33
|
|
|
I didn't realize that about New Hampshire - that probably raised some eyebrows back in the day. Is the end-game here a situation where nobody has to pay taxes because now money is speech and compelled support for things you oppose is a 1A violation? (Assuming you're opposed to literally any government program. )
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:38
|
|
|
Raldikuk posted:Hillary should have campaigned much harder on the supreme court vacancy too. It was barely a footnote. This strategy was intentional. HRC's campaign mistakenly believed that substantial numbers of Republicans would vote for her because Trump lacked qualifications and good temperament. For the Clinton campaign, that meant campaigning sparingly on the court issue: Wouldn't want to give Republican voters a reason to stay loyal to Trump. Obviously the tactic was an egregious misstep, as were the silly assumptions that underlied it.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:40
|
|
|
https://twitter.com/kevindaleydc/status/1011994216820600833?s=21 #MSCOTUSGA
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:56
|
|
|
"i shat in my pants and it felt good." - syzygy stardust
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 16:59
|
|
|
UberJew posted:The Majority's reasoning in Janus will support dismantling collective bargaining as an institution with the next case that rules restricting employees from bargaining individually with their employers because of the presence of a collective bargaining agreement is impermissible curtailing of speech. With the new era of gig manufacturing dawning we need to figure this poo poo out quick. Profit/Efficiency can be squeezed out of the backs of labor but it loving shouldn't be and that message needs to be spread NOW.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:02
|
|
|
I can't find the public sector union thread I wrote like 6-7 years ago, but glad to see the unwieldy and unconstitututional power has been reigned in a bit. I would anticipate, perhaps counterintutively, that this will have positive impacts on education outcomes in states like NY, Illinois, and California. (USER WAS BANNED FOR THIS POST)
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:09
|
|
|
Arkane posted:I can't find the public sector union thread I wrote like 6-7 years ago, but glad to see the unwieldy and unconstitututional power has been reigned in a bit. 
Mr. Nice! fucked around with this message at 17:18 on Jun 27, 2018 |
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:11
|
|
|
Please don't quote or engage with Arkane. Thanks. What we're seeing here is a preview of how things will go for the foreseeable future. A liberal Justice will die again while a Democrat is President and that vacancy will be politicized 100% and we're going to need 51+ senators in perpetuity while the GOP will be able to replace Justices on pure decorum. Trump himself worries me a lot less than the current and likely permanent state of the Court.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:18
|
|
|
Arkane posted:I can't find the public sector union thread I wrote like 6-7 years ago, but glad to see the unwieldy and unconstitututional power has been reigned in a bit. The only thing that will significantly improve educational outcomes in those states is improving educational inputs in the form of students. If California isn’t pulling in enough Asians to offset their other other inflows it’s hard to see how the other two can have much hope. Groovelord Neato posted:"i shat in my pants and it felt good." - syzygy stardust https://twitter.com/woke8yearold/status/1011720001584271365?s=21
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:18
|
|
|
The Iron Rose posted:Ah, I see that completing the destruction of our democratic institutions is now a bipartisan consensus. OK well the Republicans are gerrymandering and voter-suppressing their way to legislative majorities and executive offices despite popular minority support and using those offices to block any justices except their own appointments who go on to rubberstamp their undemocratic gerrymandering and voter suppression to perpetuate their minority governments but sure yeah this needs to continue out of respect for democracy lmbo
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:20
|
|
|
God damnit. I knew this Janus decision was going to go this way but it still sucks. I only wanted my union to get hosed not everyone else's 
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:22
|
|
|
Unzip and Attack posted:Please don't quote or engage with Arkane. Thanks. I do not expect Democrats will confirm any Republican justices while they control the Senate until at the very least they take one seat "back" that vacates during a Republican administration. And they'd only be willing to deal then if there's a constitutional amendment or something, nobody trusts the Republicans on anything now that they abolished the blue slip. Democrats have been good about not confirming Republican nominees since the Bush era (both starting filibustering nominees and simply not confirming anyone post-2006) with the exception of Supreme Court nominees and that's dead as all hell.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:22
|
|
|
Syzygy Stardust posted:The only thing that will significantly improve educational outcomes in those states is improving educational inputs in the form of students. If California isn’t pulling in enough Asians to offset their other other inflows it’s hard to see how the other two can have much hope. the right cannot meme.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:22
|
|
|
As a public union employee this is hard to take. 
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:26
|
|
|
Groovelord Neato posted:the right cannot meme. I’m so old I can remember 2015-2016.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:26
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:I do not expect Democrats will confirm any Republican justices while they control the Senate until at the very least they take one seat "back" that vacates during a Republican administration. And they'd only be willing to deal then if there's a constitutional amendment or something, nobody trusts the Republicans on anything now that they abolished the blue slip. The two parties are in a race to the bottom on judges, with no solution or end game in sight
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:28
|
|
|
Arkane posted:The two parties are in a race to the bottom on judges, with no solution or end game in sight it's been necessary to block republican nominees, because they're unqualified loons the race is "people who are qualified and within the mainstream of legal thought should be judges" and "only ideological loons who are so visibly nuts that we can be sure they won't ever come to their senses should be judges"
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:30
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:I do not expect Democrats will confirm any Republican justices while they control the Senate until at the very least they take one seat "back" that vacates during a Republican administration. And they'd only be willing to deal then if there's a constitutional amendment or something, nobody trusts the Republicans on anything now that they abolished the blue slip. 3 Dems voted for Gorsuch. 3 Dems helped the GOP actually steal the seat you think they'll want revenge for. I don't have any confidence that borderline Dems like Manchin would vote for a truly progressive Justice in a close vote. Unzip and Attack fucked around with this message at 17:32 on Jun 27, 2018 |
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:30
|
|
|
Unzip and Attack posted:3 Dems voted for Gorsuch. 3 Dems helped the GOP actually steal the seat you think they'll want revenge for. 3 dems voted for Gorsuch once it was clear he would be confirmed who will be facing tough races this year in heavily republican states, don't try to pull this dumb poo poo. that's miles different from preventing party leadership from blocking a trump replacement in 2019 if dems take the Senate.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:33
|
|
|
Unzip and Attack posted:I don't have any confidence that borderline Dems like Manchin would vote for a truly progressive Justice in a close vote. If Democrats control the Senate 51-49 or the like you may not be able to get someone as far left and ideological as alito/gorusch, but the thing is that republican judges are so far off the map into crazyville it is very easy to get a judge acceptable to red-state Democrats who will reverse huge swathes of the Lochner/Korematsu II decisions this court has been making.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:37
|
|
|
Syzygy Stardust posted:I’m so old I can remember 2015-2016. they weren't good at it then either.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:42
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:If Democrats control the Senate 51-49 or the like you may not be able to get someone as far left and ideological as alito/gorusch, but the thing is that republican judges are so far off the map into crazyville it is very easy to get a judge acceptable to red-state Democrats who will reverse huge swathes of the Lochner/Korematsu II decisions this court has been making. This is kind of my point. The way things are now and for the foreseeable future, any vacancy nets the GOP a potential Scalia disciple while at best we get a Sotomayor, who while progressive isn't willing to poo poo on the Constitution for partisan gain. Even when we "win" it's a rearguard action to attain small victories, few and far between. The rest of the time it's full-on fascism speed run.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:44
|
|
|
Unzip and Attack posted:This is kind of my point. The way things are now and for the foreseeable future, any vacancy nets the GOP a potential Scalia disciple while at best we get a Sotomayor, who while progressive isn't willing to poo poo on the Constitution for partisan gain. That's why this is all so demoralizing. Our victories are just "we were not completely wiped out and are still able to fight" while their victories are "we abolished gay rights and labor organizing" Rear-guard actions aren't cutting it.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:49
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:If Democrats control the Senate 51-49 or the like you may not be able to get someone as far left and ideological as alito/gorusch, but the thing is that republican judges are so far off the map into crazyville it is very easy to get a judge acceptable to red-state Democrats who will reverse huge swathes of the Lochner/Korematsu II decisions this court has been making. I don't at all trust a 1 person Dem majority to not put any more insane Trump picks into court seats to be completely honest.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:49
|
|
|
fknlo posted:I don't at all trust a 1 person Dem majority to not put any more insane Trump picks into court seats to be completely honest. With a Dem majority of any size, they don't get a vote in the first place. You just don't put any red-state democrats on the Judiciary Committee and none of them are referred out to the Senate for a vote. If, for whatever reason, you have to/want to refer them out for a vote, you reinstitute the judicial filibuster or do any number of procedural things to let those red-state democrats defect while still blocking the nominee.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:51
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:With a Dem majority of any size, they don't get a vote in the first place. You just don't put any red-state democrats on the Judiciary Committee and none of them are referred out to the Senate for a vote. If, for whatever reason, you have to/want to refer them out for a vote, you reinstitute the judicial filibuster or do any number of procedural things to let those red-state democrats defect while still blocking the nominee. On the other hand look at all the great deals that Obama negotiated.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:52
|
|
|
hobbesmaster posted:On the other hand look at all the great deals that Obama negotiated. on the third hand, look a the weather outside, something perhaps even more related to the topic than your post
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 17:57
|
|
|
|
| # ? Jun 10, 2024 21:51 |
|
|
You're positing that Schumer is better at this than Obama.
|
|
#
?
Jun 27, 2018 18:01
|
|