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Kinda hoping that one of the brilliant legal minds at work petitions for en banc review or something else nonsensical as a fun coda.
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Dec 12, 2020 01:53
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SCOTUS should find a way to grant cert to Trump representing himself pro se at this point. Could sell it on pay per view and pay off the national debt no problem.
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Dec 12, 2020 01:55
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Dec 12, 2020 02:26
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Stage 1: Denial
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Dec 12, 2020 02:27
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generic one posted:Buh bye. Trump rage tweets imminent.
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Dec 12, 2020 02:40
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Crows Turn Off posted:Unanimous? Yes. 7 judges denied outright. Thomas and Alito would have granted Texas’ petition to file the bill of complaint because they do not believe the supreme court can decline an original jurisdiction case, but they would have denied Texas any further relief. All nine judges told Ken Paxton to get hosed.
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Dec 12, 2020 02:42
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Crows Turn Off posted:Unanimous? Mostly. It's unanimous on the merits, but 7-2 on declining to hear the case at all. Alito and Thomas would take the case and then go tell Texas to gently caress itself.
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Dec 12, 2020 02:43
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Crows Turn Off posted:Unanimous? Sort of. All but two voted to deny their request due to a lack of standing. The two that dissented would have taken the case (because its in the Court's original jurisdiction under the Constitution) but said that no relief could have been granted so it would also have been immediatly dismissed after being taken.
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Dec 12, 2020 02:44
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Is "Texas has not demonstrated a judicially cognizable interest in the manner in which another State conducts its elections" the judicial burn it sounds like to this layperson?
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Dec 12, 2020 02:48
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Can't wait for SCOTUS to limit class action suits more https://twitter.com/SCOTUSblog/status/1337551311907278851?s=20
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Dec 12, 2020 02:50
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MrNemo posted:As others have said, the wording in the law is that scotus shall have jurisdiction over disputes between States. Thomas's argument is that since it says shall (as opposed to may), scotus has no choice but to take the case. Shall only refers to jurisdiction though, it doesn't say anywhere else that they are required to hear it just that they can't hand it over to another body to have jurisdiction. For fucks sake with this bullshit, Thomas was literally on the Supreme Court in 1995 when they decided that only must acted as an imperative and that shall is legally the same as using may. e: wrong year added link to case E. Revenant fucked around with this message at 03:18 on Dec 12, 2020 |
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Dec 12, 2020 03:01
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FlamingLiberal posted:Can't wait for SCOTUS to limit class action suits more It is, however. quote:The U.S. Supreme Court is poised to consider the fate of a lawsuit that could mean billions of dollars for shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and affect the push to end federal control of the mortgage giants. That actually will have massive massive implications in the securities market and will be watched keenly.
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Dec 12, 2020 03:25
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E. Revenant posted:For fucks sake with this bullshit, Thomas was literally on the Supreme Court in 1995 when they decided that only must acted as an imperative and that shall is legally the same as using may. I think that case is distinguishable, as the issue is whether or not there is any sort of judicial review of the AG's certification available. I believe this just came up recently in the Trump NY defamation lawsuit.
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Dec 12, 2020 04:37
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quote:In response to the ruling, Texas GOP chairman Allen West issued a statement that continued to suggest widespread voter fraud in the election, for which he offered no evidence, but criticized the court and suggested that Texas and other states secede. Yeah you should totally secede, worked out so well for you dipshits last time.
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Dec 12, 2020 05:58
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Sydin posted:Yeah you should totally secede, worked out so well for you dipshits last time. No no the time before that!
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Dec 12, 2020 06:05
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Platystemon posted:No no the time before that! Ooh, is this the part where they beg the French for help? 
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Dec 12, 2020 06:11
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Who has standing to contest the election in GA, PA, etc?
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Dec 12, 2020 06:38
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Residents or governments of the states on question, candidates, or the federal government (in the case of violation of federal law or the US constitution)? Am I missing anybody?
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Dec 12, 2020 06:47
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human garbage bag posted:Who has standing to contest the election in GA, PA, etc? People whose attempts to overturn the election already went down in flames.
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Dec 12, 2020 06:58
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human garbage bag posted:Who has standing to contest the election in GA, PA, etc? The correct move here would have been to have an in-state person or entity challenge the election in state court, which they already did, and lost every time
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Dec 12, 2020 07:04
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haveblue posted:The correct move here would have been to have an in-state person or entity challenge the election in state court, which they already did, and lost every time I thought there was one winner?
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Dec 12, 2020 07:10
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Meanwhile on Thedonald.win   
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Dec 12, 2020 07:13
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Constitution is when the government does something I like. The more I like it, the more constitutional it is.
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Dec 12, 2020 07:16
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Platystemon posted:Constitution is when the government does something I like. 
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Dec 12, 2020 07:25
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Meanwhile at SCOTUS tomorrow
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Dec 12, 2020 10:41
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human garbage bag posted:I thought there was one winner? The one win was a court saying that 15 feet was too far and observers could be as close as 6 feet.
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Dec 12, 2020 13:33
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Truly a monumental victory for Donald J. Trump.
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Dec 12, 2020 13:36
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Mr. Nice! posted:The one win was a court saying that 15 feet was too far and observers could be as close as 6 feet. I believe that was reversed The one win was getting to exclude a few hundred ballots in PA that weren't filled out properly or something like that
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Dec 12, 2020 15:27
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Sydin posted:Yeah you should totally secede, worked out so well for you dipshits last time. Imagine the big brain neccesary to say youd secede and then immediately adopt your parent nations constitution
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Dec 12, 2020 15:47
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mandatory lesbian posted:Imagine the big brain neccesary to say youd secede and then immediately adopt your parent nations constitution They made some very important changes last time! Almost all of which related to slavery...
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Dec 12, 2020 16:00
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mandatory lesbian posted:Imagine the big brain neccesary to say youd secede and then immediately adopt your parent nations constitution I suspect quite a few of the amendments would look very different.
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Dec 12, 2020 16:36
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VitalSigns posted:I believe that was reversed And it was in a county Trump won, wasn't it?
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Dec 12, 2020 17:43
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ulmont posted:They made some very important changes last time! Almost all of which related to slavery... the civil war was really about the right to have the president be able to line item veto, and also, slavery
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Dec 13, 2020 08:24
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Tiler Kiwi posted:the civil war was really about the right to have the president be able to line item veto, and also, slavery Should have just waited another 135 years and then argued slightly harder in front of SCOTUS
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Dec 13, 2020 13:55
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Tiler Kiwi posted:the civil war was really about the right to have the president be able to line item veto, and also, slavery Ah, the line item veto. One of the few things that could have made Trump even more obnoxious.
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Dec 13, 2020 21:01
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 Opinions! These are still early chaff-clearing.DAVID SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. GEORGE RUSSELL KAYER TLDR: The AEDPA makes it easier for states to execute people without the federal courts stopping it. The 9th Circuit tends not to give its states the required derence and is routinely reversed in these cases. So Nevada is going to execute George Kayer. Majority Opinion (Per Curiam): The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) restricts the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus based on claims that were “adjudicated on the merits” by a state court. When a state court has applied clearly established federal law to reasonably determined facts in the process of adjudicating a claim on the merits, a federal habeas court may not disturb the state court’s decision unless its error lies “beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” In this case, the Court of Appeals erred in ordering issuance of a writ of habeas corpus despite ample room for reasonable disagreement about the prisoner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. In so doing, the Court of Appeals clearly violated this Court’s AEDPA jurisprudence. We therefore grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the judgment below. Respondent George Kayer murdered Delbert Haas in 1994. Haas, Kayer, and Lisa Kester were on a trip to gamble in Laughlin, Nevada. While there, Kayer borrowed money from Haas and lost it gambling. Kayer then devised a plan to rob Haas, but Kester questioned whether he could get away with robbing someone he knew. Kayer responded, “‘I guess I’ll just have to kill him.’” … After a jury trial before Judge William T. Kiger, Kayer was found guilty of premeditated first-degree murder and related offenses. After being found guilty, Kayer “made clear his desire to expedite the sentencing process.” He refused to fully cooperate with a mitigation specialist. When Kayer’s counsel stated that the specialist needed more time to evaluate Kayer’s case, Kayer refused to agree to a continuance, and the trial court ruled him competent to make that choice. At sentencing, the judge again asked Kayer whether he would like more time for investigation, but Kayer “refused the offer and stated he would not cooperate with [the specialist] no matter how long sentencing was delayed.” The court proceeded to sentencing. At that time, Arizona law required a judge, not a jury, to determine whether certain aggravating circumstances had been established, and a judge was authorized to impose a sentence of death only if at least one such aggravating circumstance was shown and there was no mitigating circumstance that was sufficient to call for leniency....Weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, Judge Kiger sentenced Kayer to death, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Kayer subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief in Arizona Superior Court. Among his many claims, Kayer argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to investigate mitigating circumstances at the outset of the criminal proceedings. … The court denied relief after applying the familiar two-part test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). The court found that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient because Kayer had refused to cooperate with his mitigation team’s efforts to gather more mitigation evidence. And, in the alternative, the court held that “if there had been a finding that the performance prong of the Strickland standard had been met, . . . no prejudice to the defendant can be found.” The court added that “[i]n stating this conclusion[, it] ha[d] considered the assertion of mental illness, physical illness, jail conditions, childhood development, and any alcohol or gambling addictions.” Ibid. The Arizona Supreme Court denied Kayer’s petition to review the denial of postconviction relief. Kayer then filed an unsuccessful habeas petition in Federal District Court...A divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed. On the question of trial counsel’s performance, the panel rejected the state court’s judgment because, in the judgment of the panel, Kayer’s attorneys should have begun to pursue mitigation evidence promptly after their appointment. And on the question of prejudice, the court conducted its own review of the evidence and found that trial counsel’s alleged failings likely affected Kayer’s sentence. … Kayer asserts that his death sentence was imposed in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. As the state court recognized, this Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), provides the proper framework for assessing that claim. Under Strickland, Kayer must show that his counsel provided “deficient” performance that “prejudiced the defense.” In the capital sentencing context, the prejudice inquiry asks “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer—including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence—would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” The Strickland standard is “highly demanding.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U. S. 365, 382 (1986). A reasonable probability means a “‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” When an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is presented in a federal habeas petition, a state prisoner faces additional burdens. Among other things, no relief may be granted “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim,” as relevant here, “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Here, the state court applied “the correct governing legal principle . . . to the facts of the prisoner’s case,” so the question is whether its decision involved an “unreasonable application of ” this Court’s precedent. To meet that standard, a prisoner must show far more than that the state court’s decision was “merely wrong” or “even clear error.” The prisoner must show that the state court’s decision is so obviously wrong that its error lies “beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Congress “meant” this standard to be “difficult to meet.” … The Ninth Circuit resolved this case in a manner fundamentally inconsistent with AEDPA. Most striking, the panel “essentially evaluated the merits de novo, only tacking on a perfunctory statement at the end of its analysis asserting that the state court’s decision was unreasonable.” ... Under AEDPA, state courts play the leading role in assessing challenges to state sentences based on federal law. A state court heard Kayer’s evidence and concluded that he failed to show prejudice. The court below exceeded its authority in rejecting that determination, which was not so obviously wrong as to be “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Under §2254(d), that is “‘the only question that matters.’” We grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Unknown, but Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissent so presumptively 6-3. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1302_8nj9.pdf TEXAS v. NEW MEXICO TLDR: If Texas asks New Mexico to store Pecos River water and not send it to Texas for some time, any loss through evaporation is Texas’s problem. Majority Opinion (Kavanaugh) This is a case about evaporated water. In the southwestern United States, the Pecos River begins near Santa Fe, New Mexico, and winds its way south for hundreds of miles through New Mexico and Texas before flowing into the Rio Grande River on the Texas-Mexico border. The 1949 interstate Pecos River Compact provides for equitable apportionment of the use of the River’s water by New Mexico and Texas. The dispute in this case started in 2014 when a tropical storm hit the Pecos River Basin. To prevent flooding, Texas asked New Mexico to temporarily store water from the Pecos River that would otherwise flow into Texas. New Mexico agreed to do so. A few months later, New Mexico released the water to Texas. But in the interim, some of the water evaporated. The question presented is straightforward: Under the Pecos River Compact, does New Mexico receive delivery credit for the evaporated water even though that water was not delivered to Texas? The answer is yes. The River Master’s Manual, which was approved by this Court in 1988, implements the Compact and speaks directly to this question: When water is stored in New Mexico “at the request of Texas,” then New Mexico’s delivery obligation “will be reduced by the amount of reservoir losses attributable to its storage.” Here, the water was stored in New Mexico at the request of Texas, so New Mexico’s delivery obligation must be reduced by the amount of water that evaporated during its storage. For that reason, the River Master awarded New Mexico delivery credit for the evaporated water. We agree with the River Master’s determination, and we deny Texas’s motion for review. … Over time, Texas recognized that its water supply was vulnerable because upriver New Mexico could (if it wanted) restrict Texas’s access to the water from the Pecos River. Eventually, the two States struck a deal. In 1949, the States ratified and Congress approved the Pecos River Compact to, among other things, “provide for the equitable division and apportionment of the use of the waters of the Pecos River” and “remove causes of present and future controversies.” Because of the irregular flow of the Pecos River, the Compact does not enumerate a specific amount of water that New Mexico must deliver to Texas each year. Rather, Article III(a) of the Compact provides that “New Mexico shall not deplete by man’s activities the flow of the Pecos River at the New Mexico-Texas state line below an amount which will give to Texas a quantity of water equivalent to that available to Texas under the 1947 condition.” Article VI(c) of the Compact in turn prescribes a methodology to implement Article III(a) and determine whether New Mexico has met its annual delivery obligation: “the inflow-outflow method.” Roughly speaking, the inflow-outflow method looks at how much water is in the River in New Mexico, which in turn helps determine how much water New Mexico must allow to flow into Texas. … In 1988, the Court appointed Neil S. Grigg as River Master, and he continues to serve in that position. The Court also issued an amended decree. The amended decree requires the River Master to annually calculate: (i) New Mexico’s delivery obligation; (ii) any shortfall or overage based on what New Mexico actually delivered; and (iii) the net shortfall, if any, after subtracting any overages accumulated in previous years. In making those calculations, the River Master must abide by the River Master’s Manual, which the Court described as “an integral part of this Decree.” New Mexico ordinarily receives credit only for water that actually makes its way to Texas. But there are exceptions. Sometimes, as in this case, water may be stored in New Mexico at Texas’s request. Section C.5 of the River Master’s Manual addresses that situation. It is titled “Texas Water Stored in New Mexico Reservoirs.” As relevant here, §C.5 provides: “If a quantity of the Texas allocation is stored in facilities constructed in New Mexico at the request of Texas, then . . . this quantity will be reduced by the amount of reservoir losses attributable to its storage, and, when released for delivery to Texas, the quantity released less channel losses is to be delivered by New Mexico at the New Mexico-Texas state line.” … In November 2014, to prevent flooding, Texas’s Pecos River Commissioner wrote to his counterpart Commissioner in New Mexico: “[I]t is my request that New Mexico store Texas’ portion of the flows until such time as they can be utilized in Red Bluff Reservoir.” App. to Texas’s Motion for Review 61a. In response, New Mexico’s Commissioner agreed that water would be stored at the Brantley Reservoir in New Mexico, a reservoir owned by the United States. But he also explained that the water “belongs to Texas” and that “but for Texas’ request, New Mexico would have released” the water “to the Texas state line.” The New Mexico Commissioner added that “[e]vaporative losses . . . should thus be borne by Texas.” Beginning in August 2015, the water was finally released to Texas. But there was a problem: During the time that the water was stored in New Mexico, a significant amount of water (approximately 21,000 acre-feet) evaporated. During the early months of 2015, Texas and New Mexico discussed how to account for that evaporated water under the Compact. But they did not reach an agreement. … In September 2018, as relevant here, the River Master ruled in favor of New Mexico. First, he rejected Texas’s argument that New Mexico had waited too long to file its motion for credit for the evaporated water. He stated that “discussions about the flood and accounting for it equitably were continuous from the time the flood occurred until the present”; that the States “knew from the time of the flood that such an adjustment would be required”; and that the States had not previously expressed any urgency about resolving the matter. Second, on the merits, the River Master concluded that the evaporated water was “Texas Water Stored in New Mexico Reservoirs” under §C.5 of the River Master’s Manual. Applying that provision of the Manual, the River Master decided that New Mexico was entitled to delivery credit for the evaporated water. In the wake of the River Master’s decision, Texas invoked this Court’s original jurisdiction and filed a motion for review of the River Master’s determination. Texas first argues that New Mexico’s 2018 motion to the River Master for credit for the evaporated water was untimely. According to Texas, New Mexico filed the motion after expiration of the amended decree’s 30-day deadline for a State to file objections to the relevant preliminary report—a deadline that in this case would have expired several years ago. Texas’s argument disregards the history of the proceedings in this case. Both States agreed to postpone the River Master’s resolution of the evaporated-water issue while they negotiated and sought an agreement. The River Master’s annual reports in turn repeatedly explained that the States were trying to negotiate a solution to the issue. Neither State objected to the negotiation procedure. Texas cannot now run away from the procedure that it agreed to. … On the merits, Texas contends that it should receive credit for the water that evaporated while New Mexico was storing the water. New Mexico and the United States argue that Texas is not entitled to credit because the water was stored in New Mexico at Texas’s request. We agree with New Mexico and the United States. We agree with the River Master that the text of §C.5 of the Manual easily resolves this case. Texas’s Pecos River Commissioner asked that the water be stored at a facility in New Mexico when, in November 2014, he sent New Mexico’s Commissioner an e-mail with the plainspoken subject line “Texas request for storage.” In that e-mail, Texas requested that New Mexico hold Texas’s “portion of the flows until such time as they can be utilized in Red Bluff Reservoir.” Ibid. New Mexico did so. But New Mexico was careful to remind Texas that the water “belongs to Texas,” and that, “but for Texas’ request, New Mexico would have released” the water “to the Texas state line.” New Mexico also added (correctly, as it turns out) that “[e]vaporative losses . . . should thus be borne by Texas.” The text of §C.5 and the record evidence of the States’ correspondence establish that New Mexico is entitled to delivery credit for the water that evaporated while New Mexico was storing the water at Texas’s request. … The water was stored in New Mexico at the request of Texas. Some of the water then evaporated before it was released to Texas. Under those circumstances, as the River Master correctly concluded, New Mexico is entitled to delivery credit for the evaporated water. That result is both legally accurate and entirely fair. We deny Texas’s motion for review. Lineup: Unanimous except Barrett did not participate (argued before she was confirmed). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/22o65_dc8e.pdf
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Dec 14, 2020 20:56
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ulmont posted:Majority Opinion (Kavanaugh) I don't know why this is so loving funny to me but it is.
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Dec 14, 2020 21:56
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Sydin posted:I don't know why this is so loving funny to me but it is. It's his calling card.
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Dec 14, 2020 22:10
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SCOTUS 2020: In a per curiam, presumptively 6-3 decision...
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Dec 14, 2020 23:12
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ulmont posted:TEXAS v. NEW MEXICO All I have to say about Texas is “christ, what an rear end in a top hat.”
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Dec 15, 2020 07:40
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