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This 1963 map is a little disappointing at first glance, because it's pretty dang close to modern borders: What's surprising is how much it conflicted with underlying ethnic realities:   Instead the border represents, rather closely, the Treaty of London. These were the Dutch possessions in 1840:  Unsurprisingly, given the anticolonialism of the 1960s, the Philippines and Indonesia objected. The Philippine claim petered out into a slow-burning Muslim insurgency on its own soil which still exists today, in the same region marked as Muslim above. The Indonesian claim exploded into the Konfrontasi, which eventually ended under Indonesian domestic distractions (namely, the New Order purges), although Indonesia would continue to have secessionism in Timor and Aceh. Modern East Timor isn't visible on that map, but Aceh is the northern tip of Sumatra, identified there as Atjehnese. The educated Dutch-educated post-colonial elite in Java succeeding in defining an Indonesian identity for the rest of modern Indonesia, in the same way that the elite Malays of the new Malaysian redefined Malay to include the new ethnicities. All things considered, this was probably one of the more successful "draw a line in the sand/jungle and call it a day" post-colonial border drawing. ronya fucked around with this message at 12:05 on Dec 5, 2022 |
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Feb 2, 2013 01:11
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TheImmigrant posted:I've always understood that the 'glue' for modern Indonesia is Bahasa Indonesia. I suspect it is easier to conduct ethnic assimilation when the other ethnicities don't have a national consciousness yet.
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Feb 2, 2013 03:40
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To be fair, the enthusiasm for tying your church to the Roman Curia is probably heavily tied to your church's actual local threats. If you are in an area where being Roman Catholic is as controversial as breathing air and drinking water, then there's not much point trying to nab the support of Rome. You'd just as easily get Roman interests trumping your own instead.
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Nov 26, 2013 22:34
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A Buttery Pastry posted:But isn't the Roman Curia made up of people from the Catholic community of their respective countries? I don't see why it would be so terrible for Latin/South America to be tied closer to Rome, if it meant Rome was much more receptive to the interests of Latin/South American Catholics. Because it can't be receptive enough to beat the opportunity to exercise the de facto doctrinal independence created by the absence of democratic legitimacy of Rome. If your community of Catholics is ideologically rather different from the ideology of Catholics worldwide, then there's not much point aggressively promoting a democratic authority of the cardinals. Why let John Paul II lecture you on adhering to the Western side of the Cold War, or joining third-way neoliberalization thereafter, when you can instead remain comfortably in a populist-socialist sphere?
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Nov 26, 2013 22:57
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Phlegmish posted:As Buttery Pastry pointed out, the Church in Latin America has actually been losing a lot of ground to evangelical churches in recent decades. The lower classes in particular are susceptible to their proselytizing. I'm the one who posted it in the UK megathread, where I speculated that the present stance of the Vatican is part of a pivot to the said Latin American churches. Which, as you say, are facing threats for the first time in a while.
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Nov 27, 2013 08:02
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Nobody pointed it out earlier, but South Korea can squeeze by on its mediocre labour laws by letting a 3% unemployment rate keep pushing wages up. As a foreign observer, I've been also told that there is a stark difference between chaebol and non-chaebol employment conditions, with the former being akin to union jobs in the West, back during the glory days of unions. The horrible conditions described only afflict the latter. But that is a third-hand observation.
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Feb 18, 2014 01:05
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- Unionism in the rUK is a spent force - the Conservative and Unionist party itself is no longer particularly devoted to unionism; it's there, but they'll take it or leave it - Ireland itself undergoing a late Quiet Revolution and additionally starting to grow an appreciable non-Irish visible minority population concentrated in its cities - the kind of phenomenon that rapidly complicates nationalism by forcing uncomfortable answers on ethnic or civic identity; ask the Quebecois about the ethnic vote sometime. - probably most importantly, Ulster militancy fading in the face of deindustrialization and population aging. The days when a general strike might successfully coerce Westminster are long gone between the three it seems certain that the forces which held Northern Ireland in its grip for the better part of the 20th century will soon pass into history the "would you support unification/separation if it meant you had to pay more/less tax" question is funny to pose to Republic or rUK pollees, but there are other strange outcomes when strong identities cede the ground to material factors, like e.g., Northern Irish nationalists backing unionism in order to retain free healthcare ronya fucked around with this message at 06:17 on Dec 5, 2022 |
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Dec 4, 2022 20:45
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the ROI's own desire to include six more counties (and the ~1 million strong Ulster community in it who would promptly launch an armed insurgency) has itself faded since the 1970s, when it became apparent that Ireland would no longer be fighting as an anticolonial liberation war amongst a supportive population if it sought to seize Northern Ireland by force. Whilst this was never seriously considered beyond idle planning, it brought into perspective that the UK was retaining order in Northern Ireland only at very great expense and Dublin would have to go to even greater expense to do the same. Given the pre-EEC state of the Irish economy at the time, this was hardly a priority. conversely, a diplomatic outcome forged by Jack Lynch negotiating with a Labour government resulted in the UWC strike and a vast increase in Ulster militancy, with the prospect of a UDI suddenly becoming very real. So there went the prospect of an agreement negotiated over the heads of NI too. by the time the ROI ratifies the 19th amendment three decades later, it is ratifying a shift that had already occurred socially: people south of the border overwhelmingly no longer felt that territorial integrity is worth overriding the "unionist veto" created by Partition said veto then quietly dying anyway to demographic shift and multiculturalism would be a hilarious outcome, of course. The arc of history bends toward Dublin, Belfast, and London all being identikit cosmopolitan, international cities with significant immigrant populations: people with no party to the ancient bloodsheds to begin with. All the sound and fury for this. ronya fucked around with this message at 07:31 on Dec 5, 2022 |
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Dec 5, 2022 07:28
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I just noticed my links on the first page to maps of Indonesia have been broken for... I don't know, years probably. Just fixed them. In the spirit of the discussion on uncomfortable settler populations left over from colonialism: Map is dated to 1963. Fun (?) facts: quote:In February 1945 a study group in the Political Affairs Bureau of the [wartime occupying power Japan] Ministry of Foreign Affairs examined the possibilities of granting political independence to Malaya, and in a working paper suggested three possibilities: (1) to incorporate the four sultanates of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis into Thailand, and the rest into China (...) The incorporation of the four northern sultanates into Thailand had already occurred in October 1943. The idea of integrating the remaining states of Malaya into China was based on a change in the colony's demographic balance following the transfer of the four northern states to Thailand. The Chinese population thereafter constituted 47 per cent, the Malays 34 per cent, and the Indians and others 18 per cent. Based on these estimated figures, the study group concluded that the "main race" in Malaya was the Chinese... The same was not true of Indonesia, and the Japanese moved to promise independence to Indonesia by September 1944: this would ultimately derail Dutch plans to reassert control over the Dutch East Indies. The Anglo-Thai peace treaty repatriated the four Malay sultanates and briefly reversed this state of affairs, but the reignition of the Chinese civil war led to another wave of immigration. By the time the Federation of Malaya won independence in 1959, peninsular Malaya once again had more Chinese than Malays in it. ronya fucked around with this message at 12:40 on Dec 5, 2022 |
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Dec 5, 2022 12:35
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Probably not - in early 1945 MCP-aligned MPAJA (Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army - despite the name, almost wholly Chinese) overran the KMT-aligned OCAJA (Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army) regions in Kelantan and Perak and killed most of its leaders. The Chinese civil war ended earlier in Malaya than it would in China.
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Dec 5, 2022 14:10
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A Buttery Pastry posted:I didn't mean voluntarily, but the West/US deciding that Taiwan was the legitimate owner, and neither the PRC or the locals being able to contest it. Not sure what the potential would be for an alternate Korean War though. to nitpick (and to bring it back to the settler-population point), I feel obliged to point out that the Chinese are not the locals in this context, having moved from a largely male, transient workforce (think South Asians in the Gulf today) to a settled population within living memory during decolonization:  (foreground placard: KITA TIDAK MAHU SINGAPURA MENJADI PALASTINE - WE DO NOT WANT SINGAPORE TO BECOME PALESTINE; photo taken during Singapore's troubled membership in the federation; in the event, Malay nationalists, like the pan-Arabists, would eventually resign themselves to abandoning the Malay population in Singapore to a Chinese dominated state) the MPAJA coming to dominate Chinese anticolonial resistance by arms does have some salience here - one reason prewar Malay leftism died (unlike, say, in liberal to Guided Democracy Indonesia) was that, like with many occupied countries, the moment the war ended, resistance movements emerged to exact massive punitive justice on collaborators. But the communist resistance was overwhelmingly Chinese: it had crushed the noncommunist Chinese resistance during the war. And the collaborators - the chieftains, village leaders, and nativised police that the Japanese inherited from the British - were, of course, overwhelmingly Malay. In the six weeks between the Japanese surrender and the British return, the tide of blood that ensued unwittingly made quite certain that as long as Malaya is governed by Malays, it would be stridently anticommunist. ronya fucked around with this message at 18:42 on Dec 5, 2022 |
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Dec 5, 2022 18:16
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In the 1955 Bandung conference Zhou Enlai made the unexpected declaration that the PRC had no intention to demand the loyalty of the Overseas Chinese (as the Qing and the ROC did) and that the Overseas Chinese should owe their loyalty to their new host nations. He explicitly addressed, and denied, allegations that Beijing intended to leverage the large number of Chinese in Southeast Asia for subversion. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114673 This was obviously intended to settle anxieties amongst the Afro-Asian attendees, in particular the host Sukarno; it was not always consistently followed during the Cultural Revolution and China continued to sponsor Chinese Communist armed movements until Zhao Ziyang's (Premier under Deng) tour in 1981. https://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0803/080335.html Nonetheless, Zhou's earlier declaration put pan-Chinese nationalism to bed; subsequent insurgency support was at least notionally nationalist rather than pan-Chinese.
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Dec 6, 2022 06:14
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