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THE LUMMOX posted:A few people from the thread have PMed me asking about it so hopefully this isn't too spammy to give an update. You disrupted a conversation that was literally Hitler, I think it's alright.
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Jan 14, 2014 10:24
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[quote="The Entire Universe" post="""]Could it be broadly said that the cold war came about because Churchill was an rear end in a top hat and charmed the already-distrusting-Stalin-anyway Truman administration into being anti-Commie bros?[/quote] I feel very confident in saying no, first because it is an awfully reductionist way of trying to trace the underlying causation behind the beginning of the Cold War, and second because it reeks like an attempt to apply classic 'Great Person History', something which I had hoped has been discounted enough to not rear its ugly head again in these cases (alas). But, please allow me to approach the question from a 'Philosphy of History 101'-perspective, since trying to tie ultimate... blame if you will to single events or people with regards to the 'start' of the Cold War is A. often a tedious exercise in politically motivated point/counterpoint and B. ultimately unsuccessful as a means to bring the discussion to a mutually fulfilling close. So even if accepted as a factually true statement, does Churchill 'being an rear end in a top hat and charming the Truman administration' stand the test of being both a necessity and a sufficiency for kicking off the Cold War? Or, to put it another way, could you honestly not imagine the US and the USSR squaring off pretty much along the lines of what was historically the case without his 'contributions' to the growth of mutual distrust? I'm not trying to be coy with the man's influence, and neither am I raring to spin some kind of massive counterfactual where the "Sinews of Peace"-speech doesn't happen, but I can't for the life of me imagine a valid argument in which Winston loving Churchill takes point as the most important intermediate factor in explaining superpower confrontation.
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Jan 14, 2014 14:02
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Gesadt posted:Is there any validity to the notion that MBT (main battle tank) is getting obsolete and less essential to composition of a modern army? If so, what it would be replaced by? Or is there never gonna be a point when you dont need heavy armor on the ground? This notion of obsolescence has been around for more than 40 years now, so I'd say that the rumors of the death of the MBT have been, up to this day and age, greatly exaggerated. Indeed, is there any reason why you'd not want heavily armored tracked vehicles around as a force multiplier in a substantial number of types of situations? Not only does armor provide shock and exploitation effects in maneuver warfare, but it has (again) proven itself very useful in city combat this last decade as well AFAIK. It doesn't look like the trend of mechanization that's been going on in the Postwar period has been broken yet. Instead, there rather seems to have been a divergence in forces tasked for greater strategic mobility - like the Légère Blindée units of the French, or US Stryker Brigades - and pure mech/armored forces getting kitted out with ever heavier vehicles (with new developments like the Israeli HAPCs, or plain old IFVs being uparmored or built to a better protected spec). Then, if you've got relatively well armored targets on the battlefield, the most reliable and cost efficient way to get rid of them will, at least for the foreseeable future, be a Kinetic Energy Penetrator fired from from a large caliber long gun. You do the math on what a gun armed, sufficiently protected vehicle would look like.
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Jan 14, 2014 16:12
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bewbies posted:Yes, with a but. While you certainly make some valid arguments, I don't agree with a number of things you're saying. I'll have to address them point by point to keep myself from ranting incoherently though so please bear with me  quote:Tanks are most useful in open terrain versus conventional opponents. Every trend/prediction I'm aware of predicts that both of these things are going to become more and more rare in the future. The vast majority of combat will take place in urban terrain, and the chances of two major land uniformed services facing off against one another in a full scale conflict are pretty remote. When looking back at certain situations in Iraq, or how the Syrian Army operates in places like Jobar right now (well documented by ANNA News), would you go as far as saying tanks aren't efficient at all in a closer or more urban battlefield, against non-uniformed opponents? I recall a number of talking heads clamoring for more Armored Engineer-like vehicles to put a whole load of HE on a line-of-sight targets (this has been done by SP Artillery in Syria), and several reports coming out with regards to the ineffectiveness of autocannon fire against things like reinforced concrete structures. While clearly not *the* ideal vehicle for the job, an MBT can still perform a number of, for example, urban combat tasks to relatively good (or even great) effect, whereas other vehicles would prove either too limited in their versatility or plainly too vulnerable. I'll address your last point below since it seems to combine with an unfortunate tendency towards anatopism in your argument. quote:Tanks are moderately useful things in some scenarios, but their utility is severely hampered by their lack of strategic mobility and their sustainability [...] As Hob_Gadling alluded to, strategic mobility and even sustainability isn't the be all and end all of military requirements. Tanks can have great operational and especially tactical mobility in a number of scenario's compared to wheeled mechanized forces. Furthermore, I'd pose that in a lot of cases you wouldn't want to be paying for a smaller log train with the (at the very least!) corresponding reduction of protection and firepower. quote:All of this flies pretty directly in the face of what we're going to require from our armed forces over the next few decades: [...] Okay I have to ask, what's with the US-centric view? I don't discount the notion that 'conventional conflict' isn't very likely these days (urgh we're closing in on the awful D&D thread), but there are plenty uniformed forces around who don't need to put an armored brigade on a ship to get it within striking distance of a potentially hostile force wielding the same kind of capability. The intentions might not be there, but still. quote:The other big thing trending the tank toward obsolesence is its survivability [...] So they're growing in vulnerability compared to what... exactly? If we take this argument to its logical conclusion, nothing is particularly survivable in a future 'competitive' engagement. However, the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance environment for true... let's say tactical 'over the horizon' shooting will have to be fully in play to make heavy forces really obsolete, while any degradation of these capabilities will only be an ever expanding invitation to gently caress poo poo up with armor. Plus, if we're talking about stuff being observable, how is something like a drone/UAS/RPV/-whatever the name du jour is- going to survive in that environment anyway? quote:All that being said, in a scenario where 1) tactical air supremacy is assured, 2) terrain is relatively open, 3) the conflict is high-intensity, 4) sea and air access are uncontested and 5) the opponent is traditional and not terribly well equipped, tanks are still useful. I think this is roughly analogous to the battleship in WWII; big guns on an armored thing were useful, but only in a very limited scenario (ie, naval gunfire support), and in a way that far outweighed their acquisition and sustainment costs.
Also,
Lists, I like lists. I kinda rushed this post so please point out any stupidity. e: typos... Koesj fucked around with this message at 20:36 on Jan 14, 2014 |
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Jan 14, 2014 20:09
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Arquinsiel posted:You make good points except for this one, and oddly even Fox seems to think the current situation is silly: jobs in my backyard. What I meant is that the number of Heavy Brigade Combat Teams - wait I looked it up and they're called Armored again  - is being reduced, but that their component combined arms battalions will remain intact and parceled out to the surviving ABCTs. Which AFAIK means that on a very broad teeth to tail ratio, there'll actually be more Abrams and Bradleys for everyone and -thing supporting them.
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Jan 14, 2014 20:34
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bewbies posted:Every military is ready to fight the last war, the MBT is a fine example of this. I see where you're coming from and you're probably right at least for the longer term, but I still believe that a number of things you said are focused on recent US or maybe 'interventionist' experiences, which might not entirely apply to others. Not wanting to blow stuff up with lots of collateral damage, and your argument concerning strategic mobility as an issue to be fixed by foregoing heaviness for example. And since I'm feeling particularly quarrelsome today I'll fight your ship and aircraft analogy! Scaling issue!
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Jan 14, 2014 23:22
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Libluini posted:At least for Germany, our MBT-numbers have been reduced several times already since the Berlin wall came down. And there are only plans for adding smaller, lighter vehicles like APCs in the future. Our new MBTs are mostly meant for exporting. The Bundeswehr has gone back to upgrading and maintaining the few MBTs we still have. You guys are running a program to introduce an Infantry Fighting Vehicle that is, at its highest level of modular protection (Schutzstufe C), actually heavier than a baseline T-64 or T-72 
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Jan 15, 2014 18:32
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Hey I only said you're running a program, not that actually doing anything with it yet! I guess I should have framed it more ambiguously though. Still, it seems like everything's a Fiasko with you guys right now, so I guess we've been lucky with our IFVs, rifles, fighter planes, ships, and in avoiding Eurohawk here in Clogland. Only NH90 was a shared burden. But then again, how many acquisition programs haven't been messed up world-wide these last decades? I'm still convinced the BW will muddle through and somehow receive a couple hundred of them, because warts and all, I don't think the Puma has or will really reached Schützenpanzer HS 30-levels 
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Jan 15, 2014 19:10
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NATO as a military force in Cold War West-Germany, or in Europe as a whole for that matter, was under the command of Allied Command Europe, with, as was hashed out during NATO's formation, a US 4 star general at its head. He would indeed get the political green light from the NATO Council to meet a major contingency by means of a pretty well integrated multinational force. As you can imagine lots of people thought that sufficient pressure by the US (or maybe West-Germany if we're talking about the later stages of the Cold War) could have forced the 'devolution' if you will of decision-making authority towards NATO's integrated command structure, lest dithering politicians tear the alliance apart in the face of a major crisis. When considering the defense of West-Germany NATO was supposed to get full military authority handed to them before any invasion had taken place, since the transition from peacetime to war by the Soviets should have been picked up. Then they would have gone through a number of alert stages which entailed a very complicated set of reserve activations, forward movements, and deep reinforements getting to each nation's Army's defensive sector (I'm mostly talking about land forces here). From there on there were several ways in which different forces would act together but I'll follow up on this in a bit since I'm massively triggering (it's probably my favorite MilHist subject) and any more writing from my part means I've got to get my poo poo straight. e: welp I've got too much to tell Koesj fucked around with this message at 22:36 on Jan 15, 2014 |
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Jan 15, 2014 19:49
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Lamadrid posted:Why the gently caress Greece needs so many tanks ? Are they going to start poo poo in the middle east all on their own Alexander the Great Style? Turkey.
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Jan 16, 2014 00:11
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Isn't that all bit hyperbolic really, comparing the running of an ISAF PRT with South Vietnam, and then trying (possibly prematurely) to extrapolate its influence on long-running public sentiment?
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Jan 17, 2014 18:16
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Libluini posted:Also as I said, I don't know what will happen, I've just grown cynical. And those idiots posting on our newssites about how the Bundeswehr is bad because we don't have enough MBTs and heavy artillery to satisfy their fetish aren't helping, too. Should have ditched the Bundeswehr and kept the NVA!
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Jan 17, 2014 18:48
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Grand Prize Winner posted:Doppeldrones? Powerpoint-Landsknechten  Oh god I'm going all out on the China thread in D&D 
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Jan 24, 2014 10:27
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Agean90 posted:I want to have Obama get shitfaced and start drunk-calling world leaders in the middle of the night now. It’s 3 a.m. and your children are safe and asleep. But there’s a phone in the White House and it’s just so tempting. Something’s happening in the world. Your vote will decide who makes that call. Whether it’s someone who already knows the world’s leaders, knows the military — someone tested and ready to lead in a dangerous world. It’s 3 a.m. and your children are safe and asleep. Who do you want using the phone?
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Jan 25, 2014 19:22
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Buck Danny #45 (1994): VVV https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xr8N0Z4Cl0U&t=2371s look at how it turns at slow speed. Koesj fucked around with this message at 23:25 on Jan 26, 2014 |
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Jan 26, 2014 22:54
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Arquinsiel posted:Neither of them is capable of presenting an article without significant spin, Are you yourself in this case presenting a post without significant spin? VVV RIP your iron lady Koesj fucked around with this message at 02:09 on Jan 27, 2014 |
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Jan 27, 2014 01:58
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gradenko_2000 posted:Did the Soviets or any of their allies/client states ever get to use their heavy bombers in a combat situation? Anything from their copy of the B-29 to their Backfire bombers. Calling the Backfire a heavy bomber puts you squarely in the 1970s team B camp of wanting to have them count towards strategic weapons in SALT negotiations. Egyptian Tu-16s were mostly bombed themselves in '67 and kept way back in '73, they did operate against Libya in 1977 IIRC. The Libyans themselves flew the Tu-22 with middling results in both Tanzania and Chad. Yes, supersonic bombers in Africa. Iraq used the Tu-22 a lot against Iran, you can read about it (as well as the Libyans' shenanigans) on wiki. The bomber version of the Tu-95 was never exported but the Indian Navy flies the new MPA variant, they're also the only country outside the former Soviet bloc (or rather Russia and Ukraine) that's in line to operate the Tu-22M3Ms, but I don't think those are in service as of yet. e: Oh and I believe a number of Libyan Tu-22s were destroyed during the Toyota War Ouadi Doum raid. Koesj fucked around with this message at 20:02 on Jan 27, 2014 |
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Jan 27, 2014 19:55
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Three posters, twenty minutes, answers. This thread 
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Jan 27, 2014 20:01
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The Entire Universe posted:Right, but you can generally point to August 1945 and say that's the dawn of the atomic age, even though there are people out there still looking to join the Bomb Club. Even if you're looking at a timeframe (1945-1990) for something like the rise and fall of MAD, that's still a set of brackets you can justifiably place. I'm just wondering when doctrine transitioned from being all about poo poo like charging guns on horses and started being "this is what I want you to do by this time" - I'm guessing that was during the interwar years of the 20th century but if there's writing on this being a thing during the trench warfare of WWI I'd love to get my hands on that. I'm interested in that evolution. But those aren't brackets that you can justifiably place. Whose doctrine was it to charge guns on horses anyway? e;f;b
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Jan 27, 2014 20:08
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I don't know anything more than the German language Vertragsarbeiter and most of all the NVA Präsenz in der Dritter Welt pages on Wikipedia, which, among other things, links to a very interesting MGFA overview.
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Jan 27, 2014 22:53
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Arquinsiel posted:Also America made out like bandits. 20th century.txt
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Jan 31, 2014 17:37
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You never hear much about the role of the GRU in the Cold War either in mainstream media. Also all Soviet/Russian special forces are apparently 'spetsnaz' be they MVD, or Border Troops, CA, whatever.
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Feb 3, 2014 00:47
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Nah Jack Ryan is an ex-marine but at least Clancy (PBUH) knew about the GRU 
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Feb 3, 2014 01:02
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That's one of the things Dan Carlin goes into in his new HH episode, and he doesn't seem to agree with the notion. Haven't finished listening though.
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Feb 4, 2014 00:35
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Shimrra Jamaane posted:Isn't Dan Carlin citing Neil Ferguson in his podcasts on WWI? That isn't good. I don't remember, these episodes don't really filter through over multiple days of listening. Still, it's a source.
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Feb 4, 2014 01:56
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xthetenth posted:Yeah, a lot of the most valuable stuff isn't the history it's the historiography. Does that tend to come from focusing enough on a subject that you look at all the various views and compare/contrast how they changed with time? That's a large part of it IMO, together with (some) formal training in theory and methodology, and access to journals, internationalist cabals of subject-matter experts, etc. There are big historiographical problems with both the one subject I've done most of my professional work on - contemporary infrastructural development in NW Europe - and my hobby of trying to find out more about the military history of superpower planning in the Cold War though. Lots of... let's say meso-level historical subject matter lacks a fully rounded body of knowledge, or unifying concepts and theory cutting across the niche-y interests that drove a handful of people to do pioneering but isolated work. Or at least that's my interpretation of it  Hence me being a currently useless specialist in one field, and a pedantic hobbyist in another, fighting windmills and people's usage of tropes like the 'Fulda Gap', 'induced demand', or 'nuclear apocalypse'. e: WEEDLORDBONERHEGEL posted:No, it's deliberate and targeted. There are books out there which do nothing but give you an overview of a topic's historiography and major arguments. Depends on the subject!!!!!!!! Koesj fucked around with this message at 02:03 on Feb 5, 2014 |
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Feb 5, 2014 01:46
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My Theory of History prof (Ankersmit) p much bombarded us with stuff from Hayden White's Metahistory, which IMO is a pretty cool book if you want to get into the whole 'narrative and plot' side of history. e: this is the point where McCaine'd have told me to shut up in old D&D. Koesj fucked around with this message at 03:54 on Feb 5, 2014 |
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Feb 5, 2014 03:51
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Ensign Expendable posted:Defense in depth. A force that penetrated expects your rear echelons to be relatively easy to ravage. Infantry is on march, guns are not deployed, reserve artillery isn't dialed in, etc. If that force gets stuck on another line of defense, and you can spare some forces from the front line to pincer them, they're not going to do so well. You'll really need that operational depth though, something which NATO felt it sorely lacked in trying to come up with plans against Deep Battle 2.0, and it's not something the Germans had much of during the late war period either.
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Feb 11, 2014 23:07
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maev posted:Getting slightly into Tom Clancy territory here, but it's pretty pertinent to military history. How able was the Warsaw pacts military situation in the 1980s? Would it have actually been able to Red Hammer NATO into dust if it had invaded? How did it square up to NATO technologically and strategically? I see you caught the Wargame bug. It really depends on which period in the 1980s you're talking about. From mid-decade onwards it went all downhill for the USSR, something which Odom's Collapse of the Soviet Military describes very thoroughly, but I can't for the life remember even 10% of that book  quote:My Dad was in the British coldstream guards in Germany during the 1970s, and said that the doctrine was something like running away continually until the Americans/nukes came, so I'm interested in hearing more from people who are more in the know than I am in the subject. That's a bit egregious. The Americans were already there and would have pretty much gotten stomped on as much as everyone else (on both sides), especially in the 70s. Also it's actually the nukes wot probably prevented it in the first place. alex314 posted:Warsaw pact had numbers, so it's hard to tell if training quality would be enough. Many conscripts wouldn't be too willing to fight, there are secret police reports from The East German Army was, by all accounts, considered to be very reliable. Other WP militaries though... not so much. The Poles got demoted after 1980, and IIRC the Czechoslovakians were supposed to die in the mountains. Ghost of Mussolini posted:Up until the first supermarket they bump into at least Why stop at Aldi when there's a REWE up the road?
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Feb 17, 2014 13:26
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that during Korean war many people enlisted because they assumed they'd be sent to fight Americans. Then they'd defect in force 
I imagine that as long as Warsaw Pact forces keeped momentum everything would be ok, but during first successful counterstrike Polish, Czechoslovakian or German soldiers wouldn't be likely to fight for their opressors..
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What numbers? When? And compared to whom? You'll have to be a bit more specific because there are way more narratives here than 'hurr commie hordes'. Armaments ministries and industries run amok, atrophying the civilian economy to keep up with real and perceived threats, and party political considerations about military strength were important factors, but most Western countries ran conscription, high military budgets, and vigilant states of readiness as well.
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Feb 17, 2014 15:28
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I'd say you've been seeing bottom of the barrel stuff then, but I'll admit that the qualitative level of Cold War historiography can be pretty low. Looking at it from a late 1940s perspective is pretty useless in the face of the US nuclear monopoly IMO, and the overall trend during the early Cold War was an ever increasing focus on nuclear weapons anyway, culminating in a mutual de-emphasizing of conventional forces throughout the 50s and well into the 60s. So if you want to play a numbers game you'd have to start counting bomb(er)s, and later missiles. If by the height of tensions you mean 1962, a conflict between East and West would have been nuclear and strategic, and it probably would have meant the absolute annihilation of the USSR compared to the US possibly weathering the storm. When talking about the early 1980s of war porn fame then the situation might look a bit different on paper, but no one was willing to rattle the cage and risk total war, so what do numbers even mean in a situation like that? Anyway, the USSR only reached strategic nuclear parity in the early 70s, had big problems in operating an undersea nuclear deterrent, were very vulnerable along their Northern Frontier to bombers throughout the entire period, had to intervene with military means to keep their sphere of influence intact multiple times, had to strain their economy past breaking point to keep up with/compensate for technological developments, and ultimately lost their empire when they had to get rid of the contradictions inherent to their system. Even then, NATO had about 50 divisions (or equivalents) available on relatively short notice compared to the Warsaw Pact's 70~75 - along the FRG eastern border in 1985 that is. Oh and gently caress the Fulda Gap 
Koesj fucked around with this message at 15:57 on Feb 17, 2014 |
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Feb 17, 2014 15:54
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KildarX posted:Pretty much. My military history knowledge from an actual, "I've read tones of books" perspective only encompasses WW2(surprise). My cold war "knowledge" really is pop culture and two modern history courses which pretty much skimmed basic stuff. Oh and I read a book called WW3(I cant remember the title or author, but it had a weird tag line like" The book president Kennedy kept on his desk") which tried to present a "plausible" WW3 scenario which started with the USSR going through Fulda and ended with them nuking Birmingham England or something, but I ended up writing most of it off as wishful thinking. That'd be either Hackett's The Third World War: August 1985, or its rewrite/sequel, The Third World War: The Untold Story. Both books could have hardly been lying around on Kennedy's desk, well, maybe Ted's, but they aren't particularly stupid either. If you were to do reread you'd find that Hackett describes a world where the run-up to war was very much in the USSR's favor, but in which NATO is actually pretty successful in countering this attack. Not at all surprising really because they have prepared for it in a way that he himself thought was necessary; Hackett was COMNORTHAG in the 1960s, and therefore responsible for running NATO's entire Northern front in the FRG - comprising of Dutch, German, British, and Belgian forces. It makes for a decent read if you ignore p much everything he feels like saying about world politics, because it's one of those books that has its operational details in order. Among other things the main thrust of the Soviet attack IIRC doesn't come through the US V Corps AO (~the Fulda Gap~) but rather through Hackett's former stomping ground: the North German Plain, an area that supposedly induced an inordinate amount of headaches among NATO military planners. Other books that IMO do this scenario well are Red Army and Chieftains!. Unfortunately there hasn't been much serious work done on 1970s and 80s operational planning because both sides have locked their archives and thrown away the keys. e: VVVV this.
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Feb 17, 2014 16:36
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Arquinsiel posted:This is an important thing to consider that seems to go unchallenged pretty regularly. People seem to think that the population of the USSR is bigger than almost the entirety of Europe west of the Iron Curtain AND the entire North American continent, as well as Australia and New Zealand. Is everyone mentally adding in China to every "gone hot" scenario or something? Jus' another trope is all.
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Feb 17, 2014 16:40
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KildarX posted:Yep that's the book I read it a few years back. I'll see if I can find it on my book shelf if you think its worth a read through. Books like his were, for a long time, the simultaneous entry-level, intermediate, and final required reading on the subject. My favorite subject's historiography is simply atrocious. Nowadays we've also got stuff like Hans Boersma's fantastic write-up on 1 (NL) Corps planning, the leaked US V Corps GDP (general defense plan) out of the Stasi archives, Lautsch's not that well received stuff about East German Army planning (in German), people from my own country's Military Archives tackling mostly niche stuff, and the one German Military History Institute's dude whose name I've forgotten writing about the Bundeswehr. e: concerning the 1980s that is, Hoffenaar, Krüger, and Zabecki published a decent collection of stuff about 1948-1968: http://www.amazon.com/Blueprints-Battle-Planning-1948-1968-Military/dp/0813136512 Koesj fucked around with this message at 17:01 on Feb 17, 2014 |
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Feb 17, 2014 16:55
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A lot of them were pretty transparent about it in epilogues and such though, Team B and the more egregious RAND poo poo always presented their stuff as-is.
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Feb 17, 2014 17:54
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The whole discussion looks to be in pretty poor taste IMO. Do you guys arguing about potential sourcing problems even know the full historiography behind the subject?
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Feb 18, 2014 17:43
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Fangz posted:It's very obvious that this is a touchy subject. I'm just saying that people need to be cautious. Proper handling of sources is Hist101. What are you arguing against?
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Feb 18, 2014 18:38
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Eh, only 20~27 shots, depending on size, so less than twice the amount a RNLN cadet mate of mine is allowed to have daily when underway.
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Feb 19, 2014 17:59
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Fangz posted:Do any modern militaries still do alcohol rations? Like I said the Dutch Navy has something like a 2 alcoholic 'units' allowance per day when underway at least, or so my friend said. Don't think it's a ration though, just stuff you can buy tax- and excise-free within limits.
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Feb 20, 2014 15:12
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twoday posted:I want to figure out how bad this was in comparison to other things going on at the time. Where do I look? Are these rules for soldiers normal? Have you got the original rules in ye olde Dutch lying around?
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Feb 24, 2014 13:40
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