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Hazzard posted:How would the Finnish mercenaries get horses? I can't imagine them being rich enough to afford the sort of horse you'd need to be good light cavalry. Finnish soldiers used the local small Finnhorses, which are good pulling carts and sleds and have good off-road capabilities, but which are not very good horses for cavalry charges. They make for good dragoon horses though. I'm not a horse expert, but I'm not aware that light cavalry horses were ever very expensive. It was the heavy cavalry that needed the strong expensive horses. The Swedish allotment system rewarded those people who equipped their soldiers as poorly as possible, so when the soldiers got to Germany, they all tried to get better horses as quickly as possible. G2A himself didn't like his Realm's own cavalry very much, and said that not much would be lost if not a bone came back. The allotment system cavalry was still used very effectively in some important battles, but the cavalry horses or soldiers weren't that special. I think that the main reasons for their success were good tactics, and because they were used in the right place.
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Oct 31, 2015 16:08
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tilly said that his grooms were mounted better than his enemies when he first saw the swedes placing themselves at breitenfeld then they slapped him around a bunch lol and hogge wild, dragoons are mounted terribly, stereotypically speaking
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Oct 31, 2015 16:09
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HEY GAL posted:tilly said that his grooms were mounted better than his enemies when he first saw the swedes placing themselves at breitenfeld i have a soft spot for the 'goons they can't ride and they don't have flashy horses, flashy uniforms, or even bugles
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Oct 31, 2015 16:27
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Hogge Wild posted:i have a soft spot for the 'goons i mean, imagine being looked down on by infantry
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Oct 31, 2015 16:32
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Mazz posted:This is probably best directed at EE, but was there ever any discussion or explanation for why WW2 and early cold war Soviet armor design seemed to so disregard gun depression? Was it just not considered a useful feature? Did they ever address this point at all that you've seen? No honest man needs more than five degrees.
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Oct 31, 2015 16:51
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Scarecrow Shells posted:
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Oct 31, 2015 17:17
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100 Years Ago I hereby declare today "Burying the Dead Day", in which nothing of importance occurs at Loos: quote:We crawled out of the trenches with caution, and dealt with the dead by pulling them into depressions in the earth or shell-holes. This was not a pleasant task, and occasionally the arms disengaged from the bodies. And of course, this has to be done while playing the regular game of No Man's Land Musical Statues with the enemy's Very lights. (Meanwhile, Louis Barthas is getting wet.)
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Oct 31, 2015 20:40
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Mazz posted:This is probably best directed at EE, but was there ever any discussion or explanation for why WW2 and early cold war Soviet armor design seemed to so disregard gun depression? Was it just not considered a useful feature? Did they ever address this point at all that you've seen? From an engineering standpoint, gun depression is expensive. Every degree means you need to make the turret taller, and that means more area to armor. Taking a T-55 as an example, the end of the gun is about 1.3m from the pivot point, and the maximum recoil length is 650mm. So you need about 2m of clear space to be able to swing the gun around and not crater it into armor when you fire. That means that to increase the gun depression from 5 to 10 would cost you around 18cm. A very rough calculation with the T-55 armor profile shows that you need around 85kg of armor per cm to increase the turret height, that works out at 1530kg, or the weight of a car, to increase the gun depression from 5 to 10. And that's with a T-55 armor level, if you need more armor the cost goes up. So in the end, to get to 10 degrees gun depression a T-55 would need to go from 240cm tall and 40 tons to 260cm tall and 41.5 tons. That is a fairly significant increase for something that would mostly come into play while playing hulldown grabass in the hills, something the Soviets were not intent on doing. Also note that for that weight you could also do things like increase the frontal turret armor by around 100mm for example, going from 200mm to 300mm. So it's a legitimate question of spending the weight on armor, or spending the weight so you can use a hill as armor. (Note that this is all back of the envelope stuff, but it should be accurate enough to give a reasonable idea of the costs involved) Kafouille fucked around with this message at 21:57 on Oct 31, 2015 |
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Oct 31, 2015 21:54
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HEY GAL posted:armor     
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Oct 31, 2015 23:23
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oh my god they're beautiful
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Oct 31, 2015 23:33
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Reaching way the hell back to handwriting-chat, I came across a blogpost some of you might appreciate.quote:In his 1943 book The Life of Johnny Reb, Emory University historian Bell Wiley collects misspellings found in the letters of Confederate soldiers. Can you decipher these words?
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Oct 31, 2015 23:42
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Ridgement? RIDGEMENT!?
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Oct 31, 2015 23:47
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the life of johnny reb is a pro read, as is the companion book, the life of billy yank. edit: SeanBeansShako, isn't that more or less how it's pronounced, just with an I instead of the first E? I pronounce it redg - i - mint
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Oct 31, 2015 23:53
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darthbob88 posted:Reaching way the hell back to handwriting-chat, I came across a blogpost some of you might appreciate. This is why I don't study the Civil War in any great detail. Fisher and his friends are bad enough.
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Oct 31, 2015 23:55
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darthbob88 posted:Reaching way the hell back to handwriting-chat, I came across a blogpost some of you might appreciate. quote:dyereaer for diarrhea Makes sense I guess, it's going to dye your read...
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Oct 31, 2015 23:56
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ALL-PRO SEXMAN posted:This is why I don't study the Civil War in any great detail. Fisher and his friends are bad enough. edit: mansfeld's italian handwriting, however, is lovely 
HEY GUNS fucked around with this message at 00:04 on Nov 1, 2015 |
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Oct 31, 2015 23:57
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Mirificus posted:In that vein, here's some more on Bashford Dean's helmet designs: Bashford Dean and Helmet Design During World War I. He also wrote a book on Helmets and body armor in modern warfare (WW1) in 1920. I absolutely love that when it came time to design helmets, the Americans turned to a museum curator.
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Nov 1, 2015 00:17
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HEY GAL posted:imagine if all of them had to write in italian to communicate with the admiralty and you have my current week My condolences. I don't know how common this is, but my guys tended to write much more legibly if they were trying to write something official like a draft of a proposal. Well, most did. Beresford gave up and dictated to his secretary.
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Nov 1, 2015 01:19
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ALL-PRO SEXMAN posted:My condolences. the final drafts of these letters are probably written by a secretary, but they're probably also a pile of ash in Milan, so Mansfeld's records are what i've got.
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Nov 1, 2015 01:29
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Well, that's not that unusual, is it? I mean if I, as a German, had to talk to a Spaniard today I'd use English. That Italian is also remarkable readable. Trin Tragula posted:100 Years Ago Why weren't there any attempts to negotiate a cease-fire to recover the dead?
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Nov 1, 2015 01:52
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ArchangeI posted:Well, that's not that unusual, is it? I mean if I, as a German, had to talk to a Spaniard today I'd use English. Might be one of those "never let them see
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Nov 1, 2015 02:01
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ArchangeI posted:That Italian is also remarkable readable. edit: although we've probably heard the last of him, there's still a little bit of heironymus sebastian schutze in all of us HEY GUNS fucked around with this message at 02:54 on Nov 1, 2015 |
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Nov 1, 2015 02:16
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So here it is my effort post, weighing in at 4200 words. Any mistakes or misunderstandings are my own, and if there are any please bring them to my attention.  T-64 MBT aka Object 430  Pictured: Early production T-64A's, identified by the optical coincidence rangefinder, lack of LRF, missing Kobra antenna, arrangement of the smoke launchers and lack of the later additional glacis armor plate So, let us begin with the revolutionary and very advanced for its time T-64 tank. This tank was designed by Alexander Morozov of the Kharkov Design Bureau. The tank underwent a protracted development process, with its intended main armament changing three times. The biggest issue however was its new and very high tech 5TD(F) engine, which was plagued with reliability issues in the early part of its lifetime. In addition, this engine was very complex to make and needed new manufacturing techniques in its construction. Despite this, the T-64 was a revolutionary tank design that would influence Russian tank production until the appearance of this year’s T-15 Armata. Videos “Made in the USSR: T-64 main battle tank” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bJc4s3a_mVc Object 430 1947 to 1959 The first form of Morozov's new tank was known as the Object 430. This tank was armed with the novel D-54 100mm gun which was much more powerful than the contemporary L7 105mm from NATO and the D-10T of the T-54/55. In addition, this weapon was provided two-axis stabilization by the "Metel" system. The weapon was fed by a mechanical loader assisting the human loader accommodating 16-18 rounds. Aiming of the weapon was via a wide-base coincidence range finder, which greatly increased accuracy over previous monocular sights. However it was much more expensive and complex to manufacture. A side project at this time was the Obj.430U which was given extra glacis armor and the armament was replaced with a 122mm D-25TS gun with an additional radar-based range finder. The 430U was never produced. At first the 430 was powered by a modified V-2 conventional diesel engine that had its beginnings with the T-34 from 1940 onwards. Morozov began to explore the idea of using a new and advanced 2-cycle, opposed-piston diesel engine. The Juno 205 was the main inspiration of this engine and it promised excellent power output from a compact system. Interestingly, the Juno 205 was also the inspiration for the even more troubled Leyland L60 engine as used in the UK Chieftain. Morozov and his Obj.430 design would have significant support from Dmitry Ustinov who was the civilian chief of the soviet defense industry. He would lead the new Ministry for Defense Industries and subsequently the Military Industrial Commission after Stalin’s death. Ustinov was in favor of more innovative weapons such as the T-64 and turbine engines so that the Soviet Army would have the technological edge over their NATO opponents. This was in opposition to the military establishment who preferred more incremental and modest designs. Around this time, the main competitor to the 430 was the Object 140 from the competing UVZ team, headed by Leonid Kartsev. The 140 would eventually become the T-62 and later, the T-72. It was also armed with the D-54TS gun, but used a human loader, a more conventional suspension and an upgraded V-54 diesel engine. Object 432 (T-64) 1959 to 1964 During the years of 1958 and 1959 there was considerable turmoil and anxiety in the Soviet leadership due to the appearance of new NATO tanks armed with the 105mm L7 gun in significant quantities. These being the M60, Centurion and Leopard. They recognized that the D-54TS would not be sufficient against the M60 or the Chieftain and so a new gun was needed. In 1959, Nizny Tagil had already proposed a smoothbore version of the D-54T gun which would permit the use of new high velocity fin-stabilized, armor-piercing rounds of 115mm caliber. This new gun was designated the U-5T Molot (2A20) and Morozov's team was instructed to modify one of their prototypes to fit the new gun, leading to the 430A. Unfortunately, the U-5T used a single-piece round that was very difficult to use within the confines of the small 430A turret. As a result of this, a new modification of the weapon that used two piece ammunition was created, the D-68 (2A21), which was used on another prototype, the Object 435 and later production models of the Obj.432. It was anticipated that both guns would be able to effectively engage the Chieftain and the M60 at typical combat ranges. The first tank to use this weapon was the T-62, which was accepted into service in 1961. The Kharkov team correctly argued that the T-62 offered no improvements in protection or mobility compared to the T-55 and that it was still inferior to the new NATO tanks such as the M60 and the Chieftain. These two tanks could penetrate the T-62 turret and glacis from 3km which is far beyond the range the 115mm gun could penetrate them. On the T-64 this weapon was intended only as an interim measure as more powerful armaments were developed. In 1961 the 430 program was cancelled and the Obj.432 was authorized to produce a test batch of 5 tanks, with a further 50 to be made in 1963. Two prototypes were produced by Sep-Oct 1962 and sent to Kubinka for trials. In October a special demonstration was held for senior military and government leaders, including Khrushchev. He found the Obj.432 demonstration so impressive (not a difficult feat mind you) and authorized the tank for production despite development trials not yet having been completed. Limited production of the Obj.432 begun in October 1963 at Kharkov. The plan was to increase production to 500 per year by 1965, 700 by 1966 and eventually to 1800 per year. T-55 and T-62 production was to be halted and switched to Obj.432 production at Omsk by 1965 and at Nizhni-Tagil by 1966. However the 5TD engine was still not living up to expectations and Morozov was ordered to begin adapting a conventional diesel engine to suit to the tank. The Obj.432 was the first soviet production tank to make use of advanced composite armor design over simple steel construction in both the turret and on the glacis of hull. The armor arrangement on the glacis was an outer layer of 80mm steel, followed by two layers of 52mm fiberglass backed by a final 20mm layer of steel. This arrangement of materials gave substantial protection against contemporary threats such as HEAT. The protection requirements of the turret were much greater however as it must also protect against KE threats in addition to HEAT. Initially a matrix of ceramic balls within steel was tried, but it was found during production trials that sometimes the metal springs and wire that held the ceramic balls in place as the molten steel was poured into the cavity would melt, causing the balls to congregate at the bottom of the mold instead of being evenly distributed as required. Furthermore, there was no practical way to determine when this had happened during production. As a result, the designers replaced the turret filling with aluminum instead. So the turret front began with 50mm of steel, followed by 330mm of aluminum and a final 100mm layer of steel. Additional flipper panels known as “Eloshka” (Christmas tree) was also developed. These panels were folded against the tank during travel and then flipped out in combat to provide extra protection to the hull sides from frontal attack by HEAT weapons. Eloshka panels were first fitted to the later T-64A in 1966 and later retrofitted to T-64’s in 1967. Actual production of the Obj.432 by the end of 1964 only reached 218 tanks total. These tanks were first deployed with the nearby 41st Guards Tank Division. These trials ended by Feb-march of that year with scathing complaints from the troops in regards to engine durability and other issues. A number of small improvements were made to the Obj.432 during this short production run and Moscow instructed the factory to produce a batch of definitive production tanks for a second round of testing later that year. Nine of these tanks manufactured between June-July 1964 were used in trials with the 37th Guards Tank Division based in the Belorussian Military District that ran from September 14th to November 28th. This trial showed no significant improvement in the engine or the suspension. Object Obj.432 (T-64) 1965 to 1967 Additionally tests of the autoloader during 1965 showed that it was prone to malfunction, with nearly a third of them suffering from breakdowns. These technical problems were also exacerbated by Kharkov’s tendency to provide overly optimistic estimates of when the Obj.432 would be ready for service. The development issues of the Obj.432 project came to a head in 1965. Krushchev had been ousted in October 1964 and many of his allies throughout the soviet system were replaced by those loyal to the new premier, Leonid Brezhnev. This would have later repercussions as it provided a new opening for competing tank designs to gain favor. The designers at Leningrad and Nizhni-Tagil along with their regional party supporters began to lobby against Kharkov’s object 432, citing the numerous complaints of the army. A particular concern about the tank was its manufacturing requirements. In 1968 the T-64 took 22,564 man-hours to produce, almost four times as much as the T-62 which required 5,855 man-hours to produce. It was also very pricey, with the quoted price for a T-64A being 143,00Ru, nearly double that of a T-62 which cost 62,000 in 1973. The situation had deteriorated to the point that a special session was held in Moscow on April 16 1965 involving the Central Committee of the Communist party and representatives of the tank industry. Heading the meeting was Kharkov’s guardian angel, Dmitry Ustinov. But even he was losing his patience. After noting that the tank was 2nd only in importance to the nuclear missile program he berated Kharkov on their shortcomings. A particular point was that after three years of production, the engine had still not improved significantly in its reliability. As a result, the government demanded that Kharkov finally live up to its promises in regard to the engine. Warranty life of the engine was to reach 150 hours by the end of 1965, 300 hours by 1966 and ultimately 500 hours. The tank was to have a mobility warranty of 3,000km by 1966 and ultimately 5,000km. For comparison, in 1964 the engine averaged a lifespan of only 89 hours. In the first half of 1965, the engine life rose to 115 hours, but then fell again in the second half to 85 hours. By early 1966 the average life rose again, but only to 100 hours and 2,325km of travel. This was very worrisome, as Soviet experts assessed that the contemporary M60A1 had a durability of 6,400km. Even as late as 1967, 35% of engines deployed with the army had failed and the lifespan had only reached 212 hours. A particular weak point was the air filtration system which was repeatedly redesigned. The continuing dissatisfaction with the 5TDF engine provided impetus for other power plant options to be explored. Omsk was tasked with developing the V-46 diesel with the Object 436. Trashutin’s team at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Factory was assigned to work on adapting their V-36 to the Object 432. Ustinov’s passion for turbines in tanks was given fuel (heh) and directed Kharkov to adapt the GTD-3TL turbine to the Obj.432 as the Object 289. In a boost to Morozov however, it was recognized he had insufficient staff for his work and as a result the KB-60 design bureau was consolidated under is control in Kharkov. In late 1966, Ustinov is widely believed to have orchestrated the downfall of Gen A. M. Sych of the GBTU tank directorate who was a staunch opponent of the T-64 via a KGB sting operation over security leaks. Other personnel were also relieved and replaced in the GBTU, an example of how vicious the infighting had become. In August 1967, the Kremlin announced that all tank factories would switch to T-64 production starting in 1968. Kirov first in 1968 and with UVZ, Omsk and Chelyabinsk following in 1970. However aforementioned (engine) production issues delayed this plan continually to the point that it was never fully applied. A new round of alternative engine projects for the T-64 at two factories were started. At Nizhni Tagil (UVZ) the V-45 diesel in the Obj.439, and the GTD-1000T gas turbine in Leningrad (Kirov). Total production of the basic T-64 (Object 432) between 1964 and 1968 only reached 1,192 tanks. Due to the lingering problems, these tanks never made it to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and remained confined to the Belorussian and Carpathian military districts. Object 434 (T-64A) 1962 to 1972 Work on the up-gunned T-64 begun in 1962, running parallel with the Obj.432. Three options were considered: the two 125mm smoothbore guns D-81 and D-85 and the rifled 122mm D-83. The D-83 was abandoned and the D-85 was deemed to be too complex and expensive for serial production, despite offering superior performance to the D-81. One should note that in any case the D-81 would already be significantly more powerful than anything fielded by NATO at the time. Assisting Kharkov in the work on the new Object 434, the D-81 gun and associated weapon systems such as the fire controls and autoloader would be the OKB-9 in Perm. Twelve of Object 434 were delivered for trials in in 1966 and also suffered from the problems with the engine. The Kremlin approved the Object 434 for serial production as the T-64A in May 1968. First serial production of 12 was delivered in January of 1969 for factory trials. These winter trials showed that the engine had a much improved 435 hours life time and endurance of 8,235km. This was still below targets, but substantially better than the delivered performance of a few years prior. Troop trials of five tanks appeared to be favorable, with the five tanks covering 5,000 to 7,200km during testing. Despite the T-64 finally beginning to live up to expectations, the protracted development problems had opened the field to competition from other factories. Chief among them, was Nihzny Tagil. Their object 439 using the V-45 engine underwent range testing in 1970. UVZ had gone far beyond Moscow’s orders and expectations, as they had also replaced the suspension and autoloader with their own type based on the cancelled object 167 (T-62B) to further improve the vehicle’s overall reliability. So many extra changes had been made that it received a new designation of object 172. This design would later go on to be the T-72. In 1971, the GBTU and Ustinov finally had enough and threatened to cancel the T-64 unless it delivered. A batch of the newest production tanks was put through trials between June and November this year. Morozov was counting on new quality control measures to deliver to his fortune, they did. During these tests the T-64 demonstrated an average engine lifetime of 480 hours and 9,800km. The threat of cancellation was retracted and the Ministry of Production was instructed to expand production of the T-64A to 900-1000 per year by 1975. In 1972 the engine life further improved to the excellent figure of 700 hours. The T-64 had redeemed itself. Industry and Party Politics Despite the T-64 finally delivering on promises, the protracted and troublesome development process had empowered Kharkov’s political and technical enemies. The aforementioned object 172 received strong support from the military establishment as it offered the kind of strong reliability that they had been asking for, cheap price and equivalent firepower and armor to the T-64A. In 1971 the object 172 was accepted as the T-72. Additionally, the object 439 had been intended to be the new tank to be used by Warsaw Pact allies, and the Object 172 inherited this role. Production would start first in Poland in 1985, and later Czechoslovakia. Leningrad party officials also campaigned for the development of the Kirov Object 219 (T-80). But the army leadership and other industry figures were against this due to their concerns over the gas-turbine’s excessive fuel consumption along with the additional training and logistical burden that having three different tank designs in operation would entail. The object 219 might have been quietly shelved due to this resistance, but in 1976 the defense minister Andrei Grechko died and was replaced by Dmitry Ustinov. Ustinov had soured on the T-64A after all the disappointments of the 60’s and had long advocated the use of gas-turbines. The Obj 219 had become one of his pet projects and he used his power to protect the project and have it put into production in the second half of 1976 as the T-80. This meant that the soviet army now had three main tank lines in production by the end of the 70’s. The 64 at Kharkov, the 72 at UVZ and the 80 at Leningrad and Omsk. This decision to have three tanks of near-equal capability in terms of firepower, protection and mobility, but entirely different engines, suspensions and other small details would be labeled “a crime against the state” by a later Russian study. T-64A upgrades 1972 to 1981 T-64’s received numerous small changes to its subsystems during their production runs. One of the more significant upgrades was the replacement of the original TPD-2-1 rangefinder with the TPD-2-49 in 1971. The commander’s cupola was also replaced with a remote-controlled 12.7mm Utes AAMG in 1973 as a measure against the growing threat of NATO attack helicopters. An alternative system using Strela-3 MANPADS instead was tested but rejected. Range trials found that the steel/aluminum turret armor would develop voids and weak zones in the aluminum layer after non-penetrating hits. In production tanks of 1973-74 the aluminum layer was replaced with corundum filler in pelletized form. This “combination K” armor was also retrofitted to older tanks during the periodic capital rebuilds. The improved D-81TM (2A46-1) along with an improved stabilizer system started to be fit to T-64A’s starting in November 1974. Additionally, a thermal gun sleeve would be fitted to tanks starting in August 1975 to reduce the effects of barrel warping. The eloshka side panels were also replaced with composite resin/fabric side skirts developed for the T-64B starting in 1980. The final batch ofT-64A tanks manufactured in January 1981 also received many improvements intended for the upcoming T-64B, such as new turret armor, the KTD-1 laser range finder and other small features. These features would also be later retrofitted to older T-64A tanks during the periodic capital rebuilds. Total production of the T-64A amounted to approximately 4,600 with an additional 780 T-64AK command tanks. T-64B Sniper tank development and upgrades While Khrushchev’s earlier obsession with premature missile tank designs was a waste of resources, it did however produce the Rubin missile in the early 60’s which could be fired from a 125mm gun tube. In 1968, after Khrushchev’s ousting, there was a revival of interest in this weapon type due to the US Army development of the MBT-70, M60A2 and M551 Sheridan light tank all using the Shillelagh missile from a 152mm gun tube The missiles in competition to be used as the tube-launched weapon were the Kobra and Gyurza systems. The principle difference between these systems was the guidance package, the Gyurza used IR homing while the Kobra used radio-command SACLOS. The Gyurza was found to be unsuitable its IR homing, as there would be too many distracting heat sources in land combat (eg, burning vehicles) and was cancelled in favor of the Kobra for the T-64. Interestingly, the Gyurza was kept in development, replacing its guidance with radio-command and eventually found its wings on the Hind as the Shturm ATGM (AT-6 Spiral). The Kobra missile was kept compatible with the auto-loader system of the T-64 by keeping the missile in two parts that would snap together upon loading into the gun breech. The missile required the addition of guidance systems to be added to the tank, including the GTN-12 antenna boxed mounted on the turret roof in front of the commander’s cupola. A prototype T-64A with this system mounted was delivered in late 1969. The Kobra and its guidance systems would be one part of the Object 447 “Sosna” upgrade program for the T-64, which started in late 1973. The second major part of the Sosna program was the new 1A33 Ob fire-control system. In this FCS, the coincidence rangefinder was replaced with a 1G42 laser rangefinder. Also included was anew ballistic computer, a cant sensor and a wind sensor and other upgrades. This new FCS would increase the accuracy of the T-64B significantly over the older T-64A. The third major change was the modified 6EhTs40 autoloader that could accommodate the Kobra missile. The Sosna package was approved for service on September 3, 1976 as the T-64B. However these new advanced systems lead to a sharp increase in price, up to 318,000Ru for a T-64B from the 194,000Ru of the T-64A. As a result, some T-64B’s were manufactured without the Kobra system to reduce costs, these tanks were known as the T-64B1. At the end of 1979, a further round of improvements were incorporated to the T-64B design. The gun stabilizer was upgraded with the 2Eh42, the FCS was replaced with the newer 1A33-1 FCS, the Kobra was updated, modified autoloader and new side skirts. Other armament options such as the 130mm LP-36E rifled gun and the 125mm D-91T were explored but ultimately rejected. In 1982, Soviet testing of captured Israeli 105mm APFSDS rounds captured by Syrian troops in the Lebanon war of that year showed that they could penetrate the existing glacis armor of the T-64A. As a result, an additional 40mm of steel place was added on top of the existing glacis armor during capital rebuilds. Reactive armor had been under development since the late 1940’s in the Soviet Union, but it was use of “Blazer” ERA by the Israelis in the 1982 that prompted efforts into its deployment by the soviets. Kontakt-1, developed from July 1982 to January 1983 was the result of this effort and would be accepted for service in 1985. This first generation ERA would significantly add to the protection of the tank against HEAT warheads. Tanks with this ERA fited were given the V suffix to their designation, such as the T-64BV. One of the final upgrades was the adoption of the 6TD-1 engine which was based on the 5TDF, but featured an additional set of cylinders. This was accepted for service on December 21 1983 as the T-64AM and the T-64BM. Final production of the T-64B reached 4,200, with an additional 1,200 T-64B1. The later years Ustinov’s enthusiasm for the new T-80 and disenchantment with the T-64 led to plans to halt the production of T-64B tanks at Kharkov in favor of the new T-80. Kharkov had not been sitting on their hands however and had been developing an improved T-64B with a significantly better FCS and turret armor. Rather than waste effort on duplicating these capabilities on a T-80 turret, the new Kharkov turret was merged onto a T-80B hull and designated as the T-80U. This production shift would leave Kirov in overall control of the program and the hull, but with Kharkov responsible for the turret under their new chief, Nikolai Shomin, who had replaced Morozov after his retirement in 1976. Deliver of this new tank was delayed until 1985 in order to incorporate new improvements such as the Reflex missile system and new Kontakt-5 ERA. The T-80U would also enter production in Omsk in 1987. While being a fantastic tank, the T-80U was also fantastically expensive. A VNII Transmach study concluded that the T-80U was only 10% more combat effective than the T-72B, but cost 824,00Ru to the 280,000Ru of the T-72B. A major part of this cost was the GTD gas-turbine engine, which also increased fuel consumption to ruinous levels. This lead to renewed interest in a more economical but high performing diesel engine. This interest was exploited by Kharkov to push for the use of the 6TD 1,000HP engine that had been intended for improved T-64’s. Ustinov disagreed and still insisted on turbines. However, Ustinov’s views were not completely shared within the rest of the Soviet bureaucracy, and a study in 1984 concluded that the Soviet Army could purchase either 2,500 tanks with 6,000 6TD engines or 1,500 tanks and 2,000 GTD-1250 turbines engines. When Ustinov died in December 1984, his turbine fetish was finally pried from his cold, dead hands. The following death of Leningrad party-boss Romanov 7 months later in July 1985 removed the second major benefactor of the T-80 program. This cleared the way for a return to more conventional engines. Kharkov’s production of the T-80U had been limited, only reaching 45 until the government approved the creation of a new diesel powered T-80U. Kharkov had wanted to follow the tradition of the T-34, T-44, T-54 and T-64 and name the new tank the T-84. Their hopes were dashed and it was called the T-80UD (UD= Improved diesel), to avoid the embarrassment of acknowledging having not three, but actually four similar tanks in production. About 500 T-80UD were produced before the fall of the Soviet Union and eventually found life beyond death of revolution in one country, morphing into the Ukrainian T-84 program. Further reading Here is another forum that includes details of Kharkov’s other projects such as the T-74. http://sturgeonshouse.ipbhost.com/i...and-object-299/
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Nov 1, 2015 08:40
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darthbob88 posted:Reaching way the hell back to handwriting-chat, I came across a blogpost some of you might appreciate. This reminds me of when I was ten and wrote on my English vocabulary exam that hospital was spelled "hasperol" and each other was spelled "thichoter". I was so outraged that the word was supposedly hospital that I still remember it.
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Nov 1, 2015 09:34
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Awesome post, Xerxes! Out of curiosity, where did you find information about the actual unit cost of Soviet tanks, and can you talk about how these compare to Western tanks of the time? How were those calculated in the first place? Just material cost + manhours needed?
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Nov 1, 2015 11:07
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ArchangeI posted:Awesome post, Xerxes! Out of curiosity, where did you find information about the actual unit cost of Soviet tanks, and can you talk about how these compare to Western tanks of the time? How were those calculated in the first place? Just material cost + manhours needed? Figures are stolen directly and shamelessly from Zaloga's T-64 book Looking at his further reading it looks like he got it from Russian language books. As a result, Ensign Expendable would be a better person to ask about this.Lastly I am not an economist, so I cannot commet/know how to do a comparison of costs between two different economic systems correctly.
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Nov 1, 2015 12:31
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ArchangeI posted:Why weren't there any attempts to negotiate a cease-fire to recover the dead? Mostly because it encourages fraternisation with the enemy; GHQ is determined that Kitchener's Army will not do anything sentimental at Christmas this year. I'm sure if you trawled the battalion war diaries you'd find the odd colonel going "sod you, I'm doing this properly", but as the rare exception. The only thing the Army needs to identify the bodies is the identity disc. Also because there's a lot of them about, tens of thousands. When the dead number in the hundreds you can have an hour of peace, or a morning. Taking tens of thousands out of No Man's Land, sorting Tommy from Fritz as you go, for a proper burial, is a major undertaking that'd keep reserve and resting battalions in working parties for months, never mind everything else that needs to be done just to e.g. stop the trenches collapsing in on themselves or properly maintain your barbed wire.
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Nov 1, 2015 12:49
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Antti posted:This reminds me of when I was ten and wrote on my English vocabulary exam that hospital was spelled "hasperol" and each other was spelled "thichoter". Yep. People in the rural South still pronounce most of the words the same way still. After seeing the answers, I knew exactly how they were saying it. I even say some of them that way, myself.
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Nov 1, 2015 15:52
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Apply southern accent like you can only open your mouth a little bit and you get your answers. I got family in texas, and some of the great grand parents talk like this.
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Nov 1, 2015 16:09
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ok seriously, comantamenti? it's supposed to be "commandments" in italian
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Nov 1, 2015 16:48
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Phwoar that's a great commie tank writeup. Remember folks that those 'advanced' NATO tanks of the early 60s - Leopard I, upgraded Centurion, M60 (and the AMX-30 I suppose) - were the backbone of their armored forces well into the 1980s. For all their individual faults and collective waste, the T-64/72/80 combo really one-upped the West's efforts in raw performance.
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Nov 1, 2015 16:51
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Tank post  Yeah, one of the fun thing about the M1 was that it got a 105mm from the get go. Though the most telling thing was that NATO was going to just burn Europe if something Soviet entered the Fulda gap. EDIT: Oh, and if you included a little guide as to what leads tanks getting A, Bs, AMs and Us on their name, that would be swell. JcDent fucked around with this message at 18:58 on Nov 1, 2015 |
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Nov 1, 2015 18:00
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You can kind of infer the naming conventions from that exact post already  A is for the initial update, B is for the second one with missile launching capability or B1 without (and subsequent numbers are further iterations on top of that, we're up to T-72B3 these days), K is command, M is a further (often more thorough) update of either the base variant or a newer model (though the T-72M is an export model IIRC), U is ultraspecial stuff, D is diesel on a gas turbine platform, etc. Super easy!  Lastly, Fulda Gap delenda est.
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Nov 1, 2015 20:54
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JcDent posted:Tank post Well, for about 5 minutes.
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Nov 1, 2015 20:54
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Koesj posted:You can kind of infer the naming conventions from that exact post already So T-55AM2 is basically old as balls T-55 with the latest updates? TBH, I don't know if T-55 ever got a B
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Nov 1, 2015 21:40
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Xerxes17 posted:Figures are stolen directly and shamelessly from Zaloga's T-64 book quote:The weapon was fed by a mechanical loader assisting the human loader accommodating 16-18 rounds.  In addition the Object 430 had 50 shells not 16-18 quote:At first the 430 was powered by a modified V-2 conventional diesel engine that had its beginnings with the T-34 from 1940 onwards. Morozov began to explore the idea of using a new and advanced 2-cycle, opposed-piston diesel engine. quote:During the years of 1958 and 1959 there was considerable turmoil and anxiety in the Soviet leadership due to the appearance of new NATO tanks armed with the 105mm L7 gun in significant quantities. These being the M60, Centurion and Leopard. They recognized that the D-54TS would not be sufficient against the M60 or the Chieftain and so a new gun was needed. quote:In 1959, Nizny Tagil had already proposed a smoothbore version of the D-54T gun which would permit the use of new high velocity fin-stabilized, armor-piercing rounds of 115mm caliber. quote:This new gun was designated the U-5T Molot (2A20) and Morozov's team was instructed to modify one of their prototypes to fit the new gun, leading to the 430A. quote:Unfortunately, the U-5T used a single-piece round that was very difficult to use within the confines of the small 430A turret.   Also it should it be noted the Soviets insisted on one piece ammunition for their medium tanks, which is why the 115mm exists in the first place. quote:The armor arrangement on the glacis was an outer layer of 80mm steel, followed by two layers of 52mm fiberglass backed by a final 20mm layer of steel... As a result, the designers replaced the turret filling with aluminum instead. So the turret front began with 50mm of steel, followed by 330mm of aluminum and a final 100mm layer of steel. The armor layout is a bit incorrect: 
T___A fucked around with this message at 21:44 on Nov 1, 2015 |
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Nov 1, 2015 21:41
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T___A posted:The armor layout is a bit incorrect: The front/side armor layout on a cast turret is a bit in flux anyway, so maybe we're talking about two different slices on the same vehicle here?
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Nov 1, 2015 22:02
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T___A, I'm assuming all that is from DAV, right?
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Nov 1, 2015 22:16
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Koesj posted:The front/side armor layout on a cast turret is a bit in flux anyway, so maybe we're talking about two different slices on the same vehicle here? LostCosmonaut posted:T___A, I'm assuming all that is from DAV, right?
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Nov 1, 2015 22:35
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Xerxes17 posted:Figures are stolen directly and shamelessly from Zaloga's T-64 book Oh boy, pricing. Prices were established based on the man-hours, cost of materials, and components from subcontractors. Naturally, all of this stuff changed all the time, resulting in pricing disputes that one wouldn't expect to see in a command economy.
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Nov 2, 2015 00:16
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