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Green Crayons posted:That certainly is a wrong line graph and is terrible shorthand when we have actual voting records to compare rather than "who nominated the guy." Eliminating Chevron deference during a republican administration?
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Feb 2, 2017 18:31
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Gorsuch would be more likely to eliminate deference, which is the more conservative legal position (even if it does lead to liberal results in the short term) From what I've read, Alito was very pro deference during the Bush administration.
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Feb 2, 2017 19:28
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To strike down the executive order you'd pretty much have to overturn Korematsu. I didn't think there'd ever be an opportunity to do that but here we are. They could affirm the EO though without reaffirming Korematsu - Korematsu said racial discrimination for national security purposes passes strict scrutiny.
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Feb 6, 2017 18:47
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Mr. Nice! posted:None of them are ever going to actually give a free ID because the whole point is to keep poor and black people from voting. Giving out free identification in an accessible fashion would be an awesome thing. Wisconsin has a voter ID requirement and offers a free ID for voting purposes. It doesn't seem like an especially onerous process. http://wisconsindot.gov/Pages/dmv/license-drvs/how-to-apply/petition-process.aspx
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May 15, 2017 21:22
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Mr. Nice! posted:This is why it doesn't pass constitutional muster. The appeals court okay'd it, and SCOTUS declined to review. Frank v Walker. There was another appeals decision on it last year but I don't know much. Timby posted:The issue with Wisconsin is that essentially a day after the Voter ID bill was originally passed, the DOT began limiting hours at DMVs and closing DMV locations statewide. There are something like a dozen counties, at least, with DMVs that are open for like a day or two per month. That strikes me as onerous. Yeah that sounds bad, did not know that.
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May 15, 2017 22:00
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Jealous Cow posted:^^^^^ ahh thanks. While no tears shed for this girl, I'd be a little worried about the potential criminalization of speech discussing or encouraging euthanasia
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Jun 16, 2017 17:08
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So does this start the 90 day clock ticking before the ban ends?
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Jun 26, 2017 17:03
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hobbesmaster posted:But haven't churches been getting public funds for general purposes forever? Taken literally she's saying that the federal government should deny for example disaster relief money to churches because they're churches? She was saying the state may deny benefits without violating the free exercise clause. That doesn't mean that they must deny benefits, it only means that the state can discriminate between churches and nonchurches without violating the free exercise clause. There's space between the establishment clause and the free exercise clause, where the state can choose to either discriminate or not to discriminate. Though she does think this particular one violated the establishment clause esquilax fucked around with this message at 21:12 on Jun 26, 2017 |
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Jun 26, 2017 21:06
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I've seen some in good neighborhoods in Chicago fenced in with a gate. They are open to the general public, but locked up at night so that bums can't sleep there without getting arrested
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Jun 27, 2017 23:58
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Do the bakers actually have any chance under the free exercise clause? The RFRA doesn't apply and I don't think the conservatives want to overturn Smith.
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Jun 28, 2017 01:35
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ulmont posted:I'm confused, do you want a list of ways the US Congress can stop the Supreme Court from striking down part of a bill as unconstitutional? They knew the preclearance formula was in danger after Northwest Austin Municipal v Holder and could have passed a better preclearance formula that wasn't out of date and (e.g.) covered Wisconsin and other states that were excluded
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Sep 1, 2017 22:02
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Subjunctive posted:How much does this model bake in the assumption of only two parties? In Canada it's pretty common to form a majority government with 40% of the popular vote. The efficiency gap metric is based on the assumption of two parties. It is likely possible to use the baseline "wasted votes" metric to develop a single efficiency gap number that takes into account multiple parties, but I don't think anyone has attempted to do that yet.
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Sep 6, 2017 20:56
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joepinetree posted:Again, there's nothing in the metric itself that requires only two parties. Wasted votes is tracked for individual parties and can track any number of them. To generate an efficiency gap to determine if things are biased, you need to compare exactly two numbers. If you set an efficiency gap threshold of 10% based on typical results of two parties, it is not smart to take every pairwise comparison and check it against your two-party threshold.
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Sep 6, 2017 21:17
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joepinetree posted:The formula is simply the difference between votes wasted by the winning party and votes wasted by the losing parties divided by total votes. Nowhere in the formula does it require that votes wasted by the losing party all come from one party. Since we can clearly calculate votes wasted by the winning party and votes wasted by multiple losing parties (as the wikipedia example clearly demonstrates), there is absolutely nothing, from a mathematical point of view, that requires bipartisanship. We're talking past each other a bit. I'm talking about the specific implementation of the efficiency gap analysis as developed, and not how it can be modified to accommodate N-party systems. The intent is obviously to apply it in the US (which does technically have N-parties), but the simplifying assumption of two parties makes it difficult to apply it to systems where there are substantial votes for third parties without major modifications. The actual paper describing efficiency gap analysis assumes two parties, and the math does not work for a three-dominant-party system for a few reasons: 1. The calculation of wasted votes in the wikipedia article is not consistent with how wasted votes are calculated in the Stephanopoulos-McGhee efficiency gap paper. In the wiki wasted votes example, vote surplus is calculated using the smallest plurality number. In the efficiency gap example from the wiki (which is consistent with the paper), it is based off of a 50% of the vote instead of a plurality. These two methodologies produce different numbers for wasted surplus votes. In a 55-45 two party race, the paper methodology would say 5 votes are wasted surplus, another would say 10. Results would be similar in a three-party 55-45-0 race. In a 45-35-10 race, if you naively applied the paper methodology, it says (-5) votes are wasted surplus, and the other says 10. 2. Efficiency gap is directional - a 5% efficiency gap for R's is different than a 5% efficiency gap for D's. Your 9.2% +A in that calculation isn't directional in a way that can be added across multiple districts, where other districts might have +B or +C bias. Simply adding the wasted votes together and comparing at the end would have the problem of a huge correlation between the number of wasted votes and the total number of votes. 3. The efficiency gap is agnostic over who actually wins any individual seat, which is a really big strength. Introducing "winner and loser(s)" into the calculation reduces it's value, and has the major risk of significantly understating bias against the winning party when there is a substantial third party vote. 4. On a practical level, developing norms around acceptable efficiency gaps is far easier in a two-party system than it is in a three-party system. A district that packs the Liberals with the New Dems and no Conservatives is significantly different than one that packs the Liberals with a mix of New Dems and Conservatives, but we haven't developed the tools to differentiate the two. Again, I don't have doubts that you could develop a methodology to determine a general efficiency-gap-like metric for N-party systems. However, without significant changes, the best and most obvious way to apply the Stephanopoulos-McGhee efficiency gap it in the real world is to completely ignore third parties, which is perfectly feasible in the US but not really feasible in Canada. Is there a paper I'm unaware of that has attempted to include third parties at all?
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Sep 7, 2017 01:37
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joepinetree posted:No, the paper where the formula actually comes from is: The 12 seat example in the wiki is based on a form of proportional representation, which is not at all helpful if you are looking at FPTP. If you're not talking about FPTP then I concede that it can be a useful measure. The McGhee paper is also based on the assumption of a two party system, and does not attempt to apply the efficiency formula in an N-party system. This isn't a fault of the author, it's very reasonable to make that assumption since it's focused on American elections. Using 50% as the wasted surplus reference point (as both papers do) versus plurality as a reference point (as the wasteful vote calc in the wiki does) is a fundamental difference. A 30%/70% split is considered biased pro-winner using one reference point and biased pro-loser in another. You can't just make that change and call it "mathematically obvious" without actually doing the math. All of the math was based on two-party systems, and all of the testing they've done to actually verify that it's legit has been done on two-party systems. If anyone has attempted to apply the reasoning to multiparty systems I'd like to see it. As I've been saying, it might be relevant for places like Canada, but all of the work is being done on a two-party system basis and they need to actually go through the motions to find out.
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Sep 7, 2017 03:52
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joepinetree posted:Ok, you either fail to grasp basic math, didn't read the paper, or both. Your 30-70 example is a scenario that is contemplated in the paper itself. As the paper itself mentions, there is this intercept around 75% in a bipartisan system. In a 70-30 split where the governing party wins all the seats, the efficiency gap formula will get you an EG showing a gap against the smaller party. At 75%-25% (using the paper's assumption of 50% to win to avoid having to use decimal points), the EG will show a gap of 0. And at 76-24 it will show a gap in favor of the opposing party. So your example is simply the result of the fact that in a system with three parties the intercept will be lower than 75%. Around a 60-20-20 split that leads to the majority party holding all seats would lead to an EG of 0, with the same issues of being an intercept point as the ~75% mark for bipartisan systems. In fact, here: The fact that a 70R-30D election is treated as 10% +R in the paper methodology and 70R-30D-0G is treated as 10% +D in your methodology should tell you that changing how wasted votes are calculated is a fundamental difference. Both papers consistently use a definition of wasted votes that is different from the one that you are using, neither paper attempts to discuss yours. As I said earlier, using the "government minus opposition" metric as efficiency gap has the serious risk of understating bias against the winning party. The use of your formula in a three-relevant party system means that there is a big "dead zone" where a very small change (i.e. which party is "in government") has a huge effect on the calculated bias. Similarly, it also has the serious risk of finding bias where there is none. If used in 2015 Canada, there is a major danger of your formula falsely identifying bias in favor of the Liberal party due to combining Conservatives and NDP - even if the underlying districting is still biased in reality in favor of Conservatives after years of rule. It is a sensitive model when comparing multiparty systems, whereas when applied to two parties the paper methodology is a robust model - small changes in # of seats lead to small changes in the calculated efficiency gap. Efficiency gaps near 0% are possible and likely in hypothetical unbiased two party systems, but may not be likely under hypothetical unbiased three party systems . I don't think it's likely that an analysis of Canada or an unbiased Canada-like system using your methodology will result in a chart looking like page Figure 4 of Stephanopolous-McGhee, and might not even be centered at 0%. Which leads to significant problems in application when trying to identify where districting is biased. So in short, just because you can modify the formula to take into account multiple parties doesn't mean that it is useful to apply it in the real world. The two papers developed and tested the formula on American elections and a two-party system. Taking a methodology that has been developed under one set of assumptions and tested under conditions that match those assumptions, and then naively applying it to conditions that break those assumptions, is not wise. It's possible that they can go through the work to determine how your methodology actually looks when applied to Canada, but it has not been tested under those conditions and has the potential for the major problems that I described. Those problems being the inability to identify bias where it does exist, and finding bias in cases where it doesn't exist. I'll give you the final post on the topic so please play nice
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Sep 7, 2017 14:32
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qkkl posted:Freedom of speech is in the constitution, the right to massive security schemes isn't. The university can only refuse to offer the extra security needed. It would then be up to the speaker to go or not depending on how much they value their speech vs. personal safety. They additionally cannot charge a higher fee to make up for the cost of added security. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement posted:The costs to which petitioner refers are those associated with the public’s reaction to the speech. Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation. See id., at 321 (opinion of O’Connor, J.); id., at 334 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 55-56 (1988); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 116 (1943); cf. Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 162 (1939) (fact that city is financially burdened when listeners throw leaflets on the street does not justify restriction on distribution of leaflets). Speech cannot be financially *135 burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.[12] See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949).
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Oct 19, 2017 16:51
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Ron Jeremy posted:Options and stock can be taxed at the capital gains rate instead of the income tax rate which makes them attractive to the bigwigs. When they actually get granted the option or stock though isn't that imputed income at the normal income rate? As if they were paid cash, got taxed on it, and then immediately purchased the option or stock. The gains from that grant would be capital gains though I think.
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Jun 21, 2018 19:12
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