|
gvibes posted:SCOTUS granted cert and will review the Federal Circuit's CLS case relating to patent subject matter eligibility. Very exciting. About time. CLS was an en banc abortion.
|
#
¿
Dec 6, 2013 19:40
|
|
|
|
| # ¿ May 5, 2024 09:44 |
|
|
The Warszawa posted:The current 5th and 11th Circuits were split from the old 5th in October 1981. Resulting in the most common, and also most innocuous, footnote 1 in 11th Circuit opinions: quote:In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981. (Google Scholar identifies about 9,000 citations)
|
|
#
¿
Dec 21, 2013 22:33
|
|
|
KernelSlanders posted:Maybe I'm missing something subtle, but I don't see how this is different from my second point. It's not. Kalman is saying that the two things you stated that the DC Circuit "determine[d]" - "there is not competition for broadband services" and "service 4Mb/s doesn't count as adequate to compete with cable" - were not actually determined by the DC Circuit.
|
|
#
¿
Jan 14, 2014 22:10
|
|
|
eviltastic posted:Tricky question, that. The Supreme Court does not consider itself required to handle even original jurisdiction cases. There's a law review article out there that I found a while back discussing this, I'll try to dig it up. Not that it really matters, since all the Supreme Court does is hand off the trial phase to a special master anyway.
|
|
#
¿
Feb 17, 2014 22:35
|
|
|
dorkasaurus_rex posted:Does anybody here want to explain Granholm v. Heald to me? I read up on it and it would seem it makes it legal to buy direct from wineries, but maintains that it's illegal to buy direct from beer breweries. Is this accurate? No. The second to last paragraph of the majority opinion sums it up pretty well: quote:States have broad power to regulate liquor under § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. This power, however, does not allow States to ban, or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by in-state producers. If a State chooses to allow direct shipment of wine, it must do so on evenhanded terms. Without demonstrating the need for discrimination, New York and Michigan have enacted regulations that disadvantage out-of-state wine producers. Under our Commerce Clause jurisprudence, these regulations cannot stand. So states can ban buying direct from wineries or from beer breweries. What they can't do is let in-state wineries or breweries sell direct but not let out-of-state wineries or breweries sell direct.
|
|
#
¿
Feb 18, 2014 00:09
|
|
|
GhostBoy posted:With all these cases filtering up the system, how does SCOTUS handle it all, assuming they all get cert? Do they wait until they are through appeal and bundle them into one decision (ala DOMA + Prop 8), or would they have to rule on the first, and they (provided their are similar enough) just point to that ruling for all the others? Either way. Either SCOTUS consolidates all the cases pending before them, or they take one and then "Grant cert, Vacate judgment below, Remand for consideration in light of [whichever case they took]." The GVR would only happen for cases pending before SCOTUS at the time of their first ruling; every case then pending in the circuit or district courts would just adjust in light of the new law. Realistically, though, as soon as SCOTUS grants cert on one of the gay marriage cases, every other case would be stayed pending a ruling on [whichever case they took].
|
|
#
¿
Feb 27, 2014 16:34
|
|
|
The Warszawa posted:If the cert petition looks a bit strange, it's because Holt is representing himself and handwrote the whole thing. Beautiful handwriting, was my thought.
|
|
#
¿
Mar 5, 2014 19:34
|
|
|
hobbesmaster posted:Is the court going to appoint someone to argue Holt's position? Holt has counsel now.
|
|
#
¿
Mar 5, 2014 20:15
|
|
|
Badger of Basra posted:Now obviously racial discrimination is a thing that should be banned and the US Congress should have the power to do it. But is the reliance on the commerce clause for this and other similarly wide-reaching laws just a kind of kludge that SCOTUS uses to sanction these laws, or is it something they actually think is appropriate? Not that I would know how to give Congress similar powers anyway. Well, see, if I was trying to give Congress similar powers, I'd probably do it something like the following: quote:Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. Everything but the underline is from the Fourteenth Amendment (the underline is more or less from the Civil Rights Act of 1964). In 1883 (thus, ripe for reconsideration), the Supreme Court decided that private discrimination didn't violate the Fourteenth Amendment (as not a "State"), and so Congress's power to enforce the provisions dropped out, leaving only the Commerce Clause to underpin the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
|
|
#
¿
Apr 14, 2014 03:10
|
|
|
The Warszawa posted:There should be a case page on SCOTUSBlog that has the docket. http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/american-broadcasting-companies-inc-v-aereo-inc/
|
|
#
¿
Apr 15, 2014 03:58
|
|
|
KernelSlanders posted:If, they go the otherway and say something like, "These laws are out dated and don't protect the networks from new technology, but Congress could fix that," there's a chance of the issue actually getting resolved. Extremely unlikely. quote:The “do nothing” Congress is preparing to do even less.
|
|
#
¿
Apr 22, 2014 22:23
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:I believe you can only sign up for your own city. I think I had to have a credit card with a New York billing zip code to sign up for NY aereo. It's city specific, mainly because the Sony Betamax case was local and Aereo didn't want to push boundaries any more than they had to. Definitely no technical reason.
|
|
#
¿
Apr 22, 2014 23:15
|
|
|
computer parts posted:I think when a Justice recuses themselves and there's a tie it just goes back to the last appellate court's ruling, but it doesn't apply outside of that circuit. Yes. "Affirmed by an equally divided court." Not precedential at all, so only applies to the litigants. Happened a fair amount when Justice Powell was getting cancer treatment, apparently: http://www.scotusblog.com/2008/03/how-often-does-a-recusal-result-in-an-equally-divided-court/
|
|
#
¿
Apr 25, 2014 15:44
|
|
|
Discendo Vox posted:vvvvv Dude, I don't have Lexis or West in this location. I had to go dig up my con law textbook. That said, if you wanted to pull a surveillance argument out of the penumbra, the 3rd still feels like a stretch. Google Scholar is pretty good.
|
|
#
¿
May 10, 2014 05:06
|
|
|
Discendo Vox posted:To clarify, I'm not disagreeing with the outcome or rationale of the decision, it's the use of loaded, deontological and political language in stating the decision that I object to. What could possibly be wrong with the use of deontological language to describe an outcome compelled by previous cases?
|
|
#
¿
May 21, 2014 04:32
|
|
|
Discendo Vox posted:Well, to give the immediate example, the opening line of the opinion is "Today, certain citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are not guaranteed the right to marry the person they love." What does "deontological" mean to you, as compared to "loaded" and "political?"
|
|
#
¿
May 21, 2014 13:10
|
|
|
NJ Deac posted:Come on, it clarifies it at least slightly. Now we know definitively that the standard is not "insoluably ambiguous". Therefore, the universe of possible indefiniteness standards has been reduced by at least one. It will be interesting to see what comes out of Biosig in the lower courts. Potentially any patent defendant can now hang a plaintiff in claim construction with "in the alternative, since we have an expert saying [disputed term] means X and plaintiff has an expert saying [disputed term] means Y, the claim must be invalid as not 'reasonably certain'!"
|
|
#
¿
Jun 2, 2014 22:10
|
|
|
Kalman posted:At which point the Federal Circuit will apply the exact same inquiry they've been applying, call it "reasonable certainty," and uphold the patent as definite. Judging by KSR, there will be at least a few opinions that give a nod to Bilsog before the Federal Circuit goes back to what it was doing before.
|
|
#
¿
Jun 2, 2014 23:55
|
|
|
Commentary from Robert Merges, who wrote a lot of the IP casebooks:quote:Those of us who sweat in the clammy gymnasia of patent law have been waiting – with a mix of excitement, dread, and cynical disregard – for the Alice v. CLS Bank decision. The idea was, when the Court took the case, that we would finally have an answer to the question whether software can be patented under U.S. law. To say we did not get an answer is to miss the depth of the non-answer we did get.
|
|
#
¿
Jun 20, 2014 18:14
|
|
|
Discendo Vox posted:I'm serious. This seems to be the nominal basis for the rationale for the restriction, so knowing what procedures are conducted there would help determine the validity of the law, independent of trading political talking points about the bad faith of the parties to the dispute (or this dispute you're having in the thread right now, for that matter). This information isn't hidden. At least some of these clinics only provide drugs. quote:The ambulatory-surgical-center requirement imposes extensive new standards on abortion facilities by requiring them to meet enhanced standards for new construction. See 25 Tex. Admin. Code § 139.40. [b]The requirement applies equally to abortion clinics that only provide medication abortion, even though no surgery or physical intrusion into a woman's body occurs during this procedure. http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/WWH%20v%20Lakey_Memorandum%20Opinion.pdf
|
|
#
¿
Oct 15, 2014 23:54
|
|
|
fosborb posted:If the legal context/framework they have been posting within wasn't obvious to you Let's see: ActusRhesus posted:This is great news. Requiring facilities that conduct invasive medical procedures to adhere to set medical standards would be detrimental to women's health. Yeah, obvious legal context/framework and not sarcasm for effect.
|
|
#
¿
Oct 16, 2014 19:28
|
|
|
ActusRhesus posted:Reading the coverage on it, I wonder if the analysis would be different if, for example, rather than ZOMG ISRAEL!!!! the issue in question was a family from "Taiwan" not wanting to be documented as coming from "Chinese Taipei," and whether we would care as much about pissing off the Chinese as the Palestinians, or if that example was used in argument. (Too lazy to listen to full argument)
|
|
#
¿
Nov 4, 2014 19:04
|
|
|
Kalman posted:Well, given that there's a specific rule that Taiwan will be written on request (instead of China, which is what would be written if no request is made)... Which is the reverse of putting a disputed larger area on the passport. quote:JUSTICE GINSBURG: I want and I must
|
|
#
¿
Nov 4, 2014 19:50
|
|
|
hobbesmaster" pos t="440185793 posted:"Held: A borrower exercising his right to rescind under the Act need only provide written notice to his lender within the 3-year period, not file suit within that period. Section 1635(a)’s unequivocal terms—a bor- rower “shall have the right to rescind . . . by notifying the creditor . . . of his intention to do so” (emphasis added)—leave no doubt that re- scission is effected when the borrower notifies the creditor of his in- tention to rescind." In this case, the 8th circuit was following their prior panel decision, which agreed with the 10th and the 9th circuits and split with the 4th. To really shortcut it, the idea was that 1) The statute requires rescission to be accomplished in 3 years; 2) Rescission usually requires judicial action; therefore 3) The obligor has to file suit. quote:The regulation requires notice to the lender of an intent to rescind, and the statute requires that rescission be accomplished within three years or the right expires. Extrapolating from Beach, we hold that to accomplish rescission within the meaning of § 1635(f), the obligor must file a rescission action in court.4
|
|
#
¿
Jan 13, 2015 21:14
|
|
|
Mr. Nice! posted:Basically. It's not crazy that this was upheld at all. It's almost exactly what the ABA's model rules recommend. Although those have been tossed out before, it would have been silly to do so here for that reason. That set of opinions is pretty hilarious. 5 opinions, with Part II (the actual test, strict scrutiny) of the opinion of th court only joined by 4 of the judges in the majority, but then joined by the 3 dissenting judges...
|
|
#
¿
Apr 29, 2015 19:04
|
|
|
WhiskeyJuvenile posted:None of those examples are patentable (insignificant post-solution activity per Alice) Is a solution requiring a "client" and a "server" still tied to a particular machine, or did you figure that one out?
|
|
#
¿
May 31, 2015 16:51
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:I think Alice basically stands for (among other things) you cannot take something unpatentable, add "via a computer" and make it patentable. I assume "via two computers" would also be covered. Client/server was a particular machine after Bilski, and I don't read anything in Alice that repudiates that.
|
|
#
¿
May 31, 2015 16:59
|
|
|
Arsenic Lupin posted:Apart from the fact that he votes against everything I care about, what's Alito's jurisprudence like? Scalia without the occasional sympathy for a criminal defendant. ...as far as reasoning, by the time a case hits the Supreme Court, there's at least 1 brief (usually 4 or 5 plus 1 lower court opinion), that have the best reasoning possible for a particular conclusion, so when combined with clerks it isn't too hard to have at least a competently reasoned opinion for either side. ulmont fucked around with this message at 21:47 on Mar 6, 2016 |
|
#
¿
Mar 6, 2016 21:43
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:Circuits have split before so they'd just follow that model quote:In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
|
|
#
¿
Mar 30, 2016 19:21
|
|
|
EwokEntourage posted:Do you actually have to have 5 justices to call it a majority? I get that it's a 4 justice opinion and thus less precedence value You have to have 5 justices to call it a majority if there are 8 or 9 justices participating in the case, yes. If there are only 7 justices participating, 4 would be enough for a majority opinion. I think there's at least one case like that right now?
|
|
#
¿
Mar 30, 2016 19:47
|
|
|
Platystemon posted:Fisher v. University of Texas Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust was the one I was thinking of (Alito recused), but yes, Fisher too.
|
|
#
¿
Mar 30, 2016 20:32
|
|
|
Trin Tragula posted:If you're interested in this, you may also be interested in the fact that most spots in football aren't given with an attempt at 100% accuracy and some are even deliberately moved to make life easier for everyone... Hah.... I read WhiskeyJuvenile's post and was commenting about it to my wife, specifically referencing my faded memory of your spotting post (together with my memory of Forever_Peace saying how this works out in run statistics).
|
|
#
¿
Apr 8, 2016 02:32
|
|
|
Kazak_Hstan posted:I think they could certainly be more flexible and allocate more time for a momentous constitutional question than, say, a really niche question of statutory interpretation, or on the basis of how familiar the justices collectively are with the area of law or w/e (didn't they have longer than usual oral arguments for the ACA cases in 2012?). Also more time for US v Texas, but it's based more on importance than how familiar justices are (or every IP / tax / bankruptcy case would get four hours).
|
|
#
¿
Apr 25, 2016 00:22
|
|
|
OddObserver posted:Hold on, am I reading this right... are you really saying that nothing has ever failed to pass "rational basis review"? What's the point of that standard then? Almost nothing. The three standards are: 1) Strict scrutiny, more commonly known as "the government loses." Almost nothing survives this level of review. 2) Intermediate scrutiny, aka "this maybe isn't so bad as to require strict scrutiny, but there's still something going on. Most commonly used for sex-based classifications, because obviously women don't deserve the same level of protection as black men; also used for bastardy / illegitimacy. Also used for gun restrictions these days. 3) Rational Basis review, aka "the government wins." The real work goes into defining the standard of review, aka how important the relevant interests are. e;f,bx2.
|
|
#
¿
Apr 25, 2016 18:07
|
|
|
evilweasel posted:But then there's things like "well, is it really fair that the state required 100 hours of training to become a hairdresser, when I think that 50 hours would be just as good" - that's just not the sort of thing that courts need to decide because those sort of judgment calls are what legislatures are for. And then you get cases where requiring coffins to be sold by funeral directors only is declared irrational as pure protectionism: http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/11/11-30756-CV1.wpd.pd http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-6th-circuit/1262873.htm
|
|
#
¿
Apr 25, 2016 18:26
|
|
|
Green Crayons posted:"arguendo" and other similar latin words should be banned from all legal writing, especially judicial opinions, and definitely from an internet message board Nihil nequius est te. Supprime tuum stultiloquium. Et...Mater tua tam obesa est ut cum Romae est urbs habet octo colles.
|
|
#
¿
Apr 30, 2016 16:18
|
|
|
Dead Reckoning posted:You can't say, "Well, we can just make it illegal in this narrow instance, precedent and consistency don't matter. I'm sure the courts and congress can sort out the grey area between good free speech and mean free speech," If only there were a test for how the government can restrict speech in the interest of compelling (or possibly legitimate) government interest. ...or, for that matter, a history of making blackmail or extortion illegal that could be analogized to. Dead Reckoning posted:So you're perfectly fine with infringing on other citizens' rights as long as it maybe saves just one life? Should every car come equipped with an ignition interlock as a requirement? That's a hell of a jump from an assertion that certain actions are, in fact, not citizens' rights.
|
|
#
¿
May 5, 2016 17:58
|
|
|
EwokEntourage posted:Comparing campaign financing or political speech to extortion or blackmail is dumb tho. They're not even close, let some analogous. Blackmail and extortion are examples of areas where certain truthful speech - or restraint from making certain truthful speech - is made criminal by the government. These laws pose similar theoretical concerns to campaign finance (trust me, much ink has been spilled over the constitutionality of blackmail statutes), and yet the republic has not collapsed for their existence.
|
|
#
¿
May 5, 2016 20:22
|
|
|
Dead Reckoning posted:Those aren't even remotely comparable. The point is that the First Amendment is messy all over the place, and that, while there are difficult lines to draw on occasion, the republic has nonetheless been able to function even with restrictions placed on truthful speech based on its content.
|
|
#
¿
May 6, 2016 03:19
|
|
|
|
| # ¿ May 5, 2024 09:44 |
|
|
Dead Reckoning posted:Again, you can't really compare commercial speech to political speech. Dead Reckoning posted:Arguing that some restrictions on speech exist and therefore your pet restriction should be constitutionally permissible is like arguing that, since the exigent circumstances exception exists, a proposal that the police not need a warrant to search an Asian person's house is probably permissible under the Fourth Amendment, because clearly the 4th is not absolute. Dead Reckoning posted:Deciding whether to apply rules on a case-by-case basis rather than applying pre-agreed, universally applicable rules is basically decision making by emotional sentiment and no better than mob rule.
|
|
#
¿
May 6, 2016 14:03
|
|